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HISTORY
OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
AND OF THE
NINETEENTH
TILL THE OVERTHROW OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE,
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
MENTAL CULTIVATION AND PROGRESS.

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TO THE READER.

THE greater part of the critical investigations on which the text in this volume is founded, the author had previously published fourteen years ago in the "Archiv für Geschichte und Literatur," under the title "UEBER NAPOLEON UND DESSEN NEUESTE LOBREDNER UND TADLER." On that occasion he earnestly solicited corrections, if any were to be made, because these investigations were to serve the purpose to which they are here applied. The three essays were afterwards published in three small volumes, and, as the author knows, have been extensively circulated and read. He has, therefore, nothing here to say, except that he rejoices to see before him the termination of a work, whose views and modes of thought must necessarily be oftener misunderstood than rightly conceived in the movement and party-spirit of our times. The author regards this as so natural, that neither blame nor misunderstanding—even if he were younger, and more mixed up in the life and bustle of the world than he is—would either offend or surprise him.

F. C. SCHLOSSER.

Heidelberg, June, 1846.

and did not receive his own reward. He was
therefore sent to hell to be tormented for
ever. But the Devil, who is always seeking
to inflict pain upon men, did not let him go
untouched. He made the man's body swell
so that he could not move his limbs. He
then caused the Devil to send him to another
place where he was to be tormented. This
place was a dark and gloomy prison, where
he was to remain for ever. The Devil had
also caused the man to be born into a family
of sinners, so that he would always be
tormented by his own sins. The man
was very sad and miserable, but he
never gave up hope of being saved.
He continued to pray to God for help,
and eventually God heard his prayer and
sent an angel to him. The angel told
him that he had been saved and that
he would be rewarded for his good
deeds. The man was overjoyed at this
news and thanked God for his mercy.

THE END

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FIRST DIVISION.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH DIRECTORY TILL
THE CONSULATE OF BONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF THE PERIOD FROM THE TRUCE OF LEOBEN TILL
THE SECOND WAR OF THE COALITION.

§ I.

BONAPARTE IN ITALY IN 1797.

A.—TILL THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AGAINST VENICE.

THE treatment of the history of Italy has necessarily been reserved for this volume, not merely because there was only room in the preceding one for an outline of Bonaparte's military undertakings, but because the changes which this general effected are intimately connected with the history of the Directory in Paris.

Carnot, Barras, and Reubel were the leaders among the French Directors in the year 1796; for Latourneur and La Revellière Lepeaux, notwithstanding their position, never gained any considerable influence, because they had not, like their colleagues, previously played a conspicuous part; they had been active only in the performance of particular duties and within their houses, but not mixed in the actual tumult of the Revolution. We refer those who have any liking for general descriptions of character, for an account of these five individuals, to Thiers, or rather to Thibaudeau, because the former is a mere rhetorician. And it will immediately be seen how little reliance there is to be placed on such sketches of character, when we perceive that the two writers above-mentioned take a totally

different view of the leading feature in Reubel's character, which was the determining quality of the history of the years 1797-1799—his connexion with usurers and speculators. Thiers, indeed, admits* that Reubel acted very much as he did himself when he was a minister. Reubel, who employed Rassiat and other creatures and relations to plunder and practise usury, was the most active, and in civil matters the ablest, of the Pentarchs; and Barras was ostentatious and licentious according to ancient custom, whilst Carnot was the only really estimable and worthy man among them. They very seldom held any joint consultations, but each performed the duties of his own department in his own way and for his own purposes. Barras, who had even then entered into a secret compact with the Bourbons, would not give up the regulation of the appointments in the army. Carnot undertook the war department, and Reubel that of foreign affairs.

The whole Directory was extremely dissatisfied with the manner in which Bonaparte, at the head of the army in 1796, acted as an unlimited dictator; all the other generals, however, had suffered defeats, whilst he never lost a battle, and not only provided for the wants and comforts of his own army, but sent large sums to Paris and to Moreau. For political reasons, also, the Directory were obliged to keep such ambitious generals as Hoche and Bonaparte in good humour, because they had still to sustain a dreadful struggle with their old opponents. The election of the first third, which was to be chosen freely, had brought not only Royalists but openly declared Bourbonists into the legislature, and it was not difficult to foresee that the next election would give them a majority. In the Council of Five Hundred, there were, for example, Le Jourdan, Noailles, André, Mersan, Delarue, Couchery, Dymé, Pastoret, Gilbert, and Desmolières; in the Council of Ancients, Dupont de Nemours, Barbé, Marbois, Lebrun, Matthieu, Dumas, and Portalis. The Jacobins of the Directory and the Royalists, who longed for a Restoration, observed Bonaparte's proceedings in Italy with equal jealousy; he was, however, altogether indispensable, because he knew how to turn to account, in the most masterly manner, every error which the Austrians committed in the field, and every mistake made by the incapable and caballing ministers of the foreign powers, from an extreme and over-stretched cunning. This will be best seen from the following short review of his political and military proceedings.

In the very commencement, the Austrians were ill-advised in

* Thiers, insolently pronouncing judgment after his fashion, says: “Malgré les calomnies des contre-revolutionnaires et des fripons, il était d'une sevère probité.” Still he had a little avarice—“Il aimait à employer sa fortune personnelle d'une manière avantageuse.” Thibaudeau, who was Reubel's colleague in the Convention, in his “Mémoires,” vol. ii., p. 7, gives a very different account: “Il s'était élevé des nuages sur sa probité, dès le siège de Mayence, où il s'était trouvé comme représentant du peuple aux armées, et ces nuages ne s'étaient point tout à fait dissipé.”

selecting Beaulieu (a walloon), a general nearly eighty years of age, to oppose the young and vigorous leaders of the bold and courageous new-born French; and, according to the usual practice of Thugut and the chief council of war, they did not even fulfil the conditions under which the aged general had undertaken the command. He required Argenteau to be recalled from the army, which was not done; and Argenteau not only remained with the army, but held the command of a very considerable division on which Beaulieu was to rely. In addition to this, Beaulieu had under his command a Piedmontese army under Colli, who was as much dissatisfied with him as he was with Argenteau. Not merely the military views of the Piedmontese generals, but the political ones of the Sardinian court, were very different from those of the Austrians; and Bonaparte, after the advantages gained at Millesimo and Montenotto, founded the whole of his military and political operations on a knowledge of this fact.

Had the jealousy of the Sardinians, who, with good reason, uniformly distrusted the conduct of the Austrian cabinet, permitted Beaulieu to have garrisoned Tortona and Alessandria, Bonaparte would have hardly ventured to march as boldly upon Turin as he did, when Beaulieu had withdrawn his forces to a greater distance in order to keep up safe communications with Mantua, which lay at a considerable distance. After Colli's defeat at Mondovi, Bonaparte immediately turned to account the insignificant democratic movements in Piedmont, excited and led by the enthusiast Ranza, in order to strike terror into Victor Amadeus; and when this project was not immediately successful, he appeared himself in the neighbourhood of Turin, although he had no heavy artillery fitted to assault such a fortress. What, however, his artillery could not effect, he was skilful enough to find out the means of accomplishing through the instrumentality of Cardinal Costa, Archbishop of Turin, and Prina, secretary to the royal exchequer.

Colli was empowered to conclude a truce, which is an example of all those agreements for truces, by means of which Bonaparte, at a later period, always gained much more than by the splendid victories by which they were preceded.

This truce, concluded at Cherasco in April, 1796, was changed into a peace in May, in Paris, under still harder conditions. In fact, it gave the King of Sardinia, now completely isolated from his former allies, into the hands of his enemies, although in form and language it appeared as if designed to rescue him from their power. We shall not dwell upon the peace, because it was never fulfilled by the Jacobins, who at that time governed France, although observed by Bonaparte, who was by no means ill-disposed towards the King of Sardinia. We must, however, direct attention to the main conditions of the truce of Cherasco, in order to justify the judgment which we have passed respecting it.

Bonaparte had required the surrender of all the fortresses, Ales-

sandria included, with respect to which, it is true, he afterwards relaxed his demands. The Austrians, however, could not retain their position on the Po as soon as the Sardinians gave up Tortona. In addition to this, Cuneo and Cevi were put into the hands of the French; a free intercourse with Italy over Mount Cenis secured; and under the pretence of facilitating the journeys of his couriers to Paris, a position was taken in Turin, from whence a whole chain of small military posts was established over Mount Cenis into France. Botta, then in Gap, informs us, that not only he, but all the military men of Piedmont with whom he then conversed, were decidedly of opinion that the conditions of the truce certainly foreboded the fall of the Piedmontese monarchy. At that time the French ambassador was ruling more like a council or doge in Genoa (as was also afterwards the case in Hamburg) than as an envoy; still some confidence was placed there in an armed neutrality. This confidence wholly disappeared after the truce of Cherasco. In the cases of Parma and Modena, Bonaparte was much more guided by his own opinions than by the orders of the Directory, which never ceased urging him, with all possible speed, to press forward and plunder the Pope and the Grand-duke of Tuscany, who had been the first to conclude a peace with the republic.

Their bitter enmity towards the Pope arose from his having favoured the English, whilst, on the other hand, he had been unsparing in his denunciations against the French. The Pope's conduct had done them little injury, and Reubel and his colleagues were therefore far less stimulated by any desire of revenge, than prompted by the expectation of the immense riches which they hoped to find in Loretto. They were but little acquainted with the cunning of the priesthood, who had long before removed all that was so enticing to the Directory, and replaced, in a great measure, the diamonds and gold by tinsel and imitation stones, although there still, undoubtedly, remained a very considerable booty for the French. The English merchandise in Leghorn constituted the great object of attraction in the Grand Duchy. It is indeed clear, from Bonaparte's official correspondence, that, in spite of all his severity, in spite of his administration, which was conducted with a complete financial knowledge of the subject, he found it impossible to prevent the greatest portion of the plunder from falling into the hands of harpies, the spawn of the revolutionary mob, who had been sent forth from Paris in the character of commissioners and secretaries of legation, in order that the government might be relieved from their troublesome or dangerous presence.

Botta, in a few lines, gives such an excellent description of the whole condition of the Italian states at the time in which Bonaparte drove the Austrians out of Lombardy into the Tyrol, that, for the sake of brevity, we have only to give his account in a note.* Kel-

* “Venezia sperava nella neutralità *senz' armi*; Genova nella neutralità *con armi*; Toscana nella consanguinità coll' Austria e nell' amicizia colla Francia, Parma, e

Ierman did not plunder Loretto till a somewhat later period, and we shall subsequently have occasion to remark how Bonaparte himself remained on a visit in Florence whilst his lieutenant, Murat, was conducting himself like a public robber in Leghorn.

The weakness which eventually led to Bonaparte's destruction—the desire which he felt to see himself surrounded by the nobility and princes of the old *régime* as a court, clung to him from the very first; and Victor Amadeus availed himself of this weakness for his own advantage. The fawning nobility of Milan immediately crowded around the conqueror of emperors and kings; the King of Sardinia surrounded him with no inconsiderable number of high-born Piedmontese courtiers, thorough masters of the art of flattery, overwhelmed him with attentions of every description, and caused most eulogistic letters to be addressed to him by his second son. Botta alleges that these attentions and flatteries were received by Bonaparte with no ordinary pleasure.* The king did not confine his favours to mere acts of politeness, but actually assisted them in the pursuit of his own friends and allies, the Austrians. He furnished the French with horses and boats to expedite their passage over the Po, and went so far as to set at liberty Bonafous, a Jacobin prisoner, for whose release Bonaparte had not even asked.

Since the treaty concluded in Paris on the 15th of May, 1796, the situation of Sardinia had become serious, because, according to the terms of this treaty, Turin alone, of all the fortified cities in the country, remained in the hands of the king, and the article upon the transit of the French troops gave up the kingdom as a permanent spoil to foreign soldiers.† The counties of Savoy, Nice, Tenda, and Beuil were permanently ceded, and in addition to the fortresses of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona, already garrisoned by the French, Exilles, Assietto, Susa, La Brunette, Château Dauphin, and Alessandria, were put into their hands. No time was appointed at which these occupied fortresses and districts were again to be evacuated: contributions and requisitions were continued and enforced, and La Brunette and Susa were rased at the king's expense.‡ It was ap-

Modena, ne in pace, ne in guerra, dipendevano in tutto degli accidenti."—Botta, vol. i., p. 507.

* "Tanto poi fu dunque in Bonaparte la dolcezza di questi attaccamenti che non gli poté dimenticare e ferbo per la casa de Savoja tale tenerezza, che se nei tempi che succedettero ella non poté risorgere, fu più tosto colpo di lei, che di lei. In somma gli aveva bisogno di cavalli e se gli offerivano; bisogno di barche a passare il Po, se ne fornivano; Bonafous arrestato dai paësani fu rimesso in libertà."—vol. i., p. 334.

† The conditions of the truce and of the treaty of peace, signed by Delacroix on the part of France, and by Revela Tonso on that of Sardinia, will be found in Marten's "Recueil," vol. vi., pp. 608-620.

‡ In the 13th article of the treaty, it is said: "Les places et territoires ci-dessus désignés seront restitués au roi de Sardaigne aussitôt après la conclusion du traité de commerce entre la république et sa majesté, de la paix générale et de l'établissement de la ligne des frontières." Article 14 runs as follows: "Les pays occupés par les troupes de la république, et qui doivent être rendus en definitif, resteront sous le gouvernement civil de sa Majesté Sarde, mais resteront soumis à la levée des

parently the intention of both parties to submit the question to the mediation of the King of Spain, but this intention was rendered useless by the formal completion of the treaty concluded on the 15th of May, by the plenipotentiaries on both sides, as early as the 19th, under the pretence of haste (*parcequ'il y a urgence*).

Bonaparte having concluded his arrangements with Sardinia and Genoa, turned his steps towards Milan, into which he made a public entry, surrounded by all the pomp of royal splendour, and suffered himself to be pleased with the applause and adulation of high-born visionaries dreaming about a republic without possessing any republican qualities. The French general treated them with all possible civility and politeness, although an Italian assures us that he was well aware the whole was mere empty talk.* Immediately after came the turn of Parma, Modena, and Venice.

The Duke of Parma was nephew of Charles III. of Spain, who had died in 1788; and as the Directory was anxious to remain friends with Charles IV., Bonaparte was obliged to assume the appearance of treating Parma with greater mildness for the king's sake than would otherwise have been done. An attempt had been previously made, through the instrumentality of the Spanish ambassador in Turin, to prevail on the duke to withdraw from the Austrian alliance; and when Bonaparte granted him a truce on the 9th of May, 1796, he did not fail to announce it to Spain. The whole of the French writers can scarcely find words enough to eulogise his mildness, and yet the conditions of the truce were so framed, that both the country and city were completely and systematically plundered under the guise of forbearance.† As in the case of Sardinia, it was here

contributions militaires, prestations en vivres et fourages, qui ont été ou pourroient être exigées pour les besoins de l'armée Française.

* Botta's remarks are so striking, that we must here give them a place, although Germans and Italians will remain as they are, and in our own days would act precisely as they did then: “ Entrava in Milano il vincitor Bonaparte, non già con semplicità repubblicana, ma con fasto regale, come se re fosse, l'accolsero con grida smoderate et patrioti e parte del popolo solito a fare come gli altri fanno. Innumerevoli scritti si pubblicarono, in cui sempre più si lodava Bonaparte che la libertà: mostrossi, per dire il vero, in quello molto schifosa l'adulazione Italiana. Frà i patrioti chi il chiamava Scipione, chi Annibale; il repubblicano Ranza il chiamava Giove. I buoni utopisti, quando lo vedevano, piangevano di tenerezza. Questa dimostrazioni egli si godeva tanto in pubblico, quanto in privato; ma augurava male degl' Italiani, perchè essendo egli operatore grandissimo, credeva, e con ragione, che coi fatte, non con parole si compiscono le grandi mutazioni negli stati.”—Botta, vol. i., p. 377.

† “ Art. 2.—Le Duc de Parme payera une contribution militaire de deux millions de livres, soit en argenterie soit en monnoye. Il y aura 500 mille livres payées en cinq jours et le reste dans la decade suivante. Art 3.—Il sera remettre douze cents chevaux de trait, harnachés avec des colliers; quatre cents de dragons harnachés et cent de selle, pour les officiers supérieurs de l'armée. Art. 4.—Il remettra vingt tableaux, du choix de général-en-chef, parmi ceux existans aujourd'hui dans la Duché. Art. 5.—Il fera dans le délai de quinze jours verser dans les magazins de l'armée à Tortone dix mille quintaux de bled, cinq mille d'avoine, et il mettra dans le même délai deux mille bœufs à la disposition de l'ordonnateur en chef, pour le service de l'armée.”—Marten's “ Recueil,” vol. vi., p. 624. The text of the conditions of the truce with Modena will be found in the same volume, pp. 633-34.

reserved for the Pentarchy, intent merely on booty, to spoil the duke still more, in Paris, on the conclusion of the peace, which was to be there arranged. The peace was delayed by every possible means, and when at last it was concluded, by means of Spanish intervention, no other result was obtained than that Parma did not immediately fall under French administration. Before the peace was granted, a compulsory and burdensome commercial treaty was imposed upon the duchy; after it was concluded, forced contributions continued to be extorted, and the country was continually harassed by the passage of troops. The course pursued towards Modena was still worse than that which was adopted with Parma; the duke, who had collected great wealth by the oppression of his subjects, was defrauded both of his ill-gotten money, which was beyond the reach of the French, and of his country, which was in their power. The present duke was great grandson of Duke Hercules Rainald; the late duke, so notorious for his cruelty, and who, during his lifetime, was wholly under the dominion of the Jesuits, was son of the daughter and heiress of Duke Hercules, who had been married to an Austrian prince; the reigning duke was therefore the last branch of the house of Este, which had long become withered.* The avaricious duke contrived to remove the money-chests kept in the vaults of his palace in safety to Venice, whither he betook himself in person; but Bonaparte, notwithstanding, contrived to extract a pretty round sum. The Commander d'Este remained behind instead of his brother; Bonaparte contrived to deceive him by the agreement of the 12th of May, which he immediately afterwards regarded as not concluded. By virtue of this agreement the duke paid down seven millions in cash, a million and a half in corn, powder, and munitions; and the French artists, sent from Paris to commit worse than Vandal robberies, in the midst of ostentatious declamation about liberty, were to be allowed to select twenty pictures. Some idea may be formed of the manner in which Bonaparte converted into plunderers the artists and learned men of France, and of the opinions entertained by the Directory on the subject, by referring to Bonaparte's letter published in the *Moniteur* of that year (Anno V., No. 165). In this letter the general assures the Directory, that when those works of art were added, which he meant to extort from the Pope, he would have got together nearly every work of merit in Italy, with the exception of a few pieces in Turin and Naples. All the sacrifices made by the duke merely served to procure him a short respite; he was delayed by hopes in Paris, whither the negotiations for a peace were transferred till Bonaparte made use of the country as a part of his new republic. In October, recourse was had to a miserable pretext, the truce declared at an end, and Modena thrown into the disposable mass out of which a new state was to be formed.

* Maria Beatrice was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, son of the Emperor Francis the First. Her son, the gloomy and despotic Duke Francis Joseph First, assumed the government in 1814.

Milan was enchanted with the idea of becoming the centre of the republic of the Po, but was nothing the more exempted on that account from requisitions, extortions, and support of the French generals. In the very commencement twenty millions of francs were levied. The Venetian aristocracy, too, at length met with the fate which it had so long deserved, and even merited, by its meanness and cowardice, even at the very moment when the axe was laid to the root of the tree. On the advance of the French, it compelled the eldest brother and heir of the unfortunate Louis XVI. to depart from Verona. By scandalous faithlessness and murder the aristocrats of Venice had formerly extended their rule over the neighbouring territory, and they were now in turn deprived of their possessions on the mainland by cunning. People consoled themselves by the thought, that punishment at last certainly overtakes the sinner; true, indeed, but, like repentance, often follows at a very slow pace. At first it was falsely pretended that the Austrians had been received into Peschiera (which was not strictly true), in order to place garrisons in Crema and Brescia; but Napoleon no sooner proved victorious at Borghetto, and the Austrians again evacuated Peschiera, than recourse was had to very miserable means in order to be admitted into Verona. The most alarming fears were excited in the minds of the governor of the mainland. Foscarini, the governor, was present in Verona; Bonaparte was aware that he was a very timid man, and he therefore sent for him to Peschiera, when he treated him in such a manner, as to induce him to submit to anything from very apprehension and dread. On the 29th of May Bonaparte had issued a proclamation, in which there was not a word concerning Louis XVI., and no accusation whatever brought against Venice; but that of the 31st was in a very different tone. The Venetians, according to the latter, had dared to make Verona the residence of a pretender to the throne of France, which was the grossest insult to the French nation; and if, therefore, French troops were not immediately admitted into the city, he would proceed to take it by force. He neither could nor would have carried into execution these threats, couched in the most unmeasured language; they, however, produced such an effect on the cowardly mind of Foscarini, that to the bitter vexation of the brave garrison and the inhabitants of the town, the French were admitted into the forts.

From this moment all Paris streamed into Lombardy. Painters and sculptors, journalists, scholars and poets, were lavish in their praises of the man who sent monthly to Paris cases filled with pictures, books, and manuscripts, and enriched all by whom he was surrounded with plunder. Bonaparte was at that time as extravagantly eulogised by the Italian and French rhetoricians as the Roman heroes formerly were by the Greek rhetoricians of the Macedonian period; the Directors alone could not be satiated with booty. He had raised contributions from all the Italian states, pillaged them of their works of art, plundered their libraries, and

laid hands upon the savings' banks and moneys of the poor; but all was not enough for the Directory. The pillage proceeded too slowly, and Bonaparte was obliged to beg the ruling men in Paris to have a little patience, promising that when he had caused universal dissension between the governments and the people, he would cast down one state after another.* This favourite maxim of Bonaparte—one after another, and not too many at the same time—he also practised against Naples. He one while granted the most moderate conditions in order that the excellent Neapolitan cavalry might be withdrawn from the Austrians at the very moment at which Wurmser was advancing. The Directory afterwards delayed the peace! As early as the 5th of June, in Turin, by means of the Spanish ambassador, Bonaparte had concluded a truce with Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, who was the manager of all the intrigues of the Queen of Naples, and referred them to Paris for the settlement of a peace, when its conclusion was delayed till October.

Peace was agreed upon with the Pope in 1796, because it was supposed in Rome that they would escape from all consequences by the usual arts; the Pope, however, had to do on this occasion with a Corsican, who was much keener and more energetic than himself and his crafty cardinals. The predatory incursion into Tuscany brought Bonaparte himself to Bologna, whither the Duca de Gaudi, accompanied by Azara, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, in the character of a mediator, was sent to negotiate. On the 23rd of June, 1796, both signed a truce, whose conditions were very oppressive. The Pope, therefore, thought to profit by the opportunity of Wurmser's advance into Italy, and broke his engagement. The Romans, however, at that time were acquainted with the old times and old statesmen only, such as Thugut, Lehrbach, and the Emperor Francis, wherefore, in the beginning of the following year, the Pope was obliged to pay dear to the men of the revolution for the violation of his promise.

From Bologna, Bonaparte turned his steps towards Tuscany, although he stood in the most friendly relations with the grand-duke, and even paid him a visit of courtesy at his palace, whilst he suffered Murat to carry on the work of plunder among the grand-duke's subjects. This predatory incursion into Tuscany can only be excused, as far as Bonaparte is concerned, by the fact that the French Directory insisted upon it as often and as importunately as they did upon

* On the 7th of June, after an interview with two Venetian ambassadors, from whom he had made demands of all kinds in money and supplies, he writes as follows: "The Venetians yield to our demands with an excellent grace, and will furnish us with all the supplies necessary for our armies. If it be your plan to take away five or six millions from the Venetians, I have reserved a reason for such a demand expressly for the purpose. You have only to require compensation for the injuries sustained by the battle at Borghetto, where I was obliged to sacrifice so many men in order to take that strong place. Should you have any further views, then I must keep the breach open; you must inform me of your wishes and wait for the most favourable moment, in order that I may avail myself of circumstances. *One must not have everybody on one's hands at the same time.*"

the spoiling of Loretto. The grand-duke appealed to Bonaparte, and sent his minister to wait upon him; but the plunder of Leghorn could not be prevented. A promise was given that Florence should be spared, and Bonaparte went thither on a visit, whilst Murat led his soldiers by another road to Leghorn.* When we bear these circumstances in mind, it throws no very favourable light on the character of the Italian people, that the return of ancient freedom, announced in such sounding language, was greeted with such shouts of acclamation in Bologna; for Bonaparte at that time, in the midst of these crouching and fawning nobles who surrounded him, behaved both in Milan and Bologna as if he were already a king. He did not then precisely know what to do with the conquered provinces, and this first gave rise to the idea of forming a cispadane and transpadane republic; besides, the general and the Directory were continually quarrelling.

Austria having got new armies on foot in autumn, and the truce with Naples having been at length converted into a treaty (Oct. 10th, 1796), on the payment of 6,000,000 of francs, the ruling aristocracy in Genoa were made the subjects of extortion till they could be safely annihilated. For this purpose recourse was had to the pretext that the English had been suffered to carry off a French frigate, the *Modeste*, from under the very guns of Genoa; two millions were demanded as compensation for this loss, and an additional two millions were extorted from them under the appearance of a loan. In the same manner as advantage was taken of the old affair of the frigate to oppress Genoa, Bonaparte availed himself of a popular tumult in Reggio, without any further provocation, to issue a proclamation on the 8th of October, declaring the truce with the Duke of Modena at an end, and to take possession of Modena and Reggio as portions of the new republic about to be erected.†

Wurmser and Alvinzi having been defeated, next came the turn of the Pope. He had failed to furnish the promised supplies and payments, got on foot a new army in the rear of the French, as Bonaparte alleged and proved by intercepted despatches, entered into negotiations with the court of Vienna to make common cause against their common enemy, and had at least undoubtedly employed Austrian officers to organise his army commanded by priests. Bonaparte appealed to these things, when, on the 1st of Feb., 1797, he declared the truce of Bologna at an end, and appeared as if he was about immediately to march upon Rome, which would have been a highly imprudent step, as the Archduke Charles was advancing upon Italy. The Pope's mercenaries deserted to the French in

* “Mandava (the grand-duke) a Bologna il Marchese Manfredini ed il principe Tommaso Corsini perchè s’ingegnassero di dissuaderlo dell’ impresa od almeno da lui questo impetrassero, che piuttosto per la via di Pisa et di Pistoja, che per quella di Firenze si conducesse. Negava il generale republicano la prima richiesta consentiva alla seconda.”—Botta, vol. ii., p. 83.

† The text of the treaty with Genoa will be found in Marten’s “Recueil,” vol. vi., pp. 647-48. Its date is October 9th, 1796.

crowds, and the Pope himself became so seriously alarmed that he sent two ecclesiastics to Bonaparte with full powers to concede whatever he chose to demand. The representatives of the court of Rome met the French general at Tolentino, where he acted as if he was really determined to pursue his march, which was by no means his intention. He threatened, abused, and insulted, which was merely a feint, for he could not afterwards conceal his joy in having deceived the master of all deceit, which he described in his correspondence by saying that *he had overreached the old fox.*

He had at that time full powers to treat for a formal peace, and on that occasion there was, therefore, no preliminary suspension of arms. A regular treaty of peace was concluded on the 19th of February. By virtue of this treaty, the Pope was compelled to dismiss his newly recruited levies, to cede for ever Avignon, Venaissin, Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, and to receive a French garrison into Ancona; Faenza was restored. He was bound to furnish all the supplies, and to pay up the 16,000,000 of francs in arrear before the 3rd of May. In addition to the payment of these large arrears of the first contribution, he was called on, in the course of the months of March and April, to pay a further contribution of 300,000 to the relations of Basseville, the French *chargé d'affaires*, who had been murdered by the Roman populace during the reign of terror. And finally, the Pope was compelled to relinquish all claims to allodial rights in the ceded legations.

During the period of the negotiations at Udine, when a decision respecting Austria became urgent, the case of Venice came to be seriously considered. France had hitherto taken every opportunity of inducing Venice to enter into an alliance offensive and defensive against Austria. Proposals to this effect were made through the Grand Vizier, the miserable regent of Spain (the Prince of the Peace), and the ministers in Paris, Venice, and Constantinople. These offers were not listened to by the senate, although the French minister in Venice, in reply to the objections urged by the senate, that such an offensive and defensive alliance between a great and a small state was contrary to all historical precedent and the law of nations, drily said, "*The time for such absurdities is now altogether past.*"* From this moment the fate of Venice was determined; and when Bonaparte, on his return from his campaign against Alvinzi, was reproaching the people of Milan with their lukewarmness on the occasion, he said publicly, that they were very ungrateful, for that it had been his intention again to restore to them all those towns which had been separated from the Milanese by the

* The French minister in Venice said, in express terms, "Le gouvernement de Venise se fie aux anciennes maximes du droit public et ne craint pas des voisins envers lesquels il évite d'avoir des torts; mais dans quel moment se fait-il un appui d'un système tombé en désuétude depuis longtemp? Le droit public n'existe plus, et toute trace d'équilibre politique a disparu de l'Europe. Il ne reste plus de garantie aux états faibles, que celle qu'ils peuvent trouver dans la force fédérative."

Venetians in the fifteenth century.* All the means were now employed which French revolutionary politics and Italian treachery could suggest, in order afterwards to furnish a pretence and an occasion for the violent spoliation of the miserable aristocrats of Venice, who were sunk in weakness and corruption. The Milanese also, to whom a republic had been promised, adopted every possible means to excite disturbances in the Venetian territory, in order to have a pretence for interfering. We shall neither follow the crooked paths of the French policy, nor venture into the labyrinth of Italian treachery, but briefly give the result of their combined operations. By Bonaparte's command, the citadel of Bergamo was taken possession of by force, and the cities of Bergamo, Brescia, and Crema, were urged and stimulated of their own accord to separate from Venice and unite with Milan. Sandos Rollin, the Prussian minister in Paris, was not ashamed, on this occasion, to act as the tool of the French, in order to draw the Venetians into a snare, which, however, they fortunately avoided. As early as the end of January, 1797, Quirini, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, wrote to the senate at home that Venice was doomed to be offered to the Austrians as a compensation for their losses. The Venetians, therefore, were by no means to be blamed for endeavouring to excite the inhabitants of the mainland against the French, as the Venetian aristocracy was just as much beloved by the country people as was that of Berne. The rising in the rear of the French, when Bonaparte was in Carinthia, was excited by the numerous Italian Jacobins and emissaries of the French, who urged them to revolt from Venice, as well as by the Venetians, who embittered the minds of the people against the conquerors, by whom they were ill-treated. The insurrection of the vigorous inhabitants of the northern parts of the Venetian mainland might have been undoubtedly ruinous to Bonaparte, who had advanced too far, because at that very moment Laudon and Kerpen made their appearance on the frontiers of Italy. The insurrection commenced in Verona, and spread over the whole mountain district of Bergamo as far as Istria; many hundred French were slain by the brave country people, it is true, but there was no proof whatever that the Venetian government or its officers had taken any part in the tumults. On this occasion, too, the Venetian senate followed those rules of miserable prudence which were to be expected from the age and weakness of the doge and the cowardliness of the *nobili*, who were anxious about their luxuries and wealth. Instead of seeing that there was nothing to be hoped for except from the resolution and courage inspired by despair—instead of throwing

* “Si vous,” said he, to the people of Milan, “ne m'aviez laissé manquer d'argent, et que mes soldats ne se fussent trouvé sans souliers, j'aurais détruit l'armée Autrichienne près Mantoue, et fait quatorze mille prisonniers. C'est de la chute de cette place que dépend la possession de Vérone, de Brescia, de Bergamo, de Crème. Comme j'avais abattus les ailes de l'aigle, j'aurais fait perdre terre au lion.”

away the scabbard, when they had once drawn the sword, and countenancing and supporting the insurrection, they sent two senators to Bonaparte, on the 7th of April, to make the humblest submissions, even before it was known that a truce with Austria had been concluded. Whilst they were on their way the insurrection assumed a much more formidable aspect. Bonaparte received the senators precisely in the same fashion as an English governor-general in India would receive the ambassadors of some petitioning rajah! Even before the 9th of April, Bonaparte treated these humble deputies with threats, not so much because he was aware of any popular insurrection in his rear, as because, in the truce concluded on the 7th, he had been compelled to throw Venice into the mass of compensations to Austria. The news of the insurrection on the 9th arrived most seasonably for him. On the 9th a bloody struggle commenced in and around Verona, which afterwards continued from the 17th till the 25th. In this contest scarcely any Venetians took part: it was, however, chiefly carried on by Sclavonians in the Venetian service. The French, moreover, without any declaration of war, had proceeded to disarm the Venetian soldiers in the fortresses, and the governor sent for the Sclavonians in order to prevent the execution of this plan. A bloody contest, it is true, afterwards arose in the streets, during which many of the French were killed, and they in turn fired from the forts upon the city. The call, however, to a general massacre, which was circulated on the 20th of March, 1797, and signed with the name of Battaglia, the governor, was undoubtedly a scandalous invention and forgery of some Frenchman, or of one of their Italian partisans. As to the proclamation, which is like the fable of the wolf and the lamb, the governor, whose signature it bore, earnestly protested against its genuineness, and the Venetian senate did the same; and even Daru, who on all other occasions defends his countrymen with all the usual French sophistry, does not venture to maintain the genuineness of the document in question.*

A still deeper shade falls upon Bonaparte in connexion with this affair; for whilst Venice was annihilated on account of the proclamation, Battaglia remained on an excellent footing with the French, and was afterwards employed as a tool to have French troops treacherously conveyed over the lagunes to the islands. Before the occurrence of the bloody struggle which continued from the 17th till the 25th, Bonaparte had addressed a letter to the government of Venice, not only full of warm expressions, but written in an abso-

* "Je n'ai pu me dispenser de rapporter cette pièce, parcequ'elle devint un long sujet de discussion, et qu'elle fut désavouée par le gouvernement Venitien; mais," he adds, "seulement trois semaines après. Il seroit fort difficile d'avoir de preuves irrefragables de son authenticité."—Daru, "Histoire de Venise," livre xxxvii. Botta says: "Allontanava da se Battaglia l'infamia del manifesto con ismen tirlo; lo smentiva solennemente il senato. Ma nulla giovana, perchè i tempi eran pui forti delle protestatione."—Vol. iii., p. 6.

lutely rude and in every respect insolent style.* The letter was couched in the language of the rudest soldier or most violent *sans-culotte*, or as Daru, by a favourable turn of speech, expresses it, *in an unusual tone*. Junot, who was the bearer of the communication, added to the grievous and insulting nature of its contents by his offensive behaviour. He insisted upon an immediate assembly of the senate being called, and read the letter in their presence with an insolent tone and accent. Bonaparte obtained a new and wished-for pretence for inflicting additional injuries from the conduct pursued by the Venetians towards Captain Laugier, the commander of a French privateer. The captain, with brutal violence, had insulted the police of Venice, which was respected even by the English; whereupon the police avenged themselves by seizing upon and treating the privateer as a disturber of the public peace. On this occasion some lives were lost. The French regarded this as a violation of the treaty; it is, however, difficult to decide to which party the blame attaches; and although Daru, in order to throw off the blame from his own countrymen, appeals to the apparently impartial evidence of the “Annual Register,” we all know too well how much importance such a testimony deserves. The conduct pursued towards Venice was closely connected with the preliminary treaty agreed upon with Austria, which was itself the consequence of an underplot between the Queen of Naples and General Bonaparte.

* That our readers may judge for themselves, we give the whole of the document, which is as follows:—“Toute la terre ferme de la Sérenissime République de Venise est en armes. De tous les côtés le cri de ralliement des paysans que vous avez armés est, *Mort aux Français!* plusieurs centaines des soldats de l’armée de l’Italie en ont déjà été victimes. Vous désavouez vainement des rassemblements que vous avez organisés. Croiriez-vous que dans un moment où je suis au cœur de l’Allemagne je suis impuissant pour faire respecter *le premier peuple de l’univers?* Croyez-vous, que les légions d’Italie souffriront le massacre que vous excitez? Le sang de mes frères d’armes sera vengé, et il n’est aucun des bataillons Français, qui, chargé d’un si noble ministère, ne sente redoubler et tripler ses moyens. Le senat de Venise a répondu par la perfidie la plus noire aux procédés généreux que nous avons toujours eus avec lui. Je vous envoie mon premier aide-de-camp pour être porteur de cette lettre. La guerre ou la paix. Si vous ne prenez pas sur-le-champ les moyens de dissiper les rassemblements; si vous ne faites pas arrêter et livrer en mes mains les auteurs des assassinats qui viennent de se commettre, la guerre est déclarée. Le Turc n’est pas sur vos frontières, aucun ennemi ne vous menace; cependant de dessein prémedité vous avez fait naître des prétextes, pour former un attroupement dirigé contre l’armée; il sera dissipé en vingt-quatre heures. Nous ne sommes plus au temps de Charles VIII. Si, contre les intentions notoires du gouvernement Français vous me réduirez à faire la guerre, ne croyez pas que à l’exemple des assassins que vous avez armés, les soldats Français devastent les campagnes des innocens et malheureux peuple de la terre ferme. Je les protégerai et ils béniront un jour jusqu’aux crimes qui auront contraint l’armée Française à les soustraire au joug de leur tyrannique gouvernement.” We agree completely with Botta, who says: “Era villania di parlare con tali espressioni ad un principe in cui era raccolta tutta la nazione Venezienna. Le questa è grandezza, come alcuni stimano, io non so che cosa sia piccolezza.”

B.—PRELIMINARIES OF THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO.

When Bonaparte and the grand-duke agreed upon a suspension of arms for some days, on the 7th of April, 1797, no one suspected that a preliminary treaty of peace would be concluded in so short a time as eleven days afterwards; even the English were deceived on this occasion by the knavish Neapolitans, by Thugut, and the Lehrbachs. The Emperor Francis, whose goodness was uniformly celebrated, with and without reason, was after all an Italian of the school of the Duke of Modena. In 1790 he had been married to a daughter of the dreadful, but, after her fashion, clever Queen Caroline of Naples, and was at that time completely under the dominion of his wife. When, therefore, her mother became really alarmed, and at length earnestly desired a peace with France, the empress was to be employed to work upon the mind of her husband. Prince Belmonte Pignatelli gave Bonaparte a hint in the name of Queen Caroline, as to the manner in which Thugut was to be gained, who in his turn was able to manage the emperor and the English. The whole intrigue was to be under the conduct of the Marquis de Gallo, Neapolitan minister in Vienna, whose secretary proceeded to Naples to arrange all the particulars, and remained in Bonaparte's camp when the negotiations were opened. In order to prevent the Archduke Charles from presenting any hindrance to their plans, they contrived to win over Count Bellegarde, who always accompanied the archduke in his later campaigns, without, however, initiating him into the real and proper secret. The Marquis de Gallo instructed the empress what to do, and she then prevailed upon her husband to take the unexampled step of committing to a Neapolitan creature of Queen Caroline the whole conduct of a negotiation on which the fate of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, absolutely depended. Count Meerfeld, indeed, was present; but played a very secondary part, and was there merely for form's sake. The matter was so surprising, that even Bonaparte could not avoid expressing his astonishment that, on such an occasion, an Italian should be the representative of the *Emperor of Germany*. The Neapolitan and the Corsican, however, the former representing the Emperor of Germany, and the latter the French republic, very soon came to a good understanding.

A preliminary treaty of peace was signed as early as the 18th of April in the castle of Eckenwald, near Leoben, by Bonaparte, the Marquis de Gallo, and Count Meerfeld, the contents of which had neither been communicated to the emperor nor to the French Directory. It is obvious, from the very articles of the treaty, that it was one which neither could nor would be observed,* but was intended as a mere blind to conceal from the English that the fall of Venice had been previously and quietly determined on. The English govern-

* For the text, see Marten's "Recueil," vol. ii., Supplement, pp. 124 and 131.

ment had at that time sent one of their under secretaries of state to Vienna, but he found the treaty already concluded. This treaty was kept very secret, and has, properly speaking, never been made known, because it was a piece of wholesale fraud and deception. The principal points are:—

1. That Austria should relinquish all claims to Belgium.
2. That the integrity of the German empire should be guaranteed, and a congress held in Berne to settle the compensation for those princes who should be deprived of territory.
3. That Austria should relinquish her claim to all her possessions in Italy on the southern side of the Oglio. That the territory so relinquished should be compensated by that part of the Venetian territory which lies between the Oglio, the Po, and the Adriatic; and this further afterwards to be increased by the Venetian part of Istria and Dalmatia.
4. That *after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace*, the fortresses of Palma-Nova, Mantua, and Peschiera were to be restored to Austria.
5. That Venice, as compensation for its loss, should receive the Romagna, Bologna, and Ferrara.
6. That Austria should acknowledge as such the Cisalpine republic to be created by Bonaparte.

In this treaty, then, the integrity of the German empire is recognised and guaranteed, after the cession of the left bank of the Rhine had been already agreed upon with Prussia in Basle. A promise is made to restore Mantua to Austria, which never could be serious. Compensation is awarded to Venice, when Bonaparte immediately, in the first week after the conclusion of the treaty, officially announced the dissolution of the Venetian state. It would be obvious, from these circumstances alone, that the whole affair was a mere delusion, had we not (as is the case) positive information on the point. Not only England, but Prussia also, that is, the king's mistress, Haugwitz and Lucchesini, were made fools of, since the Countess Lichtenau at that time took a journey expressly for political information, and Lucchesini also suffered himself to be led astray. He suffered himself to be referred to Clarke, whom Bonaparte had sent to Turin expressly, in order that he might not be under the necessity of letting this minister of the Directory, who accompanied him, into his secret. The miserable clique which ruled the King of Prussia were afterwards very easily quieted by the Directory, which sent Chabannes to Berlin for the purpose. Not even the semblance of any preparation was made for holding the congress at Berne, and it was, finally, singular enough that the Queen of Naples, who managed the whole intrigue, in the very commencement of the following year was spoken of in the grossest terms in the *Moniteur*.*

* See the *Moniteur*, year VI.; among other places, col. 91, col. 1210, and as early as col. 75, she is called *fameuse Caroline*. What Montholon makes Bonaparte say of

About the time in which Bonaparte was negotiating the preliminaries, Generals Hoche and Moreau were pressing forward into the interior of Germany, the former having passed the Rhine on the 18th of April at the head of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and the latter at the head of that of the Moselle. The whole country, from Düsseldorf to the Breisgau, was occupied, which was not to be wondered at, as the French were first of all triple the Austrians in number, and then the army of the latter on the lower Rhine was under the command of the miserable Werneck. According to the Austrian custom, this general, in spite of his well known uselessness, was always again employed. He was entrusted with the chief command, whilst Generals Kray and Hotze had each merely single divisions under their orders. Werneck suffered himself to be surprised by Hoche, who crossed the Rhine at Neuwied on the 18th, and therefore the battle in which Kray afterwards tried the fortune of war was necessarily in vain. Hoche boasted that on this occasion he had made 7000 prisoners, taken seven stands of colours, and twenty-seven pieces of cannon. The Austrians already knew of the suspension of arms agreed to at Leoben on the 7th of April; but as Hoche had no official notification, he pushed forward for four days without stopping till he arrived before Frankfort, and it was merely an accident which prevented him from entering that city before the news reached his quarters. When he was informed of the truce, he went into Frankfort to Werneck on the 20th, and concluded a truce, by virtue of which the whole of the right bank of the Rhine northward from the Lahn was surrendered to the French and their extortions. Moreau had to contend with the army of General Latour, and on the 19th and 20th he sent Generals Regnier and Desaix over the Rhine and took Kehl. This fortress, which had cost the Archduke Charles so much time and such efforts, was as easily taken by the French generals as if it had been mere field works. The general himself afterwards crossed to the right bank, and had made arrangements for a general attack on the 20th, when the same courier which saved Frankfort, arrived in his quarters. The Archduke Charles had still at that time the chief command of the Austrian army of the Rhine, and he sent General Bellegarde to make arrangements with Moreau and Hoche respecting the extent of territory to be occupied by the two armies on the right bank of the river; he was obliged, however, to give up Germany to their tender mercies. Moreau's and Hoche's armies were afterwards, as well as before, provided for and enriched in Germany, and Hoche himself declared that such a course was both reasonable and right.*

her in Saint Helena is not amiss: "La cour de Naples était dirigée par la reine, femme d'un esprit remarquable, mais dont les idées étoient tout aussi desordonnées, que les passions qui agitoient son cœur."—"Mélanges," vol. iv. p. 148.

* In his answer to Bellegarde's proposals at Heidelberg on the 12th of May, 1797, Hoche says: "Il est très conforme aux principes militaires qu'une armée vive aux dépens du pays conquisé."—Martens, vol. vii. p. 182.

C.—BONAPARTE'S ORGANISATIONS IN ITALY.

The French Directory, it is true, was at that time very much dissatisfied with the dictatorship which Bonaparte exercised in Italy, but it could not do without his services, and he threatened on every occasion to send in his resignation. Events were therefore suffered to take that course which could not be altered, and especially peace was to be purchased by the sacrifice of Venice. The insurrection in the rear of the French army, the acts of violence committed by the country people, and the military measures of the Venetian harbour police, almost intentionally provoked by the conduct of Captain Laugier of the French privateer, furnished the pretence for first depriving the city of all means of protection, and then forcing upon its acceptance a French garrison. All this became possible, because the corrupt, benumbed, egotistical, and petty government, and the aristocracy out of which it was formed, there, as well as in Germany, Italy, and Prussia, were totally unfit to cope with the young and fresh strength of a new-born race of men.

The contemptible Venetian senate threw itself at Bonaparte's feet—was ready to give every kind of satisfaction, and to submit to every species of humiliation; Bonaparte, however, was not to be appeased, and announced his determination publicly in a manifesto, which he issued from Palma Nuova on the 2nd of May. In this manifesto he declares war formally against the Venetians, without waiting for those powers from the Directory which he did not receive till after this declaration: no one however of the fifteen reasons which he assigns would stand the test of examination, or admit of proof. At the same time, he caused all the Venetian *employés*, officers and soldiers, on the mainland to be dismissed, took possession of the whole country without further resistance, and sent a division of his army to the Lagunes to prevent all intercourse between the island city and the mainland. Two alone of all the senators of Venice—Pesaro and Guistianini—had courage enough to recommend a vigorous and desperate resistance, which, indeed, would not have saved the state, but have saved the honour of the senate. This body had, however, no sense of this noble feeling; or thought perhaps that it had lost long since every remnant of honour, and that nothing now remained worth the struggle. The senators, Battaglia and Donato, who were at the head of a French party, held complete rule over the Doge Manini—weak by nature, and now still more weakened by age. They were the threads pulled by Bonaparte, which moved the puppets of the Venetian senate hither and thither at his will. It was very surprising, that, notwithstanding the declaration of war, Villetard, the French secretary of legation, still remained in Venice, and even kept up the French arms over his door. He was the man who guided the movements of the French party, which was strong among certain classes of the people.

The first step of these cowardly men, anxious only for their own

private advantage, was to induce the doge to summon what was called a committee of forty-three, as early as the 30th of April, in order to consult with them upon the means of saving the state, and on the changes in the constitution demanded by the French party. In this committee, also, only two—Capello and Pesaro—voted for making a serious resistance, whilst all the rest recommended their brethren to put themselves at the mercy of Bonaparte. The French general had now advanced as far as Mestre, which, as is well known, is at the northern passage; there he was met by two senators sent with full powers, who found him in the midst of his troops, which he had posted at the Lagunes, but which he never could have led to the island unless aided by treachery. He did not condescend to give the deputies an audience, but only made them acquainted with his answer in writing through Berthier, when he reached Padua. The Venetian ambassadors were sent away altogether from Milan, and Bonaparte himself took his departure in order to vex them more thoroughly. The terrified Venetian senate now gave the ambassadors full powers to consent even to a change in the constitution, on which they at length obtained an audience before Bonaparte set out for Mantua. He received them in Marghera, an island in the Lagunes, on the 8th of May. Baraguay d'Hilliers, who had the command of the French army stationed at the Lagunes, would have had a very severe struggle, which could not possibly have ended to his advantage had there been any remnant of their ancient courage left among the Venetians. Their ships, large and small, and their batteries, were well mounted and armed; ten thousand Sclavonians, in no respect inferior to the French in courage, were collected on the island, and there were English frigates in the Adriatic sea, which, on the slightest hint, would have hastened to their assistance. The French were fully aware of all these things, and therefore had recourse to deception and treachery. They commenced negotiations with the revolutionary party—set on foot a whole series of cabals, and finally promised, if the Sclavonians were disbanded—if the government should resign, and a new one be appointed—that they would then enter into an agreement with the new government. The proposal was thankfully received—the ships were immediately disarmed—the Sclavonian regiments disbanded and put on board. The city was thus rendered wholly defenceless, and the object of the cunning French was fully attained. The sovereignty, which had hitherto been in the hands of the senate, was transferred to the people, and a new government was to be established. From the conditions which they attached to their resignation, it will be most clearly seen how completely the once proud and splendid *nobili* of Venice had fallen into contempt.

The new government, or rather the municipal council, was to guarantee the payment of the public debt; and they were to take care that the pensions and funds devoted by the state to the support of the noble families which had fallen into poverty, should be preserved and

continued. At the very moment in which the ruling nobles were bartering dominion and honour for an alms, the whole people of the city and the brave Sclavonians, now in the ships, were devoted to them for life and death; but they never attempted resistance. Their cowardice was so great, that the senate, seven hundred and fifty against five, of their own accord transferred all their rights to a commission of ten, to be chosen with the approbation of Bonaparte. From this time forth anarchy prevailed in the city, the greatest mischief was perpetrated, till, on the 12th of May, the French party succeeded in persuading the people to exercise their new rights, and to elect a new council, democratically chosen. This new town council was not only chosen from all ranks and classes, but even made up of persons of different nations: it however succeeded in stilling the bloody tumult got up by the Sclavonians, and in removing them from the city. The originators of these new cabals, whose object was to bring the French into the city, took good care to keep up a constant fear of the tumultuary proceedings of the masses, and this furnished the new government with a pretext for entering into a secret negotiation with Baraguay d'Hilliers to send in a division of his army, although at that very time a peace had been concluded with Bonaparte in Milan. The negotiations for the peace had been carried on by the old government, or, more properly speaking, with the committee of ten, to whom their power was delegated, and the peace itself, between the city of Venice and the republic of France, was signed on the 16th of May (27th Floréal, year V.) The paper was signed on the part of France by Bonaparte and Lallemand, and on that of Venice by Francisco Dona, Leonardo Justiniani, and Ludovico Mocenigo. The treaty contains five articles, and binds the city of Venice to pay three millions of francs in cash, and three millions in goods; to furnish three ships of the line completely armed and two frigates; and to put into the hands of the French twenty paintings and five hundred manuscripts.* The treaty was immediately ratified by the new town council; but as the people, who had been won over for that purpose, at the same moment succeeded in bringing French troops into the city, Bonaparte did not ratify, and that under the contemptible pretext, that he had concluded the treaty with the old government, and not with the new one.†

* See Martens, vol. vii., pp. 186-189.

† Botta has pronounced a very proper judgment in this case: “Ratificarono in fatto i municipali di Venezia il trattato concluso in Milano, persuadendosi non si vede come ne perché, che tutta l’ autorità della repubblica e del maggior consiglio in loro fosse investita. Negava Bonaparte la ratificazione, allegando, essere della parte dei mandatari Veneziani cessato il mandato, perché era estinto il mandatore, il che era vero. Ma siccome già sapeva, quando stipulava, che era spento il mandatore, fù il suo stipulare fraude per fare, che i Veneziani ammettessero in Venezia i suoi soldati. Ma questi, già essendo entrati, e l’ antico governo col quale l’ Austria aveva congiunzione di amicizia, già essendo spento, il che era l’ importanza del tutto, ei rifiuto la ratifica per legarsi a niona obligazione col nuovo.”—Vol. iii., lib. x., p. 32.

The new government carried on the negotiations with Baraguay d'Hilliers by means of Villetard, who, as we have already stated, was suffered to remain and carry on his intrigues in Venice; and having taken advantage of a rising in the city in favour of the old government, probably intentionally excited, they called in the French general to their aid. A number of barges were got in readiness by the initiated, and during the night of the 15th–16th, about four thousand French soldiers were brought over the Lagunes. Donato and Battaglia, Bonaparte's tools, having arranged the whole affair in conjunction with Villetard, we can entertain no doubt that the whole scheme was known to the commander-in-chief, when he immediately afterwards demanded five millions instead of the three mentioned in the treaty.

Daru is sensible that the conduct pursued on this occasion was scandalous. He takes care to state the particulars as well as he can, but he cannot conceal the fact that Venice then lost her credit, and that the bankruptcy of the bank was no longer any secret. On this occasion Venetians and French emulated each other in plundering. The former forcibly took 100,000 ducats from the avaricious Duke of Modena, who had sought an asylum among them for himself and his treasures; whilst the latter, in their reports, boast in the coarsest language of the plunder and spoil of all kinds which they collected in Venice.* Bonaparte himself openly admits in his letter that the treaty was a mere delusion, in order to get a pretext for spoiling Venice, squeezing it like a sponge, and afterwards handing over the exhausted town as a compensation to Austria.†

Bonaparte having lodged his troops in Venice, quietly pursued his dictatorial course in Italy, in order, when the preliminaries were changed into a peace, to be able to deliver it up to Austria; notwithstanding this the negotiations for a peace were prolonged for the whole summer. The creation of the Cisalpine republic dated

* Baraguay d'Hilliers' correspondence with the commander-in-chief, as well as the other documents connected with these scandalous transactions, will be found in the *Correspondence* already so often referred to. The passage in which the low and plundering disposition of the French, who were brought into the city as friends and deliverers, most clearly appears, runs as follows: "J'ai été visiter l'arsenal. J'en ai vu tous les details; c'est un de plus beau de la Méditerranée, et qui renferme tous les moyens propres à équiper d'ici à deux mois, avec deux millions de dépense, une flotte de sept ou huit vaisseaux de 74, six frégates de 30 à 40, et cinq cutters. Il y a d'ailleurs une immense artillerie, tant en fer qu'en bronze, des fonderies, des ateliers de charronage, une corderie superbe, des chantiers de la plus grande beauté. Tous les magazins sont pleins de bois, de chanvre, de fer, de goudron, de cordages, et de toiles. Il y a environ six milles fusils, six milles pistolets de cavalerie, et tous les ateliers sont dans la plus grande activité. J'ai de suite fait saisir toutes le propriétés Anglaises, Russes, et Portugaises, en déclarant qu'elles apparteraient à la république Française." To the report that he had installed the new municipality he adds the very characteristic remark: "La peur est le sentiment dominant dans cette ville, et il est le gage de la tranquillité publique."

† He concludes his letter on the necessity of annihilating Venice as a state with these words: "Nous prendrons les vaisseaux, nous depouillerons l'arsenal, nous enleverons tous les canons, nous détruirons la banque, et nous garderons Corfou et Ancone."

from the same moment in which Venice fell. On the 16th of May, in the midst of all sorts of rejoicings and pomp, the whole circle of Italian and French rhetoric was put under contribution, in order to produce masterpieces of eloquence, and to clothe the plan, then issued, with all the splendour of oratorical phraseology. In expectation that a fifth district should be added to the new republic, and a fifth director appointed, four directors were first nominated, besides legislative councils, judges, corporations, administrators of departments and districts: everything precisely according to the French model. On the 9th of July the new government was installed at Milan, and took possession of the whole extent of their territory (except the Valteline); as this territory consisted of five hitherto completely distinct governments, five directors were appointed, a legislative council of 168 members, and a council of elders of 80. None of these arrangements were recognised by Austria till they were agreed upon and confirmed by the treaty of Campo Formio,—whilst Tuscany, Parma, Sardinia, Naples, and even Spain, were obliged immediately to send ambassadors to Milan to offer their congratulations on the erection of a new state, to which they felt a deadly repugnance, and which threatened the destruction of their own.

In the meantime Faypoult was busily employed after the same fashion in Genoa as Villetard in Venice. He gathered together all the revolutionary spirits with whom Italy at that time swarmed, and which are still numerous enough in the same country. Cisalpine, French, and Sardinian enthusiasts, in conjunction with the brawling Genoese democrats, were stimulated violently to demand a change of the existing constitution. It is obvious that Bonaparte was perfectly acquainted with all Faypoult's schemes for exciting popular tumults, from the fact that, three days after the occupation of Venice by the French troops (on the 19th of May), he wrote to the Directory as follows:—"Genoa, with loud clamours, demands a democracy, and the senate has sent deputies to me in order to hear my opinion. It is highly probable that the Genoese aristocracy will meet the same fate as that of Venice." Faypoult did not wait till the senate had come to an understanding with Bonaparte on the changes to be made, but sprung his mine as early as the 21st of May. From the 22nd there was a bloody struggle for several days in Genoa. In Genoa, as well as in Venice and Berne, the lower classes and the country people were devoted to the aristocracy, and these came to their assistance when the senate and nobles altogether despaired of their cause. The harbour, arsenal and gates were already in the power of Faypoult's *protégés* and partisans—the senate had relinquished all hopes of resistance, and the old officers of the government were deposed—when the people, supported by the vigorous aid of the brave inhabitants of the country, rose *en masse*, and, in the midst of terrific scenes of blood, restored the old government. Bonaparte, who had long foreseen the course of events, ordered 12,000 men to the neighbourhood of Genoa, and had

an oppressive treaty already prepared, which his adjutant, Lavalette, was to carry with him to Genoa, to terrify the small council into subjection and acceptance of its terms.

Lavalette reached Genoa on the 29th of May, at six o'clock in the evening. He demanded an immediate audience with the same insolence as Junot had exhibited in Venice; and when the council was assembled, he read as insulting a letter in as insulting a tone as Junot had done in Venice. The same results followed in Genoa as had followed in her sister state, except that they did not venture to exact from the whole nobility, or the great council, what was demanded of it in Venice. The small council, indeed, accepted the compulsory treaty and the dissolution of the ancient constitution, which was its consequence; but a note was inserted in the *Moniteur*, afterwards repeated by Martens, in which it was observed that they did not venture to demand the legal confirmation of the treaty by the great council.* In reference to these events, every reader of Lavalette's Memoirs may learn the manner in which such memoirs are fabricated in Paris. Lavalette himself was entrusted with the embassy, and he could not therefore possibly have related the story of his own doings, and of the taking away of the frigate *Modeste*, as is there done. The author of this history, moreover, knew long before, from the mouth of the ex-queen Hortense (Duchess of St. Leu), how the memoirs were produced, and what share she herself had taken in their composition. The treaty, or more properly speaking, Bonaparte's rescript to Genoa, changed this aristocratic republic into a democratic Ligurian republic, in which all the inhabitants of the town and territory should possess equal rights and equally share in the government; next, all prisoners were set at liberty; and it was left to Bonaparte to appoint a provisional government, which was to consist of a doge and twelve other members.† This provisional government, as also a legislature, consisting of a legislative council of 300, and a council of elders of 150 members, was appointed on the 6th of June. On the same day a general amnesty was proclaimed, and on the 15th of the following August the constitution was fully introduced. The number of the members of government was increased to fifteen; and it was resolved, that one-third of the members, both of the government and councils, should retire every

* The treaty, if Bonaparte's rescript may be so called, is to be found in Martens, vol. iii., pp. 190-192. In page 192, Martens adds these words:—"Le *Moniteur* ajoute: 'Cette convention a été ratifié par le petit conseil. On a jugé à propos de ne pas la faire sanctionner par le grand conseil, parcequ'on a craint que par les nobles pauvres, accoutumés à opiner en faveur de ceux qui paient, il n'y en eût assez pour former une opposition inutile. Il eut été d'ailleurs absurde de tirer de grand conseil de sa nullité à la veille de dissoudre le gouvernement.'"

† In reference to the members appointed by Bonaparte to take part in the government, Botta remarks: "Quando il generalissimo Francese creava questa nuova signoria aveva in pensiero non solamente di dare autorità a uomini prudenti e lontani da voglie estreme, mà ancora mescolande uomini di diverse condizioni di mostrare, che la sovranità non cadeva più in pochi, ma bensi in tutti cosa che avrebbe dovuta quietare, certentando le ambizioni molti umori."

year, and be replaced by new ones chosen by election. This was all mere empty show, for the Ligurian troops, so called, were placed under the command of the French Generals Duphot and Casa Bianca, whose wishes the government was therefore compelled to follow.

During the following months Bonaparte had great difficulty in preventing the Directory in Paris and the crowds of Jacobins, who were either sent by them from that city or protected in Italy, from throwing everything into general confusion, and revolutionising Parma and Piedmont. La Revelliére Lepaux, who had made himself ridiculous by his extravagant zeal for the introduction of a new religion, which he called Theophilanthropism, entertained an extraordinary fear of priests and the Pope. This drove him to the adoption of the most singular steps, and to a persecution of the Catholic religion, which embittered the minds of the people against the French, especially in Rome, whither he had sent crowds of his Jacobins. Bonaparte, however, protected Parma and Tuscany; and he sent his brother Joseph as ambassador to Rome; and at length succeeded in having the peace with Naples ratified in Paris (Oct. 10, 1797), and in obtaining at least a respite for Sardinia.

Charles Emanuel IV., who succeeded his father, Victor Amadeus III., in the government of Sardinia, on the 10th of October, 1796, was compelled, as early as March, 1797, to place the admirable Sardinian army at Bonaparte's disposal, on the latter sending Clarke, afterwards Duke of Feltre, to Turin. The King of Sardinia was, in fact, rendered completely defenceless by a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, into which he entered with Clarke on the 5th of April. He was compelled to bind himself to furnish still further means of transport and subsistence to the French troops, constantly in march hither and thither across his territory; to support their *employés* and prisoners; and, in addition, to furnish and keep up in full number and condition 8000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 40 pieces of cannon. All this, however, was not sufficient for the Jacobins of the French Directory; for the news of the democratic disturbances in Piedmont no sooner reached Paris than the Directory showed themselves unwilling to ratify the treaty, and it was not till after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, that Bonaparte succeeded, by the most urgent representations, in October and November, in obtaining the ratification of the treaty. One of Bonaparte's creatures, who in other respects generally invent the history which they write, admits, however, that the treaty had never been seriously intended.*

* Montholon, "Mémoires de Napoléon," vol. iv., p. 146: "Cependant ce prince (the King of Sardinia) ne se faisait point illusion sur sa position; il savoit, qu'il ne devoit la conservation de son trône qu'à Napoléon, et combien peu étoit sincère l'alliance apparente du Directoire, il avoit le pressentiment de sa chute prochaine. Environné de tous côtés des démocraties Française, Ligurienne, Cisalpine, il avoit à combattre l'opinion de ses peuples, les Piémontais appelaient à grand cris la révolution, et la cour regardoit déjà (Dec., 1797) la Sardaigne comme un lieu de

In the mean time, De Gallo, the empress, and the Queen of Naples, had employed all imaginable means throughout the whole course of the summer at last to bring about the conclusion of a peace with the emperor. The English, however, caballed, and Thugut played a part which even Talleyrand, in a confidential letter to Bonaparte, describes as shameful. It was De Gallo who brought the matter to an issue, by travelling backwards and forwards, and working upon the mind of the empress by the invention of new rascalities. Acting without powers, he first came to an understanding regarding other preliminaries with Bonaparte, who had not fulfilled the conditions of Leoben, at the castle of Montebello, in the neighbourhood of Milan, and then arranged that the conferences respecting the peace should take place in Udine.

D.—PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO.

Bonaparte would have done long before what he at length did in August—excite the apprehensions of Austria by threats and active preparations for war—had not the decision of the dispute between the majority of the Directory and the majority of the councils long remained uncertain. In August, Bonaparte became at length sure that a *coup d'état* would make him all powerful. The Directory stood in need of soldiers; Bonaparte lent them to it, and sent Augereau to Paris, but took no part himself; he felt sure that the *coup d'état* would succeed, and that afterwards both the victorious and the conquered party would seek for his aid, and therefore he assumed a threatening attitude towards Austria. Four days before the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor, he came, on the 1st of September, 1797, to Passeriano, a castle not far from Udine, whither Austria then sent Count Ludwig von Cobenzl, who had been removed from the conduct of foreign affairs in 1795, and since that period exhibited in Petersburg all the splendour of an imperial representative. Ludwig von Cobenzl did not, however, reach Udine till three weeks after the 18th Fructidor, and brought with him a letter from the emperor to Bonaparte. The court of Vienna had waited for him since May; the issue, however, of the meeting was very different from what the court expected (27th September).

The cabinet of Vienna, however, always inexhaustible in petty schemes and jesuitical tricks, did not even determine to take this step till Bonaparte sent in his *ultimatum*, and Talleyrand, through the instrumentality of Haugwitz, had prevailed upon the King of Prussia openly to favour the friends of France in respect to Germany, and to communicate his decision to the court of Vienna, where the emperor, supported by the preliminary articles, still continued to insist on the integrity of the empire. The negotiations in Udine were conducted by Bonaparte alone, and with unlimited power, for Clarke had just at that time had a misunderstanding with his protector, Carnot, and been recalled. On this occasion, also, no

inconsiderable number of intrigues were in full action, in which the names of Queen Caroline and her minister Acton, De Gallo and his protectrix the empress, deserve to be mentioned as the chief. Matters at first assumed the appearance as if hostilities would be once more renewed, because it had been determined by the treaty of Leoben that the war should be renewed unless a peace was concluded before the 1st of October; the Archduke Charles had already taken his departure for his head-quarters in Schwetzingen, when means were found, on the 1st of October, of extending the suspension of hostilities for three weeks longer. Bonaparte, convinced that nothing could result from it, promised to give compensation to Austria as well as to Prussia, at the expense of the German states, to be spoiled for the purpose.

Could we here go into and explain the particulars of the way in which Bonaparte protected himself against the petty trickery of the Neapolitans, and conducted himself towards Augereau, when the latter became conceited in consequence of the brutal aid he had rendered to the Jacobins of Paris; or did our object permit us to develop Bonaparte's bearing towards the Directory and Talleyrand, it would clearly appear from all these things how great he really was, and how pitiful everything which either opposed or came into contact with him. This is also clear from what at the same moment he said of the fooleries of the Parisian democrats and of the enthusiasm of his countrymen, the Italians, of which he wished to avail himself for the creation of his new republic.*

We can readily believe that Bonaparte and De Gallo had recourse to contrivances of all kinds to compel Cobenzl to come to an early conclusion of the treaty; we, however, intentionally pass over all the anecdotes which are related on the subject, in order briefly to state, that, to the surprise of every one, the peace between Austria and France was concluded and signed on the 17th of October, at the ruined castle of Campo Formio, near Udine. The conditions of this peace were very different from what there might have been reason to expect, not only from the preliminaries, but from the public declarations issued by the emperor as late as the month of July. The contents of the treaty, however, will excite no surprise, when it is borne in mind, that whilst Cobenzl received the name, the real plenipotentiary was a miserable intriguer like the Marquis de Gallo, prompted by a minister like Thugut, whose mind never cherished a great idea, and still less was ever warmed by a patriotic feeling.

* Let us only compare what Bonaparte says of the visionary enthusiasts for freedom among the Italians with the lies which the good-natured Michel suffers his prattlers to tell. In a *dépêche confidentielle* to Talleyrand, of the date of 7th October, 1797, he writes as follows: "Vous connaissez peu ces peuples-ci; ils ne meritent pas qu'on fasse tuer quarante mille Français pour eux. Je vois par vos lettres, que vous portez toujours d'une fausse hypothèse, vous vous imaginez que la liberté fait faire de grandes choses à un peuple mou, superstitieux, pantalon et lâche. Je n'ai pas eu pour auxiliale l'amour des peuples pour la liberté et l'égalité. Tout ce qui n'est bon à dire que dans des proclamations, des discours imprimés, sont de romans."

Immediately after the conclusion of the peace of Campo Formio, an intimation was given to Switzerland that it, too, was to be the scene of a revolution supported by France. The districts on the further side of the Splügen and the Wormser Joch, or Valteline, Chiavenna and Bormio, districts hitherto subject to the Grisons, were now united to the Cisalpine republic, and Bonaparte on this occasion had an honourable and pleasing character to play. He had here to support the weak against the strong; and, in opposition to the positive rights of the jurists, to give free course to a right which never becomes obsolete, because it is derived from God and not from the jurists!

The Grisons, which, even comprising the Valteline, had never possessed 150,000 inhabitants, formed at that time a federative republic, consisting of the grey or upper league, of that of the house of God, and that of the ten commandments. It would carry us beyond our limits to enter into a history of this republic, which Zschokhe has treated at length.* It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that, on the fall of the duchy of Milan, the Grisons made itself master of the Valteline. This district, like many others in Switzerland, was afterwards administered and governed as a province, by certain powerful families of the grey league. The two families of Planta and Salis were all-powerful in the democratic Grisons, as that of Reding is to this day in the canton of Schwytz. All the considerable families of the league were devoted either to the one family or the other, and all public offices were filled by members of one or the other, according as each obtained a temporary preponderance in the general assemblies of the people. Of these two families of Planta and Salis, one was always sold to Austria, and the other to France, and their partisans provided for in the Valteline looked upon the offices entrusted to them, and even upon law and justice, as merely means of enriching themselves; the discontent was, therefore, still greater there than in the present canton of Tessino, which was then governed by the small cantons as a conquered province. The advance of the French to the frontiers of the Tyrol inspired the inhabitants of the Valteline with courage to throw off the burdensome dominion of their republican masters; at the same time, however, they tried all possible means to induce the members of the Grison league to allow them to enter into the union, and enjoy equal rights with themselves. They would have preferred a union with them to one with Cisalpina, had not the peasants of the league rejected every offer of amalgamation. All their efforts in this direction having proved vain, they at length sent their chancellor, Carbonera, to the Grisons on the 21st of June, 1797, as the bearer of a letter of solemn renunciation of their authority on the part of Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valteline. At the same moment in which they renounced their allegiance to the league, they commis-

* The whole of the first part of Zschokhe's Memoirs is occupied with the union or grey league. Winterthur, 1803.

sioned Herr von Gaudenz-Planta to appeal to Bonaparte for his mediation. Bonaparte called upon the Grisons as early as the 3rd of July to name a plenipotentiary, but with the express addition that the Valteline was to be regarded as a fourth province, and not as a subject of the three provinces of the league. This proposition displeased the country people, because it offended their pride; and was distasteful to the more distinguished families, because they would lose the profits of their offices. The matter was prolonged, especially by the cabals of the family of Salis, till the decision came too late.

Bonaparte concluded the peace of Campo Formio before the grey leaguers had made an end of their tedious consultations, and he had then no longer any reason for sparing either Switzerland or the Grisons. On the 19th of October, 1797, he therefore caused it to be announced to his Cisalpine republic, that henceforward the Valteline, Chiavenna, and Bormio, were to constitute a part of the Cisalpine territory. In the eighth article of the treaty of Campo Formio, in which all the constituent parts of the republic are enumerated, there is indeed no mention of the Valteline. It is there said, the Cisalpine republic shall consist of the former Austrian Lombardy, the territory of Bergamo, Brescia, and Crema—the city and fortress of Mantua—the whole territory of Mantua, Peschiera, and that portion of the former territory of Venice especially defined in another article. In addition to these, there is enumerated the Duchy of Modena, the principalities of Massa and Carrara, and the three papal legations, Ferrara, Bologna, and Romagna. The division of the territories of Venice was already fixed in the fifth and sixth articles. In the fifth, the Venetian islands in the Ionian sea, Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Cerigo, &c., are expressly reserved for France, as well as Butrinto, Larta, Bonizza, on the mainland, and all the Venetian settlements in Albania, and the Gulf of Lodrino in general. The promise of a portion of the Venetian territory to the Cisalpine republic is first mentioned in the sixth article—by which also Istria, Dalmatia, the district of Cattaro, the city of Venice itself, and everything included within a boundary line there described, are ceded to the emperor. In the 18th article it is agreed that the Duke of Modena shall be compensated by the possession of the Breisgau. The Archduke Charles and the Archduchess Christine were to be allowed to retain their estates in Belgium, with the obligation to dispose of them by sale within three months, as was also to be the case with the estates of the Archduke Ferdinand in Italy. By virtue of the twentieth article the negotiations for a peace with the German empire were to be referred to a congress, to be summoned to meet at Rastadt. This congress, according to a secret agreement, was to assist in the execution of the fourteen secret articles of the treaty, together with the ostensible ones of what was to be made public. The most casual reader, however, of these articles will easily be persuaded that they were as little capable of being carried

into execution, as the preliminaries of Leoben: the whole was therefore a mere delusion.

The emperor had bound himself to bring about the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to the French, and on his own part given up possession of the Frickthal; and he was to obtain Salzburg and a portion of Bavaria. Such stipulations as these might have been carried into execution; but the terms of the ninth article were altogether incapable of being fulfilled. In the eighth article a compensation in Germany is promised to the hereditary stadtholder, but with this single limitation, that such compensation was not to lie in the neighbourhood of the Austrian possessions; and then the ninth article runs as follows:—*France is ready to give back to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine; the two powers, therefore, enter into a mutual guarantee, that the King of Prussia shall gain no new possessions.* The reason why it was impossible to execute such an article it would be quite superfluous to detail.

In the twelfth article compensations are promised to the spiritual electors, and to a number of princes who were either protected by France or Austria—a promise which assuredly neither party was disposed to fulfil. If it is said, Austria shall obtain still more than is defined in these articles from the spoil of the states under its protection, then France also shall receive more.

It was only such men as the Thuguts, the Lehrbachs, and the Emperor Francis, a ruler inaccessible to every great and elevated thought or feeling, who could consent to such an article as the thirteenth without sinking into the earth for shame. In this article, the emperor, even before the conclusion of a peace with the empire, hands over Germany, utterly defenceless, into the power of its hereditary enemy. In it, too, the emperor promises, within twenty days after the ratification of the peace, which was certainly to take place within two months, to withdraw his troops from Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Philippsburg, Mannheim, Königstein, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, or, in a word, from the German empire.

At this time the Directory was already preparing new revolutions in Italy, and the overthrow of the old Swiss constitutions was resolved on, because on this occasion Bonaparte was of the same opinion with Reubel and his colleagues—that the ancient aristocracies must be overthrown, in order incidentally to get possession of the hoarded and dead wealth of the aristocratic families of Berne, Zürich, Soleure, and other places. At this time Bonaparte had already formed the magnificent, but wholly chimerical, project of his great expedition to Egypt, only to be accounted for by his extraordinarily vigorous power of imagination, by virtue of which everything seemed to him possible, because he had already succeeded in many things which appeared impossible.

It is evident, from the seven volumes of his correspondence at that period, that Bonaparte, whilst in Italy, had directed his marked

attention to the colossal plan of wresting Egypt from the Turks, and from thence making war upon the English in India. During his campaigns in Italy he came to a secret understanding with the French knights in Malta, and the Directory showed itself disposed to countenance and support the adventure. The five Jacobins who since the 18th of Fructidor ruled the destinies of France, were highly pleased to be able to send into another quarter of the world a great and regal man, who was in the highest degree dangerous to their comparative insignificance; they therefore put forth all the energies of the country in order to second his design. A fleet was collected, to which they gave the magnificent name of the Ocean Fleet, as well as a numerous army, under the pretence of undertaking an expedition against England. Bonaparte was appointed generalissimo, with unlimited powers by land and by sea. The real object of the armaments was a secret to every one; and it was publicly said that Bonaparte, before engaging in the expedition against England, was first to go to Rastadt as chief of the French embassy appointed to discuss and settle the affairs of Germany. During his absence, Desaix represented the general-in-chief both by land and by sea. As to the embassy, Bonaparte in fact appeared only once at Rastadt in the character of its head, and that only to compel Austria to fulfil the conditions of the peace of Campo Formio, by which the German fortresses were deprived of imperial protection. Before he came to Paris, Bonaparte arrived at Rastadt on the 1st of December, although the congress summoned to sit there was not formally opened till the 6th. He imperiously insisted upon the immediate surrender of Mayence, and agreed upon a new secret convention,* by which it was arranged that the imperial troops should retire behind the Inn and the Lech. Bonaparte did not reach Paris till the 10th, and was then solemnly received by the Directory, without, however, entering into explanations of any kind with the five directors. On his ceremonial reception Talleyrand delivered an address, which sounds no little ridiculous.† Bonaparte spoke some very home truths to the Directory in very direct and strong terms, to which Barras replied in most exaggerated and absurd phraseology.‡

* Both treaties, and everything relating to them, will be found in the Supplement to Martens, vol. vii.

† We should be obliged to transcribe the whole of Talleyrand's address to show that it was ridiculous from beginning to end. Bonaparte observed: "La paix assure la liberté et la gloire de la république. *Lorsque le bonheur du peuple Français sera assis sur des meilleures lois, l'Europe entière redeviendra libre.*"

‡ We shall quote only two of these phrases as a specimen: "La nature a épuisé toutes ses richesses pour créer Bonaparte." Again: "Bonaparte a médité ses conquêtes avec la pensée de Socrate, il a reconcilié l'homme avec la guerre."

§ II.

INTERNAL CONDITION OF FRANCE.—THE IRISH, HOCHE AND HUMBERT.—THE 18TH FRUCTIDOR.

A.—INTERNAL CONDITION OF FRANCE.

WHILST Bonaparte was engaged in extending the dominion of the republican government in Germany and Italy, it sank into distrust and disgrace at home, through the bad conduct of four out of the five directors. It was no wonder that the laws and ordinances of the revolution, admirable in themselves, became hateful to the people in consequence of anarchy in the government, and mismanagement in administration, and that they elected men into the legislature who were hostile to the revolution. The greatest possible derangement prevailed in the finances, and this became a subject of universal complaint. Not merely the resources of the national treasury, but the property of individuals, was wholly destroyed when the paper money—assignats and mandats—which had been issued in disturbed times, lost all its value. The facility of issue had been grossly abused; and the assignats, which the state professed its readiness to receive in payment for national domains, became almost wholly worthless, after forty millions of them had been put into circulation. As early as October, 1795, fifteen francs in silver had become worth 5000 in assignats, and at a later period their value was still farther depressed. This fall continued, even though a decree was issued on the 30th of January, 1796, by which it was announced that all establishments for the preparation of this paper money should be destroyed, and the further multiplication of them rendered impossible. Recourse was obliged to be had to a concealed bankruptcy, by the creation of what were called *mandats*, in order to redeem a part of the assignats, and to extinguish the remainder.* The *mandats* were secured upon certain estates of the national domains; but the mode of assignment was so tedious, and caused such delay in their preparation, that they fell in value even before they were put into circulation. They fell still more, when it was determined to employ them as a means of redeeming one-thirtieth part of the assignats, in order to be able to extinguish the remaining twenty-nine parts. This was, in fact, nothing less than to put thirty-two millions of assignats out of circulation, without giving one farthing of compensation, and to pay the other eight millions

* The necessity of this course may be seen from the following details:—In November, 1789, one hundred francs assignats were worth 95 in cash; in January, 1791, they were still worth 92; in January, 1792, they had fallen to 62; in January, 1793, to 51; in January, 1794, to 40; in 1795 to 18; and in July of the same year they were only worth a few farthings. In 1796, twenty-four francs in cash were worth 7200 in assignats.

with mandats, which no one would any longer receive in payment. As early as the 9th of August the republic declared that mandats would be received in payment of the public taxes, but only at the current price of the day. The current price may be learned from the fact, that it was decreed, in 1797, that one franc in cash was to be regarded as equal to 100 francs in mandats; in February it became obvious that this decree was absolutely useless; and on the 4th of that month, by a new decree, the mandats were left to their fate.

These financial difficulties led to disputes between the legislative councils and the directors, who subjected themselves to eternal disgrace* by the adoption of the miserable speculations to which they had recourse to obtain relief from their pressing difficulties. In this respect too, therefore, Bonaparte was indispensable, because he not only made the war support itself, but also from time to time sent large sums from his extorted millions to supply the coffers of the Directory. The letters already referred to, which were printed in the *Moniteur*, furnish a specimen of the manner in which Bonaparte was suffered to speak to the Directory respecting the system of pillage in Italy. It is no wonder, therefore, that Carnot himself, in 1797, thought the royalist party, which was still dreaming of a restoration at that time quite impossible, less dangerous to his country than a government without credit or dignity. This was, in fact, the opinion of all the better and quieter portion of the French people; and even the restless, communistic, socialistic, and fanatical enthusiasts of the years 1793 and 1794 were not at all satisfied with the conduct of the speculating, usurious, and despotic directors. The young and intemperate members of this party fell into a state of strife with the Directory almost immediately on its installation. Carnot, in his letter of justification, written immediately after the 18th Fructidor, declares that he and his colleagues were so much afraid of the club of their friends the Jacobins, which met in the Pantheon, that they found it necessary to require its sittings to be closed by Bonaparte, at that time general of the interior; he also admits that he, then a director, used to ask a shoemaker to breakfast, whom he had known since the reign of terror, in order to learn how things were going on.

Jacobins and royalists were at that time the editors of the most important journals; and the Marquis Antonelle, notorious as the chief member of the revolutionary tribunal, wrote the *Journal of Free Men*, completely in the spirit of the reign of terror. Rossignol, the goldsmith, who was a general at the same period, collected together the remnant of his former revolutionary bands; and an enthusiast and communist, who honestly believed in his dreams, clothed

* By reading the history of the company of Dijon, it will be seen what rascality was practised under the government of these dishonest men. Thiers, however, is no authority on the point, for he has played, and plays, the same game as Reubel and Barras.

his communism in a philosophical garb. The name of this visionary was Francis Noel Babœuf; but, as was also the fashion in 1793, he took the name of Caius Gracchus Babœuf. As early as 1790, Babœuf, being a raving republican, was appointed to office, but again removed on account of his uncontrollable vehemence, although he was in other respects an honest man, for he afterwards raved and stormed against the terrorists as well as against the royalists and aristocrats. Babœuf edited the *Tribune of the People, or Defender of the Freedom of the Press*, quite in Marat's style; and was in the habit of giving the most absurd descriptions and representations of civil freedom. Those to whom a new revolution would have been agreeable or useful supported this wild exaggeration; and even Fouché from time to time wrote articles for the journal, so that it appeared as if Jacobinism would again come forward under a new form. The public offices were again occupied by the men of the reign of terror. Tallien, separated from his elegant wife, Fontenay Cabarrus, again assumed a violent tone, and no man any longer put any trust in his neighbour, because a set of fortune-hunters, adventurers, gamblers, and speculators, constituted what was called good society. Merlin de Douay occupied the post of minister of police, and gave his old friends the Jacobins so much playroom that he was at length removed; and because, next to Cambacérès, he was the best lawyer in France, he was appointed minister of justice. Cochon, afterwards made a count of the empire by Bonaparte, a man scientifically educated under the old régime, and whom even Carnot, in his letter of justification, eulogises,* was minister of police, and already spoke both of an ultra-democratic and a royalist conspiracy. On his recommendation the Directory caused several camps to be established in the neighbourhood of Paris, and induced the legislature to confer upon them extraordinary powers. Among the measures adopted in consequence of these powers, it was resolved that all former deputies to the Convention who did not fill any office, or who had not dwelt in Paris before they had been in the Convention, and further, all deposed or dismissed functionaries, and all foreigners except those attached to some embassy, should immediately depart from Paris, if they had not already lived there before the 14th of July, 1790.

At the same time, all *émigrés*, whose names were not absolutely removed from the list, were forbidden to continue to reside in Paris; and, at the instance of the Directory, even those were included in the ordinance who had been in anywise compromised and afterwards exculpated by amnesty.

The democratic promoters of disturbances assembled at that time around Drouet, the deputy—the same who, as postmaster, had arrested the flight of Louis XVI., had afterwards been sent as one

* Carnot, in his "Reponse," &c., p. 168, calls him "L'estimable, le très estimable ministre Cochon, plus actif, mille fois plus courageux, plus républicain que tous vos directeurs républicains."

of the deputies to the Convention, and, as such, appointed commissioner to the army of the North. Whilst discharging the functions of a commissioner he was taken prisoner, dragged about from one horrible Austrian prison to another, and after the lapse of two years exchanged for the daughter of the unfortunate king. This raving democrat of the reign of terror, filled with bitterness against the sneaking aristocrats and their prisons, found everything so completely changed since 1793 in the legislature, that on his return he attached himself to Babœuf. Babœuf and his partisans at that time constituted a power, for in the wavering system followed by the Jacobins of the Directory, their services were sometimes needed against the majority of the councils, or against those who were called royalists, but who in reality were only desirous of putting an end to Jacobinism and anarchy. What would otherwise be wholly incredible, will therefore excite no astonishment—viz., that Reubel and Barras, in February, 1796, caused an offer of the post of minister of finance to be made by Fouché to Caius Gracchus Babœuf. In fact, Babœuf had the very best inclination to be a Marat; but the tone of his journal was rather wearisome than exciting, and his language was not the bold and determined tone of an enthusiast, but the uncertain and rambling outpourings of a madman. He fought with fanaticism for folly, despised all forms, would by all means become a martyr, and infected others with his insanity.

Neither Drouet nor Babœuf could ever, properly speaking, become dangerous, although a considerable number of papers and projects, which might have brought back the times of 1793 and 1794, were found in the house of the former, on a domiciliary visit sanctioned by the legislative councils (because he was a deputy). All that now remained, however, of Robespierre's band (*la queue de Robespierre*) and of the Cordeliers, concealed themselves behind the honest but mad visionaries. Amar, Vadier, Choudier, and other veterans of the Convention, who had not been elected members of the Legislative Assembly, stirred the fire, and more than sixty members of the assembly lay in ambush in order to fish in troubled waters, should the fanatics and visionaries succeed in breaking up the present government.

This induced the Directory once again to have recourse to a *coup d'état* against its friends, the Jacobins. From the night between the 10th-11th of May, 1796, there was considerable excitement: Drouet's papers were seized and taken away, and he himself, with the permission of his colleagues, arrested, and on the 18th of May an order was issued for the arrest of thirty of the wildest democrats, among whom was Rossignol. Fate was, however, always favourable to this man, till he was finally cruelly and unjustly transported under Bonaparte, and died in wretchedness.

The Directory, however, and its partisans, needed the support of the anarchists against the party which was anxious for the return of order, justice, and religion, and which was called royalist, because there were some royalists amongst those of whom it was composed.

The prosecution of the demagogues was conducted in a most scandalous manner, and so as to prolong, instead of putting an end to, the disturbances. Drouet was suffered to escape; and when the excitement became at length too bad, recourse was had to a device, by which a number of persons of the lower classes were allured into a snare, tried before a court-martial, and shot; the object was instantly to terrify the band, without being obliged effectually to root out the evil. The time was drawing near in which those who had been arrested in May were to be tried before a special tribunal appointed for that purpose in Vendome; there was, however, no positive act to lay to their charge. Their mere plans were not more revolutionary than those of the then existing government, and it became necessary to provoke their partisans into some positive breach of the law before they could be punished.

As we have already observed, numbers of fresh troops had been concentrated around Paris since the beginning of May, and divided into several camps, one of which was stationed on the plain of Grenelle, near the village of Vaugirard. Among the battalions in this camp there were some deeply imbued with democratic opinions, and affiliated with the Jacobins of Paris. This being known to the friends of the communist Babeuf, and to the partisans of Rossignol, among whom were Huguet and Javoques, formerly members of the Convention, they resolved to avail themselves of this feeling among the soldiers in order to set their friends at liberty. Hatry, the commander-in-chief, or, as he was called, general of the interior, did all in his power in order to catch them in the very act, and to strengthen them in the opinion that they had only to show themselves in order to secure the co-operation of the soldiers. The whole machinery of the years 1792-93 was again set in motion by the Jacobins, and the populace of Paris again made the tools of the demagogues.

Commotions had existed in Paris for a month, when at length an open demonstration was made on the 28th of August, and on the 29th scenes of violence took place in the streets. The populace was dispersed by the military: mobs and illegal meetings, however, continued in September also, till at length an attempt was made on the nights of the 9th and 10th of the month to fraternise with the soldiers in the camp at Vaugirard, and to induce these to join them.

The whole affair was so absurdly managed that one might readily imagine the directors themselves had caused the demonstration. The armed multitude of Jacobins belonging to the lower classes pressed forward into the camp, at a place occupied by a regiment which had no sympathy with their opinions, and who were far more terrified than pleased by the dreadful procession of the men of September, 1793. As this horrible procession, and the terrific shouting of the tumultuous rabble streaming into the camp was by no means calculated to win or allure the favour of the first regiment with

which they came in contact, and whose colonel, besides, was an honourable and upright man, the soldiers immediately obeyed his commands, fell upon and cut down the mob. Many of the poor deluded people were sabred, and 132 taken prisoners with arms in their hands. By this means the object of the directors was attained; and they could now betake themselves to the exercise of unlimited and arbitrary power. The legislature gave its sanction to a system of domiciliary visits, in order to discover and seize upon the wounded who had escaped. This afforded an opportunity of seizing upon those whom it was deemed advisable to destroy, and being taken with arms in their hands, or treated accordingly, they were tried by a court-martial and shot. Others, of whom it was intended to make some further use, were charged with being compromised in Babœuf's conspiracy, and sent before the special tribunal at Vendôme, which was at length opened.

The long trial of Babœuf and his fellow-prisoners was a satire upon all law and justice; for the transactions of the court, which held its sittings in the presence of an incredible multitude of people, afforded a perfect resemblance to the sittings of the Jacobin clubs in the time of Robespierre. The trial took place in the months of March and April, 1797, and the accused were sixty-four in number, of whom only forty-seven were placed before the court. The hall was filled by witnesses and spectators, who conducted themselves precisely as the occupants of the tribunes in the Jacobin clubs had formerly done; so that it might almost be supposed that the Jacobins themselves, from whom the directors were chosen, were intentionally desirous of turning the judges and the administration of justice into utter contempt. Jacobins collected to the scene of trial from all quarters. When Babœuf came forward, he threw off his coat that he might gesticulate more freely and eulogise himself as the hero of the people; he boasted of his resistance to their arbitrary rulers, and exposed the whole of their shameful proceedings. He no sooner made his appearance than he was greeted with loud applause by the spectators, and when he departed he was followed by clapping of hands. Afterwards, a low and shameless woman was sent from Paris, who, at the close of every sitting, sang revolutionary songs, in which the bystanders took part. Even the soldiers joined in these disgraceful tumults, and their officers were compelled to dismiss them from time to time, in order to prevent them from making common cause with these riotous assemblies. It was at length seen that this extraordinary tribunal, which had cost an immense sum of money, was altogether superfluous, because Drouet, the deputy, on whose account it had been appointed, was not in custody. The conclusion of the trial was as disgraceful as its sittings had been. In order to be able to acquit Amar, Rossignol, Vadier, Ricord, Choudier, and other dreadful friends of liberty, the court was obliged to declare that there had been no conspiracy. Babœuf and his friends were found

guilty, as it is said in the judgment, on account of other offences (question accidentelle).

In consequence of the turn given to the cause by the court, Babœuf and Darth , formerly the dreadful secretary of the notorious Joseph Lebon, were condemned to death; Buonarotti, Germain, Marroz, Cazir, Blondeau, and Bouin, to transportation. The sentence of transportation was not carried into effect, whilst Babœuf exhibited a fearful tragedy in the presence of the court and of the spectators in the hall. He caused his son to hand him a dagger, which he buried in his own heart, and Darth  followed his example. Amar, Vadier, and Rossignol, were soon afterwards set at liberty. The dissatisfaction of all honest people with the continuance of the government of the deputies of the Convention, or that movement which was called royalist, because many royalists were brought into the councils in consequence of it, was far more dangerous to the Directory than Babœuf's conspiracy, which was announced with so much noise, so long held up as an object of terror, and had so ridiculous a termination. There was a general and bitter feeling in the minds of all respectable men that the law proclaimed after the scenes of Vend miaire and the 3rd of Brumaire should still be suffered to remain in force, and that by its operation that very portion of the people who enjoyed the highest degree of public confidence should be altogether excluded from office. As early, therefore, as the election of the first third of the Legislative Assembly some very decided royalists were chosen as members; whilst others were only excluded by the tumultuary proceedings of their opponents, which excited feelings of great indignation amongst the electors. Aym , for example, who gave repeated assurances that he was baptized John James, was scoffed at, cried down, and not listened to, in consequence of the leaders of the tumult insisting that his name was Job. Ferrand Vaillant was not allowed to speak; Marsan, Polissart, Lecerf, Fontenay, and Palhier, were rejected without even the nomination of a committee to examine their claims, and to show that they were not legally elected. Immediately afterwards, Fayolle's proposal to abrogate the law of the 3rd of Brumaire, in virtue of which all the relations of *emigr s*, who in the last primary assemblies had subscribed any representations contrary to the existing law were excluded from being elected, was not even debated.

B.—VENDEE AND IRELAND.

Whilst the Directory was preparing itself to commence a still harder struggle with the legislative councils on the accession of a new third to the Assembly in the year 1797, Hoche was bringing the bloody war with the royalists in the west to an end, by mildness and conciliation. It was not he, but the Convention, and its wretched

plenipotentiary, Tallien—first a friend of the triumvirate of the reign of terror, then their very bitterest enemy, and soon afterwards again a raving democrat—who practised these revolting cruelties after the victory in the bay of Quiberon, which we have mentioned in the previous volume. Hoche had, however, kept himself apart from Tallien, and given the command to General Lemoine. He found it impossible to prevent the cruelties perpetrated on the prisoners, for Tallien acted in pursuance of the orders of the Committee of Public Welfare, which indeed was no longer that of Robespierre's time, but on this occasion acted precisely as its predecessor had done. The Directory having been established, Hoche obtained unlimited power, was supported also by the legislative councils in his conciliatory line of action, and in this manner quelled the disturbances. From that time forward Hoche exercised the same unlimited power in the west which Bonaparte did in Italy.

As early as December, 1795, the command of the armies of the west, previously divided, was united, and out of all these armies a single one was formed, under the name of the Army of the Ocean, which, according to the accounts given, amounted to 100,000 men. At the head of this army, which occupied the country from the Loire to the Somme, Hoche ruled with unlimited authority. This general was at that time only twenty-seven years of age, and had been raised to his prominent position because the Directory was afraid of Pichegru, did not put confidence in Moreau, and saw through Bonaparte's designs. Hoche kept his troops scattered about over the whole country, won the good-will of the inhabitants, was a handsome man, showy in the drawing-room, and knew well in tender moments how to get the secrets of their husbands from the ladies, so that the English and the *émigrés* attempted in vain to excite new commotions. Charette, Sapinaud, and Stofflet were indeed prevailed upon to renew the war, but Hoche contrived so to place his troops between their separate corps as to render their junction impossible, and to frustrate their operations. He took them prisoners one after another, and shot them, because they were taken with arms in their hands. In July, 1796, he was able to announce to the Directory that the civil war was completely at an end, which was formally ratified to the legislative councils by a message from the Directory on the 16th of July.

Hoche still retained the full powers with which he had been clothed by the Directory, because the directors were carrying on a correspondence with the discontented Irish, and were negotiating concerning the expedition of a French army to Ireland. In fact, the commander-in-chief of the Army of the Ocean at that time took a journey to Paris, in order to hold a conference with deputies from Ireland, without exciting attention. The Irish Catholics and Presbyterians became louder in their complaints respecting the oppressions exercised by the English in the last decennium, in proportion

as their parliament gained greater consistence. This parliament, which was almost wholly composed of Orangemen and privileged members of the Anglican Church, showed almost greater intolerance against the majority of the Irish people than the English themselves. This was very evident in the proposal of the Catholic toleration bill, which was even approved of by the narrow-minded and bigoted George III., and referred by the English ministry to the Irish parliament. The ministerial plan was so limited, twisted, and mutilated by the representatives of a comparatively small number of the Irish people, of whom the parliament consisted, that the Catholics gave utterance to their dissatisfaction with all the vehemence of their nation, and loudly declared that they would be contented with nothing short of complete emancipation. This was also the immediate object of the Society of United Irishmen, established in 1791, and afterwards so severely treated by the English government; it may indeed, even at first, have had other subordinate objects, as it certainly had at a later period of its existence.

Pitt, who afterwards made the king's obstinate refusal to concede emancipation a pretence for retiring from the ministry (although the real cause was a different one), was anxious, as it appeared at the close of the year 1794, to appease the storm, for Lord Fitzwilliam was sent to Ireland expressly with a view to put some check upon the fanaticism of the Orangemen and the Anglican party. He commenced his lieutenancy by dismissing a number of officials, and removing persons from places of trust and dignity, but by so doing raised such an outcry among the High Church partisans, and caused such annoyance to the king, who clung with tenacity to the existing order of things, that Pitt completely relinquished the idea of gaining over the Irish by kindness and conciliation, and, as is usually the case, he then had recourse to the opposite extreme.

Lord Camden was appointed to succeed Lord Fitzwilliam, in order to suppress the disturbances, by putting the law vigorously into execution. In March, 1796, parliament passed the infamous Insurrection Act, which empowered the justices of the peace, in every county and barony, if they should see fit, to declare such county or barony out of the king's peace, and subject the whole of its inhabitants to the dread exercise and penalties of martial law. In order to a proper understanding of events, it must be borne in mind that the Irish clubs had at that time opened communications with those of similar views in England, and that the most revolting acts of severity and violence were exercised against the Catholics, as well as against all those sects which did not belong to the Church of England. As early as the year 1794 prosecutions were instituted, both in England and Ireland, against a number of men of considerable note, in consequence of an attempt on their part to form a corresponding society, and make common cause with the French revolutionary government. The correspondence continued

notwithstanding the prosecutions. John Horne Tooke, a man of considerable distinction and learning,* was prosecuted on this account, but acquitted; whilst Jackson, a clergyman, was condemned in Ireland, because he had gone thither to organise an insurrection in connexion with the affiliated clubs in England. Jackson travelled in the employment of two brothers named Stone, one of whom lived in Paris and the other in London. The latter was also prosecuted, but escaped punishment, whilst Jackson was condemned.† At this period many men of the first families belonged to the Irish clubs. Two of their leading members, Theobald Wolfe Tone and Archibald Hamilton Rowan, alarmed at Jackson's fate, fled to Paris, and there established a club, which kept up a secret connexion and correspondence with persons of the same views in Ireland. On the establishment of the French Directory this new club immediately entered into communication with the government of France, whilst as may be, alas! proved by documents, the Orangemen in Ireland entered into a league for the bloody extirpation of the Papists. The Irish, therefore, set on foot a papistical association in opposition to this Anglican conspiracy.

They established a revolutionary committee, which sent Arthur O'Connor, and the brother of the Duke of Leinster, two of its members, into Switzerland, to have an interview on the frontiers of France with plenipotentiaries appointed by the French Directory. This occurred precisely at the time in which Hoche had succeeded in putting an end to the civil war on the Loire. Hoche was, therefore, the man who was appointed to meet the two deputies from Ireland, and who, after the interview, went to Paris, in order, with the greatest secrecy, to devise the plan of an invasion with Carnot. He gained the sanction of the Directory and of the Minister of Marine for his plan, which was kept as absolutely secret from every one, without exception, as was a year afterwards Bonaparte's adventurous project of an expedition to the East. In the mean time Hoche met with great obstruction, delays, and resistance, but towards the close of the year 1795 he succeeded in collecting an army and a fleet, which, indeed, he could only use during the period in which the English (who are very different seamen from the French) could not keep the sea; that is, he was obliged to expose his armament to all the risks and dangers of the violent winter storms. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, who was to take the command of this French fleet, assembled in Brest, and consisting of

* J. H. Tooke played an important part in the transactions of the first year of the reign of George III. The affairs of this year fill the whole of the first volume of his *Memoirs*, published by Stephens in 1813. He became afterwards distinguished for his famous and very original inquiries into the principles of philosophical grammar, entitled “*Ἐπεια Πτερόεντα*, or, *Diversions of Purley*;” but still more celebrated as an opponent of Fox, by his “*Two Pair of Portraits*,” 1788.

† In the State Trials, edited by Howell, the three trials of Horne Tooke, Jackson, and Stone, occupy the greatest part of the 1438 columns of the 25th Part.

eighteen ships of the line and thirteen frigates, besides transports for 25,000 men, preferred resigning his command to suffering himself to be employed in such a foolhardy winter expedition.

Morard de Galles was appointed commander-in-chief in Villaret's stead, and Bouvet his vice-admiral. The fleet, however, suffered considerable damage on the 14th December, from want of skill on the part of the sailors, as it was leaving the harbour of Brest. In the passage through the strait of Raz, on their way to the open sea, several of the ships were considerably injured, or altogether lost, and soon afterwards the whole fleet was scattered by violent storms. Bouvet, with the squadron under his command, reached Bantry Bay, in the south of Ireland, and then waited in vain for the other ships, from the 24th till the 27th of December. Hoche alone was acquainted with the secrets of the expedition; and Bouvet, being wholly without intelligence or instructions, singularly enough sailed directly back to Brest; the other ships arrived, after his departure, one by one. Hoche, not finding Bouvet at the place of rendezvous, was most unwillingly compelled to give up the expedition, and did so with the liveliest expressions of youthful despair. By this useless expedition the French not only lost the immense sum expended on fitting out their armaments, but three ships of the line and two frigates by accidents at sea, and one frigate and two corvettes taken by the English. On this occasion, moreover, the people of Ireland exhibited a very different feeling from that which had been calculated on by the revolutionary committee in Paris and Ireland, who had arranged the plan of the expedition with Hoche. Every one, the Catholics not excepted, as was publicly declared by the lord-lieutenant, showed the greatest zeal and eagerness to oppose the invasion by a foreign power; and yet the English government behaved as harshly after the event as it had done before. The revolutionary party in Ireland had an ordinary representative, secretly furnished with full powers, in Paris, and in the summer of 1797 they sent thither an extraordinary ambassador. This led to a new agreement, which was attended with as melancholy consequences for the Irish as the former expedition had been for the French. It had been agreed that a combined fleet from Holland and Brest should sail to the coast of Ireland, to support an insurrection against the English power. The Dutch Admiral de Winter sailed with his fleet, but was fallen in with and beaten by Admiral Duncan, whilst the Brest fleet never ventured to leave the harbour, and the Irish were left wholly to themselves.

In 1797 the Irish were at last driven to desperation by the conduct of Lord Camden, an English jurist, who was lord-lieutenant, the injustice of their own parliament, the brutality of their countrymen the Orangemen, and the oppressions and insolence of the English soldiers quartered upon them; it is obvious, however, from the transactions between the chiefs of the Catholic conspiracy in Ireland and the French government, that there was a great and

mutual want of confidence. One great stumbling-block was, that the French insisted on sending 50,000 men to Ireland, whereas the Irish were desirous of accepting only 10,000 men and 40,000 stand of arms. In the mean time, the English paid people to fan the flame, to act as spies in Ireland, and afterwards to come forward as witnesses in due time, in those incessant prosecutions for high treason by which the whole country was terrified, and the expense of which ruined many of the richer Catholics. The measures of the Plutocrats were precisely similar to those of the *sans culottes*. The sanctity of private correspondence was violated, and persons belonging to the first families suffered themselves to be degraded into spies. Precisely the very people who, to all appearance, were most zealous in the cause of liberty, were bought up by the English; and no one, therefore, will be astonished to hear that the state trials of the years 1794-99 fill three thick octavo volumes, which, from their small print and divided columns, contain materials for four folios.*

Unfortunately for Ireland, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt rendered it quite impossible for the Directory to avail itself of the favourable moment. They could not support the Irish with an army, as they had firmly promised, although the latter then began to rise in great masses. We do not believe, as has often been alleged, that the Directory did not fulfil its promise for the purpose of allowing the English and Irish to come into collision with one another, for we see that, just at the decisive moment, the Directory had no army at its disposal. In 1797 Hoche had been sent with his army to Germany, where he died in the same year. Bonaparte, it was true, was appointed to the command of the Army of the Ocean in his stead, but this was merely done in order to deceive the English respecting its destination. The fate of the Irish, and the issue of their struggle for their rights in 1798, might prove to every Anglo-maniac, if reason had any chance against prejudice, how dearly bought was the good fortune of the English, so splendidly extolled among us, and the glory of their deeds up to the peace of Amiens.

The English at that time acted precisely as the ministers of Louis Philippe have done in our own days. They followed exactly every step of the negotiations between the Irish committees in Paris and the French Directory, and never interfered till all was ready for explosion, and they had made themselves masters of the necessary judicial proofs of the conspiracy. In February, 1798, the English government arrested the Irish deputy, who had been carrying on negotiations with the English democrats. This deputy was provided with the necessary letters, and was seized on his journey back; and immediately afterwards the whole of the members of the committee were arrested in Dublin, on the 12th of March, 1798, as they were assembled in the house of Oliver Bond.

The whole machinery of the English power was now put in motion;

* State Trials, vols. xxv., xxvi., xxvii.

Lord Camden's courts, the parliament and the troops, all were let loose upon the conspirators, whilst the partisans of the latter called the people to arms: Ireland swam in blood. The struggle, however, was too unequal; all the advantages were on the side of England, who had called this civil war into being because it furnished it with a pretext for applying the system of the reign of terror in France to the evils of Ireland. The Irish were not deterred from their design by the arrest and prosecution of their leaders; they chose others, who called the Catholics to arms. Unfortunately, however, the risings were not simultaneous, but in one county after another. In our times, no undisciplined masses, however great their numbers, can contend, with any chance of success, against regular troops. No auxiliary forces from France having made their appearance in April and May, the ill-armed, and often unarmed, Irish levies were soon after put down—scattered or slain. Lord Camden was now no longer necessary: his bloody courts and tribunals had done their work, and a special commission was appointed in Dublin. In cases to which the commission was not applicable the upper house came to its aid, after the English fashion, by virtue of which a law was passed, whereby this or that man was declared guilty of high treason, and condemned to death.

Lord Camden's successor was Lord Cornwallis, the best general whom the English at that time had. He followed precisely the same course in Ireland as Hoche had done for the restoration of peace on the Loire, in Brittany, and Normandy. On the one hand, he adopted admirable measures to suppress the rebellion on all sides and to check its partisans, and at the same time proclaimed an amnesty. In order to prevent the French from taking any decisive step, the English caused negotiations to be opened with them at this very moment, through Lord Malmesbury, who was sent for that purpose to Lille: they were anxious to keep the Directory in play till their objects in Ireland had been fully attained. It was not till after the hitherto unconquered and armed Irishmen in the mountains of Wexford and Wicklow had accepted the amnesty offered by Lord Cornwallis, that any really active measures were taken in August by the French to send assistance to Ireland. The French had collected a number of ships in Rochefort, which, however, did not venture to put to sea together; and in the mean time they sent three frigates and two corvettes, with 1100 men, to the coast of Ireland. This expedition was undertaken against the wish of the Irish, and especially of the Protestants, by whom the French were not supported, because there was not the least chance of success. This little band was placed under the command of General Humbert, who had been Hoche's second in command in the former expedition to Bantry Bay. The squadron escaped the English, and effected a landing on the 22nd of August in the Bay of Killala, in Connaught. As Cornwallis was not aware of the number of the French who had landed, and as some thousands of an undisciplined rabble immediately joined them, the

landing at first excited universal alarm, although General Humbert found it extremely difficult to keep up such order or discipline amongst this crowd of irregular auxiliaries as would prevent them from molesting the peaceable inhabitants.

Fortune was at first favourable to the French, for Humbert surprised General Lake in Castlebar, the chief town of Mayo, and compelled him to evacuate the place, with the loss of 800 men and some pieces of cannon. He soon, however, found his expectations deceived, and nowhere met with any large body of insurgents among the Irish. In hopes of finding such bodies Humbert had advanced to Tuam, when he heard that Lord Cornwallis, with the whole collected force of the English army then in Ireland, was in full march against him. Humbert immediately saw that all attempts to withstand this force would be vain; but he nevertheless magnanimously resolved to keep the field as long as possible, in order to give time to the irregular and undisciplined Irish levies to disperse and to make the best of their way to their huts before they were taken and shot. The small band of French under Humbert, after a brave and determined resistance near Ballinamuck, was completely surrounded on the 8th of September; the greater portion of the Irish had, however, in the mean time dispersed.

After Humbert's capitulation, these unfortunates were hunted out and killed by their English pursuers in a brutal manner. On the capitulation, the English were no little astonished to learn how small the number of the French was which had created such a general alarm and offered such a bold resistance at Ballinamuck.

In the following month Wolfe Tone, who, through his companions in Paris, and especially through his influence with Hoche, Clarke, and Carnot, had succeeded in securing French aid to his countrymen, and had formerly been the instrument of founding the Society of United Irishmen, was taken prisoner at sea and treated as a traitor, although he produced a French officer's commission, and proved that he had been long in the French service. At length, the small French fleet collected in Brest put to sea, in order to effect a landing on the coast of Ulster, but Admiral Warren fell in with and defeated the fleet on the 12th of October, 1798, and captured the *Hoche*, a ship of the line. On board this ship was found Theobald Wolfe Tone, and in spite of all appeals to the law of nations, to his rights as a prisoner of war and as a French officer, he was placed before the *revolutionary tribunal* in Dublin—not indeed so called by the English, but styled a court-martial—and, as a matter of course, condemned. It was in vain that the Court of King's Bench issued their writ of *habeas corpus* in order to prevent the prisoner from being judicially murdered.*

* In the short report of the trial of the founder of the Society of United Irishmen, State Trials, vol. xxvii. col. 618-626, there will be found not only the whole of the documents connected with the trial and the brutal conduct of the English, but an account of the life of the accused, and of the manner in which he formed

C.—COUP D'ETAT ON THE 10TH FRUCTIDOR (SEPT. 4, 1797) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE.

We have already shown (A.) what the causes were which induced the great body of the middle classes, in the years 1796 and 1797, to prefer electing, as members of the legislature, decisive partisans of the Bourbons to the friends and co-operators of the five directors. In addition to the disorder of the finances and to the national bankruptcy produced by the destruction of paper money, and besides the severe laws of the 3rd of Brumaire, we have there also referred to the immorality and licentiousness which Barras, and all that assembled around him as a court, openly exhibited,—Reubel's regard for the contractors, speculators, commissaries, and usurers who payed him homage,—the ridiculous hatred of La Revelliére Lepaux against Christianity, priests, and the Pope, and the absurd pains which he took to found his new religion of Theophilanthropism, and to become the patriarch and prophet of this sentimental nonsense. It moreover appears, from the papers which Moreau sent to the Directory after the 10th Fructidor, but which he had kept from it as long as they might prove ruinous to Pichegrus, that there were very many amongst those who were called royalists, opponents of the directors, who altogether despaired of the old line of the Bourbons, and were even at that time working zealously in favour of the sons of the Duke of Orleans, who had been executed. The struggle with the socialists and ultra-revolutionists, to whom we have already referred, compelled the Directory for some time to keep constantly warning the people against the return of the reign of terror, to prosecute the terrorists, and to expose itself to general contempt, by treating with those whom it prosecuted as with a recognised and formal power. Babœuf, for example, declared, when he was invited to name his conditions of reconciliation, that he took it for granted the directors would negotiate with him as with an equal in station.

It cannot, therefore, be a matter of surprise, that Hoche and Bonaparte, each at the head of an army, conducted themselves as if they were wholly independent of the Directory; and that Pichegrus, at the head of a third army, entered into negotiations with the Prince of Condé. In December, 1795, Pichegrus was ready, if the Austrians would follow him, to lead his army through Alsace to Paris; and Moreau, who found all the documents in Klinglin's baggage wagons, only delivered them to the government in September, 1797, when they had long known the whole story. All France, there-

and carried on his connexion with Clarke, Carnot, and Hoche. It is remarkable, that Major Armstrong, who had suffered himself to be employed in a very ambiguous part, was amongst the number of his judges; and that Lord Cornwallis paid no respect to the writ of *habeas* issued by the King's Bench, but prevented its execution by force. The unfortunate man, after his sentence was pronounced, cut his own throat; and his widow received a pension from France.

fore, felt, in 1797, that the government must be changed; and even Carnot, who was a republican of the Cato school, joined the enemies of the Directory, of which he was himself a member. Pichegrus had at length resolved to carry his design into execution in March, 1796, when the Directory compelled him to lay down his command, without, however, venturing to call him to an account. The government was so totally powerless in opposition to the general, that, in order to be rid of him, they offered him the embassy to Stockholm, which he rejected. From that time he retired to his estate, which became the centre of all the Bourbon cabals, supported by English money, and carried on by Wickham, Crawfurd, and other intriguers. Communications, too, had at that time been opened with Barras; but the negotiations had no other result than that of forming the basis to a second on a later occasion, when Barras became desirous of securing to himself an important situation.

From that time forward General Pichegrus was regarded as being as decisive a royalist as General Willot, with whom we find Bonaparte (as appears from his correspondence) in vehement dispute from the very beginning of the year 1796.* Willot, first of all, prolonged the war in La Vendée; then, as commandant of the 8th military division, which occupied the south of France, availed himself of the royalists in that quarter to keep up a continuance of the disturbances, in order that, under this pretext, he might constantly reinforce his army, and hold it ready for action when the moment for decision arrived. He excited in Bonaparte the warmest indignation, by not suffering the divisions to march, which the latter demanded for the purpose of carrying on the war in Italy. In his letters to the Directory, Bonaparte accused him of being the cause of all the cruelties and pillage which were perpetrated in the south of France, and called upon the directors to dismiss him from his command. This, however, was prevented by Carnot, who regarded him as a sort of equipoise to Bonaparte, whose views he had already seen through, and for the same reason Carnot sent his *protégé*, Clarke, to Italy, to observe the movements of the commander-in-chief, and to curb them when possible.

When the lot fell upon Letourneur, who was a captain of engineers, to retire from the Directory (he afterwards conducted the negotiations with Lord Malmesbury in Lille), and the former Marquis Barthelemy, who had been ambassador in Switzerland, and prepared the conclusion of a peace with Prussia and Spain, was

* Bonaparte's violent reproaches, complaints, and demands, may be seen in the "Correspondance Inédite," vol. ii., pp. 86, 87. Willot's defence on the part of the Directory, in the letter of the latter, l. c., p. 176. In this letter, amongst other things, it is said: "Le général Willot n'a pas cessé de donner des preuves de son patriotisme à l'armée des Pyrénées, où il s'est beaucoup distingué; c'est lui qui a préparé en partie la pacification réelle de la Vendée, si glorieusement achevée par le général-en-chef Hoche, et sa conduite dans cette circonstance est une preuve de ses sentiments républicains, qui détruit tout espèce de soupçon d'attachement de sa part à la royauté et à ses partisans."

chosen in his stead, Carnot united with him, and those two formed an opposition minority in the Directory. The new third of the Council of Five Hundred, which had been elected shortly before the new director, consisted, if not of royalists, at least of opponents to Jacobinism; it might therefore be said, with some appearance of truth, that the majority of the members of the legislature consisted of royalists. From the moment in which this new third entered the councils (May 20th, 1797), there was a continual effort to conform more and more to the old order of things, which no one will disapprove who reflects upon the change so very easily effected in 1804.

By the elections of the 20th of May, or, as it was then called, of the 1st Prairial, not only Pichegrus and Willot found their way into the legislature, but the former was chosen by a very unusual majority to fill the office of president of the Five Hundred. In the very first sitting, the excluding decree of the 3rd of Brumaire, by virtue of which 190 former deputies were prohibited from residing in Paris, was repealed. Aymé, Mersan, Poissart, Gau, Ferrant Vailland, and Lecerf, who had been excluded in the previous year, as opponents of the existing order of things, were now invited to take their places amongst the Five Hundred. Barthélémy's election also as a director (on the 24th and 26th of May) was promoted by the friends of the old order of things. From this moment the *salons* and journals became royalist; and as early as June, the founder of Theophilanthropism, and enemy of Christianity in the Directory, was no little alarmed, when Camille Jourdan proposed a revision of the whole system of law respecting the clergy and public worship.

The directors managed their affairs just as the ministers of Louis Philippe have done since 1830; many persons, therefore, who were certainly not royalists, as, for example, Dupont and Hardy, the Girondist, attached themselves to the majority, and spoke concerning the then government of France, in language which might also be used in reference to the present one.* From that time there was open war between the majority of the directors united with the minority of the councils, and the majority of the councils united with the majority of the directors. The partisans of the opponents of Jacobinism instituted a club in Clichy; the three directors looked for assistance to Hoche, who then commanded the army of the Sambre and

* Hardy's speech, from which we quote, will be found in the *Moniteur*: "Les usurpateurs," says he, "ont tout déshonoré; les hommes de bien ont été chassés des emplois publics, et ces emplois ont été livré à la sottise, à l'immoralité, au fanatisme, au brigandage." Dupont de Nemours publicly used similar language, playing upon the double meaning of *volant* (stealing or flying): "Tout le monde aujourd'hui veut être du camp *volant*, parceque trop de gens dans la révolution ont perdu l'habitude du travail. Et il y a peu de gouvernans assez grands pour n'être pas tentés de gouverner un camp volant. Les subalternes donnent des voix dont on dispose dans les élections, et les places supérieures sont des amies utiles parmi ceux qui pourront avoir à les demander un jour."

Meuse, but they sought to organise anew the old system of Jacobinism. With this view they availed themselves of one Lenoir Laroche, who at a later period was, for a short time, minister of police, or of another enthusiast for liberty, who played so many characters, that the mere enumeration of them will serve to show what value is to be attached to the republicanism of vain and idle prattlers.

This man's name was Trouvé; he wrote a great deal in the *Moniteur*—was a tool of Talleyrand's—became a baron of the empire under Bonaparte; and afterwards, under the Restoration, was the editor of a paper (*Le Drapeau Blanc*) which preached up the most shameless priestcraft and despotism. These two persons made a sort of official declaration, that the institution of the club in Clichy had made the opening of a new Jacobin club, under the name of a Constitutional Circle, a matter of necessity. This was a kind of prelude to the *coup d'état* which Reubel, as Carnot informs us in his letter of justification,* had declared to be necessary immediately after the elections of the year V. No one entertained the least doubt that the directors would have recourse to violence; and the guard of the legislative body was too weak and too vacillating to make a successful resistance. Aubry (Bonaparte's former opponent in 1794), to whom the charge of the safety of the legislative body was especially committed, had therefore proposed, as early as June, that the guard should be strengthened by the addition of a company of artillery and a squadron of cavalry; he failed, however, because his friends were too irresolute. The directors thought they might reckon with confidence on Bonaparte, because he was an opponent of Pichegru, the president of the Five Hundred, and the deadly foe of Willot. His despotic conduct in Italy had also been warmly opposed by Carnot; and the approval of his measures in Italy, and especially of his conduct towards Venice and Genoa, was the result of Carnot's being outvoted by his three colleagues.† Bonaparte and Hoche at length declared open war against the councils, because in them their arbitrary and irresponsible administration of the public monies had been made known to the nation by the public speeches of many of their members. At that time it was publicly said in the legislative body, and repeated in all possible variety of forms in the newspapers, that the two generals on whom the majority of the Directory relied as the mainstays of the republican constitution, looked upon the treasurers appointed by the state as merely their own paymasters. This applied equally to Villemanty, paymaster of the Italian army under Bonaparte, as to Villaume, who

* Carnot, "Reponse," p. 129, observes: "Le projet de mutiler la représentation nationale fut formé dès le tems des élections de l'an V. Ce fut Reubel qui le conçut, les autres ont acquiescé à ce projet, quand on a leur montré les détails et qu'on leur a assuré le succès."

† *Moniteur*, An V., No. 301. "Le Directoire exécutif vous déclare qu'il approuve pleinement la conduite politique et militaire que vous avez tenue en Italie et notamment à l'égard de Venise et de Gênoa."

held the same office in the army of the Sambre and Meuse under Hoche. Villemanty, it was said, had paid a full million of contribution monies to the credit of the naval chest of Toulon instead of to the national treasury. This was destined for Bonaparte's secret expedition to Egypt; whilst General Hoche furnished no accurate account at all, but left behind considerable sums in the chest of the finance commission at Bonn, which was intended for the equipment and march of a military expedition in favour of the majority of the Directory.

These speeches at length excited the anger of the two generals, who then evidently had the destinies of France in their hands, against the majority of the Council of Five Hundred, and disposed them fully to concur in the necessity of a *coup d'état*. The Council of Five Hundred had passed a resolution to deprive the generals of any share in the administration of the treasury or of public monies in general. The resolution was not, indeed, carried into effect, because the Council of Ancients rejected the motion; both the generals were, however, in consequence, so angry with those who were called royalists, that the directors were able to reckon with confidence on their aid. Reubel and Barras first turned to Hoche, whose army was nearest. Hoche was more vehement and hot-blooded than Bonaparte, and did not know how to guard himself so carefully from appearing to be the mere tool of the directors, whilst by his generals and others he promoted their views, as Bonaparte did. Hoche, without intrigue or pretence, was anxious immediately to draw the sword; which, with good reason, appeared to the Jacobins a dangerous course. We must lament, for the sake of Bonaparte's reputation, that on this, as well as on other occasions, the servile people who surrounded him at St. Helena, and wrote down and interpolated everything at their discretion, which he, for the most part, falsely or boastingly dictated to them in confidential conversation or among friends, should have had so little delicacy as to have published his expressions concerning Hoche.*

The three directors reckoned upon Hoche's animosity in consequence of the violent speeches against his extortions on the Rhine and in Germany, and the keeping back on their order, the payments from the public treasury; they therefore offered him the office of minister of war. He came, in fact, to Paris at the end of May, 1797. On his arrival he immediately took the necessary measures for a *coup d'état*. He set his troops in motion, and even ordered them to advance to a distance from Paris within which troops were absolutely forbidden to approach without a special vote and

* Memorial de St. Hélène, vol. iii., p. 275: "Hoche cherchait toujours à se faire un parti et n'obtenait que des créatures; moi, je m'étais créé une immensité de partisans sans rechercher nullement la popularité. De plus, Hoche étoit d'une ambition hostile, provoquante; il étoit l'homme à venir de Strasbourg avec 25,000 hommes, saisir le gouvernement par force, tandis que moi je n'avois jamais eu qu'une politique patiente, conduite toujours par l'esprit du tems et les circonstances du moment."

permission of the legislature. Everything was ready for a *coup d'état*, and Madame de Staél, in her book, boasts that, having effected the return of her favourite, Talleyrand, distinguished for his courter qualities, she obtained for him from the Jacobins the office of minister of foreign affairs, which he entered upon just as Carnot's friend, Cochon, was obliged to resign the ministry of police. The vehement Hoche, who wished to have recourse to open force, fell out, however, with the sneaking directors, who disavowed his acts, and threw all the blame upon him, so that he was most bitterly and fiercely assailed in public speeches, and in all the journals of the day. When the public clamour respecting the detention of the money in Bonn became long and loud, and Dufresne publicly alleged that these monies were kept back to equip a division against Paris, the directors disavowed their own orders; and as the general, without paying any respect to the constitution, caused his troops to advance through Soissons and La Ferté Alais, within the prescribed distance of twelve hours from Paris, the whole blame was thrown upon him. Hoche at length burst out; haughtily spurned the ministry, publicly threatened, in the most contemptuous manner, as regarded Reubel and Barras, that he was determined to expose their deception, falsehood, and lies, and, full of indignation, set out for the army.* His sudden death soon after was ascribed to poison;—we do not, however, believe this assertion.

An appeal was now made to Bonaparte, who then publicly made the most vehement declarations against all those persons who were dissatisfied with his dictatorship in Italy, and whom he stigmatised as royalists; and, moreover, he caused what were called addresses to be forwarded to Paris from all the divisions of his army and their leaders, with the exception of Bernadotte, but kept himself at a cold distance from the three directors. He sent Augereau, who was a native of Paris—a man of no political importance at any time, but a brutal and capital swordsman—to Paris with some captured standards, in order that he might there unite and bring together under his command the numerous body of officers and soldiers who were in and around that city on furlough. The first step was taken in July, by the removal of the able and honourable Petit from the office of minister of war, because he had made some public complaints of Hoche and the three directors, for having ordered the marching of troops without his knowledge. The office was transferred to Baron Scherer, who had also been a creature of Reubel's, and continued so to the end. Still further advances in the same direction would have been made, had not Carnot at that time been president of the Directory for three months. He ought to have been succeeded in the chair by

* Villaume, paymaster of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, writing to a friend in Paris on this subject, says as follows: “Le général se plaint beaucoup de la conduite du Directoire, qui a voulu l'inculper pour se justifier. Il paroit qu'il va mettre au jour des éclaircissements qui ne tendront pas à faire improuver ce dernier.”

Barthelemy. La Reveillière was, however, preferred, and he at length sprang the mine, which had long been charged.

On the 14th of July Bonaparte had gained the approval of his soldiers, collected together in divisions after the fashion of clubs, of the dreadful addresses already referred to, and which were read before them at their meetings. On the 14th of August the divisions of Massena, Joubert, and Augereau, were compelled to play a threatening farce and to send addresses to Paris, which bore as strong a resemblance to the speeches and addresses of the Paris *sans-culottes* of 1793, as one egg does to another. Bernadotte at first refused to allow his division to be used in this way as a political tool, and when he at length complied, his address was composed in a very different tone from the others. The other addresses, sworn to on the altar of their country (we have already called them a farce), and containing nothing but the expression of a desire for the utter extirpation of conspirators and traitors, were carried to Paris by the chief of Bonaparte's staff. This was Berthier, the first who introduced the fashion of enthusiasm for the cause of America, then, like Madame de Staël, became a great advocate for the introduction of the English constitution into France; and afterwards, still more willingly, accepted a principality as the price of his devotion to Bonaparte.

The three Jacobinical directors, who had great experience in such things, established a kind of revolutionary committee in Paris. They themselves sat as members of this committee along with Sotin, Talleyrand and Merlin, who were ministers of state, and the deputies Sieyes, Treilhard, and Boulay de la Meurthe. All measures for the execution of the plans determined upon by the committee were entrusted to Reubel's creature, Sherer, the minister of war, with the assistance of Augereau, who remained for some time in Paris. Madame de Staël and her *salons*, in which her old friends, Berthier and Talleyrand, were always present, were at this time favourable to Jacobinism, and in them Benjamin Constant recruited new partisans among the deputies for the three directors.* The Council of Five Hundred thought they would be able to contend with decrees against the military measures of the men

* Madame de Staël and B. Constant sent an invitation to Thibadeau and dined with him alone. On this occasion they declared their views of the state of things after the following fashion: "J'acceptais un diner chez Mad. de Staël avec Benj. Constant: il eut lieu le 26 Thermidor, nous n'étions que nous trois. Ils me dirent: La majorité du corps législatif est royaliste, il y a cent quatre-vingt-dix députés qui ont contracté l'engagement de rétablir le prétendant sur le trône, la majorité du Conseil des Anciens veut transferer le corps législatif à Rouen à cause de sa proximité du théâtre de la Chouannerie, mais le Directoire ne quittera point Paris, et il y restera cent trente députés fidèles. Le Directoire doit être désormais le seul point de ralliement des républicains. Ce sont les attaques des royalistes qui ont inspiré de la frayeur au Directoire, et la frayeur a amené les mesures hostiles. On ne peut pas dans l'état actuel des choses, attendre l'année prochaine; le nouveau tiers sera encore pire que le dernier nomme."—Mem., vol. ii., p. 344.

who had formerly caused blood to flow in streams, and immortalised the names of Thermidor and Vendémiaire by their crimes, and they were necessarily obliged to succumb.

Bonaparte was invited to Paris. He took good care, however, not to form a union with these audacious criminals, although he lent them generals and soldiers. Augereau was appointed commandant of Paris, or, as it was then called, of the 17th military division, and, as such, collected a general staff around himself. Dammartin, another general of the Italian army, received the command of the artillery; Verdierès was made town-major, and Chérin was entrusted with the guard of the Directory, whilst Bonaparte's general military command was extended to Lyons. Shortly before the events of Fructidor, Kleber and Bernadotte also came to Paris. On the 17th of August the garrison of Paris was reinforced with cavalry, and seventeen pieces of artillery, lying at Meudon, were brought into the capital. The hall-inspectors, appointed for the protection of the legislature, opposed nothing to all these preparations, except useless complaints to the minister of war, who, as is customary in such cases, gave them an evasive answer. From this moment open war was commenced: Reubel and Barras drew around them soldiers, terrorists of the old times, and deputies, whilst the legislature made speeches and passed decrees against the generals and directors, but could never succeed in having the national guard organised. The majority of the legislature was therefore treated with open contempt on the 12th of Fructidor, for its own guard was exercising and firing in the Champs Elysées, without any notice whatever of such an event being given to the legislative body. On the following day the whole garrison of Paris was collected on the plain of Grenelle, where the artillery manœuvred and fired. The roar of the cannon was heard in the hall of the Five Hundred. Thibadeau informs us that he dined with Scherer, the minister of war, on the 14th, and that Generals Lemoine, Chérin, Humbert, Jabé, and Verdierès, who were also there, said quite openly that it was all over with the majority of the members of the legislature.

The projected *coup d'état* would have been carried into effect on the 16th Fructidor had not that been the 2nd of September, the recollection of which the Jacobin originators of the revolution of Fructidor did not wish to recall: its execution was therefore put off till the 18th, or 4th of September. On that day Augereau undertook the brutal task of arresting the majority of the Council of the Five Hundred in the Tuilleries, and of the Council of Ancients in the Palais Bourbon, whilst the minority of the Council of the Five Hundred, with the three Jacobin directors, were assembled in the Theatre Français, and the members of the Council of Ancients in the School of Medicine, to give some appearance of legality to this violence perpetrated upon their colleagues. Augereau took military possession of the gardens of the Tuilleries, and planted cannon therein;

at the same time, however, he altogether rejected the proffered aid of the mob of the Faubourgs, which was put in motion by the Directory, although he himself had been in intimate connexion with such men as Santerre, Rossignol, Tunk, and Chateauneuf Randon.

Augereau no sooner appeared in the Tuileries than Ramel, the commander of the guard of the legislative body, was forsaken by his own men. Augereau himself tore the epaulettes from his shoulders, and, with his own hand, took both him and General Pichegru, president of the Five Hundred, prisoners. At the very moment in which the president and the majority of the deputies were arrested, and Barthelemy and Carnot were to have been seized, the three directors and the minority of the council appointed a commission to condemn their opponents—for trial was altogether out of the question. Barthelemy was arrested, but Carnot was concealed by a friend, and afterwards fortunately escaped to Germany. Of the fifty-one deputies arrested with Barthelemy, twenty were condemned, not, as formerly, to death, but to transportation to Guiana, with its unhealthy climate and uncultivated soil. It is maddening to read the manner in which such men as Pichegru, Barthelemy, and their companions in misfortune were treated, partly on board transports at sea, and partly on the passage to Sinamari—more cruelly and barbarously than criminals of the lowest description in the galleys usually are.

All the papers which Reubel and his colleagues afterwards published, including those sent in at a later period by Moreau, and found in Klinglin's carriage, in reality furnish proofs of nothing more than the miserable intrigues in which Pichegru was involved, and that he was bribed with English money. The chief promoters and leaders of these cabals appear to have been the Prince of Condé, Baroness Reich in Offenburg, and General Klinglin. These were all upon a level with the English diplomatists, who were for the most part deceived and cheated by adventurers such as Wickham, Crawfurd, and Drake; like them they were betrayed by equivocal people, such as D'Entraigues, Dumoustier, and Montgaillard, and therefore deceived by double spies. The so-called Count d'Entraigues, who, God knows how, had usurped the title of count in the very time of the revolution, and intrigued for the whole world, and at last, in 1804, even for Russia, played a prominent part in these affairs. What sort of a man this count really was is known to every one who is acquainted with the history of Bonaparte. Bonaparte caused the scheming count to be seized upon and carried off with all his papers from Venice and brought to Milan. In Milan the regular story of a conspiracy was manufactured out of the documents, and afterwards gravely announced as the discovery of a grand plot. The count found the best reasons for keeping silence, and was dismissed with rich presents.

From this time forth the government of France became again

wholly Jacobin; for the vacancies left by the forcible expulsion and arrest of the two directors were filled up by Merlin, the jurist, and François de Neufchateau, a most experienced man, not in business, but in turning phrases and in poetry; he was a very *médiocre*, but, as is generally said, a good man. Merlin, who had the high reputation of being the first jurist in France, was the man best fitted in the whole country for any legal perversion, and he had long since prepared the ordinances which were to be issued: they only waited for confirmation. Their tenor was as follows:—

1. “The electoral assemblies of forty-eight departments, and the result of their elections, are declared null and void; whilst those of the two Nethes and Lot, which had been disallowed by the legislature, now dissolved, are declared good.

2. “The first two articles of the recently repealed law of the 3rd of Brumaire are declared to be again in full force.

3. “The excluded deputies, who had been allowed to resume their seats on the admission of the new third, are again expelled.

4. “All Frenchmen whose names were not definitively stricken out of the list of *émigrés* are obliged to leave Paris within four-and-twenty hours, on pain of being tried by a court-martial.

5. “The law of the 26th of Vendémiaire respecting public worship is declared to be again in force; instead, however, of the oath therein prescribed, a new oath of fidelity and attachment to the constitution of the year III. is to be taken, and (which is extremely absurd) an oath of hatred to kingly power and anarchy.”

At this period, also, those members of the house of Bourbon who had been suffered to remain unmolested during the reign of terror, were compelled to quit the kingdom. These were the Dowager-Duchess of Orleans, the Duchess of Bourbon, and Prince Conti. All the newspapers and periodical journals, as well as the places at which they were printed, were to be under the *surveillance* of the police; and the national guard, whose organisation had been resolved upon, were not to be enrolled. All the foregoing and many similar things were hastily decreed on the 4th of September, and on the 5th no less than twenty-one journalists were carried to the criminal prison. It was at first resolved to put these men immediately on their trial, but the matter was afterwards made much easier. The liberal Bailleul was the organ of the directors, and this man, who afterwards wrote two volumes full of invectives against Madame de Staél, was at that time one of the props of her party. He succeeded in having a revolting law passed. On his motion it was resolved by the legislative councils immediately on the 6th, That all the proprietors, directors, editors, and contributors to twenty-one periodicals, should be transported to Guiana. Other laws of a similar character were passed. The whole administration of the department of the Seine was altered, the twelve mayors of Paris removed, and twelve others

appointed in their stead. What was called the central office of police was retained, and similar ones everywhere established. The scandalous and contemptible men who were placed in offices of trust and authority by Barras, Reubel, Talleyrand, and Merlin, furnished Bonaparte with reason enough to show, on every opportunity, that he wished to have nothing to do with the originators of the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor. In consequence of the address of thanks presented to him by the Directory, Augereau became so insolent as to issue an unintelligible and absurd circular even to Bonaparte's divisions. Bonaparte took advantage of this to make both Augereau and the directors feel how far they were beneath him.

CHAPTER II.

EUROPE FROM THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO TILL BONAPARTE'S CONSULATE.

§ I.

ROBBERIES AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE OF THE DIRECTORY.

A.—AGAINST SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

IMMEDIATELY after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor France threatened not only Italy and Switzerland, but also the Peninsula, with a complete dissolution of the existing order of things,—the two former, because a great part of their own population were desirous of a revolution, and the latter, because its rulers, from mean and cowardly fear, gave up their own subjects and the whole power of the kingdom to the French. After the death of Charles III., Spain, under Charles IV., may be said to have been under the absolute rule of Godoy, the guardsman, who, for reasons into which it is not here necessary to enter, was the queen's favourite, and to whom the king was as liberal of his honours as his wife was of her favours. This Don Godoy was first created Duke of Alcudia and Prince de la Paz, for which reason he is usually, though not quite correctly, called Prince of the Peace. He had neither education, dignity, knowledge, industry, nor diplomatic experience, but was in fact a scandal and object of contempt to all good Spaniards. Notwithstanding this, the minister Florida Blanca, and nine months after, Aranda, the ablest of all Spanish diplomatists, were obliged to make way for this creature of the queen. As early as 1792 he ventured, as Duke of Alcudia, to undertake to conduct the business of the government, of which he knew nothing. At this time he enjoyed a short run of popularity, because he declared war against France, when all the magnanimous sacrifices offered by Charles IV. to save the life of the unfortunate Louis XVI. had been rejected. The noble enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and their sacrifices, when they thought they saw in the French nothing but enemies of God and of kings, were shamefully abused, and the popularity of the favourite again speedily disappeared. The war with the republicans of France was extremely popular among the Spaniards, who were strongly attached to the church and devoted to monarchy, whilst in the rest of Europe the war was detested by the people. The patriotism of the Spanish people was exhibited in this war in the most splendid light.

The nation was called upon to come forward and make voluntary contributions for the support of the war, and the Spanish people

most nobly responded to the appeal. From the accounts given, it appears that the sum raised in Spain, in this way, was more considerable than that which was raised in a similar manner in cases of necessity in France, or even in England.* The feudal nobility presented themselves with their vassals according to the usage of ancient times: the smugglers and even the monks formed regiments. The government had allowed everything necessary for the defence of the country to fall to ruin, and the regular army was reduced to 40,000 men. The efforts made by the nation soon placed them in a condition not only to defend the frontiers, but to penetrate on two sides into France. Godoy, however, ruined everything. His plans of attack were badly designed, and his generals executed them worse. When the French advanced, they showed themselves wholly ignorant of mountain warfare, and were therefore driven out of Biscay; whilst on the other side the enemies also appeared on the Ebro. When Catalonia and Biscay were almost lost and Castille threatened, it appeared so great a piece of good fortune to the king and his wife, that their favourite had purchased the peace of Basle at any price, that they immediately raised him to the dignity of a prince. The nation was, however, deeply offended, and the favourite was obliged to secure for himself the protection of its enemies. The circumstances of the Spanish court, which could no longer rely either on the grandes or the people, compelled him afterwards to enter into a most ruinous alliance with France against England, which gave up the whole of the Spanish colonies as a prey to the British, and was the cause of the total destruction of both its sea and land forces, its havens and arsenals, in the service of France.

The smuggling, which the English openly carried on with the Spanish colonies with the knowledge and support of their own government, and the disputes concerning the settlements and fur trade, in Nootka Sound, and on the north-west coast of America, down as far as the Oregon territory, since a matter of strife between the Americans and English, had caused a breach between England and Spain as early as 1789-1790. The French revolution, however, had united both nations against the common enemy of the existing order of things everywhere. The Spanish and English fleets formed a combined force when the harbours of Toulon and Marseilles were to be blockaded, but the exclusion of the Spaniards from all participation in the occupation of Toulon, and from all share of the booty taken by the English, deeply offended the Spanish pride. The French, therefore, immediately after the peace of Basle, availed themselves of this feeling on the part of the Spaniards for the promotion of their own objects.

In 1796 the directors used all their efforts to induce Spain to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with France, which was as

* General Foy says: "Les dons gratuits de France, offerts à l'Assemblée Nationale en 1790, ont monté à cinq millions de francs; ceux d'Angleterre en 1793 à quarante-cinq; ceux d'Espagne, à soixante-treize."

much as to say that at that time they were desirous of securing all the sources of aid which Spain could furnish for the benefit of France. This view was adopted by Godoy, who at that time was attended by a guard, and kept a court, like a prince of the blood. All opportunities were embraced of flattering him and deceiving the weak king, by the influence which Bonaparte allowed the Spanish ambassador to have in all his negotiations with the Pope and the Italian princes, and by his apparent tenderness towards the Duke of Parma. Nothing, indeed, was spoken of but the renewal of the old family compact; but, as France was already at war, this meant nothing else than that Spain should, most foolishly, take upon itself the burden of the war. This incapable man, who had made himself master of the Spanish government, was the more severely blamed, because he gave his country into the hands of the French, for whom he had no liking. He had no prepossession either in favour of the French, or of the revolution, and the family compact of the two powers had been completely destroyed by the expulsion of the Bourbons from France. Notwithstanding all this, an offensive and defensive alliance of the most burdensome kind was signed at St. Ildefonso as early as the 19th of August, 1796, but the exchange of the ratifications was delayed till October, by the internal disputes in France. It becomes obvious how ruinous this treaty must have been for Spain, as soon as we cast our eyes over two or three of its articles.

The third article contains the following stipulation:—That on a requisition from either of the two powers, in the terms of the treaty, the other shall forthwith furnish a fleet of fifteen sail of the line, and collect the said fleet in the harbour appointed by the requiring power. Among these ships there were to be three three-deckers of 80 guns, and twelve from 70 to 76; together with these, there were to be twelve frigates, four corvettes, and eight transports, well manned and armed, with provisions on board for half a year, and equipments for a whole year. In the fifth article it is further provided that, in case of need, each shall furnish to the other 8000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. In such case, it is further added, such troops and ships shall be placed at the unconditional disposal of the requiring power, which shall also be empowered to send plenipotentiaries to examine whether everything pertaining to the armament has been fully supplied. The eighteenth article expressly states that this alliance was established for the advantage of France against England alone, and therefore against the only state whose enmity would necessarily be ruinous to Spain.* As early as the 1st of October, Spain issued a

* The treaty will be found in Martens' "Recueil," vol. vii.: "Supplements et continuation jusqu'aux Preliminaires de Léoben." The art. viii., p. 661, runs as follows: "L'Angleterre étant la seule puissance contra laquelle l'Espagne ait des griefs directs, la présente alliance n'aura son execution que contre elle pendant la guerre présente, et l'Espagne restera neutre à l'égard des autres puissances armées contre la république."

manifesto against England, and war was formally declared on the 8th. This manifesto is an interesting historical document on the trading and pillaging policy of England, and on all the brutalities perpetrated by the British on its weaker ally, even during the closest alliance with Spain.

Since the elevation of the house of Braganza, Portugal had been, as it were, an English province, and was protected by the English; but at the same time its inhabitants were forced to be large consumers of British goods. In consequence of its close alliance with England, Portugal had also taken part against the French revolution, with which the Portuguese had not the least concern, and had sent ships to the English fleet, as well as a select body of troops to co-operate with the Spaniards in the invasion of France. The nine ships of the line sent to England by the Portuguese never left Portsmouth harbour, but the six regiments of Portuguese infantry, with the proper complement of artillery, which joined in the undertaking against France, were regarded by the French as the best part of the whole army. For this reason the French, immediately after the conclusion of their close alliance with Spain, insisted not only upon the neutrality of the Portuguese, but required Spain to compel them to take part with her in the war against England.

At that time Queen Maria nominally ruled in Portugal; but as she was completely of unsound mind, a regency was appointed. The eldest prince being dead, Prince John, the second son, was the head of this commission; and he, by his monkish education, by the practice of mechanical religious exercises and ceremonies, which from use had become a necessity, had become wholly unfit for all secular affairs. The Prince of the Brazils, as the regent was called, had no passions and no sins—and did not, like the Spanish and Neapolitan kings, spend whole days in hunting—but he sang matins and vespers, and had the greatest delight in listening to the performance of masterpieces on the organ, which he had caused to be built under his own eyes in the church of Mafra. As other princes were ruled by their mistresses and favourites, the Regent of Portugal was governed by his confessors, whom he changed as often as others changed their favourites and lovers. The English and the clergy prevented the timid prince from making peace with revolutionary France, as the Spaniards had done, and when Spain threatened he became greatly alarmed. He wished for peace, which the Directory, from political reasons, at first offered on very favourable conditions.

When measures were adopted towards a peace between Portugal and France, Antonio Aranjo de Azevedo was sent to Paris from Holland, where he had made himself thoroughly acquainted with all the circumstances connected with the trade and with the merits of the disputes concerning the boundaries of Guiana, to negotiate respecting the conditions, or rather to come to an understanding with Barras and Talleyrand concerning a bargain of a similar description to that which the North Americans afterwards refused. Aranjo con-

sented to a payment of six millions, which remained a secret, and publicly a treaty very advantageous to Portugal was concluded, to which Talleyrand obtained the consent of the two councils after the *coup d'état* of the 18th Fructidor. The English influence in Lisbon, however, frustrated the effect of Aranjo's bribery. The Portuguese did not fulfil the conditions of ratifying the treaty within two months, because the cabals of the English caused so many delays that the French withdrew their consent. And very glad they were to have a pretext for keeping the Portuguese money and renouncing the treaty.

On the 26th of October the Directory declared the agreement with Portugal null and void,* and gave notice to Aranjo de Azevedo to quit Paris. He, indeed, remained behind, and on the 1st of December received the ratification of the treaty from Lisbon: the French, however, now refused to renew it on their part. Aranjo knew right well with whom he had to do, and therefore he had remained behind; but on this occasion he most imprudently offered them diamonds as a bribe, and thereby gave those sinners an opportunity of playing saints. He was arrested and sent to the Temple on the 31st of December, 1797, where he was kept till March, 1798. Barras and Talleyrand thus successfully cheated the Portuguese out of their money without granting them a peace; their attempt to sell a treaty to the North Americans failed; and had they been capable of shame, or sensible to disgrace, they would have felt themselves degraded in the face of all Europe.

B.—ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST NORTH AMERICA AND THE HANSE TOWNS.

In the year 1794 the North Americans had concluded a treaty with the English, by virtue of which the same advantages were granted to them as had been conceded to the French in 1778, as the only acknowledgment for the assistance given by them in the American war of freedom. This treaty was kept very secret, and only first made known in France in 1796. The news of its existence excited their warmest indignation, because they saw that the Americans had made those concessions, in order that they might become carriers to French ports of those English goods which the English could not convey in their own ships. The French were no sooner aware that these two trading nations, descended from the same stock, and at issue between themselves merely on questions of

* The treaty will be found in Martens' "Recueil," vol. vii., pp. 201-206. In page 207 is the following: "Le Directoire exécutif, considérant que la reine de Portugal, au lieu d'envoyer une ratification pure et simple du traité de paix, conclu avec le Directoire exécutif au nom de la République Français, le 23 Thermidor, An Cinq, dans le délai de deux mois fixé par le dit traité, a mis ses forts et ports principaux dans les mains de l'armée Anglaise, arrête ce qui suit: Le traité entre la République Française et la reine de Portugal conclu le 23 Thermidor, An Cinq, et non ratifié de la part de la reine de Portugal, est censé non avenu."

trade, money, and vanity, had united for the purpose of a mutually profitable deception upon them, than they began to have recourse to reprisals. The first step was taken in October, 1796, in the shape of an order for confiscating all English goods, of whatever kind, or whencesoever brought into France; and then, by a declaration of the 15th of December, all intercourse with North America was forbidden, till satisfaction was given for all the grievances and complaints of the French republic. A new minister whom the Americans sent to Paris was sent away by Talleyrand, and the old one, on taking his leave, was openly insulted by Barras. Barras, however, in close union with Talleyrand, both of whom, notwithstanding their great incomes, were continually in pecuniary difficulties, on account of their boundless extravagance and gambling propensities, became immediately afterwards anxious to heal the breach between the two republics, and to turn it to a profitable account.

The friendly relations of the North Americans with France were for a time altogether interrupted. The French minister in the United States returned to Paris in June, 1797, and the breaking out of a war seemed unavoidable, when suddenly the Americans suggested the idea of renewing, under certain modifications, the treaty of 1778, which had been abolished in the previous year. For this purpose they sent three representatives to Paris, and in October, 1797, they began a negotiation which issued in nothing; of which, however, they sent in a report, afterwards made public. By this report the whole of Europe was made acquainted with the miserable and mean conduct of the men to whom the destinies of France were at that time committed. Such of our readers as wish to have a thorough knowledge of the character of Talleyrand, who degraded Bonaparte in 1813, founded the whole present state system of Europe in 1814 and 1815, and established the King of France upon the throne in 1830, and afterwards was and remained the oracle of all monarchs or monarchical governments, must read and re-read the whole of the printed report of the American ambassadors; for our purpose, it is sufficient to allude to a few points in the report.

The first step towards a reconciliation was, that a sum of money should be raised for Talleyrand and Barras. Neither of these two personally entered upon the question with the Americans, but a great number of diplomatic creatures and adventurers, who always swarmed around Talleyrand, were employed to open the subject. Among these a person named Bellani, from Hamburgh, deserves especial mention. The Americans were given to understand that no steps would be taken towards the renewal of the treaty of 1778, did not the ambassadors first consent to a loan of 32,000,000 to the republic, and make a present—or, as their agents shamefully called it, send a *douceur* of 1,200,000 francs. As Barras and Talleyrand, according to the declaration of their agents, would not enter upon the question at all till the money affair was arranged, a long series of correspondence and negotiation on the one side and on the other took place,

till at length the American ambassadors took their departure. On their return their report of the demands made on them, in which the names of the agents were only marked by the letters X. Y. Z., was printed in all the newspapers, which were beyond the reach of the French. The Americans, moreover, were not satisfied with exposing the scandalous conduct of the French government, but passed a series of hostile resolutions against France, and in July, 1798, were already about to declare war.

Barras and Talleyrand, it is true, threw the shield of their protection over their agents; but we remember well that no man believed them. The Directory protested, and Talleyrand challenged, the American ministers to give the names of X. Y. Z., but we all, in foreign countries, to say nothing of the Parisians, knew that Bellani, Monteron, Saint Foix, André, d'Arbelle, and Madame de Vaubanon were the parties who had negotiated for Barras and Talleyrand. Bellani caused it to be published in all foreign journals at that time that he had said nothing, and done nothing, except what he had been commissioned to say and do by citizen Talleyrand. As Talleyrand's plan of enriching himself is still daily practised in certain circles, the only thing peculiar in the matters above related is, that, instead of being, as is usual, merely whispered into the ear of a diplomatist, the affair was proclaimed in the market-place before all the people. Every weak state, and especially the German Hanse Towns, were used as money-springs by the Directory, even before the sparrings of the Swiss aristocratic cantons fell into the same hands in 1798. Contributions were required from Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, under the appearance of a loan, which, however, they escaped, till Bonaparte, at a later period, with great justice, imposed contributions upon, harassed and humiliated the Hamburghers, to the joy of all those who felt indignant with these selfish traders for delivering up Napper Tandy to the English. At the time in which Hamburg, still more than Bremen and Lübeck, was harassed by these demands for a loan, Reinhard had happily relieved himself from the post of minister in that city, and the Directory sent thither in his stead the notorious Leonard Bourdon, a name well known from the time of the reign of terror, whose conduct ruined his own cause.

C.—OUTRAGES AGAINST GERMANY, MALTA, AND EGYPT.

It is surprising that, at the very moment in which anarchy and disorder were at their highest in all branches of administration in the interior of France, the power of the republic was at its greatest among foreign powers. This will be easily explained by casting a glance at the condition of the various states in Europe, and observing how decayed and rotten all their governments were. With the exception of the English aristocracy, there was not one of all the governments, from Lisbon to Constantinople, which possessed

the smallest degree of dignity, or deserved the slightest respect, which had either physical or moral energy, or zeal for the honour and well-being of the people. Whilst all the princes were threatened by an enemy, who was sure everywhere to find friends among the people, their ministers continued to play their old diplomatic games, maintained the existing separation, and each power was only intent on the manner in which it could obtain an advantage over the others.

In Prussia, Haugwitz, Lucchesini, the two Lombards, and a number of intriguers, led the weak and timid king by the most crooked paths, because, honest and pious as he was, he was anxious to obtain as much territory for himself and his relations as he possibly could without running any risks. The king had recourse to the most miserable intrigues to satisfy at the same time the French and their enemies, and was not displeased to see that he was left in darkness respecting the crooked paths of the diplomatists whom he employed. He became so much the more the mere plaything of the Directory and Talleyrand, and drew all the German princes, who from selfishness had attached themselves to his system of neutrality, the more easily away from the interests of their country, and from the paths of true honour, to the cause of the French and to their own eternal disgrace, when Thugut and Lehrbach, in Austria, acted with as little regard to conscience or right against their confederates, as Prussia, since the peace of Basle, had behaved towards the German nation. Things reached such a state in 1798 that men, like Reubel, Barras, and Talleyrand, were in a condition to prove, by documents, that the most pious and orthodox monarchs—the legitimate rulers—had behaved still worse to their subjects than anything which had been done by the infidel and revolutionary Frenchmen of the Directory.

The French being dissatisfied with the conduct of the miserable Spanish favourite, because, at a time when a new war was threatened, he negotiated, through the mediation of the Portuguese, for a new alliance with England, had at that time the boldness to make the King of Spain acquainted, through their ambassador and by documentary proofs, with the manner in which Godoy had come into favour with his wife. This, however, was also fruitless; Godoy retained his influence, but because he had fallen into disfavour with the French, he laid down his office of minister for a short time. He remained, nevertheless, all powerful as before, and very soon resumed the reins of government. The same thing took place in Vienna, for when Thugut continued to intrigue against them, they laid documentary proofs before the emperor that he had previously entered into secret negotiations with them to his own advantage; he too, however, retained the same influence after this exposure as he had before possessed. In the same way, a document, hitherto kept concealed, was laid before the king in Berlin, in order to counteract English and Russian influence in that quarter, and to keep Prussia

from forming an alliance with Austria for the deliverance of their common country, and the maintenance of the existing order of things: from this document it appeared that Austria wished to gain advantage over Prussia and Germany. The French at length made public the most secret articles of the peace of Campo Formio, and proved also, by documents, that the emperor had been desirous of depriving Prussia of all the advantages which it expected from the secularisation of the ecclesiastical principalities.

It was therefore no wonder that three Jacobins—all eminent pettifoggers—should have used the most brutal language at the Congress of Rastadt in the name of the Directory. Austria longed after Bavaria, or at least a part of the territory, and Prussia openly negotiated and apparently in conjunction with the emperor for the empire, but secretly with the French, and *against both emperor and empire*. The Austrian and Bohemian ambassadors held very different language; they and the chief commissioner at the imperial congress gave such different votes, that Ritter von Lang, who was at that time in Rastadt, not without reason and after his fashion, represents them as the characters of a farce. Whilst no result could be arrived at in Rastadt, Prussia suffered the small Treves garrison of Ehrenbreitstein, which, in the midst of peace, and on the right bank of the Rhine, had been so closely invested for the whole year 1798, to be completely starved out, and the brave Colonel Faber, whose heroic endurance no man ventured to praise as it deserved, was at length obliged to capitulate, in January, 1799. The Austrians, as we have stated above, had been driven out of Mayence by the momentary appearance of Bonaparte in Rastadt, and this imperial fortress was left altogether in the hands of the French troops. The troops of Rhenish Bavaria tried in vain to prevent the French from taking possession of the defences of Mannheim before they were formerly ceded to them by treaty. The French took them by storm, and afterwards demanded satisfaction for the considerable loss which they had experienced in consequence of the vigorous resistance offered them by the Bavarians.

In reference to the left bank of the Rhine the French were at least able to appeal to the concessions of Prussia in the peace of Basle, and in the shameful agreement of 1796, and supported their appeal by the conditions of the peace of Campo Formio; the demands, however, which they made in May, 1798, prove how much, and with what good reason, they despised both Prussia and Austria. In April, 1798, the representatives of the German governments were brought to such a condition, that they consented to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, which Prussia and Austria had done long before, and acceded to the principle, that the secular princes who had suffered any territorial loss by the concessions to France, should receive compensation from the secularisation of the territories of the ecclesiastical princes. In a note of the 2nd May, 1798, the French demanded even still more. They demanded that Ehrenbreitstein and

all the *têtes de pont* on the right bank of the Rhine should be rased, that Kehl and Castel, opposite Mayence, the only points of defence against invasions, should be surrendered, the navigation of the Rhine made free from tolls of every description, and that the islands in the Rhine on both sides of the navigable channel should be left in their hands. Their demands were fortunately made at the very moment in which Austria was seeking for a pretence, at least, for delaying the fulfilment of the promises made in the peace of Campo Formio, and not then performed. It therefore availed itself of the excessive demands made by the French to leave its troops in Bavaria, which it had agreed to evacuate, to keep up the garrisons of Ulm and Ingoldstadt, and, under the pretext of lending troops to the Empire, not to withdraw the garrison from Philippsburg. At the moment in which England directed the attention of Russia and Austria to the fact, that the Jacobinical government of France no longer paid any respect whatever to the rights of nations, and were undermining the whole existing order of governments and society, the Directory, without any provocation, were devising schemes against and making aggressions upon Switzerland, the Knights of Malta, and the Mamelukes in Egypt, and, consequently, upon their protector and superior, the Grand Sultan. We shall afterwards refer to the case of Switzerland, and confine ourselves at present to the predatory invasion of Malta and Egypt, which was planned and executed by a great man, who during his whole life proceeded upon the principle that the mere prosaic world, and the morality of everyday life, are never to be allowed to interfere with the creative plans of genius, and the ambitious views of a hero.

We have already mentioned, that the idea of assailing the English in the East, and for that purpose of first gaining a footing in Egypt, had been entertained by Bonaparte as early as 1796. The idea of establishing a French colony in Egypt, or rather of establishing in Egypt similar regulations and a similar system for the benefit of France, which Mehemet Ali has done in our days for his own advantage, is said originally to have sprung from Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, who had secured for his views the favourable opinion of the French minister Delacroix. It is said (for we have not examined the case minutely) that Bonaparte, when he took up the idea, availed himself of the Venetian archives for the settlement and perfecting of the project which he laid down in 1797. It appears at least, from his correspondence, that as early as 1797, he had in various ways opened communications with and formed a party in Malta, and set on foot a French conspiracy. The Spanish and French knights were extremely dissatisfied with the influence which had been exercised by the emperor in promoting the election of Von Hompesch to the office of grand-master, because he was nothing more than one of those Austrian *figurants* who are still so numerous in their armies, and even in their ministry.

Whilst Bonaparte, by means of his confidential agents, won over a number of the French knights in Malta to an approval of his views, Delacroix, the French minister, endeavoured to gain the countenance of the vain Don Godoy, by holding out to him the lure of a prospective grand-mastership. The Prince of the Peace, however, did not place complete confidence in these promises, and through the instrumentality of the Portuguese he gave the English a hint of what was going on; the latter were quite incredulous, because they could not believe that such a practical man as Bonaparte would ever engage in such an extremely adventurous undertaking. We have already stated, that since March, 1798, Bonaparte, as general of the Army of the Ocean, had the command of all the armies in the interior, in the west and south of France, as well as of the whole navy, and was therefore in a condition to put in requisition for his purposes all the stores, artisans, scholars, and generals of France. The English knew that there was a large fleet in Toulon, and that ships were lying in Genoa, Bastia, and Civita Vecchia, to reinforce the principal squadron, but they regarded the whole affair as a mere feint. They thought that all these ships and troops were destined to form a junction with the fleet lying in Cadiz, to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, and, in conjunction with that at Brest, to invade England; they therefore reinforced the English fleet in the Straits of Gibraltar, but sent no special force to watch and blockade the harbour of Toulon. At first merely three ships of the English fleet, under Admiral Nelson, were sent to cruise between Sardinia and Toulon; Nelson, however, in consequence of an injury to one of his ships, was compelled to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Toulon for a short time, and the French availed themselves of the opportunity to put to sea. Nelson's fleet, it is true, was immediately afterwards reinforced, and when he learned that the French had sailed towards the south-east, he directed his course straight to Egypt, and not having fallen in with the French fleet on that coast, sailed first east and then west, in hopes of finding it.

The French fleet, with a select body of troops on board, and reinforced by the ships which were lying in Genoa, Bastia, and Civita Vecchia, appeared before Malta on the 9th of June, 1798. The united fleet consisted of fifteen sail of the line, with a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels. The fleet was accompanied by 1400 transports, on board of which there were 36,000 choice troops. The object of the equipment of the fleet and of the whole expedition was kept so secret, that even Scherer, the minister of war, and Admiral Brueys, who commanded the fleet, did not know its destination till it had sailed. This expedition, moreover, has been more important than any other event for the science and civilisation of Europe, the knowledge of ancient Egypt and its arts, and for the literature, development, and magnificence of the art of war, as practised by the modern French. The most renowned generals, not

only of Bonaparte's school, but also of Moreau's,* together with the most celebrated artists of France, scholars, mathematicians, astronomers, chemists, physicians, and surgeons,† all pushed forward, eager to share in the adventures and perils of the expedition. And it must be admitted that they availed themselves of the short period of their sojourn with wonderful skill and activity for the advancement and promotion of science.

After only three days (on the 12th of June) the island capitulated—an island which had formerly bid defiance to the power of the Turkish empire, which had overpowered Constantinople and Rhodes—without having even made an attempt at defence or resistance. We have already shown, from Bonaparte's own correspondence, that for a year before in Italy he had been laying his schemes, and preparing for a treacherous betrayal of the island; and we here add, from other sources, that Dolomieu, a commander of the Maltese order, and so well known as a geologist, and Poussielgues, the commissary, were the men who formed the traitorous conspiracy; and that Boisredon de Ransignat and Bardonnache, both also commanders, were the men who helped them to carry their traitorous purposes into effect. But withal, had not the miserable grand-master Von Hompesch been as mean, petty, and cowardly in his conduct on that occasion, as his relation, Von Hompesch, minister of the Elector Palatine, was in the last war in Düsseldorf, it would have been easy for him, in defiance of all these traitors, to have defended the island till the arrival of the English, which was daily to be expected.

Those who are acquainted with Von Hompesch's career will not be astonished that, when the hour of trial came, he finished that career with shame and disgrace. He originally went to Malta as page to the grand-master, and was afterwards sent as ambassador to Vienna, where he lived for years as the people of high society in Vienna are accustomed to live. When afterwards, in 1797, the French tongue lost that preponderating influence in the order which it had formerly possessed, Bavaria and Austria gained weight enough to procure the office of grand-master for this statist of German knighthood, in the same manner as grand crosses of any order are procured for men of pretension, or who enjoy court favour.

The grand-master behaved as men of his rank and condition were accustomed to behave in Ratisbon and Wetzlar during the old

* Among the generals of Moreau's school, we may name Desaix and Kleber. Among the others, the following deserve particular notice:—Berthier, Reynier, Dammartin, Cafarelli-Dufalga, Murat, Lannes, and Davout. Among the officers of the staff were Junot and Marmont.

† A few names out of a great number will suffice:—Berthollet, the chemist; Comte and Champy natural philosophers; Thouin, Geoffroy, and Delille, in the department of natural history; Desgenettes, the physician, and Larrey, the surgeon; Monge, Fourrier, Costaz, and Girard, mathematicians; and in the department of belles-lettres and the arts, Parseval Grandmaison, Redonté, Denon, and Lapeyre.

routine of the empire. He submitted to accept the terms of a capitulation, but made a protest, although he gave not the slightest idea of his intention to protest till he had arrived safely in Trieste. He well deserved to be defrauded, as he really was by the French, of the petty bribe for which he sold his honour, his order, and the island entrusted to his keeping and defence. Pretended plenipotentiaries of the order were appointed, who, through the mediation of the Spaniards, the *protégés* and allies of the French, were to hold a convention for settling the conditions on which the island was to be surrendered. This convention, which, properly speaking, was invalid, was concluded in the ship in which Bonaparte was. By virtue of this treaty, Malta, the forts, and all the islands belonging to Malta, were to be given up to the French Republic. In return, the grand-master was to receive a principality in Germany, to be determined and recognised by the congress at Rastadt, as soon as the French Directory and the grand-master, in the name of the order, had ratified the treaty. In the mean time he was to receive a pension of 300,000 francs, and 600,000 as payment in advance for two years. The whole affair was a scandalous farce. Nothing was ever said of a ratification either by the Directory or the grand-master. The poor blockhead received 15,000 francs, and for the whole remainder of his life knew not how to escape from the continual persecutions and prosecutions of his numerous creditors.

All the treasures of the order, its plate and valuables, ships, stores, artillery, and ammunition, were taken away; and neither on this occasion nor up to the present day have any of the French writers been able to find language sufficiently strong to eulogise this heroic exploit, although France was at that time neither at war with the order nor with the King of Naples, to whom the island belonged!! Bonaparte left General Vaubois behind with 4000 men to garrison the island, and to assume the military command and civil administration. As provisional rulers, he appointed Boisredon de Ransignat, the leader of the conspiracy against the grand-master, together with the commissioner of the Directory, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely—a man not to be surpassed in the use of fine phrases and plausible dialectics, and who from that time always continued to be one of Bonaparte's chief organs and tools. On the 19th of June the fleet sailed from Malta, and was led by that lucky star which never forsook Bonaparte till his expedition to Russia. We shall hereafter refer to the fate of this fleet when we come to speak of the imprudence of the Queen of Naples on the rejoicings at Nelson's victory in the Bay of Aboukir, and shall at present merely observe, that before the fleet was destroyed, Bonaparte had made good his footing in Egypt. His army and all his *matériel* were disembarked, and the fleet ready to take its departure. He had occupied Alexandria, beaten the Mamelukes, and reached Cairo. Bonaparte was cut off from all intercourse with Europe at the very time when Russia, England, Austria, and Naples entered into an alliance

to make war upon the Directory, which at that time threatened to change France into a mere predatory state. And that this fear was really well founded will most clearly appear when we come to give an account of the manner in which the allied republics established by the directors themselves were treated.

§ II.

BATAVIAN, CISALPINE, HELVETIC, AND ROMAN REPUBLICS.

A.—BATAVIAN AND CISALPINE REPUBLICS.

ON the conquest of Holland, the French at first satisfied themselves with oppressing the Dutch in every way and by every means, and by attempting to extort from them their money and valuables; they merely changed the persons in the government, and suffered the states-general and the federation to remain as before, with some few modifications; things were different in 1796. A national assembly was called, from which a national convention was formed. Holland also possessed its Jacobins; Vrede formed amongst this phlegmatic people a violent and powerful party, who lived in a state of constant dispute and enmity with the Moderates, who were called, after the name of their leader, Becker's partisans. As long as Noel, the French minister, who had married the daughter of a rich Dutchman in Rotterdam, remained at the Hague, the violent party was kept within due bounds, although, even at that time, a new constitution, after the model of that of the French, had been drawn up by Vrede's followers and partisans. Noel was recalled in 1797, and Delacroix sent in his stead. The latter was accompanied by a secretary of legation, as was at that time the custom of the directors, who kept up a close correspondence with all the revolutionary mob.

We have already observed above, that the violent democratic party in Holland succeeded, on the 20th of May, 1797, in having the new constitution rejected, because it recognised two chambers, and was by no means sufficiently democratic to meet their wishes. The interim government, which had been established on the dissolution of the states-general, therefore continued till the revolution of the 18th Fructidor inspired the Jacobins with boldness to place their friends in Holland immediately at the helm of the state. It was, therefore, resolved to remove all the real friends of their country from public office, and to put French creatures in their places; and in order to effect this, it was necessary to force upon the Dutch a constitution modelled after that of France. The whole affair was arranged between Joubert, the commander-in-chief of the French army, a very young man; Delacroix, the ambassador, and Ducange, his secretary of legation; and General Daendels, who was the commander of what was called the Batavian army. The president of the national convention, chosen from the national assembly, availed himself of

their assistance to carry into execution the views of the violent party by means of military force; and there was in fact a repetition on a small scale of the 18th of Fructidor in Paris. Twenty-two deputies were seized upon and thrown into prison, and the others, *nolens volens*, were obliged to choose an interim government of five persons and a commission for drawing up a constitution.

The commission was soon ready with its draft of a constitution. Holland was divided into eight departments, the legislative power was committed to two chambers, the one consisting of sixty and the other of thirty members, and the government entrusted to five directors. This constitution was not only forcibly imposed upon the people, but the same national convention, which had given the new constitution, appointed the new legislature by its own choice, without appeal to any electoral assemblies, and also chose the legislators and directors from its own body. The three persons who had effected this revolution soon disagreed among themselves, and the new government carried on its administration by violent means. The French minister and the French commander-in-chief paid no attention whatever to the representations of General Daendels, and Ducange, the secretary of the French legation, offended him deeply. This gave rise to a new revolution. Daendels was compelled to yield; he left his country and fled to Paris, where, as being the promoter of the revolution in Holland, and having facilitated the conquest of the country by the French, he found a very numerous body of friends, who took up his cause.

Daendels, supported by the directors in Paris, returned to Holland on the 10th of June, held a consultation with the five ministers of the Dutch Directory, who were at that time called AGENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, and carried his revolution into effect on the 12th of June, 1798, having first collected his partisans together at a great banquet of five hundred persons. The five directors were surprised at table; two saved themselves by flight, two others were arrested, but soon after set at liberty, and the fifth kept for some time in confinement. The five ministers or agents of the government entered upon the offices of the directors who had been forcibly expelled; and in a manner quite characteristic of the French authorities of the time, the latter were driven out of their country by troops of their own nation, at the instigation of secret commands received from the French ministers in Paris. The representatives who had been forcibly imposed upon the Dutch were now also compelled to give way, and the legislative power was at length committed to deputies legally chosen.

The Italians were treated very much in the same manner as the Dutch; they were oppressed and driven hither and thither at the will or caprice of French generals, ambassadors, agents, emissaries, usurers, and contractors. It may be seen from the just observations of Botta, how little mankind are really aided by celebrated and splendid names, if those names do not stand for men of practical

ability, prudence, and intelligence; for he enumerates to us all the celebrated Italians who were members of the councils of the Cisalpine republic,* but at the same time he complains bitterly of the poetical democratic giddiness which impelled onward their lively natures, not accustomed to freedom. This enthusiastic and visionary spirit of his countrymen did not escape the attention of Bonaparte, when on the 12th of November, 1797, he adorned the Cisalpine republic, in a speech full of declamatory pomp, with a freedom, which, in truth and in fact, he neither would nor could confer upon it nor secure. It vexed him very much that Italian patriotism prompted his hearers to interpret his splendid phrases more seriously than they were meant.† Bonaparte at that time, no doubt, meant well to the Italians, and as early as March, 1797, compelled the cabinet of Vienna, in a certain way, to recognise the new republic, because he perceived that there were indications of an intention to put off this acknowledgment on various pretences. The protecting spirit was, however, no sooner withdrawn, than the republic fell completely into the hands of the French Directory and its creatures.

The Cisalpine republic had sent Visconti, Serbelloni, and Rangoni, three of the largest landowners and of the first class of nobility in Lombardy, as ambassadors to Paris, where they were so overawed by the threat of violent measures, that they entered into a treaty of commerce and alliance with Talleyrand, which made the Cisalpine republic as really dependent, and exhausted its resources as much, as had been done in the case of Holland. By the terms of this treaty, the republic bound itself to take part in all the wars of France; to receive into its territories 25,000 French troops, to pay 18,000,000 of francs yearly for their support and clothing, and to suffer French troops to be placed in Modena, Peschiera, and Ferrara.‡ The Council of Ancients of the Cisalpine republic having summoned courage on the 12th of March, 1798, to refuse to recognise this compulsory treaty, entered into by its plenipotentiaries in Paris, gave such deep offence to the French Directory, that the latter issued a decree, by virtue of which a contribution was demanded, and twenty-one members of the Cisalpine Council of Ancients were degraded and arrested. Paradisi and Moscati, two of the five directors, were also removed from office, and afterwards a third. The treaty was

* Eranvi un Quadrio, un Giovio, un Melzi, un Brago, un Cicognara, un Compagnoni, un Savoldi, un Cagnoli, un Monga, un Venturi, un Lamberti, un Polfarccheschi, un Martinengo, un Fenaroli, un Lecchi, un Lattanzi, un Colonia Ebreo, un Arese, un Reina, un Beccaria, un Somaglia, un Bossi, un Castiglione, un Tassoni, un Cavedoni, un Aldini, un Guglielmini, un Aldrovandi, un Muscheroni, un Mangili, un Bellisoni, un Malaspina, un Alpruni, un Fontana, duo Scarpa, tutti tre professori molto celebrati di Pavia, un Castelbarco, un Pallavicini. A tutti quelli s'aggiungeva Francesco Gianni, giovane di singolare spirto poetico dotato, e cantor suo favoritissimo. Era il poeta nato in Roma. Botta, libro xii.

† Botta, i.e. Dall' un de' lati dispiaceva a Buonaparte a cagione della natura sua inclinata allo stringere, dall' altro gli piaceva per dar timore a l' Austria.

‡ The treaty will be found in Martens, " Recueil des Traités, Suppléments et Continuation," vol. vii. pp. 243, &c.

then, it is true, acknowledged by the councils, but the democrats raved and clamoured so loudly, that the French minister, who, like his colleague at the Hague, played the same character in Milan which the English residents do at the court of the Indian princes, thought that there was no other means of putting an end to this clamour and rage than by a change of the constitution granted by Bonaparte.

Trouvé, the French minister, therefore, relying upon La Reveillère Lepaux, who was a greater friend of order than his colleagues, collected a number of the deputies belonging to the moderate party at his house, and with their assistance drew up a new constitution. Brune, who was a wild democrat, and, after having lent his aid in overthrowing the Swiss aristocracy, had been appointed in the room of Berthier to the chief command of the French troops in the Cisalpine republic, strongly opposed the establishment of this new constitution, and warmly espoused the cause of the democrats; but Trouvé at length succeeded, through La Reveillère, in obtaining his recall.

Brune having been removed, the French soldiers were then at Trouvé's disposal, and by their instrumentality he forcibly introduced his constitution, which was to put an end to all these anarchical movements. On the 30th of May, 1798, he first assembled those members of the legislative councils whom the democratic vehemence of their colleagues did not approve, laid the draft of his constitution before them, obtained their acquiescence and approval, and on the following day surrounded a plenary meeting of the councils with French troops, and in this way compelled them to accept the new constitution.

The change of the constitution in itself would not alone have excited so great a commotion, but, in connexion with the change, Trouvé took upon himself the absolute privilege of appointing the new Directory and the new legislative councils. This induced the opposite party to apply to Brune, in Paris; and the latter had still influence enough there to procure Trouvé's recall, and to have Fouché sent as minister, and himself as general, to Milan; neither of these had any proper commission to change the constitution, but were merely to remedy Trouvé's arbitrary conduct respecting persons. Fouché, however, made another change precisely in the opposite direction to that which had been made by Trouvé; removed from office forty-two members of the legislative councils, and replaced them by a like number of restless and unquiet spirits. In the same year again the two democrats were recalled, and Rivaud appointed to succeed Fouché, whilst Joubert was entrusted with the command held by Brune.

Joubert appears to have become weary of politics in Holland; he assumed a very passive character in Milan, and left the whole of the revolutionizing department to Rivaud, the minister. As long as Rivaud only used words, he found a most vigorous opposition from the Italians, and he therefore also soon had recourse to military

measures. He too caused the legislative councils to be surrounded by French troops, and, at the very moment in which the consultation was going on, as to the best means of escaping from his violence, he at a stroke cancelled everything which had been previously done by Fouché and Brune. The deputies, who had shortly before been introduced into the Assembly by Brune, were again forcibly expelled; and the deputies appointed by Trouvé, as well as the three directors previously removed, resumed their former offices. The manner in which the French authorities had now behaved four times in one year in Milan, necessarily excited general anxiety and alarm, and it was impossible not to believe that the directors in Paris had no other view than to destroy order of all kinds, old and new, for the purpose of furnishing their creatures with an opportunity of fishing in troubled waters. The history of the newly-created Helvetic republic, and the short-lived establishment of a similar one in Rome, led to precisely the same result.

B.—HELVETIC AND ROMAN REPUBLICS.

The thirteen united cantons of Switzerland, in spite of all the repeated admonitions arising from the demands of the age, maintained their peculiar constitutions derived from the middle ages, their distinctions of citizens, subjects, and protected states, as well as all the rights and privileges of the different classes of citizens in relation to one another, even during the French revolution. Although the constitution in some of the cantons was democratic, the government was nevertheless perpetually in the hands of certain rich and powerful families, and in others the government always filled up its offices from the small number of the citizens of the state who were allowed to have a voice in public affairs. In Berne, Friburg, and Soleure the government was in the hands of an aristocratic order, whose administration was more advantageous to the lower classes than our government by jurists can possibly be. Berne treated the Pays de Vaud as a conquered province, and Thurgau and Argau were both governed by landvogts appointed by the superior canton. The Bernese were renowned for their mild and wise government; but the pride and haughtiness of the patricians were very offensive to all who did not belong to the caste: the common people were won by their condescension, which was intolerable to others. In Zürich and Basle the people were offended by the trading pride of the citizen aristocracy, and the government used by them as a trade; and all the intercourse, commerce, and trade in the country were made subservient to the advantage of the towns. The citizens of the cantons, even those of the democratic ones, made not only a matter of honourable distinction, but a species of trade, of the offices of landvogt, judge, or receiver in those districts, which never enjoyed equal rights or privileges with the others. The children, relations, or *protégés* of the pri-

vileged classes were provided for in the districts of Thurgau, Argau, and Pays de Vaud, at the cost of the inhabitants of those districts. Neither our object nor our space will permit us to enter into many of these very confused and perplexing relations; we shall only remark, that there were twenty-one landvogteis and two towns which were ruled by several cantons in common.

The unnatural relations which existed in most of the cantons in which the majority was ruled by the minority, and the inhabitants of whole provinces regarded as subjects of people who made a mere trade of governing, frequently excited disturbances almost everywhere in Switzerland, which were generally followed by political persecutions. In consequence of such persecutions, many distinguished men were exiled or obliged to flee from their native cantons, in order to avoid a severer punishment. Such persons were continually on the watch for an opportunity of returning to their homes. This uneasy spirit of dissatisfaction prevailed most of all in the Pays de Vaud, and in the Italian cantons in general, not so much on account of bad government, of which, properly speaking, they did not complain, as on account of the manner in which their feelings of honour and patriotism were offended by the Bernese. Many natives of the Pays de Vaud lived in Paris, kept up a continual correspondence with their countrymen at home, who were so ill-treated by the Bernese aristocracy, and, in 1790, allied themselves with the party of the Girondists. When the Jacobins afterwards became the victorious party, the Vaudois attached themselves to them, and Colonel Laharpe, the tutor of the Russian Emperor Alexander, endeavoured, even from Petersburg, to rouse the indignation and encourage the efforts of his countrymen. The disturbances in the Pays de Vaud are chiefly ascribed to him; and his cousin, Laharpe, of Urbins, played the chief part in those which took place in 1791. The latter was banished by the Bernese patricians, in consequence of the share which he took in these disturbances, although, in other respects, the Bernese government behaved on the occasion with great mildness and moderation. Laharpe entered the French service, became celebrated as a general of division in Bonaparte's army, but fell before Switzerland was attacked.

The only important man among all the old authorities in Switzerland who did homage to the new ideas, and kept up communications with Paris, was Peter Ochs, president of the guilds of Basle. The aristocracies slumbered, for even the disturbances in Geneva were happily suppressed with the aid of the Zürich and Bernese aristocracies; and a Swiss cordon, established on the frontiers of Basle, effectually prevented the Girondists, during their short period of power, from giving that assistance which they desired to the people of the district of Basle against their superiors in the town. At a later period, the pressure of foreign armies upon France compelled the Committee of Public Welfare to leave Switzerland at rest, and Barthélémy, as their ambassador, did all in his power to maintain

the public peace; but his efforts proved successful only for a very short time. In the year 1794, Laharpe having completed the education of his pupil, the Emperor, who, as well as the Empress Catherine II., was attached to him, returned to his native province, and produced an immense influence among the people of the Pays de Vaud, exciting them to resistance. When the Directory was placed at the head of affairs, in October, 1795, the conduct of Barthélémy, the French ambassador, and of Bacher, his mean and covetous secretary of legation, seemed to Laharpe so hostile to Jacobinism, that he sent Bassal and Felix Lepelletier, two violent Jacobins, as plenipotentiaries into Switzerland, to excite democratic commotions. It was assumed as one ground of complaint, that the Bernese aristocracy had favoured the insurrection in Lyons, and that Wickham, the English ambassador in Switzerland, was endured, although he was constantly employed in supporting the malcontents in France with English money, and by all sorts of political intrigues. The removal of Wickham was, indeed, imperatively demanded, but the friends and the prominent men of the Swiss party, who looked for support in Paris against the ruling aristocracies, were by no means satisfied with that. Among the Swiss propagandists the Russian Colonel Laharpe, and Ochs the president of the trade, were the most important. Laharpe was so much an object of hatred to the aristocrats of Berne, that he, Monges and Dr. Cart, were expressly excluded from the amnesty which was extended to all who had been banished from the Pays de Vaud in 1791, and by which even their property, after having been confiscated, was restored to the descendants and heirs of his cousin Laharpe, the general of division. The three persons thus excluded by name from the act of grace on the part of the Bernese, had very great influence in the canton, even although the patricians of Berne had prevailed upon the Empress Catherine the Second specially to express her disapprobation of Laharpe's proceedings. At the time of the revolution Ochs perceived that his talents, capabilities, and partisans would secure him a great influence should a central government be formed in Switzerland; and being moreover convinced that in the territory of Basle, on the immediate borders of France, the old system could not continue, he had taken care to form a considerable party favourable to the movement in the midst of that ancient city. Having come to an understanding with Barthélémy respecting a change, and, in conjunction with his friends, taken all the necessary preparatory measures in the Pays de Vaud, he set out for Paris in 1797, under the pretence of pushing some pecuniary claims made by the town; and there, at the end of the year 1797, he found circumstances very favourable to his plans.

Bonaparte, who at that time had the ball at his foot, returned from Italy; for military reasons he considered the occupation of Switzerland as a thing absolutely necessary, and on political grounds came to the same conclusion with respect to the overthrow of the

aristocracy. He communicated his views to the Directory, and suggested that the rich treasures of Berne and the other aristocratic governments, then lying unemployed, might be most usefully appropriated for the equipment and maintenance of the expedition to Egypt. Whilst the feelings of dissatisfaction with the existing state of things was loudly expressed in the Pays de Vaud, and in other parts of the interior of Switzerland, and no trace of concession was exhibited anywhere, except at a somewhat later period in Lucerne, the French Directory assumed a hostile attitude towards the united cantons as early as December, 1797, and January, 1798. In the middle of December, the valleys of Erguel and Münster, as belonging to the bishopric of Basle, were taken possession of by the French, and the town of Mühlhausen was united to France in 1798. Up to this period, this town, though completely surrounded by the territory of Alsace, had continued to be united with Switzerland, much in the same manner as Hamburg with Germany. When Switzerland was no longer able to protect it, nothing remained to the town but voluntarily to relinquish its independence, and to get as well out of the affair as possible. It obtained tolerable conditions, which are contained in the treaty of the 28th of June, 1798.*

The people of the Pays de Vaud, to whose frontiers French troops were already sent, availed themselves of this moment to rise against Berne, and the country people of the canton of Basle followed their example by boldly demanding equal rights with the citizens of the town. At the same time Peter Ochs availed himself of his sojourn in Paris to render his assistance to the rulers of France in drawing up a constitution for the Helvetic republic, which Reubel and Barras had resolved to establish. The draft of this constitution, about which the French afterwards gave themselves very little trouble, was for the most part left to the judgment of their Basle auxiliary. Ochs, in conjunction with his friends in the Pays de Vaud, afterwards greatly facilitated the interference of the French in the affairs of Switzerland, on the attempt by the Bernese to put down the people of the Pays de Vaud by force, and on their appeal to the canton of Zürich to aid them in the maintenance of their supremacy. The citizens of Basle calmed the disturbances in their canton before the people had applied to the French, by a ready concession of the rights and privileges claimed. The Bernese attempted to stem the current and to maintain their power. On the 18th of January, 1798, the inhabitants of the country district of Basle flew to arms and destroyed the castles of the landvogts; but as early as the next day the council and citizens of the town agreed to concede equal rights to the inhabitants of the country, and even received their militia with friendly greetings in the city. In the mean time Colonel Laharpe had purchased a house at Rolle, in the territory of Geneva, but on the very borders of the Pays de Vaud, from whence he took means to organise

* See Martens, vol. vii., p. 237.

an insurrection amongst his countrymen against Berne, and then to establish a defensive union against all attempts at oppression on the part of their former superiors. The Bernese endeavoured to draw all Switzerland to their aid—for that purpose caused a diet to be summoned to meet in Aarau, and then pressed upon the assembly a renewal of the old oath of confederation, in order to be in a condition to summon all Switzerland to take arms to protect the country against the threatened invasion of the French. In the mean time democratic agents, such as Mengaud and his colleagues, were sent into all districts of the country, and announced in all the aristocratic places that the French were ready to lend a helping hand to the people whenever they should demand their proper share in the government. The oath of confederation was in fact renewed by the whole of the cantons, with the exception of Basle, and the diet decreed the raising and organisation of a confederate army, but it separated at the very moment when the advance of the French into the soil of Switzerland rendered promptness and united co-operation most necessary.

On the breaking out of the insurrection in the Pays de Vaud, the Bernese organised fourteen battalions of admirable troops. The Schultheiss von Steiger was for the adoption of speedy and energetic measures, and his views were shared by Erlach von Spiez, who was at first intended to command the troops destined to act against the Pays de Vaud. Opinions however were so much divided in Berne, as well as throughout the whole of Switzerland, that Steiger found a strong party of opponents in the council, in consequence of which it became dangerous for Erlach to accept the proffered command, and he therefore declined to assume the office. The appointment was then conferred on Colonel Weiss, to whom the council of Berne gave a dictatorial power in reference to the settlement of all constitutional affairs in the Pays de Vaud. The same Weiss, who was now to become the prop of the old order of things, had previously exercised a powerful influence by his writings throughout the whole of the subject districts of Switzerland, and especially in Fribourg and the Pays de Vaud in exciting dissatisfaction, and he therefore neither enjoyed the confidence of those who were really zealous for the unconditional maintenance of the old *régime*, nor of those who wished for a reform. The situation of affairs was critical; for as early as the 18th of January, 1798, the French Directory had declared, that, if the people of the Pays de Vaud were attacked by arms, they would lend them aid, and Massena's division, then under the command of General Mesnard, was ordered to the frontiers. In the mean time Weiss put his corps in motion with a view to act against the insurgents, who received their orders from the revolutionary committee in Nyon. This committee immediately applied for aid to General Mesnard, who crossed the frontiers on the 21st of January, and caused the independence of the Pays de Vaud to be proclaimed in Lausanne on the 24th. The arms of Berne were

everywhere torn down, new authorities chosen, and the Bernese army retired to Yverdun.

Almost on the very same days on which the independence of the Pays de Vaud was declared and a democratic constitution established, the constitutions in the other cantons were also remodelled, partly with the will and partly against the will of the several governments. As early as the 31st of January the government of Lucerne yielded of its own accord to the demands of the times and of the majority of the citizens; Schaffhausen and Soleure, with more difficulty, and more slowly, determined to follow the example, and when at length they resolved on concession, it was done with reluctance and with many limitations. In the canton of Schwyz, Küssnacht and the district of March demanded equal rights with the other parts of the canton, but their demands were only conceded after the bloody fall of the aristocracy of Berne. Zurich proved itself, according to its traditional practice, slow in deliberation and rich in devices, but at length declared itself disposed to establish another constitution; it was, however, easy to perceive that the government was not serious in its declaration. Thurgau shook off the yoke of the landvogteis of the cantons to which it had been in subjection. In Argau the towns were all in favour of independence, whilst the country people were heartily devoted to the government of Berne. In those cases in which the government yielded, it was done with the hope of allaying the storm, as the hostilities of the French were only directed against Berne, against which alone also war was declared as soon as some Frenchmen had fallen in battle. Friburg also offered military resistance, as soon as the French advanced across the frontiers of the Pays de Vaud.

In Berne, Charles Louis Erlach von Hindelbank, who had formerly been a general in the royal service in France, and a very able officer, was appointed to the command instead of Colonel Weiss. He was opposed to the French corps under General Mesnard, the chief command of which was assumed by Brune. Steiger and his party insisted that an immediate attack should be made upon Brune, before the second French army, which was advancing through Soleure, should have reached Berne; but there was a universal want of confidence, and the time was spent in consultations and dispute, when nothing but a quick and desperate resolve could have saved them. Schauenburg, who commanded the French army, which had entered Switzerland through Basle, first took possession of Soleure, whilst the Bernese were hesitating as to their course, and next, by an agreement, tore away Biel from Switzerland, as had previously been done with Mühlhausen; and Brune contrived to keep the army opposed to him in a complete state of inaction by negotiations with the council of Basle. Erlach, with his 20,000 men, of whom 480 were cavalry, was eager to attack Brune, as soon as the French advanced to Peterlingen; the council of Berne, however, were desirous of waiting for the contingents from the other

cantons, and sent Techarner and Frisching to commence negotiations with Brune, respecting which they could not possibly be in earnest. The deputies from Berne concluded a suspension of arms for fourteen days; nothing, however, could result from the negotiations, because Schauenburg, during the suspension, was continuing to march right upon Berne from the other side. The united force of the Bernese, composed of their own troops and the contingents from the other cantons,* were at length obliged to proceed to extremities, and try the fate of arms. Two battles were, therefore, fought on the one side at Frauenbrunnen, and on the other at Neueneck; the greatest bravery was displayed as long as order remained undisturbed by treachery. On the 5th of March, the Swiss at length gained the advantage over their opponents at Neueneck, and were about to cross the Sense, when they received intelligence that Steiger and Erlach had been defeated at Frauenbrunnen, and the French had entered Berne. The unfortunate issue of the battle of Frauenbrunnen was closely connected with the change of government which had been effected in Berne on the 28th of February; Steiger, Erlach, and others, consequently fell under the suspicion of the common people, and were pursued by them in their flight. We do not, however, by any means allege, that the French would not have been victorious, independently of the circumstance just mentioned. After the battle Steiger escaped and reached Vienna, Erlach was seized upon and murdered by the enraged country people.

Soleure, Berne, and Friburg were immediately occupied and laid under contribution; and at a later period Zürich shared the same fate. Brune, who commanded in Berne Massena's division which had belonged to Bonaparte's army, couched his reports to the latter in such terms, that it may be documentary proved that an eye had been had long before to the treasury of Berne—that it had been calculated upon for the expedition to Egypt, and that a part of the spoil was sent to Toulon direct. Brune was in the fullest sense a child of the revolution, for before that event he had been a journeyman printer, became a friend and tool of Danton from the year 1791, was afterwards pushed forward and promoted by Barras, and knew how to recommend himself to Bonaparte also; in Berne he now prepared the way for Reubel's plundering and avaricious creatures. He not only immediately prescribed a contribution, took possession of the public treasury and carried off the contents of the state chests, but even laid hands on the monies belonging to family and private foundations, which were intended to secure a decent subsistence to decayed patricians; and last of all completely emptied the well-stored magazines and arsenals. The booty realised at the very commencement has been stated at 42,000,000† of francs, and in addition

* Soleure sent 2000 men, Friburg 1200, Zürich 1440, Lucerne 1250, Uri 590, Schwyz 900, Unterwalden 320, Zug 170, Glarus 400, Appenzell 130, and St. Gall, 200.

† The Directory in Paris compelled Brune to give an account of the plunder,

that portion of the treasure of the state which had been fortunately saved in the Oberland, was obliged to be given up to the French. The same system was put in force in Friburg; and yet Mangourit, who had the management of all political affairs, and Brune, who was at the head of the army, exercised a great deal more moderation and forbearance than Rapinat, who replaced Mangourit, and Schauenburg, who succeeded Brune. Brune, Mangourit, and Desporte, from whatever reason, were desirous of maintaining the cantonal constitution; but Ochs and Laharpe, supported by Bonaparte and Talleyrand, and at length also by the Directory, were determined to have an absolute unity in Switzerland, and a central government for the whole; and, consequently, because everything was necessarily to be constructed according to the French model, two legislative councils and a directory consisting of five persons. According to Brune's more moderate and more sensible plan, the old cantons, where no plunder was to be found, were to be left completely unaltered, and two new republics were to be formed out of the other portion of Switzerland. Brune had, in fact, already proclaimed his three Helvetian republics, when Ochs presented himself before him with the draft of a single and inseparable republic formed by the Directory. Brune opposed the project, but he was recalled and replaced by an Alsatian baron, whilst a liberal tyrant succeeded Mangourit.

Reubel's creature, Schauenburg, who now received the command, was a member of the Alsatian nobility, and he was aided on this occasion by Lecarlier, a French proprietor. Immediately on the 12th of April, 1798, these two announced and inaugurated, in Aarau, their republic, one and indivisible, with its councils and directory, but they embittered the minds of all by their arbitrary and harsh conduct. To give merely a single example—they caused eleven members of the old Patrician government of Berne, and five of those of Soleure, to be carried away from Switzerland, and to be conveyed to the citadel of Strasburg. Lecarlier no sooner arrived in Friburg than he exacted a sum of 100,000 dollars, and ordered a contribution from Berne of 800,000 francs, but he was by much too honourable for the directors. Head-quarters were then removed to Zürich. Rapinat, Reubel's brother-in-law, and Roubière, who had been sent from Paris to replace Lecarlier, accompanied by a whole crowd of greedy adventurers, paid no respect whatever to the government of the Helvetian republic; and when they threatened Lucerne and the small cantons, they never once consulted the government concerning

which he did in a secret despatch of the 21st of March, 1798, and in a second of the date of the 25th. This account is as follows:—In the treasury, 7,000,000 francs. Silver bars, &c., 3,070,000. Contributions, 4,000,000. *Pour achat de titres*, 2,000,000. 857,000 cwts. of corn=17,140,000 francs. 6000 casks of wine=1,440,000 francs. Value of the booty taken from the arsenals, 7,000,000—making in all a sum of 42,280,000 francs seized by the French at their first entrance into Berne. The estimate of the treasure foolishly laid up and unused by the previous government is variously stated—probably about 12,000,000.

the robberies which they perpetrated. No district and no property was spared; no law or no principle was respected where they exercised dominion. The remainder of the public treasure in Berne, the government funds of Zürich, and all the public monies, not only in Zürich but in Lucerne and the Vallais, were also carried off by the commissioners, who never furnished any proper accounts to their own government; magazines, arsenals, and stores of every description were plundered. In addition to this, 2,000,000 was demanded from Lucerne, a million each from the establishments of St. Urban, in Lucerne, and from the monastery of Einsiedlen; from Berne six; from Friburg two; from Soleure, also, two; from Zürich three millions; and six abbeys were required to raise among them a sum of 750,000 francs. A forced contribution of 6,000,000 was demanded from the former patricians of Berne, and similar claims were made and enforced upon those of Zürich, Lucerne, and Friburg. Hostile possession was at first taken of Geneva, but an agreement was afterwards made with this city similar to that which had been entered into with Mühlhausen, and the town and territory of Geneva were united to France.*

The Helvetic republic was, indeed, proclaimed and established in the beginning of April, but the small cantons, covered and protected by their mountains and lakes, continued their resistance till the end of the month, and in the beginning of May repulsed the French with loss at the foot of the Rigi; they were, however, ultimately compelled to yield. In order to avoid the destruction which impended over these towns, they felt themselves constrained to acknowledge the new constitution, till Rapinat's plunderings, and the new oath which they were to take, drove them, in the course of July and August, to resort to some desperate undertakings. Rapinat raged like a tyrant, seized upon hostages wherever he pleased, caused the most respected persons to be arrested and exiled; and, at last, had the shamelessness, on the 19th of June, publicly to forbid the people of the Helvetic republic to obey their own authorities when they issued any orders not in accordance with the measures of the French government. All the newspapers and other periodical literature were subjected to censorship; and he compelled Pfyffen, of Lucerne, and Bay, of Berne, two of the directors who were unwilling to be driven out of the Directory by military force, to lay down their office. Rapinat, at his own discretion, appointed two new directors to succeed those whom he had violently driven out. These were Dolder, who always remained the mere creature of the French, and Peter Ochs, who, however, soon saw that it was intended to annihilate the independence of Switzerland, and therefore split with the French, as his friend Colonel Laharpe also did. First of all, Rapinat, on the 21st of June, caused Dolder and Ochs to be installed in their office by Brigadier-general Meunier. Such conduct became at length too

* Martens, "Suppléments au Recueil," vol. vii., pp. 249-52.

bad even for the Paris Directory, although two of them, at least, Reubel and Barras, were cognisant of the whole affair; and they now commanded Schauenburg to have the vacant places of the two directors filled up by the Helvetians themselves, by a legal election.

The choice of the Swiss councils fell upon the originators of their revolution, because these councils consisted wholly of its friends. Ochs and Laharpe became directors (July 28). In the mean time Ochs perceived that he had been deceived, and that quite as little good was to be expected from the new constitution as from the French; and, moreover, he himself was wholly blameless of the evils of the constitution, although he had laid down its principles. Talleyrand, Madame de Staél, and Benjamin Constant, at one of their splendid evening assemblies, had been the real authors of the new Swiss constitution, although the details were afterwards left in other hands. The French, indeed, perceived as early as July that, if they continued to go on as they had commenced, they would infallibly starve themselves together with the Swiss, and they therefore concluded a treaty with the Helvetic republic in August, in which they promised to evacuate Switzerland as soon as all the cantons had taken the new oath. This was at length done by all the cantons, with the exception of Unterwalden and Schwyz, which refused. Schwyz at last perceived that it had been very foolish to venture to enter into a struggle at the same time with the Helvetic and the French republics. Unterwalden not only waited till the French had invaded the territory of the canton, but even offered a desperate resistance. The unfortunate herdsmen engaged the French on the 8th of September, near Stanz, and fought with the courage of madness and despair. They inflicted a considerable loss upon the enemy, but, as was to be foreseen, they were compelled to yield to an overwhelming force. The French revenged their loss by dreadful slaughter, by plunder and burning, throughout the whole canton.

The new Roman republic was no better treated by the French than the Helvetic; for the former had no root whatever in the country itself, and was established quite against Bonaparte's will. It is true Bonaparte had completely denuded Rome itself, and robbed all the Roman nobility, the churches, convents, and even the papal residence, of all their ready money, plate, and valuables, by means of the contribution irresistibly demanded at Tolentino, all which had met with the entire approbation of the Directory; and yet, notwithstanding, the rulers in Paris sought for a new cause of quarrel with the pope immediately after Bonaparte's removal. Joseph Bonaparte, who by his brother's influence had been appointed ambassador to Rome in the room of Cacault, was compelled to deliver one threatening note after another, from the time in which the Jacobins had again made themselves masters of the government through the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor. Sometimes these notes, of which Joseph Bonaparte by no means approved, dwelt on the murderer

of Basseville being at large in Rome, although the pope had been already obliged to pay a heavy penalty for his death; sometimes they complained of the correspondence carried on by the pope with Vienna, or that Provera and other Austrian officers remained in Rome. A number of Polish and Cisalpine regiments were even stationed on the frontiers of the papal states, because the people were not willing immediately to acknowledge the new republic. In all the towns of the states of the Church there were constant commotions, such as now take place on every opportunity. The revolutionary party in Rome was strengthened by Italians from all parts of the peninsula, by Frenchmen, foreigners, and artists, who gave great offence and provocation to the great mass of the people, grown up under the shadow and imbued with the spirit of popery. Bonaparte sent Duphot, Arrighi, and Scherlock, three of his younger and more vehement generals, to Rome, to effect what his brother could not consistently do; and they made it their business to promote and increase the fermentation. Joseph Bonaparte resided in the Corsini Palace, which became the central point of the commotions. The pope followed the same course in Rome which had been adopted in Vienna in April, 1798; he left it to the populace to form and constitute a police to act against the republicans, because his government found it very advisable to conceal itself behind the people. The populace, therefore, assaulted and ill-treated a number of these mad enthusiasts for liberty, when they met together at the Villa Medici, without the city, and had collected three hundred sympathisers, in order to call upon the people to strike for freedom. As this republican rabble were marching from the Villa Medici to the city, on the 28th of December, 1797, the papal guards did their duty, but they left it to the populace to disperse and pursue the three hundred republicans. The scattered band again assembled in and before the Corsini Palace, where they were protected by the privileges of the embassy, and where also papal soldiers were on duty; the latter, however, appeared much more disposed to fire upon the French than upon the populace. The people pressed so hard upon the disturbers of the public peace collected about the palace, that Joseph Bonaparte and General Duphot at length came out themselves, as they said, to restore peace, but, as their opponents allege, to insult and bid defiance to the Romans.* Duphot had his drawn sword in his hand, and was surrounded in the throng by adjutants and armed Romans, when the papal soldiers fired. He fell, and his attendants fled and dispersed.

The unfortunate shot which struck Duphot excited great indignation, because it was supposed to have been intentionally aimed, and because Duphot on the following day was to have been married

* The details, as usual, are very differently related, even by those who were opposed to the proceedings. Botta's account, libro xiii., vol. iii., p. 306-308, does not agree with the long report of Joseph Bonaparte to Talleyrand, to be seen in the *Correspondance inéditee*. As far as our object is concerned, this is immaterial.

to the sister of Joseph Bonaparte's wife, who afterwards became the wife of Bernadotte and Queen of Sweden. The object of the Directory was all at once accomplished by this unlucky affair. Joseph Bonaparte left Rome, and proceeded first to Tuscany; Berthier, whom Bonaparte had left in command of the army in Milan, received orders to march upon Rome, and take possession of the city and territory, with which order he most unwillingly complied. This fully appeared, when the French entered Rome on the 10th of February, 1798, and occupied all the posts in the city. Berthier remained completely behind till the 13th; he left the aged and infirm pope (Pius VI.) for two days in his usual chambers under the protection of his faithful Swiss guards, and there was not the slightest appearance of a revolutionary movement in Rome till the commissioners from the French Directory arrived. These commissioners were Haller, the usurious contractor and banker, who had great influence with Bonaparte, because, as is the case with such men, he was never in difficulty about means, and the shameless terrorist, Bassal, who had been a member of the convention, and now appeared as a government commissioner.

At the same time as the two revolutionary speculators, whole crowds of adventurers and restless agitators from other parts of the states of the Church, from the legations and the Cisalpine states, came to Rome; and even Berthier was not able wholly to withdraw himself from the ridiculous comedy which was enacted in that city on the 13th of February. On that day he was constrained to make his triumphal entry into the city—the people, so called, were assembled on the Campus Martius (Campo Vaccino), the republic proclaimed with the most farcical ceremonies, and the pope summoned to renounce his secular authority. Although he refused, and was then treated as a prisoner, still he was suffered to exercise his spiritual jurisdiction and supremacy, as long as Berthier remained in Rome; when, however, Berthier was relieved by Massena, everything was immediately altered. From this moment all order was at an end, because the commander-in-chief himself behaved in all respects like a common plunderer. Haller and his colleague emulated Massena in plundering and robbing all the public and private establishments; and generals and colonels in abundance followed the example of their superiors. Under Berthier the system of plunder was only commenced, as he exercised merely the military command; whilst, under Massena, it became general.

The new republic, indeed, obtained a provisional government, as the Helvetic did immediately after; but Massena and Haller behaved exactly in the same manner as Brune, Schauenburg, and Rapinat did at the same time in Switzerland. A contribution of 12,000,000 in money, 2,000,000 in provisions, and 3000 horses, was enforced with the greatest rigour; and Haller carried his scandalous oppression so far as to cause two valuable rings to be taken from the fingers of the pope. It was this usurer, also, who ordered all the pope's

private property to be sold, and announced to him that he must not only leave Rome, but the States of the Church. He was consequently compelled to travel to Tuscany at a season of the year when the weather in the mountains was very rough, and, till the day of his death, he continued to be alternately the cruel sport of fate and of the French. He at first found an asylum in a splendid Augustinian monastery in Sienna; this, however, was soon afterwards laid in ruins by an earthquake, and the pope took up his abode in the Villa Segardi. From thence he removed to a Carthusian convent at Florence, where, however, he was not allowed to die in peace. It was first proposed to carry him from Florence to Sardinia; but, as we shall hereafter see, they brought him, after a wearisome journey, into the rude mountains of the maritime Alps.

In the midst of this robbery, murder, and violence, Daunou, Monge, and Florent Guyot, all three formerly members of the French legislative councils, appeared in Rome on the 22nd of February, in order to erect the shadow of a Roman republic; and, with this view, they called in to their aid Faypoult, who had previously changed the ancient Genoa into an ephemeral Liguria. Up to the 20th of March, Rome was wholly governed by the military power; it then received a constitution modelled after that of France, with this exception, that French things were called by ancient Roman names. Eight departments were created, and the government was committed to five consuls, of whom Bassal, the Jacobin, was named secretary-general; two legislative councils were organised, the one of which was to deliberate on the laws to be proposed, and the other to determine their acceptance—the former named the Tribunate, and the latter the Senate; and, to complete the farce, prefects, praetors, and quæstors were appointed. All this sounded very magnificent; and yet, lately, under Berthier, and afterwards under Massena, all public order and government had been dissolved, and the French generals, commissioners, and agents, had established a regular system of depredation, which at length roused the indignation even of the subaltern officers, because it was a crying disgrace to the French nation. All property, whether it belonged to the nation or to individuals, became insecure, the plate and valuables of the nobility, their statues and pictures, were seized upon and carried off, wherever and whenever they could be found. This was, indeed, dreadful; but it must be remembered too, that such a state of things could not endure, and would not have endured long; whilst, on the contrary, the rule of priestcraft appears to be eternal, like the fallen angel, who always again obtains the mastery over the kingdom of Christ. We are therefore decidedly of Coletta's opinion, that the free exercise of all the human faculties, bodily and mental, can never be bought too dear.*

* Coletta, "Storia del Reame di Napoli," vol. i., p. 126, § xxviii., expresses himself very correctly as follows:—"Chi prevedeva i futuri benefizii di stato libero tollerava

Whilst Massena collected immense riches, and the generals, colonels, contractors, and usurers revelled in luxury and license, the soldiers were in want of everything, although all discipline was at an end; their pay was kept back, they had neither clothing nor shoes, and at last they rose against their own generals. Massena, Augereau, Victor, Rusca, and Lanouvieux were denounced as enemies of the soldiers by that portion of the French army which had already refused obedience in the middle of February in Mantua; they durst, therefore, no longer show their faces. When, therefore, Massena was sent to Rome, everything was ready for an explosion, which indeed threatened to burst before Berthier's departure. The scandalous Jacobin, La Primaudière, whom the directors in Paris had sent as a commissioner to Rome, soon raised a universal spirit of revolt against the higher authorities. Before Berthier's departure, the officers had held a meeting in the Pantheon, laid a list of their grievances before the general, and expressed their disapprobation of the system of robbery and plunder practised by the generals and commissioners. Berthier, however, was removed, and the case was left for Massena to provide against. He was very unwilling to take any notice of the meeting held in the Pantheon; he attempted severity, and was met by disobedience. When he commanded the disobedient to march out, he was laughed at. His command therefore expired of itself; he was obliged to withdraw on the 27th of February, and Dallemagne for a time undertook the chief command.

The interim commander had scarcely assumed his office, when the Romans also began to revolt against their oppressors. The most vigorous portion of the Roman people, the Transteverini, as they are called, first took up arms, the insurrection spread, and the French were for a moment really in danger.* The appearance of danger, however, united the hitherto disunited French, and the raging multitude experienced that fate which universally befalls a mob of undisciplined men when opposed to regular troops, be the number of the latter ever so disproportioned. A dreadful slaughter ensued; plundering was renewed, and a hundred and fifty prisoners taken, some of whom were shot and others sent to the galleys. These bloody scenes of cruelty, spoiling, and murder were followed by republican comedies. The cardinals were compelled to lay down their dignities and leave the country; and on the 20th of March the new republic was proclaimed in the capital with the usual pomp; the phrasemongers exhausted all their ability and imagination to furnish the most splendid addresses for the occasion, and the

le passeggiere license della conquista; chi giudica e vive del presente abboriva e temeva gli ordini nuovi."

* Botta, vol. iii., p. 384: "I primi a romoreggiare furono i Transteverini, gridando *viva Maria*. Avvialisi verso San Pietro in grosso numero, uccidevano una guardia Francese, s' impadronivano di Ponte Sisto e delle strade, che mettono capo in esso. Al tempo medesimo le campagne tumultuavono; Velletri, Albano, Marino, Civita di Castello si muovevano."

alliance with the French republic was theatrically announced, amidst boasting, singing, playing, and dancing. On this occasion Dalle-magne, with a hand still dripping with Roman blood, unfurled the standard of their liberty; and a medal was struck in honour of Berthier, who but very shortly before was compelled to withdraw himself from the indignation of his own army and of the people by a quick departure. On this medal he is handed down to all succeeding generations in our collection as *Restitutor Urbis* (the restorer of ancient Rome), and the French are immortalised as the *saviours of mankind* (*Gallia, salus generis humani*).

After the suppression of the insurrection in Rome, Massena it is true returned to the city on the 13th of March, but he tried in vain to resume the place of commander-in-chief, for there was a general refusal to acknowledge his authority. The army had sent four officers to Paris to lay their complaints before the Directory; and the directors were obliged to concede their demands. Massena was recalled and received another appointment, whilst St. Cyr was sent in his stead to Rome, and order was restored.

§ III.

RUSSIA—ENGLAND—AUSTRIA—NAPLES—PRUSSIA.

A.—RUSSIA.

WE have stated in the preceding volume the manner in which the Empress Catherine the Second and her empire were dependent on that physical necessity which united her to this or that favourite who for the time enjoyed the privileges of a husband; but that, Potemkin, after he had played out his character as the empress's favourite, was the only man who retained so much influence as to aid her in the attainment of colossal objects by colossal means. Even before Potemkin's death, the three hateful brothers Suboff—Plato, Nicolas, and Valerian, had taken his place in the empress's favour. Plato, moreover, had made himself master of a decisive voice in the ministry, and after Potemkin's death ruled with the most absolute sway. Neither Plato Suboff, Soltikoff, minister of war, who was his earlier Mentor, nor the frivolous and extravagant gambler Maskoff, who filled the same office at a later period, were men of distinguished talents, although Maskoff, who had risen from the condition of a peasant to the highest offices in the state, was in reality an excellent and ready man of business. Notwithstanding this, the plans which had been devised and commenced under Potemkin were completed under the direction of Plato.

However disgraceful the last years of the Empress Catherine's life may have been when considered in certain relations, they were unquestionably very splendid when regarded in a merely political or diplomatic point of view. However much we may feel averse to

the Russian system of government, it must nevertheless be admitted that, if the maintenance of the existing state of things, and the military renown, splendour, and wealth of all those who took any part in the government were the only objects of political institutions, these ends were completely attained, at the close of the eighteenth century, by the Russian aristocracy and by the plutocratic aristocracy of England alone. During the time in which Plato Suboff was at the head of affairs, Russia terminated the war with Sweden and the Turks in the most glorious manner; and by empty promises urged the neighbouring powers, and England also, to make war upon France, because some advantages might be thereby gained against Sweden, against the Turks and the Poles, whilst all attacks upon France must necessarily be attended with loss. The Russian government thus got free scope for the prosecution of its own plans. Russia well knew how to keep England in good humour by conceding facilities and privileges for commerce, and even contrived to obtain subsidies for which no services were rendered; for we reckon it as nothing that a few ships were sent, which afterwards lay unemployed in English harbours. It was not till a subsequent period that Catherine showed any serious intention of mixing herself up in the war against France; but even the union formed between England, Russia, and Austria in the year 1795, proved totally ineffective, and they were not really agreed about the treaty till 1796. This treaty contained the usual conditions respecting English subsidies; whilst Russia, on her part, promised to raise the numbers of the Russian auxiliary army for Austria from 65,000 to 80,000 men; and the English were to prevent the Turks from affording any aid to the Persians, against whom Valerian Suboff, in the name of the empress, had declared war. The treaty was to have been ratified on the 17th of November, 1796; the empress, however, died on that very day, and her successor did not approve of the terms of the alliance.

The Emperor Paul the First, Catherine's successor, had been long known for his singularities, his great dislike to the French, and to everything which Catherine had done. He appeared desirous of proceeding directly on the very opposite course to that which she had followed. She had chiefly directed her attention to foreign relations and affairs, whilst he appeared to occupy his mind solely with the internal state of his dominions. His very first act was a proof that he was quite ready to go in opposition to all the ordinary rules of political prudence, and when under the influence of his humour to follow his views, reckless of consequences. He caused splendid funeral honours and services to be performed for his murdered father, and forced the audacious and godless, though clever criminals, who had helped to place his mother on the throne, to be publicly exposed to the gaze of the people. Notwithstanding this, he suffered them to remain in possession of their honours and estates, whilst he designated them as murderers, and reminded the people that his mother had taken part in the murder of his father. The

body of Peter the Third, which had been deposited in the convent of Alexander-Newski, was by his orders placed beside that of his wife; and it was notified by an inscription in the Russian language that, though separated in life, in death they were united. Alexis Orloff and Prince Baratinski, two of the murderous band, were compelled to come to Petersburg to accompany the funeral procession on foot, but they were not so treated as to prevent them afterwards from doing further mischief. Alexis obtained permission to travel in foreign countries. Baratinski was ordered never again to show himself at court; which, under existing circumstances, could not to him be otherwise than an agreeable command. Single proofs of tender feeling, of a noble heart, and touching goodness, nay even the emperor's magnanimous conduct towards Kosciusko and his brethren in arms, combined with his sympathy with the fate of Poland, could not reconcile a court, such as that of Russia under Catherine the Second had become, and a city like that of Petersburg, to the change of the court into a guard-room, and to the daily varying humours of a man of eccentric and half-deranged mind. Even the improvements in the financial affairs of the country were regarded as ruinous innovations by those who in times past had profited by the confusion. The whole of Russia, and even the imperial family, were alarmed and terrified; a complete flood of decrees, often contradictory, and mutually abrogatory, followed one another in quick succession; and the mad schemes of the emperor, who was, nevertheless, by no means wicked or insensible to what was good and true, reminded all observers of the most unhappy times of declining Rome. Every indication of favour towards anything which had any connexion with, or savour of the French revolution, excited the bitterest scorn of the emperor. For this reason, he caused the two Massons, to whom we are indebted for the scandalous chronicles of Russia, and whom his mother placed about the person of her son Alexander, to be seized, carried away, and conveyed beyond the frontiers. The military were again to assume the old Frankish equipment, which Paul had forced upon his guards at Gatschina, where he lived as hereditary prince. He brought this guard, which had been an object of general ridicule, with him to Petersburg, where it was made the model for the army. We shall not detain our readers with an enumeration of the whims, severities, devices, and arbitrary and tyrannical commands of the emperor, and altogether pass over the numerous and severe punishments and persecutions, as well as ill-treatment, inflicted upon all who fell under the emperor's displeasure from any oversight or neglect whatever. In the following part of our history we shall also avoid all mention of those horrible sentences of exile to Siberia, whither many most innocent persons were sent in long processions and in crowds, because all this properly belongs to the internal history of the country. We are only concerned with the tendency and direction of the emperor's politics;

and in order to form a just estimation of these, we must first cast a glance upon England.

B.—ENGLAND.

Before England was able to bring Paul the First back to the principles of his mother—that war must be carried on with a vigorous hand by all monarchical states against republican France—it had assumed the appearance of an inclination to conclude a peace with the republic. This was only publicly done in order to deceive the English people, which at that time, on many occasions, expressed its dissatisfaction. The first attempt necessarily failed, from the very fact of having employed the same Wickham who bribed Pichegru, who also attempted to win over Barras to the cause of the Bourbons, and who was continually busy in all directions in setting on foot conspiracies against the republic. A second attempt was made in September, 1796, by Pitt's high Church ministry; which, however, was just as earnest in its devotion to the church as the infidel government of France, which despised all morality and principle. It appeared at first as if the English government was really serious; for Lord Malmesbury went to Paris in October, and remained there till December. The English ambassador, however, took leave of Paris in a very unfriendly spirit; and Burke, who, as is well known, enjoyed a considerable pension as the organ of the rigid aristocratic faction, was commissioned to publish a piece, which, by its tone, language, contents, and even title, “Thoughts on a Regicide Peace,” necessarily gave deep offence, not merely to the French Directory, but to the whole French nation. The difficulties of England were increased about this time, or rather in the beginning of the year, by the stoppage of the Bank, which is ascribed to the ministers having employed its resources in war, in a manner hitherto unexampled, the former law by which limits were put to the power of the government in this respect having been repealed in the year 1798. The ministry was compelled to relinquish cash payments, till parliament should take such measures as were necessary to preserve the credit of the country. This, indeed, was speedily done, because the English people knew well that the money, power, and industry of the country rested upon the Bank, its security and credit. A greater danger, however, of another kind, threatened them at the same moment from another quarter. Whilst the oligarchy continued more and more to oppress the fanatical people by increased taxes, and the sums extorted from them were squandered in pensions and sinecures upon the families and relations of the aristocracy, in subsidies to foreign powers, or in bribing foreign cabinets and ministers, the brave defenders of the country were suffering want, although the Admiralty in that very year had obtained from parliament almost incredible sums for the equipment and provisioning of the navy.

The English sailors in the Channel fleet unanimously determined to mutiny, because they were badly paid, and supplied with insufficient and bad provisions. The commotion continued from February till April, 1797; and so little were the seamen influenced by the dread of punishment, that the Admiralty was at length obliged to give way, and in order to secure a return to discipline and obedience, to promise a remedy for their complaints and grievances, and to grant oblivion of the past. The ministry hesitated and delayed the fulfilment of its promises, and in May no payment of wages had been made; the mutiny therefore broke out anew, and more fearfully than before, and soon spread through the whole Channel fleet. The men in all the ships refused to obey orders, and even went so far as to make a prisoner of an admiral who was disposed to have recourse to force. The marines, who were ordered to act against the sailors, entered into bloody strife with them. Pitt now, for the first time, brought the matter before parliament, which voted a sum of 372,000*l.* and a complete oblivion of the past, which, in fact, served as it were to excite the other fleets to follow the example of the Channel one.

The North-Sea fleet arrested its commander, and even blockaded the mouth of the Thames. It was, however, by no means so fortunate as the Channel fleet, and chiefly because the seamen went too far in their demands. At the very commencement of the mutiny the same concessions were proffered to them by the Admiralty which had been already made to the Channel fleet. The seamen, however, were not satisfied, became insolent, and made still further demands. The reply to these claims was the expression of a determination to withdraw the concessions already made. The insurgents were prevented from entering any of the harbours, and all access to them was strictly prohibited; as, therefore, the mutiny continued till June, the seamen got into the greatest difficulties, and were at length compelled to sue for pardon, which was granted, under very severe conditions. The leaders of this dangerous mutiny, and thirty of the most forward of the sailors, were arrested, tried by a court martial in the admiral's ship, and for a whole month there was nothing to be seen or heard but a series of trials and executions. This dangerous insurrection in the fleet, the disturbances and civil war in Ireland, and the threatening measures adopted by the French with a view to a landing in Ireland, did not, however, at all weaken the power of England abroad. Even at this time the English gave the most splendid proofs that none of their enemies was any match for them at sea, in the same manner as the French generals and armies did by land. This will be obvious from a summary, but by no means complete account, of the advantages gained by the English in the year 1797.

In February the Spanish admiral, Don Josef de Cordova, who commanded a fleet consisting of French, Dutch, and Spanish ships in the Mediterranean, ventured to leave the harbour of Carthagena,

and to pass the Straits into the Atlantic Ocean, where Admiral Jarvis was cruising. Although Cordova had twenty-seven, and Jarvis only fifteen ships, the latter never hesitated to attack him, and compelled him to seek for shelter in Cadiz, with the loss of two ships of 112 guns, one of 80, and another of 74. In October, Admiral De Winter, who was lying in the Texel, was to support Humbert's undertaking against Ireland with his fleet. Admiral Duncan received orders to find, intercept, and give him battle. This gave occasion to the most obstinate and bloodiest naval engagement of the whole war—an engagement from which the Dutch obtained the highest honour, but which nevertheless resulted in favour of the English.

The two fleets met on the coast of Holland, near Camperdown, and the engagement would probably have ended favourably to the Dutch, had the admiral, who commanded the centre of the line, fought with the same perseverance and obstinacy as De Winter and his second in command. The Dutch, indeed, lost the battle, but they did not strike their colours till one-half of their crews were slain, and most of the other half wounded. The English suffered considerable injury, and lost a great number of men; but on the other hand they captured eight ships of the line and two frigates. This splendid victory completely annihilated the hopes which the French placed upon the continuance of the disturbances in Ireland, for De Winter's fleet was especially destined thither. In the summer of 1797, Lord Malmesbury, for the third time, received full powers to negotiate with France, and for that purpose travelled to Lille, when notes were exchanged from July till the beginning of September. On the 17th of this month it appeared that there was in reality no prospect of an agreement; but Malmesbury did not declare his opinion till the 5th of October, on which day he intimated, in an unfriendly note, that he must break off the negotiations.

No sooner had the English frustrated all the hopes of the Irish from French aid, by their victory over De Winter, than they had recourse to measures of the most novel and severe description in the commencement of the year 1798, in order, as it were, to conquer Ireland a second time by military force. By virtue of a resolution of parliament, they sent to Ireland twelve regiments of militia, raised exclusively for the defence of the country against invasion. By this means they were able quickly to suppress the Irish insurgents, who had received a sort of military organisation during the continuance of the revolt; and they anticipated the new attempt of Humbert to get a footing in Ireland, which, as we have stated above, was undertaken too late. In consequence of the complete failure of the landing at Killala in September, 1798, and the military execution of Theobald Wolfe Tone, the founder of the society of United Irishmen, there was for a term a dead stillness. The English at that time not only put to death Wolfe Tone, but they terrified the citizens of Hamburg to such an extent, that they delivered up into their hands

James Napper Tandy, Tone's colleague; for which act the Hamburgers were afterwards deservedly punished by Bonaparte, who imposed upon them the penalty most severely felt by a trading people—a heavy contribution in cash.

C.—AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, NAPLES.

The crimes of the French democrats, and their disregard not only of all existing rights, as has been previously detailed, but even of all the principles of moral order, very much lightened the labour of the English in 1798 in forming a new coalition against France. Violence was done to the Emperor Paul's moral feelings; his ideas of monarchical power and of the divine right of kings, were offended, and he, therefore, with knightly sacrifice, suffered himself to be made the blind tool of English policy. The English freely distributed their money, because this was easily recovered again; and in other respects they had little to lose in the war, but a great deal to gain. The acts of violence and injustice committed by the French not only sensibly offended his sense of right and his sympathy with the weak, whom he considered it to be his duty to defend against the aggressions of the strong, but the French threatened also to act in opposition to the political objects of Russia, and thus offend his personal pride. The former took place when they appropriated to themselves, in the peace of Campo Formio, the Ionian Islands, and the territory belonging to them on the continent, and therefore threatened to withdraw the Greeks and the Turks from Russian influence. The other happened when they refused to allow the emperor's ambassador to sit in the congress at Rastadt. At the beginning of the year 1798 the Directory also fell into a diplomatic dispute with the Emperor of Germany.

The command of the Italian army had been destined for General Bernadotte, as soon as Bonaparte should have removed from Milan: as early, however, as August, 1797, he drew upon himself the displeasure of the commander-in-chief, and of the Directory, because he would not blindly serve either the one or the other in relation to the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor. He alone, at the commencement, refused to send an address from his division, and when at length he did send it, as he said, *upon command*, he did not forward the address through Bonaparte, but transmitted it direct to Paris. Berthier, therefore, received the command of the army in Italy, and almost at the very moment when he was obliged to march upon Rome, Bernadotte was appointed ambassador to the court of Vienna. He arrived in Vienna on the 8th of February, 1798, and in his person it was proposed to give a splendid manifestation of the greatness of the republic, for he was attended by an immense suite, and 144,000 francs were allotted for his income. All those persons were sent with him from Paris of whom, as dangerous men, the Directory were desirous of relieving themselves for a time, as Talleyrand ex-

pressly states in the *Moniteur*.* Bonaparte himself, who, whilst in St. Helena, represented most things very differently from what they really were, or the people by whom he was surrounded, and who most absurdly made him an idol, are therefore most completely in the wrong when they throw the blame of the tumults in Vienna upon Bernadotte.†

The chief commission given to the ambassador by the Directory was to procure the dismissal of Thugut from his office, by representations to the emperor himself. The project failed, as well as a similar attempt made at the same time to overthrow the Spanish favourite, who was all powerful at the court. Thugut incensed the French by again entering into negotiations with the English, after having previously betrayed them by the aid of the Queen of Naples and the empress; and the Queen of Naples too, since the occupation of Rome by the French, had again turned to England. Bernadotte was now to lay before the emperor documentary proofs of Thugut's corruption; this could only be done through the empress, but he was not able to obtain an audience of her before April, first in consequence of her pregnancy, and then her confinement. This delay furnished the Directory and Bonaparte with an opportunity of exciting suspicions against him, and of heaping abuse upon him in all the Paris journals, because he did not constrain the officials and servants of the embassy, who were not Frenchmen born, to wear the national cockade, and neglected to have the national tricolor waving on his hôtel. In Vienna, on the other hand, it was generally supposed that he had taken so many Germans into his service, in order to spread revolutionary opinions. In order to meet the blame thrown upon him by the Parisians, the ambassador took advantage of the first favourable opportunity to insult the emperor in his own capital.

The young men of Vienna proposed to celebrate the anniversary of the sacrifices which they had made in the preceding year when Bonaparte was advancing against Vienna, and had appointed the 11th of April for the celebration. Bernadotte assumed that this was an insult, and, singular enough, called upon the government to for-

* Mon., An vi, p. 258: "Quelques jours après le 18 Fructidor le gouvernement, disposé à oublier les anciens torts, et sachant que les passions les plus fougueuses peuvent trouver un emploi utile lorsqu'elles sont bien dirigées, désira que certains citoyens, connus par leur caractère impétueux, fussent placés à l'extérieur et trouvassent là avec des moyens de subsistance des occasions de faire preuve d'un zèle qui seroit contenu dans les véritables bornes par une surveillance supérieure." The article then proceeds to give an account of the manner in which the minister sends for the persons to whom it refers, promises them salaries of 2400 francs, but finds it difficult to induce them to take their departure, because they required to have instructions on a kind of business respecting which *no instructions are usually given*. "Quel est l'homme assez peu versé dans les matières diplomatiques, pour ne pas savoir que jamais les instruction *des agens secrets* ne sont écrites, qu'elles se réduisent toujours à un petit nombre d'indications confiées de vive voix; qu'en un mot, on se borne à leur dire, observez bien telle ou telle chose et rendez nous compte de vos observations?"

+ In the *Mémoires de St. Hélène*, Montholon, or whoever else there speaks in Bonaparte's name (perhaps Bonaparte himself, who dictated thousands of such false reminiscences), complains that Bernadotte had become *exalter*, and acted as such.

bid the festivities. The requisition was refused, and Bernadotte, therefore, determined to celebrate a fête of a very different description on the very day on which the young men of Vienna resolved to celebrate the anniversary of their taking up arms and marching out against the French; and the ambassador on this occasion caused a tricolored flag to be mounted on the balcony of his palace with the inscription "LIBERTY AND EQUALITY." The police, who, as is well known, understand well how to suppress popular commotions and to keep a tight rein upon the people, on this occasion looked quietly on as the masses pushed forward to the palace of the embassy, raised a tumult in the street, and finally broke the windows. A guard was indeed mounted, and the soldiers appeared as if they would take measures to suppress the violence, but the tumult hourly became greater, and the ambassador sent adjutants and notes to Thugut in vain. On the receipt of his first note, Count Dietrichstein, and Count Pergen, the director of the police, appeared; they, however, required the ambassador to take away the flag. This was refused, and they satisfied themselves with friendly advice and warning to the raging multitude, which, in Vienna, from such persons, and at such a time, could be nothing else than an encouragement. The house was then stormed, the balcony scaled, and, in spite of repeated messages to Thugut, the mischief continued for five hours. Furniture, chandeliers, mirrors, carriages and state coaches, were broken in pieces and thrown into the streets. It was not till a third note had been sent to Thugut that serious military measures were adopted to quell the riot, several regiments put in motion, and two fresh ones sent for into the city. An end, however, had long before been put to the affair; at length all the accesses to the street had been occupied by a strong military force, and the populace dispersed, after having burnt the colours in the market-place, uttering loud cries of "*Long live the Emperor—Down with the tricolor.*" The emperor himself having appeared to the citizens of the capital on this occasion, Bernadotte regarded the fact as a formal approval on his part of what had taken place.

As early as the morning of the 15th the ambassador wrote an insulting letter to the emperor himself,* demanded his passports, and

* On the 15th of April, Bernadotte's adjutant delivered the following letter: "S. M. Impériale ne peut avoir manqué d'être instruite des excès qui ont été commis contre l'ambassadeur de la république Française. Trois notes successives ont été addressées par l'ambassadeur à M. le baron de Thugut pour lui annoncer le commencement et les progrès du tumulte. Il a vu s'écouler, sans recevoir aucune réponse, tout le tems de danger, et ce n'est que sur trois heures du matin qu'il a enfin reçu une note bien peu faite pour remplir son attente. Une conduite aussi extraordinaire met l'ambassadeur de la république Française dans le cas d'engager S. M. Impériale à se faire représenter les diverses notes qu'il a fait parcourir à son ministre des affaires étrangères. C'est à regret qu'il prie S. M. d'observer qu'au nombre de ses reclamations se trouve la demande de passeport, dont il est forcé de faire usage pour aller prendre les ordres du gouvernement auquel il a l'honneur d'appartenir. En s'éloignant de cette résidence il emportera la certitude consolante de n'avoir rien négligé pour convaincre S. M. Impériale du dispositions pacifiques et amicales que le gouvernement Français entretient à son egard. L'Ambassadeur espère qu'une juste réparation prouvera au directoire exécutif que

would not suffer himself to be dissuaded from his purpose by any entreaties or any representations. The emperor then caused a full and particular account of the whole affair to be written down—the minute to be signed by Bernadotte himself, and to be laid before all his ministers assembled in a council, at which all the ambassadors of foreign powers were invited to be present. They unanimously declared that Bernadotte's own imprudence had provoked the scene, and that the Austrian government had done its duty on the occasion. This declaration, signed by all the ministers present, was despatched by a special courier to Paris.

Shortly before, Thugut had resumed the conduct of foreign affairs, which had been for a time transferred, out of mere ceremony, to Cobenzl, because he had been Talleyrand's friend at the university, and understood his principles, in accordance with which he had been a party with Bonaparte to all the intrigues relating to a peace. This minister was now sent, on the pretext of negotiating concerning the offence committed against the ambassador, but, in reality, with the expectation of meeting Bonaparte at Rastadt. Bonaparte and the Directory had at that time long done injustice to Bernadotte, and the embassy to Holland had been offered to him. In the mean time, both industriously availed themselves of the pretence, in order to conceal the proper object of the negotiations, now transferred to Selz. Cobenzl, on the part of Austria, was commissioned to supersede the slow progress of the negotiations carried on at Rastadt, after the traditional custom of a German congress, by the shorter method of a direct communication between Talleyrand and Thugut, whilst negotiations were being carried on in another way, and in another sense, with Russia and Bavaria, by the French in Rastadt.

A principle of the then French constitution furnished the pretext for transferring the negotiations between Cobenzl and the French plenipotentiary to the left side of the Rhine. François de Neufchâteau, one of the directors, was replaced in the Directory by Treilhard, who up to that time had been ambassador at Rastadt, and Neufchâteau was appointed to occupy his place. According to the constitutional law, no retiring director was suffered to leave the territory of France till a prescribed period after the exercise of his functions. Cobenzl availed himself of this law, in order to justify him in going to Sebz, in Alsace, to meet the French plenipotentiary; and admirably he knew how to befool a man so completely inexperienced in diplomatic affairs and unknown.

At the time in which Thugut came from behind the scenes and again appeared on the stage, England had already spun all the threads of a new coalition, and the Emperor Paul had agreed to the treaty of commerce formerly proposed to him, as the commencement of a closer union with England. The refusal to admit his ambassador Count Rasumowsky to any place in the negotiations at Rastadt

greatly incensed the emperor, and he took great pains to induce Prussia also to relinquish its connexion with France. In May, 1798, Thugut concluded a defensive alliance with Naples, the significance of which could be a secret to none. As long as Charles Theodore lived, Bavaria was involved in all undertakings which were promoted by English subsidies, through English money and Austrian influence. To win his favour, it was only necessary to favour the Count of Leiningen Guntersblum, the Prince of Brezenheim, the Prince of Isenburg, the Counts of Hollnstein and many others, who like those already named were either natural sons of the Elector or married to his natural daughters; for they stood in a much nearer relationship to him than the legitimate heir to his dominions. Charles, Duke of Deuxponts, the acknowledged successor of Charles Theodore, had died in 1795, and his brother Maximilian became entitled to his rights; during the war, however, the latter lived in very poor circumstances in the Palatinate, and was only called to Munich when it was discovered that Austria, in the peace of Campo Formio, had not only secured Salzburg for herself, but also aimed at obtaining a portion of Bavaria. Prussia and Russia also, as guarantees of the peace of Teschen, took up the cause of Maximilian Joseph, who was called to Munich, appointed co-regent, and had Mannheim assigned to him as a residence. On this ground Prussia promised to guarantee the integrity of Bavaria. In this way Bavaria became an ally neither to be relied upon by Germany, Prussia, nor the emperor; but with the death of Charles Theodore, in February, 1797, everything was completely changed.

D.—PRUSSIA.

A most beneficial change was effected in Prussia in 1797, both in the court and in the private relations of the royal family, by the accession of Frederick William III. to the throne, because the king and queen were models of all the domestic virtues and of genuine religious feeling; in political affairs, however, things were neither better nor worse. Everything was changed in the administration of home affairs and finances, in church concerns and freedom of teaching; but in politics the king suffered himself to be led into a labyrinth by the same intriguers who had led his predecessor to fish continually in troubled waters. The young king was timid and anxious, he was afraid to have persons of decisive character in his councils, and carefully shunned all decisive measures; he was, it is true, very willing to aggrandise himself and increase his territories, but would venture nothing; and at a time when all Europe was in a state of commotion, he tried by means of every sacrifice to preserve a species of neutrality, which ultimately made him an object of contempt to both friend and foe. In the last years of his life, King Frederick William II. had sunk as low as even Louis XV., and resembled the French monarch in entrusting the government of

his kingdom to the very meanest and lowest of his mistresses, Riez, whom he had created Countess of Lichtenau, and to such people as Wollner and Bischoffswerder, of whom she was the protectrix and friend. The whole three, and along with them the numerous and licentious or hypocritically saintly tribe of their creatures, were obliged to retire as soon as William III. mounted the throne, on the 16th of November, 1797.

The vacillating character of the young king soon appeared in his conduct towards the originators and promoters of the scandals of the preceding reign, as well as in other things. Bischoffswerder and the contemptible countess were obliged immediately to leave Berlin; the latter indeed was even arrested, and her conduct subjected to a criminal investigation; but immediately after recourse was had to another method of disposing of her case. She was not tried by a judge according to the rules of law and justice, but at once acquitted, and at the same time immediately condemned. By a cabinet order she was freed from arrest, and by another cabinet order deprived of everything which had been bestowed upon her during the previous reign, and she herself banished to Breslau with a pension of 4000 dollars. Wollner remained till February, 1798, when he was dismissed from his office; but the most ruinous of all the creatures of Lichtenau and Bischoffswerder, Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and Lombard, retained and exercised their influence upon Prussian politics after, as they had done before, the king's accession.

Even before the late king's death, Lucchesini had very cunningly withdrawn for a time from public affairs. Haugwitz was quite indispensable for that course of politics which Frederick William III. wished to follow; but he and Lombard could not carry on their French intrigues and cabals without the aid of the marquis, who was wholly a stranger to the Germans and their interests. Under the new government, Le Coq was associated with them as a right worthy companion, so that the whole course of foreign affairs in these most dangerous and completely new times was guided according to the petty, selfish, and thoroughly obsolete views of the time of the seven years' war. The king's amiable and beautiful wife led him to indulge in all the sentimentality of a private man—which, indeed, did him honour, but distracted his attention from those great political concerns which the then circumstances of the nation and the prevailing revolutionary movement of the times demanded; whilst the pictures of family life drawn by Lafontaine and other writers of the same school, which the king read with the queen, initiated him into a description of life wholly at variance with the reality. Von Kokeritz, his friend and adjutant-general, was a man of pure, sentimental, noble, and honourable mind, but, at the same time, as narrow in his views and tedious in his manner as his king. The good Kokeritz was often talked over and led astray by his chamberlain, Nagel, and still oftener by Nagel's wife, just as his master was by Haugwitz, who at that time still possessed the power

of detaining his rival, Hardenberg, in Franconia. Menken, one of the council, who possessed and deserved the respect of the king, formed a perfect contrast to the band consisting of Haugwitz, Lombard, and Le Coq; but, unhappily, his strong dislike to a feudal aristocracy was exhibited at the most decisive moment, and his prepossessions in favour of the first French National Assembly, shown by his connexion with Sieyes, proved ruinous. These prepossessions of Menken were, however, very wholesome in Prussia, and the old Prussian prejudices were shaken to the foundations by a long series of ordinances issued by the king on Menken's recommendation. These ordinances made the king popular; but, unfortunately, they were couched more in the language of instruction than of command. The services of Von Schulenburg, another of the ministers, were also very beneficial. He restored order to the whole financial system of the country, which had fallen into inextricable confusion, and restored the old unity of administration, which, during the previous reign, had been broken up into a number of departmental administrations, each under the complete guidance of a separate head. In these changes he was faithfully supported by the king himself, who was always desirous of promoting what was just and good. The young monarch endeavoured, by prudence and frugality, to recover the hundreds of millions which had been recklessly squandered by his predecessor. He continued to reside in the palace of the Crown Prince, avoided all mere pomp and ostentation, and never increased his establishment. As he very unwillingly exhibited himself in the splendour of royalty, and by no means with the facility of a well-trained actor, he hated all court ceremonies, and, like a good head of a family, universally preserved order and discipline. Unfortunately, the new king, who continued to play with soldiers as with puppets till the end of his life, left the army exactly as it was, and adopted none of those improvements which the experience in Champagne and the new military tactics of the French ought to have led him to introduce. The officers of the guards, after, as well as before his accession, were mere braggarts—noble, haughty, insolent, and intent upon spatterdash service, as appears from the whole direction of the Prussian military affairs being left in the hands of General von Zastrow, who continued to be the evil genius of the service even for a whole year after the battle of Jena, and who pursued precisely the same course as had been followed previous to the young king's accession. Moreover, Berlin and the whole of the noble and fashionable world had really become so entirely corrupt under the previous reign, that the moral, simple, and sober life of the royal family, the great goodness of the king, the virtues of the queen, and the exemplary lives of Kokeritz and Menken, could not possibly produce any beneficial effect upon the generals and nobility, or upon the distinguished *literati* and officials. Luxury and license had effectually debased the whole of the higher classes; immorality had become the fashion, and belonged to the court and fashionable circles; and sensual

enjoyments of all kinds had been so refined, that the young king's court presented the sharpest contrast with the circle by which his ministers were surrounded. The king and Kokeritz withdrew, isolated themselves, and lived morally. Haugwitz, and Hardenberg, too, when he afterwards came from Franconia to Berlin, had a circle of profligates around them, who regarded themselves as men of genius, to whom, at a later period, Johannes von Muller, and other so-called celebrated men, were united. From these circles sprang that generation of Prussian boasters who disappeared after the battle of Jena, and now only occasionally lift up their heads.

The king was therefore for the most part wholly a stranger to the intrigues which were being carried on at his accession in Rastadt and Berlin. Haugwitz had drawn up the instructions for the representatives of Prussia at the Congress, and Hardenberg sent thither Ritter von Lang from Franconia, to act as an observer, because Hardenberg had to defend the faithless articles of the peace of Basle, as at a later period Count Cobenzl had to do the secret articles of the peace of Campo Formio, especially directed against Prussia, and with which Count Lehrbach, the emperor's principal commissioner, was not at first at all acquainted. Ritter von Lang, in his memoirs, draws a very cynically sarcastic picture of the Prussian embassy at Rastadt, in which, however, in a most unworthy manner, he does great injustice to the able Von Dohm, who formed one of the body.

Austria and Prussia worked continually against one another, and felt no shame in seeking by all means to gain the favour of the democrats when even the smallest advantages were thereby to be gained. Austria had prevailed upon France to agree to secure her a portion of Bavaria; Prussia assumed the appearance of being the protectrix of Bavaria, but at the same time enjoined her representatives at the Congress to make it their first business to see that the Prince of Orange was provided for in Germany, which Austria tried by all possible means to prevent. Under these circumstances, it can excite no astonishment that the rude jurists whose business it was to manage the affairs of France at the Congress after Bonaparte's departure, insulted the empire, the King of Prussia, and the emperor. Bonaparte had previously imperiously required the surrender of the Rhine fortresses, and he absolutely refused permission to Count Fersen, whom Gustavus IV., as Duke of Pomerania, had with perfect right sent to the Congress, to remain at Rastadt. The king, indeed, ought not to have sent this Parisian Count Fersen, who had been an active abettor of the flight of Louis XVI., and whose name was prominent in the notorious "Red Book," which contained the list of the royal beneficences and their licentious and extravagant recipients; but the speech in which Bonaparte so rudely treated and abused him was, notwithstanding, extremely insulting both to the empire and the emperor. The refusal to admit Count Rasumowsky might be excused for many reasons, and especially because the

Emperor of Russia, when he sent him, had already entered into an intimate alliance with England against France.

The English contrived, through their ambassador, Lord Whitworth, gently to withdraw the Emperor Paul from adhering to his first determination of confining his attention solely to the administration of the internal affairs of his empire. He appeared at first so much disinclined to adopt the system of his mother, that by a number of ridiculous and petty changes he destroyed the whole system of military discipline established by Suwarrow, and sent the hero of the Russians and the idol of the army in disgrace to reside on his estates. Whitworth and his friends in Russia succeeded in changing his opinion. The first step towards a close and cordial alliance with England was the treaty of commerce, already mentioned, and ratified at Moscow in March, 1797, the still further importance of which was clearly indicated by the King of England's speech to Parliament in July, 1797. It was not, however, till a year after that the effects of English intrigues and English money became obvious to all. The close alliance between England, Russia, Naples, and Austria, was first openly announced by the accession of the Grand Sultan in the year 1798, after Bonaparte had taken possession of Malta, and made a descent upon Egypt, and therefore after Nelson's victory over the French fleet in the Bay of Aboukir.

E.—NAPLES.

The queen, by her own and her creatures' intrigues, had been very useful to the French in the affairs connected with the peace of Campo Formio; but notwithstanding this, immediately after Bonaparte's departure from Italy she was furiously assailed by all the Paris journals under the influence of the Directory, and all the scandals of her public and private life were in a most offensive and insulting manner brought to light. Respecting her private life we shall be silent; but we must say of her public conduct, that the queen completely surrendered, not only herself, but her kingdom, to English influence. Acton, her favourite, belonged more to England than to Naples. An actress of great beauty, and celebrated on the stage, but of immoral life, and who had been notoriously in the pay of one English nobleman after another, was at length purchased by the old and simple Sir William Hamilton, ambassador at Naples, from his nephew, and made his wife: this lady was the bosom friend of the queen. The queen was so little ashamed of this friendship, that she took all possible pains to show her affection for Lady Hamilton. When this lady afterwards openly became Nelson's mistress, without being separated from her husband, and Nelson gave the most unworthy proofs of his bondage to her charms, the queen did homage to him as well as to his mistress; in return for this he afterwards became the instrument of her unexampled vengeance. The journals of the Directory had therefore materials

enough for scandal and abuse, but the French did not satisfy themselves with newspaper missiles; they also had recourse to serious threats.

Berthier had no sooner taken possession of Rome, in February, 1798, than he sent General Berlier with some haughty demands to Naples. He required that all emigrants should be driven out of the Neapolitan territory; that an English ambassador should not be suffered to remain in Naples; and that Acton, the king's minister, should be dismissed from his post. Berthier also laid claim, on behalf of his allies and *protégés*, the Romans, to the principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, and required that a free passage should be granted to his troops in order to go and take possession of these territories. The French, moreover, laid an attachment upon the King of Naples' possessions in Central Italy—the Farnesian fiefs, as they were called—required the king to acknowledge the feudal superiority of Rome over Naples, and therefore to pay the homage offered to the Pope, as well as the usual tribute, although these were paid to the Pope not as secular ruler of Rome, but as the successor of St. Peter. In this extremity, the queen, through the instrumentality of the Duke of Campochiaro, caused a secret and a public treaty to be concluded with Thugut, the former of which related to the new coalition war, and the latter merely to the terms of mutual defence. The treaty was signed in May, 1798, and the public part contains ten articles.*

It was agreed that the emperor should always keep on foot 60,000 men in the Tyrol, and in that part of Italy which formerly belonged to Venice; and Naples the half of that number, in order to be ready upon the first hint to lend their aid to the allies. In the 5th article, both the powers declare that any attack upon either shall be regarded and treated as a declaration of war against both. Immediately afterwards Nelson appeared with his fleet upon the coasts of Naples and Sicily, and through his connexion with Lady Hamilton, by whom the queen was completely ruled, he gave occasion to acts of folly and imprudence, which must have incensed the French to the highest degree. As we have already stated, Nelson had proved unable to prevent the French from getting possession of Malta, because he had tried in vain two or three times to fall in with their fleet in the Sicilian seas, and on the coast of Egypt. His provisions and water were exhausted in this unsuccessful cruise, and he was obliged to return to Sicily in order to re-provision his ships, where he remained from the 19th till the 24th of July. During this period Bonaparte had succeeded in disembarking his troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores, and ascended the Nile as far as Gizeh, opposite Grand Cairo. He had previously given orders to Admiral Brueys, either to run his fleet into the old harbour of Alexandria, or to sail immediately to Corfu. This has given an opportunity to

* See Martens' *Recueil des Traité et Suppléments*, vol. vii., pp. 253-255.

Gourgaud and his companions, and all those writers who believe in Bonaparte's infallibility, to allege that Bonaparte had foreseen, and by his orders provided against, the subsequent catastrophe, and that the whole blame, therefore, was to be ascribed to Admirals Brueys and Villeneuve. The two admirals, it is true, were by no means equal to their task, as was clearly proved by both at Aboukir, and by Villeneuve frequently afterwards, and especially at Trafalgar, but at the same time Bonaparte's commands were much more easily given than carried into execution.

Bonaparte's adjutant, Lavalette, who had conducted the grand master from Malta to Trieste, and performed a mission with which he was entrusted to Ali Pacha of Jannina, arrived at the fleet on the 21st of July, and expressed his astonishment at finding it still at anchor in the open roads of Aboukir. Brueys replied, that he considered the running into the old harbour of Alexandria as very difficult, and a matter which would require great caution and a long time; whilst leaving the coast altogether appeared to him a very questionable proceeding, as he dared not leave Bonaparte in a foreign country without a fleet, till he had obtained some intelligence of the success of his undertaking.

When Nelson at length returned from Sicily, he found the French fleet still moored along the coast, and Admiral Brueys full of the persuasion that his line was only assailable in front, and his rear completely covered by the coast; Nelson, on the contrary, soon saw that his seamen could easily overcome a difficulty which appeared insuperable to the French. He made himself better acquainted with the depth of the water between the fleet and the coast than his opponents had done, and to their utter astonishment ordered a division of his fleet to run in between the French ships and the shore. By this movement a part of the French fleet, which could not move from their moorings, were immediately placed between two fires. The French admiral should then, indeed, have stood out to sea, and fought the battle upon the open waters.

The battle of Aboukir was dreadful, but the issue not doubtful for a moment, for the French admiral's ship, *L'Orient*, took fire at the very commencement, and that not from the enemy's fire, but from the negligence of the French themselves. Brueys lost his life, nine ships of the line were taken, one frigate was sunk by the English, and a ship of the line and two frigates by their own crews. It has been brought as an accusation against Villeneuve, who, nevertheless, like Mack in Austria, was always again employed, that the five ships in his division never fired even a shot. So much at least is clear, that he took his leave of the fight very early, and reached Malta with two ships of the line and two frigates. These four ships and the transports in Alexandria were all that now remained of Bonaparte's immense armament. Nelson's ships also had suffered so severely that he could not put to sea, but was obliged to spend fourteen days in so far refitting his vessels as to be in a condition to

convey his prizes to Sicily. His return to Naples took place precisely at the very time in which the queen and her tools were persecuting with unrelenting severity every free expression of opinion—almost every free thought; and the king, too, was well pleased with everything which was done by Acton, Vanni, and Castelcicala, for, from his childhood to his old age, one feeling of humanity never entered his heart.

A French coat, a high cravat, a certain style of address, an innocent letter, or even a gesture, were sufficient to impel Vanni and Castelcicala to try and exhaust all those means of torment by which suspected men are harassed and confessions extorted. The first families of the country, the best educated men and women, became suspected; for in Italy, as is well known, the case is just the opposite of what it is in Germany. The higher classes of the people constitute the malcontents; the common herd, through oppression and priestcraft, have long since lost all sense of intellectual privileges or blessings. All the jails were filled with prisoners, and all who hoped for better times were full of bitterness and sorrow. Nelson's arrival gave courage to the cowardly originators of these persecutions to bid defiance to the French also, who continued daily to send threats from Rome. The most unfriendly reception had been previously given to the French who had either escaped from the English or were driven to Sicily: many of them were even murdered, and others arrested, whilst the English were received as liberators and heroes.* At a time when Naples was at peace with France, and a French ambassador was living in her capital, the queen had the thoughtlessness to celebrate Nelson's arrival in the harbour of Naples in such a manner as she would scarcely have celebrated one of the most splendid victories of her own fleet.†

This course was the more imprudent, as the French government at that very time was endeavouring, if possible, to come to a better understanding with Naples, by means of more judiciously chosen ambassadors; and as it was all-important for the queen to preserve the peace until her allies were ready for action, which they could not be until the beginning of the spring. The quarrels between France

* Colletta, lib. iii., vol. i., p. 181. “Poche navi da trasporto fuggirono nelle rade Siciliane di Trapani e Girgenti, dove li abitanti non fedeli alla pace, spietati alla sventura di quelle genti e sordi alla carità di refugio, ricevettero i Francesi ostilmente negando asilo, predando i miseri avanzi della desfatta, uccidendo alcuni marinari, fugando i resti, mentre in Napoli si bandiva lietamente il commentario della battaglia.”

† Colletta, I. c. “Subito il re, la regina, il ministro d'Inghilterra e sua moglie, sopra navi ornate a festa andarono incontro per molto camino al fortunato Nelson; e, passati nel suo vascello l'onorarono in varii modi; il re facendogli dono di spada richissima (the very sword which his father, Charles III. of Spain, had given him when he gave him Naples) e di lodi si allegri, che non pui se la vittoria fosse stata della propria armata in salvezza del regno; la regina presentandogli altre ricchezze, tra le quale un giojello col motto *al eroë di Abukir*, l'ambasciadore Hamilton ringraziandolo da parte dell' Inghilterra, e la bellissima lady mostrandosi per lui presa d'amore. Tutti vennero in Napoli alla reggia, tra pazza gioja che si propagò nella citta,” &c., &c.

and Naples about ambassadors and ambassadors' secretaries had continued without interruption; and even when Garat at length arrived in Naples, he did not at all behave as he ought to have done. Garat was always a better rhetorician than diplomatist; but in Naples there was an especial reason for wishing to be rid of him. It was known that, during the Reign of Terror, when Danton became a member of the Convention, Garat had supplied his place as minister of justice, and in this character had read the sentence of death to Louis XVI. He was at length recalled, but the Directory could not be induced to choose a man who should be agreeable to the queen, nor the queen to confide in a man who had taken part in the Revolution; until at length, when the quarrels with the Roman Republic began, Lachaise was sent to Naples as *chargé d'affaires*. This officer, however, at the time of Nelson's reception into the ports, allowed himself to have recourse to a violence of demeanour which even Talleyrand regarded as unseasonable, and which at length induced the Directory to send General Lacombe St. Michel, a man of ancient and noble family, and of the old school, to Naples. Even he, indeed, could not be perfectly pleasing to the queen, because he was a zealous republican.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND COALITION WAR TILL BONAPARTE'S RETURN
TO FRANCE.

§. I.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
PARTHENOEPEIAN REPUBLIC.

A.—RUSSIA—PRUSSIA—AUSTRIA.

LORD WHITWORTH, the English ambassador, who had induced the extraordinary Emperor Paul to sign a treaty of commerce with England, afterwards undertook to prevail upon him to become the champion of German interests. The emperor therefore issued his orders to Count Andrei Kirilowitsch, his ambassador in Vienna, to interpose in favour of the maintenance of the integrity of Bavaria (that is, in favour of the Duke of Deux Ponts), which had been guaranteed by Russia at the peace of Teschen, and he was no little embittered when Rasumowsky was not allowed to take part in the Congress at Rastadt. Immediately afterwards, the unexampled demands which the representatives of France made upon Germany at Rastadt in their note of the 3rd of May, and Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt, served to fill up the measure of indignation in the mind of the autocratic and knightly Paul. He published a declaration, which was really equivalent to the proclamation of a crusade against France. The emperor averred that he was ready, with all the force of his arms and resources of his empire, to assist in the restoration to their old condition of the relations amongst the European states, which had been violently disturbed by the French.

Paul no sooner returned to the policy which his mother had adopted at the end of her reign, than Suwarrow and Repnin, whose services she had employed, became necessary for the execution of his plans. Repnin was at first preferred, and as he had many connexions at the courts both of Vienna and Berlin, he was sent to both courts attended by an unusually splendid suite, to persuade them that the emperor offered them an alliance, without asking anything in return except the glory of being the deliverer and protector of the old state system. Thugut had previously declined Paul's offer, because, as he said, Austria could not enter into an alliance with Russia for the maintenance of the integrity of Germany unless Prussia took part in the union; now Austria and Russia united to induce Prussia to join the alliance. Count Panin, Russian ambassador in Berlin, and the Austrian Prince Reuss, took all possible pains to persuade the weak king to relinquish his ideas of neutrality; but Haugwitz drew the negotiations into his own

hands, and, according to his custom, soon found out how to involve them in difficulties so as to prevent any result. This want of success led to Repnin's mission. A man of Repnin's rank, who had occupied the most splendid positions under Catharine, might claim the privilege of negotiating immediately with the king himself without the intervention of ministers. Prince Nicolas Wasiliewitsch Repnin appeared so much the better fitted to mediate between Austria and Prussia concerning the spoiling of Bavaria agreed upon in the peace of Campo Formio, as Panin, Catharine's most celebrated minister of foreign affairs, had early employed him in the most important diplomatic negotiations. In Poland he had played the part of a despot; in 1774 he had prescribed laws to the Turks at Cudjuch Cainardshi, and had been sent in 1779 as mediator to the Congress at Teschen.

In addition to his experience in diplomatic affairs, Repnin also enjoyed the confidence of the Russian army, whose victories had made the Turks, as it were, dependent upon Russia. He was the man who, in the year 1791, at Maczyn, gained the most glorious victory over the Turks which had been won in the whole course of the war. On this occasion, however, he fell into a dispute with Potemkin, was obliged to leave the army, and was for some time Governor-General of Livonia. After the annihilation of Poland, he played the haughty Satrap in Lithuania, of which he was governor-general at the time in which Stanislaus Poniatowski was sent thither from Moscow. Stanislaus doubly felt his melancholy fate, because Repnin, by his splendid court, luxury, and expense, quite obscured him—the very vainest man in Europe. Catharine had removed Repnin from the command of the army because he was too systematic and methodical, and promoted Suwarrow because he was bolder and more rapid; for the very reason for which he was removed by Catharine he was preferred by Paul, who was a friend to everything old, and by him created a field-marshal. He came to Berlin, that as a prince he might hold intercourse with princes, not as an ambassador, but merely as a traveller. In order to counteract his plans, Talleyrand advised Sieyes to be sent to Berlin. Sieyes not only knew how all the adherents of the ruinous triumvirate of the times of the Countess of Lichtenau could be set in motion, but he had also an intimate acquaintance with the able Menken, and other distinguished men who were opposed to the old mode of managing affairs in Prussia: at the court he had no influence. Mollendorf and the high nobility received Sieyes very badly, and it was impossible that it could be agreeable to the narrow-minded king, who liked only what was moderate, to have anything to do with a dialectician who was celebrated as a friend of Mirabeau. Repnin arrived in Berlin as early as the 18th of May, 1798; he immediately displayed an almost royal pomp, and scattered his money with a liberal hand; Sieyes, on the other hand, played the sly, stoical republican, but found out means of winning over a Frenchman who possessed Repnin's complete confidence, and from

whom he received his most secret papers. The history of the affair is as follows:—

Aubert, secretary to Descorches de Sainte Croix, the last ambassador of France at the court of Poland, had entered into Repnin's service, managed his affairs, and written for him the necessary reports and correspondence. Repnin brought this secretary with him to Berlin. Whilst there, prospects of a return to his native country were opened up to him. In return, he discovered everything which came to Repnin's knowledge; and when Repnin was ordered to Vienna, he set out for Paris with all his secret papers. The Berlin statesmen, and especially Mollendorf, displayed great want of discretion and tact. They never concealed their dislike and contempt for the French, and also gave offence to the Russians by their egotistical and tradesmanlike politics. The haughty and avaricious Mollendorf condescended to receive honours and presents from Repnin; demeaned himself so far as to give utterance to the rudest and coarsest reproaches against the republicans at the Russian embassy; affected a ridiculous repugnance to Sieyes and the Convention, of which he was a member; and yet favoured the timid and anxious policy of his king, who was incapable of a great thought, and the French views of the triumvirate. Hardenberg, too, who, on other occasions, always favoured England, could not be friendly to a coalition which would necessarily have destroyed all the benefits of the peace of Basle, concluded by him. Repnin, therefore, having respect only to the opinions of the court and the high nobility, with whom alone he came into contact, wrote to his emperor that Sieyes had no weight in Berlin;* whilst the latter, in a report to the Directory, gives a far more correct account of the real state of affairs. "The king," writes he, "is too stupid to adopt sound views of politics, inasmuch as he imagines that a man devoted to family life, and unacquainted with the sea and the winds, can steer the vessel of the state, in the midst of a most dreadful storm, into a secure haven."†

Whilst preparations were in progress again to begin the war with united strength, Thugut caused the shallow François de Neufcha-

* "La Prusse," says Repnin, "se tient envers ce missionnaire de l'anarchie (Sieyes) au sentiment de juste défiance; elle le surveille, ne le croit point, *et le hait*. Sa présence à Berlin a plus servi l'Europe que le Directoire de république Française. Il paroit même que par l'importunité et la violence de ses notes, il s'est totalement aliené le ministre des affaires étrangères, le comte de Haugwitz, *bien que ce ministre soit le plus invincible promoteur de la neutralité.*"

† "Le Roi de Prusse," says Sieyes, "ne veut se résoudre à rien; c'est à dire, qu'il a la plus mauvaise des résolutions, celle de n'en prendre aucune. Il est d'autant plus obstiné à vouloir ce qu'il s'est fourré dans sa tête de roi, qu'il ne se détermine point d'après les lumières les plus éclairées de son conseil. La haine de la révolution l'empêche de s'allier avec la France, quelque grands que soient les avantages qui pourroit lui procurer cette alliance; d'une autre côté la crainte l'empêche de se coaliser. Il est assez plaisant qu'il puisse croire que la politique extérieure ne soit pas d'une grande importance. Enfin, voilà l'homme qui veut absolument rester seul. C'est fort commode pour la France, qui, pendant cette stupeur Prussienne, pourra en finir avec tant d'autres."

teau, who was merely rich in phrases, and altogether incapable of diplomacy, and whom the Directory had sent to Selz, to be placed in a slippery position by the arts of Cobenzl. By his ingenuity at Selz, Cobenzl contrived to bring the negotiations for a long time to a stop at Rastadt, where Bonnier, Roberjot, and Jean Debry, the three French representatives, behaved with the greatest insolence; and, after all, nothing whatever was arranged at Selz. When the conference at Selz came to an end, England had attained her object, and Cobenzl was selected to go to Berlin and Petersburg, to labour for the promotion of the objects of the coalition. In Berlin, Cobenzl was only, properly speaking, to sound the views of the court, and make inquiries. But he gave himself unspeakable trouble to induce the king to relinquish his idea of neutrality, which had brought a complete relaxation into the army, always adhering to its old forms. All his representations proved useless.* On the other hand, before he left Berlin, in August, he came to an understanding with Repnin concerning the march of the 30,000 Russians which the Emperor Paul had even at that time ordered to proceed to the Austrian frontiers.

During these negotiations concerning the coalition, the French, by the occupation of Malta, had furnished the Russians with an apparently just reason for taking up the cause of the order; and by Bonaparte's descent upon Egypt, they compelled the Grand Sultan to throw himself into the arms of his hereditary foes, the Russians. As to Malta, the Emperor of Russia, as grand prince of the order of St. John, had warmly espoused its cause. After his accession, he restored the grand priorate of Poland, and considerably increased the revenues of the order, in order also to establish a Russian branch. He then distributed with a liberal hand the dignities, revenues, and crosses of the order of St. John, because this order had chosen him for its protector, and he had solemnly accepted the dignity on the 29th of November, 1797. As soon as the news of the capitulation of the grand-master, and of the traitors who availed themselves of his weakness, reached Russia, all the knights who were then within the empire issued a protest. In the name of the Russian grand priorate they declared Ferdinand von Hompesch and his companions to be traitors, and appealed to the protection of the Emperor of Russia. By a proclamation of the 10th of September, 1798, the emperor not only took the order under his protection, but caused

* In a confidential letter of the French embassy, of the date of August the 19th, 1798, the following occurs:—"Lorsque M. de Cobenzl a été à Berlin, soit zéle, soit vivacité de caractère, il y a oublié ou dépassé ses instructions. Dans trois audiences accordées par le Roi de Prusse, M. de Cobenzl est sorti du rôle de *demandeur en passant*. Il ne s'est appliqué qu'à faire valoir toutes les raisons spacieuses qui pouvaient entraîner le Roi de Prusse à des mesures de guerre, et en dernier résultat à une coalition. Tous ses efforts ont été vains; sa visite n'a changé en rien le système prononcé du cabinet de Berlin pour la neutralité absolue. Le Prince Repnin et le Comte de Cobenzl n'ont eu ni l'un ni l'autre aucun succès auprès du Roi de Prusse."

the knights then present in Russia, in their own names, and in those of their absent brethren, to elect him as grand-master, which dignity he solemnly accepted on the 13th of November, 1798.

The Grand Sultan, again quite contrary to his own wish, was compelled by the fanaticism of his subjects to make war upon the French. During the whole continuance of the revolution the Sultan Selim had been urged from all sides to join the coalition. Even Count Choiseul Gouffier, the last ambassador of the French monarchy in Constantinople, a man beloved even in Turkey, and thoroughly acquainted with all its institutions and the character of the people, had taken all possible pains to induce the Grand Sultan to make war upon his native land, from which he was an exile; but Selim was, with good reason, of opinion that a Turk ought not to draw the sword for any principles, whether autocratic or democratic, but for Islam alone. During the Reign of Terror the intercourse of the French Government with the Grand Turk remained long interrupted, till at length General Aubert Dubayet, celebrated for his heroic defence of Mayence, was sent as ambassador to Constantinople. The embassy and its equipment was on a very splendid scale, but the general was very rough in his manners, and by no means calculated to hold intercourse with Orientals; the Turks were therefore very much annoyed when the French secured for themselves the cession of the islands formerly belonging to Venice, when Jacobin emissaries laboured to get up an insurrection in Greece, and when at last Bonaparte went so far as to enter into negotiations with Ali Pasha, the rebellious chief of Jannina. All this was admirably turned to account by Kotshubey, the Russian ambassador, to turn away the suspicion of the Turks from the Russians to the French: a suspicion which was afterwards fully confirmed by Bonaparte's descent upon Egypt.

When Bonaparte sailed from Toulon, Aubert Dubayet had been five months dead. His first secretary, General Carra St. Cyr, was absent, and the management of the embassy devolved upon the first interpreter. This interpreter was the learned Orientalist, Ruffin, who had been a person of importance as early as the time of Choiseul Gouffier; he, however, knew nothing of the plan of invading Egypt. Talleyrand, who, according to Bonaparte's wish, was himself to have undertaken a journey to Constantinople, and whom Bonaparte, when he was in Cairo, really supposed to be there, suffered himself at that time to be guilty of a trick which was more worthy of a common liar than of an episcopal diplomatist. The Turks had received a hint from the English that the Toulon fleet was destined for Egypt; they therefore sent an ambassador to Paris to make inquiries, and at the same time required Ruffin to declare the intentions of France. To the Turkish ambassador in Paris Talleyrand denied that the expedition was intended against Egypt, and alleged that its object was Malta; whilst Ruffin, at the very same time, was obliged to send in a notice to the Reis Effendi

(minister of foreign affairs) which said exactly the reverse. In this note Talleyrand said that the French took possession of Egypt, not to attack the Turks, but the Mamelukes and Beys who oppressed the Egyptians, and from thence merely to march to India, and would raise the usual tribute for the sultan much better than the Beys had done.

From this time forth the Turks drew closer to the English and Russians, and entered into a common alliance with those two powers to drive the French from their possessions in the Ionian Sea and from Egypt. On the 5th of September war was declared and Ruffin arrested, a fleet and army having been ready equipped since the end of July, when the news of Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt reached Constantinople. The Emperor Paul had previously removed Prince Kurakin, out of respect for the Turks, and committed the management of foreign affairs to Count Kotshubey, who, as ambassador in Constantinople, had so skilfully brought about a friendly understanding with the Grand Sultan. Negotiations were mutually carried on between the Austrians and Russians, at the same time in Petersburg and Vienna—by Cobenzl in the former, and Repnin in the latter. Martens has not been able to learn the conditions of this treaty, signed at the same time in the two capitals; and, as far as we know, they are still a secret. This, however, we know, that in consequence of the treaty, 60,000 Russians marched to the Danube in the concluding months of the year 1798, to reinforce the Austrians in Italy, at the same time that negotiations were being carried on with England and Naples. An auxiliary treaty was concluded with Naples on the 29th of November, 1798, and with England not till the 29th (18th) of December of the same year, the latter agreeing to pay considerable subsidies for the 45,000 men which were to be furnished by the emperor. Up till the very moment in which the treaty was concluded, hopes were still entertained of being able to draw Prussia into the alliance, and in this case the 45,000 Austrians were to join the Prussians. This negotiation, however, having failed, a second treaty was concluded. According to the terms of the latter compact, agreed to on the 29th of June, 1799, the 45,000 men were to be employed wheresoever England should see fit to determine. On the 2nd of January, 1799, England became a party to the treaty between the Porte and Russia.

B.—PARTHENOPEIAN REPUBLIC.

Of all the powers allied against France, the Queen of Naples appeared first in the field, as soon as the Russians commenced their march, and whilst the French were organising new armies in Upper Italy and on the left bank of the Rhine. General Jourdan, then a member of the French legislative body, had brought forward the plan of a conscription, afterwards universally introduced, and caused it to be passed into a law; it was this conscription which afterwards enabled

Bonaparte, as easily and quickly to incorporate all Frenchmen of mature age into his armies, as the Emperor of Russia could call for the serfs of his nobles. According to the law thus passed upon the motion of Jourdan, all Frenchmen, from the age of twenty to twenty-five, were declared liable to serve. It therefore only became necessary to declare every year how many men were wanted. And, moreover, according to the registries, the government was empowered, in case of necessity, to go back to those beyond the age, which, as is well known, was called completing the conscription of one year by that of another. It was quite impossible for the Neapolitans, driven together by Queen Caroline and her minister Acton, to contend with armies raised in this manner from the warlike nation of France, by virtue of a law passed by their deputies, and, therefore, by themselves. Whenever the queen stood in need of an army, she had recourse to the most arbitrary modes of levy; and the Neapolitans who from the middle ages have always had the reputation of being bad soldiers, naturally deserted as soon as ever they had an opportunity. This miserable army was to be reduced to a state of discipline by the Austrian cane, for the queen, as an Austrian princess, had no sooner made herself mistress of the government, than she employed an Austrian general for the organisation of the Neapolitan troops. At that time she brought Count Salis from Vienna, and he drilled the army half after the Russian and half after the Austrian fashion. On this occasion, Colonel Mack, notorious for his plan-making, and always unfortunate in the field, was sent with a whole crowd of drill sergeants to train and exercise her pressed soldiers. The honour which Mack accepted in September, 1798, was very wisely refused by the able Hotze, of Zurich, and it was altogether more suitable for a man who, as a disciple of Lascy, was much more at home on the parade-ground and at his writing-desk than in the field, where Hotze would have won still more honourable laurels, had there not been the Wernecks and a whole squadron of princes in the Austrian army.

It was, moreover, no fault of Mack's that he was unable to form an army for the Queen of Naples between the beginning of September and the end of November, from people whom she had levied by force, without lot or law, but whose number was boastingly given at 40,000 men.* On the 2nd of September a decree was issued requiring a levy of eight men in every thousand throughout the whole kingdom, and these were immediately put into the hands of foreign officers, partly called thither from Austria, and partly consisting of French emigrants. Had Mack with such an army, even had it consisted of 60,000 men, proved able to defeat one of only 10,000 French, he would undoubtedly have been entitled to

* A description of this army, and an account of its particular parts, may be seen in "Posselt's Annals" for the year 1798, 3rd quarter, pp. 262-274. It there appears, from the account of an eye-witness, that the impossibility of success was obvious even before the campaign was commenced.

the character of a great general, which he at that time enjoyed in Austria and England.* The queen, Acton, Mack, and Castelcicala, placed such great confidence in the very exaggerated number of this army† of peasants collected together in haste, that Acton, who had previously, in some degree, withdrawn from activity, again came conspicuously forward, and there was no longer any necessity for endeavouring to obtain the good-will of the new French ambassador. Acton having been a great object of dislike to the French, the old Marquis de Gallo had been for a time placed at the head of the foreign affairs, whilst the Directory, on their part, had recalled Garat, and left Lachaise as *chargé d'affaires* in Naples. Lachaise had conceded the points respecting the homage and the principalities, and it would not have been difficult to have prolonged the negotiations for some months, had not the queen been so delighted with Mack's beautiful plans of a campaign, that she was anxious to make some conquests before her allies were in the field.

Championnet was then in command of the French army in the States of the Church, when suddenly and unexpectedly the Neapolitan army, in five divisions, invaded them at five different points, on the 25th of November. One of these divisions marched along the shore of the Gulf of Venice, and the strongest, with which the king was present, directed its course immediately to Rome; in the mean time, the French for a time evacuated Ancona and Rome itself, in order to concentrate their troops to the north of the city. On this occasion King Ferdinand played the Knight of the Rueful Countenance, for he was as cowardly as he was cruel. After having made a pompous entry into Rome on the 29th of November, at the head of 30,000 men, he fled, as early as the 10th of December, in all haste and consternation, back to Naples, accompanied merely by his favourite.‡ He thought nothing about

* Posselt's Annals, year 1799, 1st quarter, p. 257, contain a paper in which Mack, in the sketch of his life there given, is reckoned amongst the number of the greatest generals, and a wish is expressed, that, like Xenophon and Thucydides, he would become the historian of his own deeds.

† In Posselt's Annals, 1802, q. 3, p. 268, the amount of the army is stated to be 120,000. It is however remarked: "The army consisted for the most part of peasants, who had been forcibly taken away from their labours in the field, and formed merely undisciplined and discontented hordes. The officers had all purchased their places, which were given to the highest bidders. In this way, even the most important places fell into the hands of the most miserable and ambitious creatures, who possessed nothing to make them worthy of them except money; and the court, to which the attachment and fidelity of the old Neapolitan officers appeared suspicious, was imprudent enough to trust the whole undertaking to strangers, in whom the soldiers had no confidence."

‡ Colletta, lib. iii., § xxxvi.: "Il re Ferdinando, il quale dal giorno 7 stava a Albano, per natura codardo, impaurito fuggì al declinando del giorno 10 verso Napoli. Disse al Duca d'Ascoli suo Cavaliere, esser brama o sacramento de' giacobini uccidere i re; e che bella cosa sarebbe ad un soggetto esporre la propria vita in salvezza della vita del principe, esortandolo a mutar vesti et contegno, così che egli da se, il re da cavaliere facesse il viaggio. Il certegiano, lieto, indossando il regio vestimento, sede alla diritto della carozza mentre l'altro con riverente aspetto, avendo a maestra la paura, gli rendea omaggi da suddito."

his army, which at that very time was being attacked on all sides by a very inconsiderable number of French troops. Mack was, however, driven to distraction, when Micheroux, who had advanced along the shore of the Adriatic, suffered a defeat, and he himself attempted in vain to push forward from Rome to Tuscany. Even before Championnet had been able to collect his forces, French corps under Macdonald, Rusca, Kellerman, and Maurice Matthieu, drove Mack's columns back at all points, which had been very prettily and systematically arranged upon paper. Poor Mack became so dreadfully alarmed, and fled from Rome with such precipitation, that he sent no account whatever of the state of affairs to General Naselli, who had landed at Leghorn at the head of 6000 men, and was there awaiting his orders. Roger Damas was the only one among the Neapolitan generals who gave any proofs of ability and courage, for he successfully cut his way through the enemy, and retired with his division in good order. Mack, it is true, endeavoured to maintain his ground upon the Roman territory, near Carpi or Cantalupo; but as Championnet, in the mean time, had succeeded in uniting his forces, he did not think it advisable to await an attack.

Seventeen days after the entrance of the Neapolitans into Rome, the French returned to the city victorious; but still every one expected that Mack would maintain his position in his camp between Naples and Capua, as Capua was fortified and covered by the river Voltorno. There was the greater reason to suppose this would be the case, as Generals Duhesme and Lemoine had been obliged to relinquish their design of forcing their way through the Abruzzi into Campagna, and General Maurice Matthieu, who had got possession of Civitella, Pescara and Gaeta by treachery, was not provided with the means necessary for carrying on the siege of Capua. Cowardice was everywhere the order of the day, and no one showed himself to be a greater coward than the king. As early as the 21st of December, when Capua was still occupied by his troops, and Mack still maintained all the posts as far as Caserta, the king left his capital by night and in a fog, and in accordance with the faithless counsel of the English, deprived his own subjects of all means of defence by sea by causing his ships of war and gun-boats to be destroyed by fire. The dreadful fire before the eyes of the people, who knew nothing of the king's command, and the circumstance of the king having on his departure caused the minister of war and Marshal Airolo, who had previously regulated everything, to be thrown into chains, and to be taken with him to Palermo, spread, and confirmed the idea amongst the more violent and vigorous of the lower classes, that they and the king were betrayed by the higher classes and by foreigners. A dreadful tumult immediately took place in the capital; the people flew to arms, and at the same time threatened destruction to the higher classes of their countrymen, who were favourably disposed towards republicanism, as well as to Mack and his generals. They would not listen for a moment to

negotiation, but fought desperately with the French in and before the city.

On this occasion Mack was not only threatened and abused by the lazzaroni of the city, but a portion of the Neapolitan commanders openly took part in the conspiracy of the educated men and nobles of the city, who had opened up a correspondence with Championnet, and wished to surrender the fort to the enemy behind the backs of the people and of the army. As early as between the 10th and 15th of January, 1799, Roccaromana, Federici, and Prince Moliterno, officers under Mack's command, had been gained over to join with the noble conspirators in Naples, and Mack was compelled to place Prince Moliterno under arrest. He did not, however, venture to detain him, but was obliged by an insurrectionary movement again to set him at liberty, and contented himself with removing the division of the army which was under the prince's command to a greater distance. Matters became much worse when the king, after having fled to Sicily under Nelson's protection, appointed Prince Pignatelli, one of the most miserable of the queen's creatures, his viceroy. This prince had especially recommended himself to the queen's favour by inducing King Charles III. of Spain to change his views with respect to Acton's continuance as a minister. On the queen's first pretensions to manage the affairs of the kingdom, Charles III., the king's father, had earnestly insisted on Acton's dismissal. In consequence of his success, Pignatelli was loaded with honours and wealth, and had been the conductor of all the revolting investigations which were entered into respecting the conduct of the visionary but noble friends of liberty. For reasons admirably but severely given by Colletta, such a man was the least possible qualified in such a time to induce the nobles, the people, and the army, to make common cause against the common enemy.* Mack was therefore to be excused if, to please him, he did everything possible in order to capitulate with the French; but he ought not here, as he afterwards did in Ulm, to have neglected all military precautions.

Before anything was agreed upon, Mack not only evacuated the fortified town of Capua, but also the very advantageous position previously occupied by his troops. The people and soldiers, therefore, raged against their officers and civil governors when they saw that the French were allowed to become masters, even without a struggle, of all the accesses to the city. It was reported immediately afterwards that Prince Pignatelli had sent the Duca de Gasso, one of the servile courtiers, to Championnet, without even asking the opinion or consent of the corporation of the city (*eletti della cettà per*

* Colletta, lib. iii., § xli., p. 199: "Ma il generale Pignatelli nato in ignorantisima nobilità e allevato alle bassezze della reggia, non poteva, ne per mente ne per animo, giungere alla sublimità di servare per vie generose un regno e una corona. E questo è il peggior fato del despotismo, educando i suoi all' abbedienza, non trovarne capaci di comando."

gli ordini civili); the council of the city therefore constituted itself into a kind of temporary government. Its members increased their number by elections from the nobility and the citizens; and from the citizens and lazzaroni they formed an insurrectionary army, which might at the same time be used against Mack, Pignatelli, and the French. In the mean time, Mack and Pignatelli, by cringing and begging, had obtained a suspension of arms for two months from the French, on condition of their evacuating Capua without rasing or injuring the fortifications, delivering up all their artillery and stores to the French, and not placing any obstacles in the way of their passing the Voltorno. Mack was to evacuate the towns of Acerra, Arienzo, Aspajo, Benevento, and Ariano; Pignatelli to recall the Neapolitan militia which had advanced into the Romagna, and to compel the city of Naples to pay 10,000,000 of frances to the French, one half of which was to be made good on the 15th, and the other on the 18th of January, 1799.

When, in consequence of this agreement, the French sent Arcebulo as their commissioner to Naples, to receive and bring away the first half of the contribution, an insurrection broke out; thousands of lazzaroni made themselves in an instant masters of the city, in the midst of the greatest tumult and confusion. They took forcible possession of Castel Nuovo, St. Elmo, and Del Carmine, then assailed the arsenal to provide themselves with arms, and next made an attack upon Pignatelli's palace. The viceroy imitated the conduct of his king, left both city and kingdom to their fate, and fled to Sicily, where, however, on his arrival, he was sent to the fortress of Girgenti by order of the king. On the 12th of January, 1799, Mack had resigned his commission as a Neapolitan officer, and in the uniform of an Austrian general officer sought an asylum in Championnet's camp. The French general gave him a friendly reception, but the Directory soon after caused him to be arrested in Tuscany, and to be conveyed as a prisoner of war, first to Milan and then to Paris. He was there set at liberty on his parole, till he saved himself by flight, and thus gave occasion to a long and violent dispute in the journals of the day, whether he had broken his word of honour, or whether, as was alleged, it had been wrongfully required of him.

The wild confusion which usually takes place under a despotic rule, and in a state of general demoralisation, when slaves for a moment are able to throw off their chains, now reigned in Naples. The government, which had been formed by the town council, had neither dignity nor experience: Roccaromana and Molaterno, to whom the chief command of the popular army was entrusted, undertook it unwillingly, and were, besides, persons on whom no confidence could be placed. The whole city became a scene of desolation, robbery, and murder. The republicans, who had previously opened communications with the French, and separated themselves completely from the insurgents and the town council, at length advised

the French to enter into no compromise or agreement with the popular authorities. The people having broken the truce, and many of the French having been killed, the authorities sent deputies to Championnet in order to negotiate with him. The proposals made by the deputies were rejected, the republicans, with whom Moliterno and all those who belonged to the higher classes had united, succeeded in again wresting the forts from the hands of the wild mob, whilst the people murdered in the streets every one who was not a lazzarone or a priest. At last the alarm bells were rung, and the country people were called into the city, united with the populace of the town, and rushed with blind fury upon the French, who were advancing on the invitation and to the assistance of the republicans. It is obvious how great the multitude was which on this occasion rushed on to engage in desperate combat with a brave and well-disciplined army, from the fact of Championnet's having found it advisable to call in all the remoter divisions of his army before he ventured to attack the wild and desperate people of the city. General Broussier, who was pressing on to join him, lost at that time the greatest part of his army, as it is said about 4000 men, in the Caudine passes, celebrated in history since the time of the wars between the Romans and the Samnites.

At length, on the 20th of January, 1799, Championnet divided his army into four columns, which were to enter Naples through different gates, and to form a junction within the city. The resistance offered by the country people and the lazzaroni was desperate, and the French were obliged to purchase every step in the streets of the city by blood. They attempted in vain to terrify the people into flight. The superior tactics of the French, their well-directed artillery, and their advantage in arms, strewed the ground with hundreds; the people were compelled to yield, though only step by step; and every square, street, and house, was in its turn converted into a place of assault and defence. General Mounier, who was in command of the division which entered through the Capua gate, paved a way for himself through blood and over the dead bodies of the people, till he arrived at the Capua square, where the people from all sides suddenly rushed upon the French. Up to this point the French column had driven the populace before it, but in the square the people became the attacking party, and the French were compelled to give way. Mounier himself fell; and the division which he had led were driven out of the city and took up a position outside the Capua gate.

The following night, too, was equally bloody and destructive to the Neapolitans and the French. On the second day (the 22nd) Championnet, who exhibited a mild and friendly disposition, tried to find some of the authorities with whom he might be able to negotiate, in order to put some bounds to the misery, devastation, and murder in the royal city; all the authorities, however, had disappeared, the town council was dissolved, and Moliterno and Roc-

caromana had fled. After the bloody repose of a day, therefore, the slaughter was renewed with redoubled fury on the 23rd. The issue was necessarily destructive to the bold and desperate lazzaroni, because the French generals now began to arrange the mode of attack in a formal military manner, and the people fought in the streets without leaders or discipline.

The defenders of the ancient abuses and of the ancient superstition at length became aware that their republican countrymen of the higher classes had got possession of the forts, and that Moliterno and Roccaromana were firing upon them from the fortresses, whilst the French were attacking them with the bayonet from before, and they therefore accepted what was offered to them. They relinquished the fruitless struggle, whilst Championnet put a stop to the pillage and slaughter, and caused peace and liberty to be proclaimed. The people dispersed, and on the next day the French made a peaceable and triumphant entry into the city; and before the 1000 French and about 3000 Neapolitans, who had lost their lives in the preceding days were buried, the Neapolitan republicans proclaimed their new republic. Championnet took up his abode in the royal palace, and, before the provinces were subdued, the whole kingdom was divided into eleven departments, and was called the Parthenopeian republic, after the ancient name of the city of Naples. Maria Pagano, the philosopher and enthusiast of Southern Italy, was commissioned to draw up the constitution of the new state, in which Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel, the Italian Madame de Staél, afterwards played the same character which Neckar's daughter had undertaken in Paris, though not with the same good fortune or success. The noblest minds, and the most highly cultivated men and women of Naples, persecuted by a fury and her satraps, paid, a few months afterwards, the most dreadful penalties for the short dream of their poetry and philosophy. We refrain from relating their well-meant follies and ridiculous actions, because in the warmer climate of the South an active imagination leads men accustomed to the comforts, social enjoyments, and pleasures of life, far more easily beyond the bounds of prudence and experience than under our more ungenial sky.

We shall not detain our readers by going into the details of the constitution of this ephemeral republic, because we regard the whole affair as a mere bauble without principle or permanence, and content ourselves with observing, that the legislative body was to consist of twenty-five of the most distinguished Italians, who divided themselves into five committees, the presidents of which, elected monthly, formed the government, or five directors. This was, however, a mere shadow; the generals and commissioners of all kinds who had been sent from Paris paid no attention whatever to the Parthenopeian directors, and pursued the same system of pillage and violence as they had done in Holland and Switzerland. Championnet, whilst yet on the march, had fallen into disputes with Macdonald, and he now came to

issue with Faypoult and the plundering rabble sent from Paris by Barras and Reubel. By his treatment of Faypoult he gave the most serious offence to the Directory, which had appointed him their plenipotentiary. Blame might fairly be attributed to both parties, although Championnet was unquestionably less selfish and avaricious than the harpies of Reubel and Barras, and a purer democrat than the Jacobins of the Directory.

It is not however to be denied—and even Championnet's warmest defenders admit—that he had completely neglected the discipline of the army,* and that officers and soldiers gave way to the most unbounded licence, and with the same result as had formerly befallen the troops of Hannibal in the same country. Naples was forced to furnish means for all the luxuries and licentiousness of the army, to support the troops, and, in addition, to pay 75,000,000 of francs. Bassal, formerly a priest, and a low-minded Jacobin, notorious both in France and Italy as a mad democrat, followed Championnet from Rome and Naples, and became the guide of his conduct; the general blindly signed whatever Bassal laid before him. The republicans were either utopians, enthusiasts, visionaries, or people without principle or morals, such as Roccaromana and Moliterno. Championnet was therefore by no means in a condition to do what Bonaparte had always done. True, he drove away Faypoult and all the creatures of the Directory, which, however, took its revenge, and treated him as it treated almost all the other generals. The Directory not only recalled him on the 25th of February, but ordered him and Bassal, and all those who had opposed Faypoult and his companions, to be called to account. He was most unworthily treated; for when he reached Rome, Bertoli caused his carriages, and those of the persons by whom he was accompanied, as well as everything they had with them, to be taken from them as stolen goods, and to be sold. Championnet himself was conveyed in irons to Milan. He was afterwards tried by a court-martial and acquitted,—and in autumn appointed to succeed Joubert in the command of the Army of the Alps. Macdonald succeeded Championnet, and Abrial was appointed commissioner of civil affairs instead of Faypoult. This took place in March, when the Parthenopeian republic was already tottering to its fall.

* Botta praises Championnet highly, and Colletta also speaks favourably of him. On the other hand it is stated, in an official report made to the *Conseil des Anciens*, and published in the *Moniteur de l'An VII.*, col. 1010, that he had organised a system of the most dreadful extravagance.

§ II.

SECOND COALITION WAR.

A.—HISTORY OF THE WAR TILL THE DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH FROM NAPLES.

THE Archduke Charles having tried his utmost, but in vain, to prevent the breaking out of the war, because he foresaw that Thugut and his colleagues would obstruct and prevent by means of the council of war all operations in the field, was appointed in the beginning of the year 1799 to command an army in Southern Germany, and Kray, general of artillery, was at first at the head of an army which was on the Adige, and was at a later period to be commanded by Melas. This latter force was to be joined by the Russian army, which the Emperor Paul had ordered to the Danube. At this time the Directory had availed itself of the newly-introduced law of conscription, had by its means incorporated 200,000 vigorous men in its armies, and given the command of all the troops from the Maine to the Alps to Jourdan. This army, although distributed on the left bank of the Rhine, received by anticipation the name of the Army of the Danube; the corps under General Bernadotte, which was to proceed up the valley of the Neckar, and the troops in Switzerland under Massena, were both to form subordinate parts of Jourdan's army. As the English appeared to have some idea of sending an army to Holland, there to be reinforced by a corps of Russians, the command in Holland was given to Brune. In November, 1798, Joubert travelled to Milan, in order to prevent the King of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany from doing any harm to the French in the impending war.

From the time of Bonaparte's departure from Italy, Charles Emanuel IV. of Sardinia found himself without support in the midst of a body of wild democrats; the Ligurian republic pressed on the one hand, and the Cisalpine on another; while both republics contributed to excite the vehement and restless minds of that portion of his subjects which was hostile to priestcraft and autocracy, and supported every insurrectionary movement by military aid. It must, however, be admitted that the malcontents in Turin constituted by much the smaller portion of the inhabitants. The people, properly speaking, was as favourable to the government in Piedmont as in Naples, and for the same reason; those, therefore, who were disposed to democratic principles, collected on the frontiers of the Ligurian republic, where they were joined by multitudes of Frenchmen and people from Liguria and Cisalpina, and supported by these in all their attempts to excite an insurrectionary spirit among their countrymen. The malcontents became at length so bold as to make a formal incursion into Piedmont from the Lago Maggiore, and, supported by the Cisalpine republicans, they pushed forward

as far as Ornavasco. At this place they were fallen upon and defeated by the Piedmontese, and many of them made prisoners. The whole of the prisoners were subjected to the strictest military law, in consequence of which the French and the Cisalpines were greatly incensed. The democrats, who were supported by the Ligurians, suffered a similar defeat near Casale, and the king's jurists proceeded to hang and decapitate after the ancient fashion; they appealed, just as the Germans always do, to Byzantine law and to the Roman institutes. Many persons were executed in Turin, and still more cruelly imprisoned: General Brune and the French ambassador in Turin interfered in favour of the latter in a threatening and insolent manner.

In June, 1798, the democrats and the Ligurians made a new incursion into Sardinia, and were more fortunate than before, so that the king, between the democrats and the French, was placed in a situation of great peril. He then endeavoured to arrange matters with the French, who cruelly deceived him. They led him to proclaim a general amnesty, and afterwards offered to protect him against the insurgents, but required that he, in return, should receive a French garrison into the citadel of Turin, the only fortress still in his hands, and which was regarded as the masterpiece of Vauban. In fact, the king consented to the signing of an agreement in Milan on the 28th of June, in which he promised to receive 1500 French troops into the citadel of Turin. These troops really took possession in the beginning of July: a report was however spread about the same time that the democrats and Ligurians were about to fall upon Alessandria, in order to have this fortress also put into the hands of the French.

From this time forth the king lived as a prisoner in his own capital, and was daily annoyed and insulted by General Brune and the ambassador Guingenée, the celebrated author of the French history of Italian literature. Instead of protecting the king against the insolence of the democrats, they suffered daily insults and contempt to be heaped upon him and his kingdom before his eyes; and not a week passed without some public dispute or scandal. At the end of September, Guingenée was recalled, and Brune afterwards resigned the command of the troops to Joubert, who, however, had express orders to drive the king completely out of Italy as soon as hostilities were commenced with the emperor. Charles Emanuel had always been the mere plaything of priests; he was therefore utterly incapable of any firm resolution, but trembled, and begged, and at a later period terminated his life in Rome in conventional retirement from the world; with him Joubert had easy work.

As soon as intelligence reached Joubert that the Neapolitans had fallen upon the States of the Church, he set his French troops in motion from all sides, in order to disarm the excellent Piedmontese army, which remained faithful to the king. The lot first fell upon the garrisons of Arona, Susa, Chivasso, and the citadel of Alessan-

dria; it was found necessary to proceed more cautiously with Turin, for had not the king been a monk, as he really was, he would have been able to rouse the people and soldiers to stand for his defence. For three months long recourse was had to all sorts of deeds of violence, treachery, and falsehood, to compel the poor wight of a king to lay down his crown. This is the place to show, that those who worshipped Bonaparte as an idol were for the most part wholly destitute of all sense of morality and truth. The Bonapartists, who at a later period wished to be regarded as the champions of liberty and rights, were under the Directory the most willing and submissive tools of power. Alix, Grouchy, and Clausel, three men who were the most zealous defenders of Bonaparte, during his life and after his death, with their swords and their pens, were at that time the most active instruments of the Directory in Turin. One while they assailed the weak king with rude and brutal speeches, at another they threatened to bombard Turin, and again promised to leave him at peace if he would resign the government. This he at length did, by a declaration published on the 9th of December, 1798. In order that the reader may form some idea of the course of conduct which was pursued, and of what French generals were capable, we have only to state that Grouchy actually dictated to the king his act of abdication, and that Clausel and the king's master of the horse afterwards signed it. He himself was obliged to ratify the declaration.

By the first article of this extorted act of abdication, the king renounces all the privileges which he had hitherto exercised in Piedmont, and commands his subjects to obey the government authorities, which should be appointed by the French. By the sixth article, permission is granted to the king to travel through Parma to the island of Sardinia. He fortunately reached the sea before the subsequent order to seize his person reached him, but many of his friends and servants who wished to accompany him were detained. In the mean time, the king had scarcely arrived in Cagliari when he issued a manifesto, in which he recalled his act of abdication, and declared that everything he had done, as long as he was in the power of the French, was compulsory and void.

The expulsion of the Grand Duke of Tuscany was reserved for General Scherer, who received the command of the army on the Adige on the 12th of March, 1799, when war was declared against the emperor, as king of Hungary and Bohemia, because the Empire was indisposed to the war, and at the same time against his brother, the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Shortly before the expulsion of the grand duke, the pope, old, weak, and sickly as he was, had been conveyed to the rude mountains, to Briançon, where the ungenial climate soon put an end to his life. The expulsion of the grand duke has been excused, by stating that it would have been impossible for the French to have suffered a brother of the King of Hungary and Bohemia to remain in their rear, and that he had also

given a friendly reception to the Neapolitan troops which were disembarked at Leghorn in December, 1798, as well as to the English ships.

The supreme command of the German and Russian army which was to form a junction in Lombardy, and of which the Austrian portion was first commanded by Kray and then by Melas, was first destined for Prince Frederic of Nassau, of whom great expectations were entertained: when, however, this prince unexpectedly died, Austria and England urged the Emperor Paul to recall Suwarrow from the kind of banishment in which he was then living, and to confer upon him the chief command. At that time Suwarrow was living in complete retirement on his estate of Kantschansk, near Novgorod, and had not the smallest idea of being called into active service, when the first division of the Russian army had already reached the frontiers of Moravia, and in the beginning of February he was suddenly summoned to Petersburg. This was especially effected by England; English influence also proved sufficient to have the command of the Austrians given, not to the Archduke Charles, as was desired in Vienna, but to Melas, and, as he was for a time ill, to Kray. In Petersburg, Suwarrow was appointed commander-in-chief of the three Russian armies destined for Italy, and therefore Rosenberg and Herrman, who commanded the other two, were placed under Suwarrow's control. He proceeded with his usual haste through Mittau to Vienna, where he arrived on the 26th of March, just a day after the Archduke Charles's victory over Jourdan at Stockach.

In Vienna Suwarrow was created an Austrian field-marshall, and received the supreme command of the army, with Melas and Kray as his lieutenant-generals: from this moment, however, he was at issue with Thugut, and for the same reasons as the Archduke Charles. Suwarrow would only accept the command on condition of receiving his orders from the emperor direct, and not from the council of war, which was wholly under the influence of Thugut, the Queen of Naples, and her creatures: the Archduke Charles always complained that this council continually acted as a clog and incumbrance upon his proceedings.* Scherer, the French general—Reubel's creature—

* De Laverne, an *émigré*, who was at that time with Suwarrow in Vienna, gives a perfectly correct account in the following terms: "Souvaroff ne voulait jamais s'expliquer sur les détails de la campagne, et sur la manière dont il prétendoit diriger les operations. Il refusa obstinément de s'ouvrir à cet égard au conseil de guerre formé à Vienne pour assister les ministres et diriger les généraux, et il rejeta de même la connaissance que se conseil voulait lui donner des plans conçus dans son sein. Souvaroff savait que les plans les mieux imaginés sont exposés à des inconveniens très graves, le premier de ne pouvoir jamais recevoir une exécution complète, attendu qu'il est impossible de calculer d'avance les modifications, que la résistance de l'ennemi ou ses contreprojets forceront d'y apporter; le second que ces plans écrits, et devenus par là le secret de plusieurs personnes, ne tendent pas à devenir celui de l'ennemi, qui dirige ensuite ses démarches d'après la connaissance du vos vues. Depuis plusieurs années, l'on pourrait dire depuis un siècle, l'Autriche payait

known only by his extortions and embezzlement, was addicted to intoxication, and had been only a short time before removed from the office of minister of war. He proved himself quite incapable of command, and did not understand how to avail himself of the great advantages which he enjoyed. By means of Aubert's papers he was made fully acquainted with the plans of the enemy; he had obtained very extraordinary powers from the Directory, and had the able and volunteer assistance of Moreau, to whom the Directory at that time did not entrust a command. The whole plan of the campaign had been found amongst Aubert's papers, on account of which Repnin, who had entrusted them to Aubert, fell under the displeasure of the Emperor of Russia, and on his return was sent to Moscow. Talleyrand had formerly communicated this plan to Joubert when he was sent to Turin, and the knowledge of it probably led to the commencement of hostilities, even before a declaration of war was issued.

Between the 1st and 3rd of March, 1799, Jourdan passed the Rhine at Basle and Kehl, and Bernadotte, who commanded what was called an army of observation, and whose positions stretched from Spires to Düsseldorf, attacked Mannheim, closely invested Philippsburg, and on the 4th of March appeared in Heidelberg. The Directory had not then, indeed, declared war, but their resolution to renew hostilities had been communicated to the army on the 20th of February, and on the 28th of that month Jourdan published a manifesto, in which he declared that he should be obliged to regard the crossing of the Inn by the Austrians, and the march of the Russians, as equivalent to a declaration of war. This manifesto also most absurdly referred to the long-forgotten insult offered to Bernadotte in Vienna.

Jourdan established his head-quarters at Offenburg: this no sooner took place, than the Archduke Charles, who had hitherto remained behind the Inn and the Lech, crossed the Danube, and almost at the same moment the French in Switzerland marched against the Imperialists in the Grisons. At the close of the year 1798, the French having compelled the Helvetian republic to grant them two roads for the passage of their army, the one south by the Lake of Constance, and the other through the Vallais, the emperor sent General Hotze, himself a Swiss, and one of the most distinguished generals in his service, with a division of his army into the Grisons. As soon as Jourdan put his troops in motion Massena and Lecombe directed their march against the Austrians under Hotze. Coire was taken by the French, and Massena advanced into the Voralberg, in order to force his way into Swabia through Feldkirch,

cher cette manie de vouloir tout prévoir et tout combiner sur le papier et de conduire les généraux à la lisière d'après des plans tracés dans le cabinet. La seule campagne brillante et décisive faite par les armées Autrichiennes depuis le prince Eugène a été celle d'Italie en 1799."

and to form a junction with Jourdan. He made three attempts to take Feldkirch by storm, and showed great ability as a general, but on the last attempt, on the 22nd of March, he was repulsed with such a loss as obliged him to withdraw farther into the Voralberg.

At the same time as Massena advanced against Feldkirch, the Archduke Charles and Jourdan had been in presence of one another since the 19th, in the territory of Sigmaringen. On the 21st of March they fought a bloody but indecisive battle at the village of Ostrach. Some thousands fell on both sides. Jourdan boasted of the victory, although he was obliged to relinquish the field of battle; but the Directory was somewhat more modest than Jourdan, and did not allege that their troops had obtained a decided advantage at Ostrach. Four days afterwards, on the 25th of March, the armies met for a second time at Stockach. Night separated the combatants, but the battle was renewed on the 26th. Even this second engagement was not decisive—the number of killed on both sides was about equal, and the Austrians took only a very few pieces of cannon. They, however, gained their object, and Jourdan failed in his, because he retired with his army across the Rhine. Every one was astonished that the archduke did not more vigorously follow up his advantage, but gave the French time to take up a very strong position in the neighbourhood of Zürich. Jourdan was removed from the command of the army of the Danube, and it was united to the Helvetian army, under Massena. This general had Switzerland especially in his eye, whilst Thugut and the Aulic council of war in Vienna had their attention much more fixed upon the Tyrol and Italy than upon Switzerland; this arose especially from Dessois and Lecourbe having taken possession of some places in the Tyrol, pushed forward far into the Valteline, and gained some considerable advantages. The supreme council of war, therefore, did not place the division of the army, which was under Bellegarde in the Tyrol, under the command of the archduke, who in his strategical work excuses his inactivity during the month of April, by stating that the pedants in Vienna had falsely regarded the Tyrol as the basis of his operations, and that Bellegarde had not been placed under his command.

In the mean time, Lehrbach and his colleagues, as we now certainly know, were guilty of a political crime which filled all Europe with horror, at the time in which the archduke was on one side extending his operations down the banks of the Rhine, and on the other towards Switzerland. They were anxious to dissolve the Congress of Rastadt, and to get back some papers which were in the hands of the French embassy, and would furnish living and permanent proofs of Austrian treachery; they therefore did not shrink from the crime of causing a murderous attack to be made on the representatives of France on their journey from Rastadt to France. The representatives of the German states, too, who were rivals for the favour of the French, behaved very singularly on this occasion, by

not separating on the first hints given to that effect. As early as the 8th of April, the Imperial commissioner declared that the congress must be adjourned, and on the 13th he himself took his departure, and the roads were rendered unsafe by the Szekler hussars. Roberjot, Jean Debry, and Bonnier, the French representatives, and the Germans who fell in with their views, became overbearing, and insisted upon prolonging the congress. On the 19th, several of its members were seized upon and annoyed by the hussars, and on their complaining of the interference and insult, Colonel Barbaczy, who was then lying with his corps at Gernsbach, replied that he was very sorry for what had happened, that no one should be *intentionally* molested, but that he could not be answerable for what might take place. It was not till the sitting of the 23rd, ten days after the departure of the Imperial commissioner, that the representatives of the Empire declared the congress to be dissolved, and on the 25th called upon the representatives of France to take their departure within three days. Barbaczy, who insisted on their departure, because no Frenchman could be suffered to remain in the midst of the Imperial army, promised to allow them still three days quiet in Rastadt, and not to disturb them in their departure, if that event took place within the three days.

The German ministers applied to the colonel of the Szekler hussars for an escort for the French, who prepared everything for their departure; but no answer was received till the 28th. Late in the evening of that day, between seven and eight o'clock, a captain arrived with a note from Barbaczy, in which he intimated that the ambassadors must leave Rastadt in twenty-four hours. As everything was ready, and the carriages in waiting, they set out immediately, but had scarcely proceeded a mile from Rastadt when they were fallen upon by a band in the uniform of the Szekler hussars. All their papers were seized and taken from them, the ambassadors torn out of their carriages, and so injured by sabre wounds, that Bonnier and Roberjot lost their lives, and Debry merely saved himself by creeping into a ditch. Debry was brought back to Rastadt, and recovered. His report, however, of the affair is much more comic than tragic. The ladies, servants, and suite were allowed to pursue their journey. In a letter to Massena, the Archduke Charles speaks with great indignation of this scandalous business; but the Austrian government never offered any other apology or excuse but this—that *it was one of those violations of law and order which are usual in a state of war!* None of the names of the parties concerned ever came to light, and the doer of the deed was never mentioned. The ridiculous speeches and ceremonies by which the French government and legislature sought to rouse the national hatred against the Austrians, the theatrical scenes which they exhibited, and the absurd report drawn up by Jean Debry of the surprise and assault, led many to believe that the whole affair had been contrived by the directors,

who were undoubtedly as capable of such a thing as the Queen of Naples herself.*

In the mean time, Scherer had received orders from Paris to attack the Austrians and Kray before the arrival of Suwarrow or Melas with an additional force. He was, however, not only destitute of the necessary abilities, but did not even understand how to follow good advice. It is generally said that Scherer would not have been so unsuccessful either the first or the second time, had he carefully followed Moreau's advice as to the time and manner of his attack. He was scarcely arrived in Mantua, on the 23rd of March, when he assembled a general council of war, in which it was resolved to attack the Austrians along the whole extent of their line. The Austrian army was posted from Porto Legnago to the Lake of Guarda, with its centre supported by Verona. Before Verona, where Moreau commanded in the general attack on the 26th, Scherer gained some advantages, but he lost so many men at other points, that he found it advisable to retire, and to take up a safe position, on the 28th and 29th, under the cannon of Peschiera, in order to renew the attack on the 30th. The main attack was again directed against Verona; but Kray put himself at the head of 10,000 fresh troops, and then indeed he obtained some real advantages, although the French maintained their ground. From Magnano to Villa Franca the two armies remained in presence of each other, and the centre of the Austrians was still around Verona. A series of bloody engagements took place on the first days of April, and on the 6th a decisive battle was fought at Magnano, which ended in the defeat of the French, who had now fought three bloody battles from the 26th of March to the 7th of April, and lost 11,000 men. Scherer was at length obliged to retreat behind the Mincio, and to

* Every one was justly of opinion that Thugut and his band were not a whit better than Talleyrand, Reubel, Barras, and their colleagues. The Queen of Naples, who at that time had great influence at the Court of Vienna, is openly accused by all writers of a similar deed, by having, as is said, prompted the murder of Antonio Ferreri, a cabinet courier. He had come from Vienna, and knew her secret. The king, with whom he was a great favourite, was sending him with a message to Nelson, when, without any reason, he was cruelly murdered before his eyes. Not only Colletta and Botta name the queen, but in the account of the affair in Posselt's Annals, 1802, vol. iii., p. 203, there is the following note:—"It is said that the murder of this courier was a result of the Queen of Naples' policy, who wished to put out of the way all witnesses of the last letter from the emperor to the king; a letter which, as is alleged, the queen with her own hands tore in pieces, in order to compel her husband to prosecute the war. The reason of the attack upon the French was of a similar description. A commission for the investigation of the affair was, indeed, appointed, but Austria has never given any report whatever of the result of the inquiry." Herr von Dohm has given his report of the facts in Posselt's Annals, 1799, 2 quar., No. iv., p. 84. The reports of individual ambassadors, who were very well informed, were printed under the title "Beurkundete Mordgeschichte der Fränkischer Gesandten unweit Rastadt mit 2 Urkunden, 1799." We know now with certainty that the plan was devised by Thugut and his right-hand man, Count Lehrbach, in order to get possession of some papers which would have been ruinous to them, and Colonel Barbaczy caused it to be put into execution. This is admitted by Herr von Hormayr, in his "Lebensbilder," part i., pp. 156-157; and part iii., pp. 130-137.

leave Brescia to its fate. Melas, accompanied by Suwarrow, the commander-in-chief, reached the army on the 4th, and was first received by Kray in Verona, but afterwards with great ceremony at the head-quarters, on the 14th.

The Russians, whom the council of war in Vienna, according to its fashion, had previously caused to march with unexampled slowness, now advanced rapidly. They had spent twenty-four days (from the 12th of March till the 5th of April) in making their way from St. Pölten to Villach, about 250 miles, whilst they afterwards performed the march from Villach to Verona, 260 miles, in ten days. The former is an example of Thugut's crooked ways, whilst Suwarrow pursued the straight one. The honour of reducing the citadel of Brescia was left to the valiant Kray; it fell on the evening of the 26th, and he and his division were afterwards sent to cover the siege of Mantua, which had been opened by General Klenau. About this time Scherer was recalled, and Moreau, as senior officer, assumed the command of the French army till another commander-in-chief was appointed. This was a sacrifice for his country, for Suwarrow estimated the army against which he was advancing with 80,000 men at not more than 18,000 capable of bearing arms, but which occupied a strong position behind the Adda. The attack upon the French, usually called the battle of Cassano, was conducted in a most masterly manner on the 27th of April, and Moreau, after an obstinate resistance, was obliged to retire still farther, in order to secure himself by the fortresses of Tortona and Alessandria. Melas had the chief share in the battle of Cassano; Suwarrow was received as a deliverer by the good Catholics in Milan, and by the archbishop, who a few days before had been a good republican; and the Russian general having received homage in the Milanese hastened immediately to Turin. From this moment Suwarrow became entirely dissatisfied with the Austrians, who—being merely anxious for conquests, and not, as the Emperor Paul wished, for the restoration of the exiled princes—when Suwarrow was eager hotly to follow up the enemy, divided their army for the siege of the fortresses, and neither permitted him to restore the old king's government in Turin, nor to administer Piedmont in the name of the King of Sardinia.

B.—NAPLES TILL BONAPARTE'S RETURN FROM EGYPT.

Championnet having been removed from Naples in 1799, Macdonald remained at the head of the French army, which was the sole support of the Parthenopeian republic, for the government itself had neither army nor finances. Macdonald had at first restored Faypoult to his functions; the Directory itself, however, soon recalled him, and sent Abrial to organise the republic, which had already become untenable on his arrival, because the Abruzzi, Calabria, and Apulia had revolted against the republic. It was im-

possible to suppress this dreadful insurrection without the aid of French troops; but Macdonald was obliged, at the most dangerous moment, to recall Duhesme, who had been sent to Apulia with his troops, because he himself was compelled to proceed with all haste to Upper Italy. During the concluding months of the year 1798, the country people, under experienced and bold leaders, assembled in bands, and, under pretence of supporting religion and monarchy, committed the most fearful depredations and murders of all descriptions on the inhabitants of the towns. The bands in the Abruzzi were under the leadership of Rodio and Pronio; in Terra di Lavoro, Michael Pezza, so notorious for his cruelties as a robber and murderer that the admiring people had given him the name of Brother Devil (*Fra Diavolo*), was at the head of the insurgent plunderers. In the Basilicata pillage and desolation were prompted and promoted by a bishop and many of the clergy; in Apulia the people were called to arms by three Corsican adventurers; in Campania most horrible cruelties were perpetrated by Mammone Gandano, who was almost rivalled in his love of plunder and wickedness by Sciarpa and Decesani. In Calabria, however, a plenipotentiary at length appeared from the royal family, which had taken refuge in Palermo, who has gained for himself a distinguished place among the tools of royal cruelty. The name of the king's representative on this occasion was Fabrizio Ruffo, who, indeed, enjoyed the title of a cardinal, but was at the same time capable of the commission of any crime, and had been long since guilty of robbing the treasury.* He had been removed from the management of the treasury by Pope Pius VI., on account of gross irregularities of which he was guilty, and from Rome proceeded to Naples, where he was at the time in which he was created a cardinal. When he received his new dignity he returned to Rome, and remained there till the city was taken possession of by the French; he afterwards went to Palermo, from whence he came back in February to Calabria, as the king's plenipotentiary, but without either money or troops. He no sooner appeared with his boasting and promises, than whole crowds of fanatical priests, murderers, and robbers, collected around him, together with the whole of the rude peasantry of the mountains. Whilst scenes of horror were enacted in the southern and western part of the Parthenopean republic, the fantastic visionaries

* Colletta, lib. iv., § 14, p. 220: "Fabrizio Ruffo, nato di nobile mà tristo seme, scaltro per natura, ignorante di scienze e lettere, scostumato in gioventù, lascivo in vecchiezza, povero di casa, dissipatore, prese né suoi verdi anni il ricco il facile cammino delle prelature. Piacque al Pontefice Pio VI., dal quale ebbe impiego supremo nella camera ponteficia; ma per troppi e subiti guadagni, perduto ufficio e favore, tornò dovizioso in patria, lasciande in Roma potente amici acquistati, come in città corrotta co' doni ed i blandimenti della fortuna. Dimandò al re di Napoli ed ottenne la intendenza della casa regale di Caserta; indi tornato nello grazie di Pio, fu cardinale, andò a Roma et là restò sino al 1798, quando per le rivoluzioni di Roma prese in Napoli ricovero e poco appresso in Palermo seguendo il re."—Botta, lib. xvi., vol. iv., p. 193: "Scrivono alcuni che il cardinale disse anche a voce che fosse fatto papa. Ciò dissero di lui, perchè lo credevano capace di dirlo."

and enthusiasts of the capital, the ladies of the saloons and their rhetoricians got up the most ridiculous and childish exhibitions in favour of liberty and the republic. Not only were Alfieri's declamatory pieces in favour of liberty represented in the theatres, but additional speeches were delivered between the acts, and curses fulminated from the stage against tyrants and despotism. This was, however, nothing but mere words—no active exertions were made to sustain the cause, whilst Ruffo's army of the faith increased daily. Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel, the Neapolitan Madame de Staél, published a journal, which was full of accounts of victories won by the republicans, while in fact they were everywhere defeated. Michel Agnolo Ciccone translated the Gospel into the popular Neapolitan dialect, and accompanied his translation with democratical comments. Mantone, the minister of war, caused public collections to be made from house to house for the threatened republic, by the Duchesses of Cassano and Pepoli!! Championnet was still in Naples at the time in which the Russians and Turks had driven the French from Corsu, and were threatening a landing in Naples in favour of the Royal Government, when Ruffo and his army of the faith had assumed a formidable character, and were on the eve of marching to Campania. He sent a division of Neapolitans, and also a French corps under Duhesme, against the Royalists. On this occasion there was as little want of ridiculous exhibitions as of simple faith, for the republicans caused Cardinal Zurletto Capone, Archbishop of Naples, to issue a ban of excommunication against Ruffo, and, as if it had been in the very depths of the middle ages, Ruffo treated him with like for like.

Of these two divisions, the one under Duhesme, consisting of 6000 men, and in which there was very few Neapolitans, was successful in its undertaking against Apulia; there the Russians and Turks were threatening an invasion, and the general insurrection deprived the city of all intercourse with the country. Six towns were saved from the insurrection and the country was occupied; but the events in Lombardy compelled Macdonald to recall Duhesme. The other division, which was composed wholly of Neapolitans, suffered a defeat, and was obliged to seek an asylum in Salerno. At this moment not only was Calabria occupied by the cardinal's royal army of the faith and by some regular troops which had been sent thither, but also Lucera, Manfredonia, Andria, Bari, Ascoli, Venosa, Bitonto, and Barletta became the prey of the insurgents after the recall of General Duhesme, and the departure of Macdonald from Central and Lower Italy, which took place immediately afterwards. The inhabitants themselves forcibly drove out the authorities of the visionary republicans, and again received in their stead the bailiffs and plunderers of their queen within their walls. Foggia alone resisted for a longer period—but at length the dreadful cardinal, supported by the English, Russians, and Turks by sea, appeared before Naples, with his hellish bands, immediately after the departure of

Macdonald. On the 7th of June Macdonald had marched from Caserta into the states of the Church. Immediately afterwards Ruffo's hordes appeared and made preparations in the name and by the commission of the king to storm the capital of his kingdom, with the assistance of some Neapolitan and Sicilian soldiers who had been disembarked, and supported by English, Russians, Romans, Tuscans, Portuguese, Dalmatians, and Turks. As early as the 5th of June the republicans had made themselves masters of the relatives of Cardinal Ruffo, among whom was his brother, and made them answerable for his deeds of blood, because at that time the city of Naples was declared to be in a state of siege.

The legislative body removed the sittings to Castel Nuovo, whilst Méjean and the Frenchmen left behind under his command took possession of the Castle of Saint Elmo. The aged admiral Caracciolo, who had accompanied the king to Palermo, and then as a Neapolitan returned to Naples to serve his country, which the king had forsaken, equipped a fleet of small craft in order to cannonade the shores, whilst the Russians and Turks effected landings at various points and stormed the trenches. On the 11th of June Ruffo invested the city; and on the 13th, relying confidently on the aid of the fanatical and blind populace within, who sympathised with the army of the faith, he ordered the storming to commence on three sides at once (Maddalena, Forier, Capo di Monte). The fighting and slaughter continued for the whole day, and recommenced with double fury on the morning of the 14th. The streets were defended with such desperation that they were only to be won one after another by the bloodiest and most persevering assaults. Ruffo had distributed arms among the Lazzaroni, blood flowed in streams, houses were plundered and many of them set in flames, and the most inhuman cruelties practised on both sides. On the 15th, also, murders and slaughter continued till nightfall, and the whole city was occupied by Ruffo's hordes, with the exception of a fortified palace in the street of Toledo, the mole, a small part of the coast, and the castles. The scenes of strife, murder, and pillage, were repeated uninterruptedly in the city from the 15th till the 18th, and at the end of these three days, Ruffo, finding himself unable to reduce the castles, made proposals, on the 19th, for a suspension of arms. Méjean was accused of being a traitor, because he at that time entered into a combination, as it were, with Ruffo, against the republicans, and very probably received money in order to betray them. This we shall neither allege nor deny, because the Italians, who have asserted it, are not very scrupulous in their allegations; so much, however, is certain, that being in possession of the Castle of St. Elmo, he perfectly commanded the city by its artillery, and could have shot down Ruffo's hordes at his discretion.

Méjean undertook to mediate between Ruffo and the republicans, who, however, required guarantees for the observance of the terms

of the proposed capitulation, because, though Ruffo negociated in the name of the king, they knew that neither the king, the queen, nor the cardinal himself, would pay the slightest attention to the obligation of an oath. The English, who were at that time under the impression that the French fleet which had sailed from Brest might be intended for Naples, recommended Ruffo to accept the offer, and the capitulation was concluded on the 23rd, in the cardinal's dwelling, and signed under the guarantee of an English, Turkish, and Russian plenipotentiary. Ruffo and Micheroux signed on the part and in the name of the king, and General Massa on that of the republicans. The agreement consisted of six points.

1. The republicans were to be allowed to march out with military honours, and neither to be molested in their persons nor properties.
2. Ships were to be provided by the king's representatives to convey them to Toulon, except such as chose to remain in the kingdom, who, as well as their families, were to be exempt from prosecution.
3. These stipulations were to apply not only to the republicans lying in the forts, but to those also who had been taken as prisoners of war.
4. The forts were not to be evacuated till the ships were in readiness.
5. Hostages* were to be given by the king's plenipotentiaries for the fulfilment of these conditions.
6. Related to the hostages.

The hostages were sent to Méjean to the Castle of St. Elmo, the republicans put on shipboard, and even a part of the ships had luckily sailed for Toulon, when Nelson appeared in the harbour, with the king on board his ship. From that moment forward might became right, and two female furies proceeded to satiate their revenge. The queen had sent her friend, the pure Lady Hamilton, from Palermo, to follow Nelson, and the admiral being the slave of her charms, lent his instrumentality, on her solicitation, to assist the helpless king to carry into execution his wife's revengeful commands. None but the few republicans, who had already taken their departure, arrived fortunately at Marseilles; all the rest were detained. After some days the king returned to Palermo, declared the agreement to be null and void,† and ordered eighty of the most distinguished persons of his kingdom to be thrown into prison and chains. Even before the cruel criminal justice of Queen

* In reference to the signatures to the agreement, Colletta, vol. ii., p. 260, observes: "Seguivano in nomi di Ruffo e Micheroux di Foote per l'Inghilterra di Ballie per la Russia e di — per la Porta e per la parte repubblicano di Massa e Méjean." In the note it is observed that the place for the name of the Turkish ambassador is left blank in the original of the treaty. In Botta, Kerandy is given as the name of the Russian representative, and Bonien as that of the Turkish. It appears to us, therefore, that the whole affair of the guarantee was a mere mystification agreed upon between Ruffo and Méjean—Ruffo had people enough to play the several characters.

† We give the original words of the proclamation, which convey an idea of the cowardly, stupid, and cruel disposition of the king: "I re non patteggiare eo sudditi, essere abusivi e nulli gli atti del suo vicario; voler egli esercitare la piena regia autorita sopra rebelli."

Caroline was brought into full play against these unfortunate prisoners, Ruffo's bands of faithful and orthodox Calabrians and Lazaroni had lived and pillaged after their own fashion. Whilst they were alone in the city, houses were plundered and palaces burnt down, rich and even well-dressed persons maltreated, murdered, and many even publicly burnt. Heaps of dead bodies were lying in every street and blood ran in torrents. In order to avoid the appearance of exaggerating these dreadful details by rhetorical language, we give in a note a passage from Colletta, in which he refers to the occasion and circumstances in language which, as we know from other sources, is by no means exaggerated.*

On this occasion particularly, Méjean became an object of suspicion. He had the hostages in his hands, commanded the city with his artillery, and could have set the prisoners free. He is, however, accused of having received money from the English, with whom he entered into negotiations because he had no confidence in Ruffo. The accusation derived some appearance of probability from the fact, that on his departure with the French in English ships to Toulon, he allowed the unfortunate Neapolitans who were in the French ranks to be mercilessly torn out—not to be protected even by their French uniform. Dreadful as the days and nights from the 9th till the 13th of July were rendered by the cannibal rage and unrestrained license of the army of the faith, the Turco-Roman justice administered by the queen, Acton and their helpers in the capitulation of Capua and Caserta, was still more horrible. The king had, as we have already mentioned, before his return for some days to Palermo, appointed a junta of state as a political tribunal, declared all the existing laws of the city abolished; and, after the Turkish fashion, the country to be conquered. In accordance with these Turkish principles his junta held and regulated the proceedings of their criminal court. This tribunal consisted of two Neapolitans, notorious as the authors of the most cruel police regulations, and three fanatical Sicilian judges, who conducted themselves precisely after the fashion of the revolutionary tribunals of the Reign of Terror. Whoever had

* Colletta, lib. v., cap. i., vol. i., p. 263: "I visitori correvarono sopra i vinti: chi non era guerriero della santa fede, o plebe incontrato era ucciso, quindi le piazze e le strade bruttate di sangue e di cadaveri, gli onesti fuggitivi o nascosti, i ribaldi armati ed audaci, risse tra questi per gara di vendette o di guadagni, grida, lamenti. Chiuso il foro, vote la chiese, le vie deserte o popolate a tumulto, aspetto di citta come allora espugnata. E la fieraZZa, saziata di sanguine, voltasi all'avarizia, fingendo, che i giacobini stessero nascosti nelle case, non lasciò luogo chiuso; e, appena aperto, vi rubava a sacco; i lazzari, i servi, i nemici, e i falsi amici denunciavano alla plebe le case che dicevano dei rebelli ed ivi non altro che sforzare, involare, uccidere tutto a genio di fortuna. Traendo i prigionieri per le vie nudi e legati, li trangiggevano con le armi, avvilivano per colpi villani e lordure sulla faccia, gente di ogni età, di ogni sesso, antichi magistrati, egregie donne già madrè della patria, erano strascinati a quei supplizii; così che i pericoli della passata guerra, la insolenza delle bande regie le ultime disperazioni dei repubblicani, tutti i timori degli scorsi giorni al paragone delle presenti calamità parevano tollerabili. Il Cardinale Ruffo, gli altri capi della santa fede ed i potenti su la plebe, validi ad accendere gli sdegni non bastavano a moderare la villania."

filled any office under the republic, whoever was in the most remote degree connected with any of the originators or promoters of the new institutions, was executed; and those executions, *en masse*, continued from the middle of July to the middle of August. It is a thing incredible to relate, but capable of proof, from the records of the junta itself, that about 40,000 individuals were condemned to death, and 40,000 more to banishment. In order to give some explanation of this apparently incredible statement, it is necessary to bear in mind, that all who were even members of any of the numerous clubs; all who had been present at any meeting during the republican period; all whose names had been enrolled on the conscription list, though they had never served; all whose names, even without their consent, had been placed by the town councils on the list of the citizen guard, were arrested by order of the junta, and could only be liberated by a special act of favour on the part of the king. The number of persons really executed is said to have exceeded 4000, without taking into account those who were tormented in their hateful dungeons, or those who perished from starvation, maltreatment, and torture. This persecution unhappily fell upon those persons who, in an ignorant and benighted country, were alone capable of any noble thoughts or worthy aspirations. True it is, their dreams were often ridiculous and Utopian, but their views were honest and their convictions sincere. The noblest and the best of the people, therefore, men and women, all who had distinguished themselves either in literature or the arts, were cruelly extirpated. Were we to enter into details, the register of the cruelties practised by this tribunal would never end; we shall therefore merely remark upon the unworthy treatment and noble courage of Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel. She met her death in a manner worthy of a philosopher and a hero! Grimaldi, Maria Pagano, and the celebrated physician and naturalist, Cirillo, were not less noble in their endurance of an ignominious death, or less remarkable for their adherence to their humane though visionary dreams. Cimarosa, the celebrated composer, was exposed to unspeakable persecutions; he was at length, indeed, rescued from death by Russian interference; but soon afterwards died from the effects of his shattered constitution and long sufferings.

The part played on this occasion by the overbearing English, and by Nelson, whom they honoured as a god, and whom they afterwards employed to destroy and burn the city of Copenhagen in the midst of peace, was disgraceful and dishonourable. The violent and brutal admiral, influenced by his mistress, who wished to please queen Caroline, allowed his flag-ship to be made the scene of a criminal tribunal, established to pass sentence upon the most deserving officers of the Neapolitan army. Among these we may especially mention the name of the aged and venerable Prince Caraccioli, who had formerly been a very intimate friend of the king's, and had rendered great services both to him and to the city of

Naples, and who had also been a friend of Nelson's,* even the cruel Neapolitan judges who formed the court-martial were willing to give a favourable ear to the desire of the aged admiral for an adjournment, in order to enable him to produce new witnesses and additional proofs of his innocence. It was necessary, however, to report their proceedings to Nelson, who decided that *there were no grounds for any longer delay*. The court afterwards condemned the old man to perpetual imprisonment, but Nelson wrote underneath the sentence—"to death"—caused him to be removed from his ship to the Neapolitan frigate Minerva, which was lying near, and to be hanged from the yard-arm.

The dreadful lesson, too, which Providence on this occasion gave to the hardhearted king, by the reappearance of the corpse, which had been sunk by weights in the sea, was altogether thrown away on his stony heart. The event awakened a momentary terror, which speedily disappeared. As the king was returning from Palermo, and standing at the bow of the ship, there appeared a dead body floating on the water. As the body approached, a wave threw up the head, and the king, to his astonishment and horror, recognised the countenance of his old friend, with his grey dripping locks. He screamed out the name of Caraccioli, and expressed himself after the fashion of Shakspeare's Lady Macbeth.† The impression, however, lasted only for a moment, and the king remained such as he had been from his youth up. As, on the 14th of July, the Pope was removed from the Carthusian monastery in Tuscany to Turin, and thence to Briançon, the Roman republic deprived of French aid and the Cisalpine one dissolved, the queen of Naples now hoped to be able to conquer the States of the Church. She did, indeed, afterwards succeed, with the help of the English, in getting possession of Rome; but the coalition now began to fall to pieces of itself, for Austria fell into disputes with Naples respecting the States of the Church, and with Russia respecting Piedmont, because Austria alone wished to swallow up the whole prey.

* Colletta calls him "Dotto in arte, felice in guerra, chiaro per acquistate glorie, meritevole per servigi di sette lustri alla patria e al re, cittadino egregio e modesto, tradito del seruo nelle domestiche paretì, tradito dal compagno d'armi Lord Nelson, tradito dagli uffiziali suoi giudici."

† Colletta: "Volgendo il re inorridito chiese in confuso; *ma che vuole quel morto?* Al che nel universale sbalordimento e silenzio de' circonstantì, il cappellano pietosamente replicò: 'Direi che viene a dimandar christiana sepoltura.' 'Se l'abbia' rispose il re, e andò solo e penseroso alla sua stanza."

§ III.

HISTORY OF THE WAR TILL THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA
FROM THE COALITION.

A.—WAR IN ITALY AND SWITZERLAND.

As we have already stated, Moreau made a fortunate retreat after the engagement at Cassano, collected around him the remnant of the French power in Italy, and encamped first at Tortona, and afterwards at Alessandria. Suwarrow, it is true, ordered a division of the army to attack him, but this attack was repulsed by Moreau, on the 12th of May, at Bassignano; the French general, however, marched into the territory of Genoa, there to await Macdonald, who had commenced his movement from Naples as early as the 7th of June. Macdonald gained for himself great military glory by his march from Naples to Tuscany. He separated his force, stated to amount to 36,000 men, into three divisions. Placing himself at the head of one of them, he proceeded through Fondi and Terracina; the second, under the command of Vatrin, took the route of San Germano and Ceperano; whilst the third, which consisted of the troops previously scattered about in the Abruzzi, was led by Coutard, by the shortest road to Tuscany. Macdonald and Coutard met with no resistance; but Vatrin, in the neighbourhood of Sora, came upon a considerable body of mountaineers, which had taken up a strong and almost impregnable position in the small town of Isola, and there disputed his passage. He was compelled by a desperate struggle to drive his opponents into the fortress, next to venture a murderous storm against Isola, and cut a way of deliverance for himself and his troops over dead bodies and ruins. All the posts were withdrawn, but garrisons were thrown into the fortresses of Ancona, Perugià, and Cività Vecchia. Macdonald left his heavy artillery behind him in Rome, but the difficult march from thence to the summit of the Appennines has secured him a place amongst the greatest generals of his age. His ambition, however, led him astray—when arrived at the summit, two ways were open before him—one into the district of Genoa, the other into the plain of Lombardy. He ought to have taken the former, as Victor, whom Moreau had sent to meet him, was there awaiting his arrival, in order to effect a junction between the two armies. He, however, took the northern road leading into the plain of Lombardy, because, by pursuing that route, he hoped to surprise the Austrians without being obliged to share the honour with Moreau.

Moreau had at first marched to Coni, and then to Genoa, whilst the Russians, to Suwarrow's great vexation, were engaged with the Austrians, and, according to their system, in besieging and reducing the fortresses of Pignerol, Susa, La Brunette, and Col d'Assiette; by this means their strength was divided, and rendered inefficient.

Victor had sent Lapoype with an army of Ligurians to Bobbio, and thither Macdonald ought to have directed his course, whereas he took precisely the opposite direction, and marched to Modena. He hoped to surprise the Austrians, who were employed in covering the siege of Mantua, and had distributed their forces with a feeling of perfect security. Kray was at that time engaged in the siege of Mantua; Klenau besieged and took, first, Ferrara, then Bologna; Ott had forced his way into the passes of the Appennines, and Suwarrow was at a great distance. The last-named general had pushed forward to the Col di Tenda, and the Cossacks stretched even into the province of Dauphiny, where Macdonald committed the error of marching upon the river Tidone instead of forming a junction on the Bormida with Victor's army, and thereby with Moreau.

Suwarrow's official correspondence best proves how much dissatisfied he was even at that time with the Austrians, who were desirous of profiting by the noble enthusiasm of the Emperor Paul, and his knightly and honourable sacrifice of every mere political advantage, for the promotion of their own petty, contemptible, and selfish ends. In almost every letter Suwarrow ridicules the tediousness, systematic caution, and pedantry of the Austrians, who at length prevailed upon the Emperor Francis to copy and sign instructions for Suwarrow, which, as the printed correspondence proves, were wholly opposed both to his own views and to those of the Emperor Paul.* The intrigues at Vienna frustrated all the advantages which Suwarrow hoped to realise by refusing to receive any orders from the council of war in the capital, and requiring to have his instructions immediately from the Emperor himself. The Emperor was in fact compelled by these court cabals to sign instructions which proceeded from the council, and even to give to his generals orders the very reverse of those which they received from Suwarrow as commander-

* The title of the collection of documents connected with Suwarrow's campaign in 1800 runs as follows:—

Correspondence of the Imperial Russian Generalissimo Prince Italinsky Count Alexander Wassiliewitsch Souwaroff-Rimnisky, concerning the Russo-Austrian campaign in the year 1799, collected from official sources and original documents, printed by command of the Emperor of Russia, and published by G. Frechs, Imperial Russian Councillor of State. Translated from the Russian by a Prussian officer, part vii., p. 304; part ii., p. 346-8: Glogau and Leipzig, 1835. Carl Heymann. The very fact of appointing Austrian commissioners for the administration of territories occupied by the Russians and *not* belonging to Austria, must have been offensive both to Paul and Suwarrow; but the letter of the Emperor Francis, of the date of the 17th of May, after the conquest of Turin and Piedmont, is decisive (i., p. 74): "In reference to the course of further operations, I have already communicated to you my views in the letters of the 12th and 13th of May. In accordance with these, I find it impossible, however much I regret it, to approve of all your arrangements in the civil and political administration of the Piedmontese states, or of the employment of the Piedmontese troops in the service, which you referred to on the 2nd of May. In accordance with these views I must beg you, dear field-marshall, to recall the orders issued by you in those districts, and not to allow the instructions given to General La Tour and Colonel Atems to be carried into effect. *Hereafter you are to leave everything which relates to the civil administration to my own and further orders.*"

in-chief. For example, Suwarrow had long before given orders to Kray to relinquish the siege of Mantua, and go and meet Macdonald; whereas the Emperor commanded him on no account to do any such thing; Macdonald, therefore, was very near attaining his object and relieving Mantua.*

Kray had satisfied himself with sending Ott and Hohenzollern to meet and check Macdonald; he himself did not march till too late, and Suwarrow's rapidity of movement alone saved the fruits of the preceding victory. On the first intelligence of Macdonald's appearance in the plains, Suwarrow proceeded with astonishing rapidity to march through Asti and Alessandria to the Trebbia. He afterwards devolved upon Bellegarde the duty of keeping Moreau at a distance from Tortona and Alessandria, and appeared at Tidone, on the Trebbia, on the 17th of June, at the very moment in which Macdonald had gained some advantages, and was about to venture on a general attack. On the 18th, however, he found himself opposed to the whole army, which had been victorious at Cassano, and had since received reinforcements. On the 18th, Suwarrow and his Lieut.-Generals Korsakoff and Melas, with his subordinates Ott and Fröhlich, drove Macdonald from the left to the right bank of the Tidone; and he was then imprudent enough to risk everything on the 19th. The battle was bloody, the issue long doubtful, and Suwarrow, according to his custom of bringing on a decision in battles and the conquest of cities, was obliged to sacrifice a vast number of men, as he lost many more than the French; but his victory was complete. Some idea of the loss which this victory on the Trebbia cost may be formed from the fact that the loss of the French in three days was estimated at 11,000 men. They, notwithstanding, made a masterly retreat through Modena, but found during its execution that they had to do with the bold and rapid Suwarrow, and not with the systematic and tedious Austrians. Suwarrow pursued and hung upon their rear, and made several thou-

* Suwarrow was so much dissatisfied at this, that he was unwilling to remain. On the 27th of May he writes as follows to the Russian ambassador in Vienna: "They (Kray and Klenau) were, however, suddenly recalled to the siege of Mantua, without a word of information being sent to me. After such a course there can be no need of my services; I am desirous of returning home. This cabinet order has disturbed the whole plan of my operations; and in order to repair its effects, I must remain here for some time." After some other remarks on the madness of the people at Vienna, he continues: "Each general turns not only in his own affairs, but in general ones, to the council of war at court, and thus has the right of intriguing after his own inclination, and for his own advantage. The council also has the right of giving them commands of all kinds, and thus of binding me. The Archduke Charles, however zealous he may be for the general cause, is quite as much hampered as I am in reference to our operations. Were it not so, we would pursue a very different course, and have a different report to give—I in Italy, and he in Germany and Switzerland! His Excellency Baron Thugut must, forsooth, look through all instructions! His wisdom is to get over all difficulties, and his strength of mind is to remove all obstructions which stand in the way of the European governments." The Emperor Francis' letter to Suwarrow distinctly shows that at Vienna they pretended to know everything better, and distributed and received everything.

sand prisoners at Piacenza, among whom were Generals Rusca, Cambray, and Salm.

Macdonald, with the remainder of the army, afterwards reached Genoa; but he was not disposed to serve in either of the two armies, one of which was placed by the Directory behind the Var, and the other in the territory of Genoa. The one in the French territory was first to be organised and then commanded by Championnet; the second, in Genoa, consisted of the combined forces of Moreau and Macdonald, and daily received considerable reinforcements from France. Moreau remained at the head of this army till Joubert's arrival, for whom the chief command was destined. At this moment Suwarrow began to find the jesuitical policy of the Austrians altogether intolerable, as it became obvious, that their aim was no less than to get possession of the whole of Upper and Central Italy.

Thugut also offended and incensed the Archduke Charles, by weakening his forces, withdrawing from him one division and one general after another, in order to attain his ends in Italy, by preventing him from restoring the old Swiss governments. Every one expected that the Archduke Charles, from Zürich and in Zürich, would appoint administrations consisting of independent Swiss, but when this expectation was not realised, general fears were entertained in Switzerland also of the false Austrian policy; no one, therefore, felt any interest in the cause, and the Archduke Charles was obliged to maintain himself against Massena without aid or sympathy.

The Archduke had shown very little activity since the 30th of March, 1799; for he first lay sick for some weeks at Stockach; he was then annoyed and complained because the Tyrol had been excluded from his command, although he expressly solicited its inclusion in the district to which his supreme command should extend. The Archduke did not set out to Schaffhausen till the 13th of April, when Massena, having united a great part of Jourdan's army to his own, took the command and strongly fortified his position near Zürich. On this occasion the Austrians were reproached, we know not how justly, with their usual methodical and systematic pedantry. They had not, as is said, although it was in their power, occupied a single point upon the left bank of the Rhine, but contented themselves with cannonading Constance and occupying their troops in a petty warfare in the long strip of country between Basle and Mannheim, so that Massena was suffered to strengthen his army by continual reinforcements of fresh troops, and to make his position near Zürich almost impregnable. The assistance which the Archduke might have been able to obtain in Switzerland, seeing that Steiger, the former mayor of Berne, and other members of the old governments, were in his camp, was wholly frustrated and sacrificed by Thugut's chicanery respecting the proclamations to be issued by them. Nothing of importance occurred till the end of April, when the Archduke at length resolved to make an attempt to form a junc-

tion with Suwarow and to drive the French out of the high Alps. In accordance with this view, Hotze was to proceed from the Voralberg to the Grisons, and Bellegarde from the Tyrol against Le-course, who was in the Valteline. A series of bloody engagements were fought in the east of Switzerland, from the 3rd till the 6th of May. The Grisons were occupied by the Austrians, but on the 3rd of May Massena hastened to the relief of the French in that province, and again drove the Austrians out with great loss, whilst Soult, with great cruelty, suppressed the movements in the small cantons. It was not till the 14th of May that Hotze found himself in full possession of the Grisons and the whole valley of the Rhine, and Massena was compelled more and more to concentrate his forces and therefore to evacuate Schaffhausen and even Constance. On the 21st the Archduke pushed farther southward, whilst Hotze also marched from Sargans against Zürich. From the day just mentioned till the 27th the French and Austrians fought with varying success, the latter with a view to effect a junction between Hotze and the Archduke, and the former to prevent them from effecting their purpose. On the evening of the 27th, the Austrians succeeded in effecting a junction, and the whole army advanced against Zürich with the intention of storming the fortifications of the French.

In the deadly strife before Zürich from the 3rd till the 6th of June, the French and Austrians gave equal proofs of valour, but at the same time Massena showed himself to be a man of extraordinary military abilities and genius. He was in fact as able and skilful as a commander, as he was contemptible as a man and a politician. During these three days of carnage multitudes of brave soldiers fell; and among the Austrian generals Hotze, Wallis, Kerpen and Hiller, were severely wounded, and among the French Humbert and Oudinot. The archduke was about to renew the attack on the 6th. Massena, however, thought he had sacrificed men enough, and therefore relinquished his position at Zürich, in order to occupy another in the neighbourhood, which was more extensive and yet more secure. The Archduke advanced into Massena's position in and around Zürich, whilst the French general took up a new one on Mount Albis, with his left wing supported by the Rhine and his right by the lake of Zug; both armies rested on the Limmat. Whilst the Archduke Charles and Soult lay opposed to and watching each other, with a view to a new and favourable attack, the Emperor of Russia split with the English because they would not recognise him as Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, and with the Austrians because his generals in Italy were driven to despair.

In every one of his letters to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Suwarow expressed his dissatisfaction, impatience, and earnest desire to be permitted to lay down his command; whilst the ambassador with great prudence mediated between him and the singular Paul, and performed his necessary duties in Vienna. In these let-

ters Suwarrow complains of the government council of war; of Thugut; of Prince Dietrichstein,* of Chesteler, the Quarter-Master-General; of the necessity of being obliged to consult some one in Vienna concerning every trifle; and finally, also, of the Archduke Charles, and of old Melas' secret understanding with the Council in Vienna. Suwarrow and Rasumowsky knew the Emperor too well to rouse his passions; they therefore concealed from him for a long time the true state of affairs; but as the Emperor Francis' letters became more imperious in their tone and obstructive in their character, it became impossible at length to conceal what the Austrians meditated doing with the King of Sardinia, who was under the protection of Russia. Even the whole truth was not told, but recourse was had to a middle plan proposed by England. The Austrians alone were to remain in Italy, and all the Russians to be brought together in Switzerland; and the Archduke Charles, with the army under his command, was to be opposed to the army of the Rhine under Moreau, from Basle to Mayence. This plan was looked upon at that time as an Austrian cabal, for the purpose of getting rid of the Russians in Italy at any cost. Suwarrow did not conceal his vexation and annoyance from the minister in Vienna, but poured out his indignation in every letter to Rasumowsky. He said nothing, however, to the Emperor, because he was acquainted with his character, and knew what his feelings were towards himself. Cobenzl, who was still in Petersburg, exhibited masterly skill in working upon the Emperor by male and female favourites; he kept him in such excellent humour, that Paul was prevailed upon to recall the orders already issued to Suwarrow respecting the restoration of the King of Sardinia to his dominions. The Russians might, and ought to have left Italy as early as July, in order to form a junction with the army under Korsakoff, which had marched directly to Switzerland for the purpose of relieving the army of the Archduke; but a new French army was threatening Lombardy from Genoa, and Suwarrow thought it his duty to remain for some weeks longer. The fortresses had for the most part capitulated at that time, and Latour Foissac had surrendered Mantua also, on the 28th of July. This caused a great outcry against this general, who was accused of corruption, although since Macdonald's defeat Mantua had been cannonaded by 600 pieces of artillery, and the Pradelles gate had become untenable. Latour and his council of war appealed to these facts to justify the capitulation; Bouthon, the commander of the artillery, however, alleged, that the place might have been maintained, and did not sign the capitulation. This was the reason why Latour Foissac was accused of having been in correspondence with the Countess of Artois, and of having failed in his

* On the 13th of July, Suwarrow writes to Rasumowsky: "For the sake of the general good, prevent by all means the secret correspondence carried on between that wise Demosthenes, Dietrichstein, and those under my command."

duty. The citadel of Alessandria had also fallen. Tortona, on the other hand, maintained its resistance; and Joubert appeared with Moreau's army, which had by degrees been reinforced till it amounted to nearly 50,000 men, to relieve the latter town.

When Joubert was marching through the pass of the Bocchetta, which was not then a highway, into the plain, he begged Moreau not to take his departure for the army of the Rhine till the battle, which must infallibly soon take place, had been fought, because Suwarrow, with his usual vehemence, was hastening to meet the French. Both armies sought for a quick decision, as it happened that just two days before the decisive battle, Kray, with the 25,000 men, who had up till that time been engaged in the siege of Mantua, formed a junction with Suwarrow's army, between Novi and Serravalle. As the citadel of Serravalle was in the power of the Austrians, Suwarrow founded the whole plan of the battle to be fought on the 16th on that fact, when he pressed on against Joubert at the point of the bayonet with an unexampled sacrifice of men. In fact, he succeeded in prevailing upon the Austrians to join him in storming the position of the enemy, instead of waiting to be attacked, as they wished to do. Joubert fell in the very commencement of the engagement, from his own imprudence, in having, without any necessity, placed himself as commander in chief at the head of his troops, who were to charge with the bayonet. A Tyrolese rifleman took aim at him and brought him down; then, indeed, Moreau assumed the command, but was unable to carry out a plan which he had not drawn up, and which was not in accordance with his views,* especially after Melas had outflanked him on the right wing.

The French were defeated, their ranks broken, and a dreadful slaughter perpetrated by the Russians, who were obliged to complete the victory by pressing forward, sword in hand, over heaps of the dead bodies of their countrymen; the whole of the French artillery was taken, and without believing that the number of the slain was as great as has been stated, it may be safely affirmed, that since the battles of Malplaquet, Pultawa, and Kunersdorf, there had been no such loss of life as that which took place on this occasion at Novi. Suwarrow was indeed victorious on all points, but he had been so unsparing of his troops, that of the 40,000 men who remained with him after Korsakoff's departure, he had no longer 20,000 left. Notwithstanding, therefore, all the honours which were heaped upon him on the day of the battle of Novi, he declared that he would have nothing to do with any other Austrian undertaking.† He

* Matthieu Dumas, *Précis des Événemens Militaires*, vol. i., p. 330, says: "Celui-ci avoit le secret de ses dispositions, mais non sa propre pensée et jamais pendant l'action celui qui commandoit n'est suffisamment suppléé même par un plus habile que lui."

† On the 16th of August, Suwarrow wrote from the field of battle to Rasumowsky as follows: "Everything is unsatisfactory; the almost hourly orders which arrive from the council of war in Vienna destroy my health, and I cannot remain any longer. The council wish to direct operations by a thousand threads, and do not

was now to cross the St. Gothard, and to march through the Muttenthal and Reussthal, in order to form a junction with Korsakoff, for whom the Austrians were making room in the north of Switzerland, at the very time of the battle of Novi. Melas was entrusted with the chief command of the Austrian army, and having first despatched a considerable division of his forces under Ott to besiege Genoa, he marched to the Var, where Championnet was forming a new army.

As early as the 5th of August, the Archduke Charles informed Suwarrow, that Korsakoff had arrived in Augsburg on the 31st of July, that he might be in Schaffhausen in eleven or twelve days, and that he himself would then set out with his army for Mannheim. This was the end of the long thread of intrigues and cabals which Cobenzl had been engaged in spinning in Petersburg since June. As early as July the corps of Condé, in the pay of England, was sent to the Rhine, and measures adopted to make room for Korsakoff. A communication to this effect was made to Suwarrow by a letter from the Emperor Francis, of the date of the 17th of August. At the same time that Suwarrow received this letter, he received another from the Emperor Paul, wherein he was informed, that, by virtue of a treaty recently concluded, 17,000 Russians, under General Herrmann, were to be sent from Revel to North Holland, in order to co-operate with English troops and the Orange party in Holland for the restoration of the stadtholder. When the army was about to be removed from its positions in the presence of such a general as Massena, in order to make a place for Korsakoff, and when Laudon, Bellegarde, and Haddick marched away, Suwarrow perceived how easily the whole of the weakened left wing might be attacked before Korsakoff could take possession of the vacated positions; and, therefore, at the very moment in which the misfortune, which he foresaw, was happening, he wrote that remarkable letter to the archduke, in which he begs and entreats him not to sacrifice his cause.* The month afterwards he wrote very plainly

know that every minute leads to some change both in place and position. They make me the mere executor of the plans of a Dietrichstein or a Thugut. Herewith I send you a recent order of the council, the original of which, with my report thereon to the Emperor, I have intrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Kuschikoff, and from this you may judge whether I can stay any longer. I beg your excellency to inform his majesty of it; as well as that, after the operations in the Genoese, I shall formally beg for my recall, and for leave to take my departure.—Weakness does not allow me to write more."

* Correspondence. vol. ii., p. 99. On the 29th of August, Suwarrow writes to the archduke as follows: "I have received from you the very surprising intelligence, that your royal highness esteems it your duty so quickly to carry into effect the plan of leaving the Russian troops alone in Switzerland; that you are on the eve of taking your departure for Swabia with the imperial army at present in Switzerland. The melancholy results of such a course, both for Germany and Italy, cannot have escaped the penetration of so experienced a general as your highness. I am convinced that your royal highness, in your zeal for the general good, will not precipitately yield obedience to an order, which is either wholly destructive to the grand object, or must at least extremely increase the difficulty of its attainment. Relying on your goodness of heart and keenness of judgment, I am quite at ease with reference to your departure from Switzerland," &c. &c.

to the Emperor Francis, that in consequence of these changes, the Russians were placed in the greatest danger; that he had only 16,000, and Korsakoff 24,000 men; and that even with the remaining Austrians, they were only in a condition to bring at the most 60,000 into the field, against 70,000 French. When this letter arrived, the Emperor Paul became very indignant with his allies. The English showed that by falsehood and deceit they had juggled him out of Malta; and the Austrians, that they meant to profit by the victories which had been won at the expense of Russian blood; they were eager to lay their hands upon Rome and Sardinia; they made a tool of Suwarrow, in order to draw Lucca and Genoa also into their net; and did nothing, as Suwarrow delicately gives the archduke to understand, to restore the former order of things in Switzerland.

The French Directory had long before issued urgent commands to Massena to attack the archduke; he waited, however, till the latter, deeply offended at Korsakoff's brutal language concerning the Austrians, withdrew his regiments from their former positions, which were not very rapidly occupied by Korsakoff. The Russian general was not expected in Schaffhausen till the 17th or 18th of August, to occupy the positions which were so materially weakened by the departure of three divisions, when Massena made an attack along the whole line on the 14th. In the Bernese Alps, the small cantons, and on the St. Gothard, where Lecourbe was posted with an army of 12,000 men, the Austrians had suffered great losses and been obliged to evacuate the vallies, through which Suwarrow was to march into the north of Switzerland. They succeeded in maintaining their positions on the Limmat, because the archduke quickly returned. Massena afterwards delayed his grand attack, till Suwarrow, who was to be obstructed by Lecourbe, was advancing, and Korsakoff far separated from the archduke, who was on his march downwards to Mannheim.

By the passage of the St. Gothard, not then as now traversed by an excellent road, Suwarrow crowned all the other glories which he had won as a general. He did as much as any general had ever done, although fate immediately robbed him of the fruits of all his efforts. On the 15th of September Suwarrow arrived in Lugano, where he found no sign whatever of the preparations which the Austrians were to have made in order to facilitate his march. He complained bitterly of their neglect, and was compelled to lose much valuable time. He was not able to reach Bellinzona till the 21st; and it was not till the 24th that he topped the St. Gothard and drove the French out of Urseren. At this very moment (the 24th) Massena caused Korsakoff to be attacked in his positions at Zürich, by General Lorges, and the French general most skilfully profited by the faults which the Russian one is said to have committed. Although we do not make pretensions to judge of military affairs, those must however be right, who allege that Korsakoff made gross mistakes, as Suwarrow himself had no good opinion of his talents, and only entrusted him with such

a command in obedience to the will of his obstinate master. The struggle for the possession of Zürich was fearful, the defeat of the Russians, whose artillery was taken, dreadful and ruinous to Zürich, because the town was taken by storm. It was also shamefully plundered by the pretended allies of the Helvetic republic, and the pious Lavater was shot in cold blood by a French officer. The Austrians lost Hotze, one of their best generals and a native of Zürich, as well as three others; five more were made prisoners, and their whole army so completely separated from the Russians, that a junction could only afterwards be formed behind the Lake of Constance. Korsakoff's foolhardiness was the subject of general reproach, because he abused the courage of his troops, and madly renewed the battle on the following day. In consequence he lost the remainder of his artillery and baggage, and was obliged to retreat to Schaffhausen, which he might have done before.

Massena and Soult on this occasion gained great glory, and after that time were extolled as demigods by all the journals, rhetoricians, and admirers of false renown; whilst in fact every friend of virtue and humanity silently execrated their names for their robberies in Switzerland, and afterwards cursed them aloud for their behaviour in Spain, as notorious plunderers endowed with great military talents. The Emperor Paul, who had honest intentions towards the coalition, and held the jesuitical acts of the Cabinet of Vienna in abhorrence, having before declared that there must be an end of all the falsehood and deceit practised by Thugut, Cobenzl, Lehrbach, and their colleagues, now became completely indignant at their conduct.* Suwarrow had calculated upon Korsakoff's defeat, and his note upon that subject will show how far wrong those people are who are of opinion that

* On the 12th of September the Emperor Paul wrote (vol. ii., p. 177) to his ambassador in Vienna as follows: "In compliance with this you are to demand explanations from Baron Thugut on the three following points:—1. On what grounds is the army of the Archduke Charles so quickly to leave Switzerland and to proceed to the Rhine, before the army of 45,000 men, destined to keep up the communications between the archduke and General Korsakoff, according to the general plan agreed upon by the cabinet of Vienna, has even been formed? 2. Why has not the minister of the court of Vienna in Constantinople received full powers to accede to the treaty concluded between me and the Porte, respecting which negotiations have already taken place? 3. What difference does the cabinet of Vienna consider it to make, whether the 6000, raised by the Duke of Wirtemberg according to the treaty, be united to the Austrians or the Russians? As if it were not the same thing, when the forces are employed for the good of the general cause. The explanations given by Baron Thugut you will immediately forward to me." On the 15th of September the emperor writes to Suwarrow as follows: "The troops of Major-General Borosdin might afterwards be sent from Naples, either for the conquest or occupation of Malta, where a united garrison of Russian, English, and Neapolitan forces should remain till the peace, presuming that the cabinet of Vienna, instead of breaking off its intrigues, will increase them more and more in proportion to the success of its arms. *I therefore inform you beforehand, that I am resolved, after having occupied Switzerland, and entered into a closer alliance with England, to which I am bound by the terms of my honourable alliance, to act independently against the French, and to think of the means of accomplishing my other views.*"

he was only great in desperate assaults, and conquered solely by making immense sacrifices of his troops.*

As to Massena and Soult, the former not only suffered his soldiers to indulge in all sorts of military license, but he extorted 800,000 francs from the city of Zürich and as much from that of Basle, after the officers of rank in his army had forcibly raised money for themselves and all the arsenals had been completely emptied. He pushed the matter so far, that in spite of the idolatry which the French paid to every successful general, and their disregard of the crimes and offences committed by every fortunate soldier, the legislative body at length protested against these disgraceful excesses. In reference to Massena in particular, the legislative body sent a message† to the government. In the mean time Suwarrow pursued his march over the St. Gothard as far as the point where he hoped to find the Austrians, but his expectation was vain. At Amsteg he formed a junction with General Auffenberg's brigade, which had been sent to the valley of the Rhine and made its way over Dissentis; on the 25th of September he advanced to Altorf, sent General Auffenberg with his brigade to Glarus, and afterwards took the same route himself.

From Glarus, Suwarrow, in conjunction with the Austrian general Von Linken, whom he hoped to find there, was to turn toward Zurich; shortly before, however, Von Linken had been obliged to give up all his positions in the passes and valleys which led thither, in consequence of what had taken place in Zurich, and Suwarrow was obliged to pave a way for himself to the Grisons over almost impassable mountains. On the 30th of September, by means of General Rosenberg, he drove Massena himself, who was advancing against him, out of the Muttenthal, on the 1st of October defeated the French troops which were hastening to reinforce him, and compelled them to take refuge in Schwyz. In a letter to the Archduke Charles, of the date of the 7th of October, Suwarrow states that he intended to have pushed forward still further when he was in the Muttenthal, but that his ammunition was exhausted, and he had perceived the impossibility of effecting a junction with General Jellachich by Mollis and Wallenstadt. He pursued a pathless and almost inaccessible route, where the Russians were compelled to clamber like chamois, and in this manner he made his way through Matt, Elm, and the baths of Wihl, to Panix. All who are in the least acquainted with the country and the roads will ask with astonishment, how it was possible for Suwarrow, who had lost a third

* On the 23rd, Suwarrow wrote the following note (vol. ii., p. 198): "1. The Russians are suffering from want of troops, clothing, and other supplies. 2. They are often obliged to encamp on rough, mountainous, and dangerous ground; consequently lose many men, and will have but few left before they reach Winterthur. 3. Massena has no reason whatever for beating us *in detail*—he will throw himself upon Korsakoff, and that will be sufficient for him."

† This "message du corps législatif" may be found in the *Moniteur de l'An VIII.*, col. 109.

of his army since leaving Lugano, with the other two-thirds to climb the Flimser, and successfully to reach the valley of the Grisons, between Ilanz and Coire. He immediately continued his march to Lindau, and here made known his determination not to suffer the Russians under his command any longer to be used as the tools of the Viennese Jesuits.

The correspondence carried on between him and the Archduke Charles at that time was very warm, and on his part rude. He haughtily declined the archduke's invitation to pay him a visit in his head-quarters, or rather he proposed that if he pleased he should come to him. To all the Austrian prince's subsequent letters, he replied in the same bitter tone, steadfastly rejected every proposal for farther co-operation, and took up a position far from the enemy, between the Iller and the Lech. Here he accidentally furnished Maximilian Joseph, the new Elector of Bavaria, with an opportunity of gaining the favour of the Emperor Paul, who previously entertained no good feelings towards him. This proved afterwards important to the house of Bavaria, when the question arose respecting the divisions of Germany, and also in respect to Paul's successor. Suvarrow, in order to be able quickly to retire, provided he received orders so to do, asked for the loan of a million, and immediately received 200,000 florins. In January, 1800, orders arrived to return to Russia through Moravia and Silesia.

B.—THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

The Emperor Paul had long lost all confidence in the cabinet of Vienna, while he still continued firmly attached to Grenville and Pitt, to please whom he had issued an absurd declaration of war against Spain. He was, however, soon completely undeceived respecting the Plutocrats, by their refusal to acknowledge his protectorate or grand-mastership of the Order of Malta, and by their conduct in the expedition to Holland. His indignation against both his allies had already become boundless in January, 1800. The egotistical Britons pursued precisely the same course towards the Russians, as they had done towards the French in the Bay of Quiberon. They pretended to wish to make a diversion in favour of the Austrians who were fighting in Italy and Switzerland, and to assist the Hereditary Stadholder or his son; but their real object affected neither the Russians, the Austrians, nor the Prince of Orange. They were merely anxious to deprive the Dutch of the remnant of their navy, and to prevent the French from attempting a landing in Ireland.

At that time the French, in conjunction with the Spaniards, were equipping a considerable land and sea force with a view of effecting a landing either in England or Ireland; whilst, on the other hand, the Orange party in the seven provinces was eager to bring the former hereditary stadholder (William V.) to Holland, where there was

then no army. The allies entertained hopes that the insurrection in Holland would easily spread to Belgium, because, in the course of the year 1799, such considerable disturbances had broken out in this country, which had been an integral part of France since the year 1795, that its rulers were obliged to have recourse to arms for their suppression, and to use absolutely revolutionary means. We find it, notwithstanding, very difficult to convince ourselves, that the English were ever completely in earnest in their undertaking against the Batavian republic, when we know that an English army, under the brave General Abercrombie, which was first conveyed across, long lay ready; that the treaty with Russia, by virtue of which Admiral Popham was to convey 20,000 Russians in English ships from Revel, had been concluded as early as the 22d of June; and that, notwithstanding the execution of the project was delayed for two months, till the commencement of the autumnal season, which is deadly in Holland. And when the campaign was at length really commenced, the Duke of York, who had previously proved himself to be useless or worse in the field, was placed over the able General Abercrombie.

At the time at which Abercrombie was lying ready, in June, with his fleet and army, and was obliged to delay his departure, the French had no army in Holland. When the command was given to Brune, that general could scarcely bring together from 10—12,000 men, but the delay of four months gave the Dutch and French full time to make preparations. One of the causes of detention was, that when the armament was equipped, a French squadron, destined either for the coast of England or Ireland, had actually put to sea. During the temporary absence of Admiral Lord Bridport, who was employed in blockading the French fleet under Brueys, in the harbour of Brest, the fleet had put to sea and sailed for Cartagena, where it was to form a junction with the Spanish fleet. Although the English reinforced Lord Bridport, and even ordered Lord Vincent's whole fleet to join him, so that his force became sixty ships strong, yet the combined Spanish and French fleet not only sailed without attack or molestation from Cartagena, but reached Brest in safety on the 21st of July, from whence it continued to threaten the coasts of England and Ireland.

A great mistake also had been made with respect to the Orange party in Holland. The proclamation issued by William V., and the appearance of the Prince of Orange in person at Overyssel, was more advantageous to the French than to the English. Long before the arrival of the English the prince had betaken himself to Lingen; from Lingen he attempted to get possession of the fortified town of Coevorden, in Overyssel, and the nobility of Gueldres were ready to take arms in his cause; but circumstances had completely changed since 1787. The popular party was now split into partisans of the house of Orange and republican democrats, to the latter of which the so-called patriots had now attached themselves in their need.

The Batavian Directory, too, which had hitherto enjoyed neither influence nor respect, became more powerful as the anarchists, from fear of the partisans of the house of Orange, at length kept themselves quiet; and the French, who were hitherto unwilling to endure a Batavian army, although the country was obliged to pay for one, were now favourable to the incorporation of such a force. Daendels and Dumonceau, to whom the command of the Batavian army was afterwards entrusted, as well as Vandamme and Brune, who commanded the French, proved themselves to be as active and capable, as the Duke of York was tardy and incapable.

The first division of the English army, 12,000 strong, sailed from the Downs on the 10th of August, under convoy of Admiral Duncan, whilst in the mean time the Duke of York took his ease in Margate. The object was to effect a landing on the extreme point of North Holland, in order first to secure a safe position in the marshy district of Zyp. Contrary winds, however, prevented them from reaching the Texel before the 27th of August, and from encamping on the Helder, the extreme point of North Holland, under the protection of the guns of Admiral Duncan's fleet. There was only a very small garrison in the Helder. The Dutch made an attack upon the English as soon as they had disembarked, but, being repulsed, they withdrew their troops from the trenches and evacuated the promontory, so that the way to the Texel was opened, and the chief object of the English, the annihilation of the Dutch navy, attained. The Orange flag was no sooner planted on the Helder and in the Texel, than Admiral Story and his captains were no longer able to reckon upon the inferior officers and sailors of the fleet, and on being summoned to surrender by Vice-Admiral Mitchel, in the name of the Prince of Orange, on the 30th, they were obliged to give up the whole fleet to the English. This fleet consisted of thirty ships; among which were eleven ships of the line, eight frigates, and four East Indiamen.

It is very obvious, that the Duke of York was selected in an unlucky hour to be the commander-in-chief of this Anglo-Russian expedition, when we compare the time in which Abercrombie was alone on the marshy promontory of the Helder, traversed by dykes, and in autumn covered with water, with the subsequent period. On the 10th of September Abercrombie successfully repulsed the attack of General Brune, who had come for the purpose from Haarlem to Alkmar; on the 19th the Duke of York landed, and soon ruined everything. The first division of the Russians had at length arrived on the 15th, under the command of General Herrmann, for whom it was originally destined, although unhappily it afterwards came into the hands of General Korsakoff. The duke therefore thought he might venture on a general attack on the 19th. In this attack Herrmann led the right wing, which was formed by the Russians, and Abercrombie, with whom was the Prince of

Orange, the left, whilst the centre was left to the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief. This decisive battle was fought at Bergen, a place situated to the north of Alkmar. The combined army was victorious on both wings, and Horn, on the Zuyder Zee, was occupied; the Duke of York, who was only a general for parades and reviews, merely indulged the centre with a few manœuvres hither and thither. The duke did not wish to risk the lives of his people, and the Russians, therefore, who were left alone in impassable marshes, traversed by ditches, and unknown to their officers—lost many men—and were at length surrounded, and even their general taken prisoner.

The duke concerned himself very little about the Russians, and had long before prudently retired into his trenches; and as the Russians were lost, Abercrombie and the Crown Prince were obliged to relinquish Horn. Both armies remained on the following day in their former positions.* It would have been at that time possible to have renewed the attack in a more favourable season, for about 4000 men only had been lost, and the enemy had suffered also; the duke, however, remained for ten days completely quiet in the marshes of Zyp, when the autumnal fever, endemic in those districts, and the effect of the climate, soon produced greater destruction than a series of continued engagements could have done. In the meantime, the last transport had arrived; but in spite of the immeasurable expenditure for the care and provisioning of the army, want began to prevail, and all the attempts of the partisans of the house of Orange, even those made in Friesland, completely failed; it was therefore at length resolved to make a last attempt to push forward to South Holland. This, too, was frustrated by the incapacity of the Duke of York. Everything was ready for the attack on the 30th of September, and the Russians were highly indignant at its being delayed till the 2nd of October, because in the meantime the enemy was receiving reinforcements.

A series of bloody engagements took place from the 2nd till the 6th of October, and the object of the attack upon the whole line of the French and Batavian army would have been attained had Abercrombie alone commanded. The English and Russians, who call this the battle of Alkmar, were indisputably victorious in the engagements of the 2nd and 3rd of October. They even drove the enemy before them to the neighbourhood of Haarlem, after having taken possession of Alkmar; but on the 6th, Brune, who owes his

* The Duke of York did on this occasion, what the English are not accustomed on others to do: he wrote as our official journals do, or as Bonaparte dictated his bulletins. In his report to Dundas, the secretary of state, he says: "I have much pleasure in being able to state, that the efforts which have been made, although not crowned with success, so far from militating against the general object of the campaign, promise to be highly useful to our future operations." On the other hand, a French general writes: "Rien n'égale l'ineptie militaire du Duc de York pendant le cours de cette campagne."

otherwise very moderate military renown to this engagement alone, having received a reinforcement of some thousands on the 4th and 5th, renewed the battle.

The fighting on this day took place at Castricum, on a narrow strip of land between the sea and the lake of Haarlem, a position favourable to the French. The French report is, as usual, full of the boasts of a splendid victory; the English, however, remained in possession of the field, and did not retire to their trenches behind Alkmar and to the marshes of Zyp till the 7th. The duke reports that he had given up his former advanced positions for the benefit of the general cause, in consequence of the bad weather, the impassable roads, and complete destitution of means of transport, and that he was there awaiting his majesty's further orders.

He did not, however, wait for these further orders, because, in not more than eight days afterwards, the want in the army and the anxiety of its incapable commander-in-chief became so great, the number of the sick increased so rapidly, and the fear of the difficulties of embarkation in winter so grew and spread, that the duke accepted the most shameful capitulation that had ever been offered to an English general, except at Saratoga. This capitulation, concluded on the 19th of October, was only granted because the English, by destroying the dykes, had it in their power to ruin the country, and because the works which they had erected since August, if maintained, were of immense value. Brune had at first required from the duke the restoration of the fleet, as a compensation for agreeing to a suspension till the first of November for the undisturbed embarkation of the troops; he, however, recalled this condition, when he learned that the duke had nothing to do with the navy. Notwithstanding this, the eighth article contains a condition to which he could have consented only on the ground of his influence being so great with the then ruling oligarchy, as to justify him in conceding something, which had no connexion with the expedition to Holland. In the eighth article, he promised that "eight thousand French and Dutch prisoners, then in England, should be set at liberty." The chief thing was, that the English were not only to surrender, in good condition, to the Dutch all the military works erected by them since their arrival, but to repair all the injuries which had been done to the former dams and fortifications.

C.—BONAPARTE IN EGYPT.

We have already stated that Bonaparte had sent his adjutant, Lavalette, to the Adriatic Sea, on pretence of accompanying the Grand Master of the Maltese Order to Trieste, but in reality to form a treaty of friendship and alliance with the hateful Ali Pasha, of Jannina. Lavalette, however, learned from General Chabot, in Corfu, that nothing was to be effected by his mission, and therefore he went quickly to Egypt. Although the attempt made in this way so

to occupy the Turks in Europe, as to prevent them from turning their attention to Egypt, failed of success, Malta itself was most rapidly placed in a condition to resist the impending siege threatened by the English. Within eight days, from the 12th till the 20th of June, the whole of the new works and preparations were completed.

The garrison which Bonaparte left behind was formed from the different divisions of the expedition to Egypt, and the soldiers belonging to the Knights of Malta were incorporated with these divisions. Vaubois was placed at the head of the whole, and everything was done which the security of the place required. Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, whose sophistry was at a later period turned to such admirable account by Bonaparte, was entrusted, under him, with the civil administration, and with the office of State-sophist. The whole was admirably regulated and ordered by Bonaparte. Greatness of mind was manifest in everything. But we need look for no more respect to principle or morality in the choice of the means for accomplishing his political objects, or no more regard to purity of personal character in the men to whom important posts were entrusted, than we find in the usages of all the governments of the present time.

The whole property of the knights, and of the order, was seized—their plate, valuables, and everything of the slightest worth, carried away—the grand master, deceived with respect to “the pieces of silver” which had been promised him for betraying his country, and directions given to Vaubois to make provision for the pay and support of the troops out of the spoils of the estates belonging to the order.*

The loss of the fleet, in consequence of Nelson's victory at Aboukir, was taken advantage of by Bonaparte to reinforce his Egyptian army by six or seven thousand able seamen, artillerymen, &c., who had served in the ships. In the conquest of Alexandria, which is described by the boasting French writers as a splendid deed of arms on the part of Generals Menou, Kleber, Bon, and Regnier, 2500 men were sacrificed to no purpose; as we are assured by an eye-witness, an idolater of Bonaparte, and one of the tyrants of his police, that there was no necessity whatever for a storm, because, if they had marched round the city, they would have found the Damahout gate open and unoccupied.† Among the Beys of the Mamelukes, so called, or the slaves brought from the Caucasus to Egypt, and there formed into a valiant cavalry, Murad Bey was the most distinguished; and under him served the most numerous, bravest, and most distinguished of the slaves, who were used as troops by the beys or leaders of bands: a smaller number of them served under Ibrahim. Murad no sooner heard of the landing of the

* Vaubois writes to Bonaparte as follows: “*Cette resource que vous nous avez indiqué sera peut-être nulle pendant bien du temps.*”—Correspond., vol. v., p. 288.

† Mémoires du Duc de Rovigo. vol. i., p. 56.

French than he set out from Cairo, and descended the Nile, to meet the French on the left bank, as they were advancing upwards. When, on the 13th of July, 1799, at Chebreis, they met the French, oppressed with thirst, heat, and weariness, already become aware how much they had deceived themselves in their dreams of the East, of oriental pleasures, paradises, and wealth—they learnt that the strategy and tactics of modern times can give the weakest a superiority over the strongest. The Mamelukes were repulsed, and did not try their fortune a second time, till the French had advanced along the left bank of the Nile, to within about fifteen miles of Cairo. The battle fought near Omedinar, on the 21st of June, is known as the Battle of the Pyramids. Bonaparte was victorious, and the colossal phrase of the commander has gone from mouth to mouth, and from book to book.* The reward of the victory was the possession of Grand Cairo. Murad Bey hastened with his followers to Upper Egypt, and Desaix pursued him, whilst Ibrahim passed over to the right bank of the river. Bonaparte repeated what he had done in Lombardy, and establishing himself in Cairo, he proceeded to establish a new state in Egypt—half Oriental and half Occidental in its form.

Bonaparte's reason for taking with him to Egypt some of the most distinguished artists, scholars, chemists, naturalists, and political economists of France, now became apparent. Those distinguished men, such as Larrey and Desgenettes, as physicians—Monge and Berthollet, as chemists and natural philosophers, would have done much more for science and for Egypt, had they not been obliged to apply all their abilities and the whole of their time to the army, and to procuring the very means of existence for the French. Artists, antiquarians, and scholars, followed Desaix to Upper Egypt, and, in the midst of dangers incredible, privations, and fatigue, they made numerous drawings of Egyptian antiquities, which were afterwards collected in a splendid work. It is true this work had many deficiencies, but it served at least to rouse the attention of other nations, and especially that of the Italians and English, who afterwards, in leisure and in peace, completed what the French, in haste and in the midst of the great dangers of war, had begun.

Bonaparte was as little scrupulous in the selection of his allies as in the choice of the means for effecting his end. He had already offered his friendship to Ali Pasha, of Jannina, a monster of cruelty, inhumanity and avarice, and now from Cairo he sought for an alliance with another monster, whose crimes excited a shudder of horror even in the East. This tyrant was the governor of Acre, but who exercised the power of an independent prince throughout a great part of Syria. An Oriental like Djezzar Pasha was not to be deceived, as the weak rulers of Europe suffer themselves to be, from anxiety and fear; he

* "Soldats," s'écrie Bonaparte, "songez que du hauteur des monumens quarante siècles vous contemplent."

not only haughtily rejected all his offers, but took threatening measures against Egypt.

Out of a feeling of jealousy towards Murad, Ibrahim Bey, at the head of his two thousand Mamelukes remained a perfectly cool spectator of the battle near Omedinar. He then passed over to the right bank of the Nile, with a view of encamping on the Isthmus of Suez. Bonaparte, however, pursued, overtook, and defeated him at Salahiéh. Ibrahim escaped with a thousand Mamelukes and took refuge in Gaza. Djezzar Pasha granted him his protection, and both parties began to make such serious preparations for an attack upon Egypt, that Bonaparte was obliged to use all possible expedition in completing his civil and military administration, in order to anticipate their attack, before their preparations were completed. For this reason, Bonaparte had no sooner defeated Ibrahim at Salahiéh, on the 19th of August, than he immediately returned to Cairo, in order quickly to complete the organisation of Egypt, for which he had appointed a commission in Cairo.

We think it superfluous to spend time in describing this new organisation, as it was nipped in the bud; and, as almost all the French writers lavish the highest praises upon its author, and exalt Bonaparte to an equal rank with Solon and Lycurgus, we shall confine ourselves to this single remark, that this highly eulogised organisation was the cause of the insurrection in Cairo, and of the cruel treatment of the capital of Egypt. This allegation is made, not by any of Bonaparte's opponents or enemies, but by his best friend, D'Aure, his commissary-general, who defends him against the lies and calumnies of the Pseudo-Bourrienne. D'Aure confirms all that has been stated by Abdul Rahim Effendi, in his history of the liberation of Egypt, concerning the causes of the insurrection in Cairo. He states, with honesty and truth:—"We brought with us to Egypt all the fiscal regulations of France; and the commissioners, full of their own wisdom, forced them upon the Egyptians. A measure of unexampled occurrence was adopted, by imposing taxes upon landed property, and upon industry. The system of the European bloodsuckers, which we call the science of finance, was applied in the East, where, it is true, money and other contributions are always collected by force, but where it never has been the custom systematically to oppress and plunder in times of peace." Abdul Rahim's words will prove, that those very things of which the French boast the most, were precisely those which excited the strongest dissatisfaction in Cairo. The Egyptians were reduced to a state of desperation by the attempt on the part of the French to introduce and apply in the East their scientific and systematic doctrines, which had been long in use in Europe; and the unsophisticated good sense of the Orientals did not allow them to be deceived, like the Germans and Italians, by the farce of calling an Assembly of Notables in Cairo.

Abdul Rahim throws the most blame on what the French extol

as Bonaparte's legislative and administrative wisdom. He altogether repudiates and condemns Bonaparte's Tribunal of Commerce (*Mekem el Lada*), not only because fees and presents were to be made, or because, to the great offence of the Moslems, it consisted of six Copts and six Mahometans, but because Mutti, the Copt, formerly the hated secretary of Egul Bey, was appointed president, and because causes were to be decided, not according to the usages and traditions of the East, but according to French laws. Of this new judicial ordinance, which was announced by placards on the corners of the streets, he freely and strongly expresses his abhorrence, as a thing containing articles without number, and words without connexion (we suppose, because it was translated hastily and ill). The registration tax was found intolerable even in France, because it affected widows and orphans, and even the poorest of the people; how much more so, then, in the East, where similar ordinances are wholly unexampled? The judicial account taken of property, and the tax upon inheritance, drove the inhabitants of Cairo completely to desperation, and Abdul Rahim's account of the matter may serve to show that benefits were forced upon the people which they appeared to regard as unexampled annoyances.

"When," says this writer, "any one died, it was first necessary to obtain permission from the Divan before the body could be removed, and in four-and-twenty hours after death an inventory was required to be given of everything which the deceased had possessed. If the family refused to make the return, the Divan took forcible possession of the whole, and nothing was left for the heirs. When the inventory was made, payment was demanded; when the heir appeared, money was required; and if a creditor of the deceased presented himself with a claim, he was obliged to pay for the recognition of his debt; and if he obtained satisfaction, he was called upon for a further contribution. Other articles were also published in reference to trade, voluntary gifts, and all processes in general, great and small. Even travellers were not allowed to go from one place to another without a paper, for which they were also obliged to pay. If a birth was to be registered, payment was to be made; and every private transaction between man and man was made the opportunity of some extortion," &c., &c. We also are disposed to eulogise Bonaparte's activity and the versatility of talent exhibited in the ordinances published after his return from the defeat of Ibrahim, at Salahieh, and in the calling of the Assembly of Notables, under the presidency of Abdallah Kezkaoni, but only in reference to the great capacity of his mind; for no real use can be ascribed to either of the two things, except in reference to the inquiries which were made, and the regulation of the contracts. There can be no doubt, as the Turkish writer alleges, that the chief cause of the insurrection in Cairo was the introduction of our European fiscal regulations into the whole administration of the country, whilst accessory reasons are to be found in the fanaticism and incitement on the

part of the government in Constantinople. The Porte had already declared war against the French, and formed an alliance with Russia and England; and the Beys, also, of Syria and Upper Egypt, who had more connexions in Cairo than Bonaparte had, roused and excited the minds of the people against the foreign intruders. The secret was so well kept, that all of a sudden the population of Cairo rose against their oppressors—many French were killed in the streets, and the house of Caffarelli, the commandant, was stormed. Bonaparte's measures for the suppression of the tumult were as rapid as decisive and overwhelming. He himself advanced from without against the unarmed, or at least badly armed populace, and fired upon the mosques as if they were forts. By means of shells and grenades, Dammartin soon converted these buildings into masses of ruins, and the citadel kept up an incessant fire upon the town. The French, who rushed with their bayonets upon the masses of the people, hemmed up in the narrow lanes, pushed forward over heaps of slain, wading in blood from square to square; the town continued to burn for two days, and during all that time the slaughter and destruction of the buildings was carried on, so that many thousands of the inhabitants met with a miserable death.

The insurrection occurred at a most convenient time, as it enabled the French to relinquish all ideas of humanity and compassion. The unexampled contributions, demanded and exacted as a punishment, served, it is true, to relieve the momentary want of money, but they all furnished grounds for the accusation against the French commander-in-chief of having designedly caused the insurrection, in order to be able to have recourse to every description of oppression with some appearance of right. D'Aure has successfully defended the victorious general from this foul imputation, but at the same time, in the very passage in which this occurs, he gives a very correct account of the unhappy consequences of the insurrection. “The insurrection,” he observes, undoubtedly furnished a means of relieving the immediate pecuniary wants from which Bonaparte was at that time suffering, but the political consequences were far more destructive than any temporary want of money could have been. The dreadful slaughter in Cairo produced such a horrible impression throughout the whole East, gave the lie so completely to all the eulogies of the Sheiks, and impressed Bonaparte's government so indelibly with the stamp of autocratic and arbitrary rule, that people must be mad who can believe that he was pleased with or caused the insurrection.”

Immediately after the suppression of the rising in Cairo, Bonaparte perceived that he must secure possession of the harbours and coast of Syria, if he wished to avoid being attacked by the English, who had now entered into an alliance with Djezzar Pasha, by this tyrant himself and by the Osmanlis in Egypt. We have already stated, that on the death of Aubert Dubayet in Constantinople, Ruffin, secretary and first interpreter to Choiseul Gouffier, had been ap-

pointed *chargé d'affaires* exactly three months previous to the sailing of the expedition to Egypt; that he, however, when questioned by the Turkish minister as to the object and destination of the equipment, had been unable to give any account. We have also observed in the same place, that Bonaparte, who regarded Talleyrand as a complete master in all the arts of diplomacy, thought he could even persuade the Turks that black was white and white black—and obtained a promise from him, that even although he was at that time minister of foreign affairs, he would himself go to Constantinople. Promising and performing, as is well known, were very different things with Talleyrand, from what they are amongst ordinary persons; and even Bonaparte, who understood this difference as well as his diplomatist, was therefore deceived. In the firm conviction that Talleyrand was in Constantinople, immediately after his landing he sent Beauchamp, the celebrated astronomer, who had lived long in the East, in disguise from Alexandria to Constantinople, to inform Talleyrand of the true state of affairs. The scheme was discovered, Beauchamp detained by the Turks, and would have been bowstringed, had not the Russian and Spanish ministers interfered on his behalf. He was, however, kept a prisoner for three years in a fortress on the Black Sea.

The Grand Sultan immediately formed an alliance with England and Russia (although the treaty, properly speaking, was not signed till the end of the year), received the Russian fleet into his harbours, deposed his Grand Vizier, caused the French *chargé d'affaires* to be arrested, and issued a declaration of war on the 5th of September, after having already, on the 1st., received a Russian squadron, with 4000 men on board, into the port of Constantinople. The English, who, as they always do, reaped where their allies had sowed, left the Russians and Turks to carry on the war against the French in the Ionian Islands, and their dependencies on the coast of Illyria, whilst, on their part, they undertook the siege of Malta, and the duty of watching the coasts of Egypt and Syria. Jussuf Pasha, of Erzerum, was to march from Syria against Egypt with the immense baggage and incumbrances of an imperial Turkish army, or, supported by the English fleet, to effect a landing on the coast. Bonaparte determined to anticipate the invasion, and therefore, in the very beginning of the year 1799, he set out for Syria, at the head of a chosen body of troops, and left the administration of Egypt to his generals, committing one province to one and another to another.

The Turkish flotilla, which was expected in Syria, had not yet arrived. Lord Keith, who commanded the English fleet in the Mediterranean, had, however, sent Sir Sidney Smith in the *Tiger* ship of the line, accompanied by other small vessels, to the coasts of Syria and Egypt, to watch the movements of the French. Sir Sidney Smith had provided Djezzar Pasha with everything which he could in haste collect. Acre, as a fortress, would in itself have been of little account, for its fortifications were of the date of, and merely fitted for

defence in, the middle ages. For this very reason, however, it was surrounded by immense walls, which could only be breached by heavy artillery. Sir Sidney Smith supplied the Pasha with some admirable gunners from his own ships, and the French emigrant engineers did everything in their power to save the city from falling into the hands of the hated republicans. The distinguished Col. Phéliqueaux was at the head of the engineers in Acre, whilst the artillery was under the direction of Tromlin. A reconciliation had taken place between the Grand Sultan and Djezzar Pasha, so that the latter was appointed Seraskier of the army, or rather of the hordes and mobs which were to be brought to him by the Pasha of Damascus; nay, more, in the full anticipation of success in driving out the French, he was appointed Pasha of Egypt.

At the moment in which all the preparations for the expedition to Syria were completed, about the end of December, Desaix pushed forward to Nubia and the falls of the Nile, having followed Murad Bey since September, and driven him before him. Having first defeated the Bey, on the 7th of October, at Sediman, he drove him into the Desert. Murad again returned from the Desert into the valley of the Nile, and suffered a second defeat on the 23rd of January, 1799, at Samahoud, not far from Jirdschi, on which Desaix became complete master of the whole of Upper Egypt. Middle Egypt was to be protected by Dugua, whose head-quarters were in Cairo; Menou lay in Loretto; Almeyras in Damietta, and Marmont in Alexandria, when Bonaparte departed on his expedition to Syria, accompanied by Generals Kleber, Bon, Regnier, Lasne, Murat, Caffarelli du Falga and 13,000 men. On the advance of the French, Djezzar Pasha not only placed a garrison in El Arish, on the extreme frontier of Syria towards Egypt, but also received Ibrahim with his thousand Mamelukes into the fortress of Gaza. The Pasha of Damascus was at that time assembling his miserable militia and light-armed Bedouins, in order to bring auxiliaries to Djezzar from the banks of the Euphrates, and the main body of the Turkish army, under the Grand Vizier, was assembling in Rhodes, in order to be conveyed in English ships to the coast of Syria. In this expedition to Syria, at the head of a few thousand men, Bonaparte furnished a practical proof of the possibility of those splendid military deeds of ancient times, which are recorded of Miltiades, Themistocles and Cimon, who, at the head of a few thousand Greeks, dissipated and conquered immense armies of Persians; their courage and skill were more than compensation for the deficiency of physical force. By addresses and proclamations, which touched the national pride and filled the military imaginations of the French, Bonaparte inspired his soldiers with indomitable courage, and by his bulletins and speeches he incited them to noble and glorious deeds, which by bombast and exaggeration, and occasionally by falsehood, have been exalted to something altogether incredible. Regnier led the advance, laid siege to El Arish, and on the 13th of February,

1799, defeated the Mamelukes who were hastening to the relief of the garrison. The Mamelukes then retired to Jaffa. The whole French force was no sooner united on the 17th, before El Arish, than the 1500 to 2000 Arnauts, who composed the garrison, capitulated. By the terms of the capitulation, they were allowed freely to depart, on condition of agreeing to proceed to Damascus, and not again to appear in arms against the French. This promise, however, was not fulfilled. Gaza offered no resistance to the conquerors, whilst Jaffa, into which the bold Arnauts had thrown themselves, bade defiance to the whole French army. According to the Memoirs of Bonaparte, an authority, therefore, which is not likely to detract from the deeds of the French arms, the whole fortifications of the city consisted of a single wall, and the Turkish artillery was very badly served; nevertheless, the French were compelled to sacrifice many men before they got possession of the place. In order to spare human life, and from a feeling of respect for the Mamelukes and Arnauts composing the garrison of Jaffa, Bonaparte's adjutant and his stepson, Eugene Beauharnois, on the storming of the place, granted terms of capitulation, which, however, Bonaparte himself refused to ratify, and caused some thousands to be cut down and shot; and this he regarded as a perfectly justifiable course. His conduct on this occasion has been very differently judged by different writers: we refrain from passing a judgment, because we think the mere detail of the facts sufficient.*

Acre would most probably also have fallen before the Grand Vizier or the Pasha of Damascus had completed their levies and preparations, had not Sir Sidney Smith captured Bonaparte's heavy artillery, without which he could produce no effect on the thick walls of the city. On the 3rd of February, Sir Sidney Smith bombarded Alexandria without result, and then sailed along the coast of Palestine to Acre. During this short voyage he fell in with the small flotilla on which Bonaparte had embarked his heavy guns. According to his orders, the guns should have been landed in Jaffa. His commanders, however, on the taking of the city, had in their haste forgotten to haul down the Turkish flag; and when the fleet saw this standard still waving on the walls, they did not venture to land, and unfortunately for them fell into the hands of the English commodore. These very guns were mounted in Acre and employed against the French, on their attempts to take the city by storm. Bonaparte had only eight eight-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four howitzers to oppose to the English guns and English mortars, which Sir Sidney Smith had landed from his ships; and the effect upon

* We expressly adopt this course, because we do not wish to allege that the fact speaks against Bonaparte, who was obliged to act as a general and not as a man, if he would attain his object. He therefore writes with perfect coolness to Dugua and Marmont that 4000 were cut down. His words to Kleber are still more definite: "The garrison of Jaffa consisted of 4000 men; 2000 have been slain in the fight, and nearly 2000 have been shot between yesterday and to day."

the walls was too weak. The defence of Acre was as brave and dauntless as the attack. The city maintained itself till the news arrived that the Pasha of Damascus, with the miserable militia of his pashalic and with countless swarms of Bedouins, was advancing to the relief of the town. Bonaparte thought it better to meet the pasha and offer him battle than to await his attack before Acre. In a few days, therefore, he left Acre, and, like a great military genius, made his dispositions in such a manner, that if he could bring the pasha to action, his whole horde must be scattered to the winds, precisely as the Russians, in the last war, routed and dispersed the main army of the Turks. Bonaparte's anticipations were fulfilled on the 16th of April, when he attacked the Turks and Arabs behind Mount Tabor.

Immediately after the victory, the French general hastened back to Acre, but had the vexation to see the failure of all his plans for the siege and reduction of a fortress, which could not have held out for two days against him in Europe, nor even in Asia, under different circumstances. True, indeed, that since the 28th of March he had obtained three four-and-twenty and six eighteen-pounders, and was now able to breach the walls; but the Turks and English had adopted new means of defence. Even after his return from the victory at Mount Tabor, he could not force his way over the breaches, but was obliged to evacuate as soon as his troops had mounted them. Caffarelli, his admirable general of engineers, fell; Phéliepeaux, the brave defender of the city, was also killed; and, in addition, the ammunition of the besiegers failed for some days in the end of April. At length, in the first week of May, Bonaparte determined to make a desperate assault both upon the walls and towers.

Having obtained supplies of ammunition and also heavy guns at the end of April, the storm was commenced on the 7th of May, and on this occasion seemed at first likely to be attended with success, as the leaders of the storming parties made good their positions in the breach. At this moment, however, the English brought reinforcements and additional stores to the Turks, and the French, who performed almost incredible deeds of valour, were again obliged to evacuate the breach. They, nevertheless, renewed the storm with double fury on the following day. In our opinion, we shall do more honour to the brave soldiers and their officers, as well as to the great military genius of their commander-in-chief, by a simple detail of the facts, than has been done by all the pompous, empty, boasting eulogies of the rhetorical and sophistical French. On the 8th the French pushed forward and forced their way through three breaches actually into the city, but they there met with such a vigorous resistance that they were again compelled to withdraw into their camp, because Sir Sidney Smith himself, with the crews of his ships, was in the city. This attempt, therefore, at the reduction of Acre also failed, as well as a new storm which continued from the 10th till the

12th. The failure of Bonaparte's assault upon Acre determined the fate of the whole expedition to Egypt. Many hundreds of his bravest soldiers and officers, and among these General Bon, had fallen during the last assault upon the city, the plague and want of all kinds threatened them with destruction, and the hospitals were filled with sick and wounded; Bonaparte, therefore, however unwillingly, was obliged to give up all hopes of the conquest of Syria. The French and their renowned leader, nevertheless, carried back with them to Egypt and to their homes the glory of having been victorious in Syria over their enemies, over nature, and over themselves.

It was a piece of good fortune that Bonaparte had taken only a small number of guns with him to Syria, for the heavy pieces which he had were lost. Some of them he buried deep in the sand, others were shipped at Jaffa, and taken at sea by the English.

The loss in men suffered by the French was comparatively small. And when we bear in mind that the plague raged in the French army, that it had to march the long distance from Acre to Cairo—that much of the way lay across a burning desert—that they carried along with them their sick and wounded, we shall find ourselves unable to restrain our astonishment at the possibility of their having accomplished their return to Cairo with the loss of such a small number of men. According to the account given by D'Aure, the commissary general, and which is probably within a few hundreds of the truth, the total loss on the whole expedition amounted to about 2000 men. This account is, moreover, confirmed by a letter from Bonaparte himself to the Directory, in which, as he asks for reinforcements, he has every reason rather to exaggerate than to conceal his losses. At the end of July, 1799, he asked for 6,000 fresh troops, because, from his landing in Egypt till Messidor, of the year VII., he states that he had lost 5340 men.

Bonaparte secured his army from the pursuit of the Turks by the manner of his departure; for although he had set out on the 20th, Djezzar was not aware till the 22nd that the French had left their camp before Acre. On the 14th of July he was again in Cairo, where he had scarcely arrived when he was obliged to set out anew. By a bold march through the Desert, Murad Bey had descended from Upper to Middle Egypt, although he was hotly pursued by Generals Desaix, Belliard, Donzelot, and Davoust, and had encamped very near the spot where the battle of the Pyramids was fought in the preceding year. Bonaparte was therefore scarcely back in Cairo, when he was obliged to hasten to find Murad, who, however, escaped him. Murad proceeded through the Desert to the insular district of Fayoum, on the Lake Mœris, from whence he again ascended along the course of the Nile to Upper Egypt, whilst Bonaparte was in his turn compelled to make the best of his way to Alexandria, because a division of the grand Turkish army collected at Rhodes, under the Grand Vizier, had at length arrived at Aboukir.

The English had landed from 11,000 to 15,000 Turks on the extreme point of the peninsula on which Alexandria is situated, at that mouth of the Nile which was called by the ancients the Canopic, and on the 15th of July these troops had made themselves masters of the fort of Aboukir. Bonaparte therefore hastened to attack this Turkish division before a greater number had reached Egypt. He made his appearance a few days after the capture of the fort, collected his forces at Rahmaijeh, on the left bank of the Nile, and gave directions and orders to Marmont, who commanded in Alexandria, to allure the Turks away from the extremity of the peninsula and Fort Aboukir, and bring them nearer to Alexandria. The Turks fell into the snare which was laid for them, and on this occasion it is clear, even to those who are no judges of military operations, with what skill and rapidity the movements of the French were conducted, and with what punctuality and precision the measures of the commander-in-chief were executed by his generals to enable him to cut off 4000 Turks completely from the main body. Seidman Mustapha, Pasha of Roumelia, who was in command of the Turkish army, saw his defeat begin on the 25th of July, by Des Taing's attacking and cutting off a thousand men, who were posted in the works at the very extremity of the peninsula. By his success, the attack made by Lannes and Murat upon the whole first line of the trenches was greatly facilitated, and the three thousand men who occupied these met with the same fate as the first thousand to which we have just referred. The Turks did not wait for an attack upon the second line, but rushed out furiously against their opponents, and commenced a dreadful onslaught, which was at first unfavourable to the French. In the very commencement Murat lost no inconsiderable number of the bravest soldiers and best officers of his division from the fire of the Turkish gun-boats; and at length, when he had obtained the upper hand in the open field, and led his infantry against the trenches, he was obliged to give way by the cross fire of the Turks, supported by the English; the Turks, however, by their own fault lost all the fruit of the advantages already gained.

The ranks of victorious Turks separated, because the soldiers, according to the barbarous custom of the East, dispersed over the field of battle, in order to cut off the heads of their fallen enemies. This great error was immediately taken advantage of by Murat, Fugieres, and Bonaparte. The two former took the trenches in the flanks instead of storming them, whilst Bonaparte directed his reserve against the Turks, who defended themselves with fury, but were at length either cut down or driven into the sea. Mustapha was wounded and taken prisoner by Murat with his own hand. On the following day, the Fort of Aboukir also was taken by storm, and the whole Anglo-Turkish expedition against Egypt, which had been so long prepared at such an immense cost, and with the sacrifice of so many lives, was rendered fruitless. The loss on the part of the French was not inconsiderable. The news in the European journals, which Sir Sidney

Smith sent to Bonaparte at Alexandria, convinced him, however, that there was much more for him to do in Europe than in Egypt, and he therefore resolved on returning.

D.—THE DIRECTORY TILL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE.

IMMEDIATELY on its establishment, the Directory had neither enjoyed confidence at home nor abroad. It continued afterwards to sink progressively deeper and deeper, and after the revolution of Fructidor became an object of universal contempt. Barras and Talleyrand, as we have previously stated, suffered themselves to make the most scandalous proposals to the ambassadors of the United States of America. Reubel, through his acquaintances and relations, caused Switzerland to be most shamefully spoiled, whilst Upper Italy, Holland and Spain, were grossly ill-treated. Talleyrand wished also at that time to levy contributions from the Hanse Towns, for the very same reason which Bonaparte afterwards alleged, when he put the wish into execution. A demand was made through Leonard Bourdon, an ex-member of the Convention, to exclude the English from Cuxhaven, and for a loan of 12,000,000 francs. Circumstances did not at that time enable the French to compel Bremen and Lübeck to obedience; and Hamburg, which alone was to pay 10,000,000, escaped in consequence of the renewal of the war. The French themselves were no better treated than their allies by Reubel, Laréveillière Lépaux, Barras, Merlin, and François de Neufchateau, and by Treilhard after Neufchateau's retirement in May, 1798.

In March, 1798, the partisans of the Directory were extremely dissatisfied with the election of deputies and with the prevailing tone of public opinion, but they never hesitated therefore, in April 1798, to impose, by an unexampled *coup d'état*, their own deputies upon the people instead of those who had been freely elected by the popular suffrages, and stamped the whole body of their opponents with the name of anarchists. In order to be able to effect their purpose, they had recourse to the assistance of the legislature. The Directory complains (*Gracchi de seditione querentes*), in a letter to the Council of Ancients, of the anarchists; speaks of the partisans of Robespierre, Babeuf, Hebert, &c., and requests the appointment of a commission to devise means or frame laws for the suppression of anarchy. The commission was appointed, and Bailleul, who was *semper paratus*, who had given a completely Jacobinical tone to the report on the 18th Fructidor, and who had attempted Jacobinically to refute the ridiculous book which Madame de Staél, with whom he for a time went hand in hand, published concerning herself and her father, and incidentally concerning the revolution, was appointed the reporter. His propositions were discussed from the 7th till the 11th of May, on which day they received the force of laws by the confirmation and sanction of the Council of Ancients.

The consequence of these Jacobinical laws was, that the elections were declared null, not only in those departments where there was a division of opinion, but even in those in which the choice had been unanimous, wherever that choice had fallen upon individuals whom the powers that were thought proper to designate as anarchists. This arbitrary conduct excited universal disgust and resistance, and the government, in order to get rid of troublesome opponents, had recourse to the old means—hatched and discovered a conspiracy. As they did not venture to establish a new revolutionary tribunal, recourse was had to military commissions. The courts martial caused so many of the condemned to be shot, that the soldiers at length refused to be employed as executioners. So far did the governing powers proceed on this occasion, that in opposition to the express letter of the constitution, they again introduced the principle of confiscation of goods, and punished the relatives of the condemned with Turkish barbarity, even when they had no connection whatever with the immediate objects of their enmity. When the news arrived in Paris, in November, that eight of those who had been banished in Fructidor, had escaped from Sinamary, among whom were Pichegru and Barthélémy, a law of unexampled severity was passed, by which additional penalties were imposed upon them and all with whom they were connected. It was decreed that their estates, and those of all the persons who had been banished at the same time, should be confiscated. Only a single member of the Council of the Five Hundred (Ronchon) had the courage to raise his voice against this piece of execrable tyranny.

At the time of the new sitting of the legislature, and the retirement of the weaker of the two directors (François de Neufchateau) who had entered upon office on the 18th of Fructidor, Treilhard, who had been ambassador at Rastadt, took his place and formed a close alliance with Merlin. The opposition was greatly strengthened by the election of the new third of the legislature, and its members commenced the storm against all the Directory by an attack upon Treilhard and Merlin. Long before these were attacked, Scherer, who, as minister of war, had been the creature of the Directory, and their active assistant in the establishment of military commissions, and in carrying their decisions into execution, had been threatened with prosecution. He had proved unsuccessful in Italy, and did not venture to accept the compensation offered him by the Directory for the command of the army of Italy, of which he was deprived; and Reubel was obliged to exert all his rhetorical ability to avert the accusation which was to have been brought against him by the legislative body.* The opposition tried to put a

* To form some idea of the tone of these times, we have only to read the horrible address from Chambery, printed by command, in the *Moniteur*, An. VII. Scherer was appointed "Inspecteur-général des troupes Françaises en Hollande," but did not accept the office. Some notion of the course of conduct pursued by the legal sophists of whom the Directory was composed (with the exception of Barras), may

check on the Jurists of the Directory—the Advocate-government—by the instrumentality of the covetous, sly, and apparently speculative Sieyes of Provence, the celebrated and subtle companion of Mirabeau. In the first years of the revolution an artificial reputation had been made for him, precisely as is daily done among us in Germany for any man whom it is thought desirable to use for the interest of a party. Mignet, Thiers, and other French writers who have the best reasons for doing honour to sophists and *doctrinaires*, have attempted, even in our days, by all the means in their power, to burnish up Sieyes' colossal renown, and as early as 1798 the Directory availed itself of his acquaintance with the able and honest Menken, and with many of the friends of liberty in Berlin, to make him a diplomatist: he had, undoubtedly, a diplomatic soul. In consequence of this embassy to Berlin he was raised to the dignity of an important person; for although he enjoyed but little either of the public notice or of that of the court, yet he contrived to be useful to his country by seducing the integrity of Repnin's secretary; and by the cunning with which he communicated the secret articles of the peace of Campo Formio, he deterred Russia from entering into any alliance with Austria.

As at a former period all the efforts of those who were called partisans of the house of Orange were promoted by means of Sieyes,—at that of which we are now speaking Bonaparte's brothers and the Bonapartists drew him into the intrigues by which they aimed at placing Bonaparte at the head of the state. Two of the general's brothers at that time played important characters in Paris, and the success of their intrigues was eminently promoted by Reubel's withdrawal from the Directory (on the 16th of May, 1799,) and by the accession of the new third to the legislative body, elected in March, but not entering upon their duties till the 20th of May. As to the character of the Abbé Sieyes, the exaggerated praises which have been heaped upon him by Louis Philippe's *doctrinaires* must be tempered by the excessive condemnation which at that time the editors of the popular journals pronounced upon him.* His participation in the war of the legislature against the government, or in what was then called the crisis of Prairial, year VII., appears partly from his subsequent behaviour and partly from the very fact of his having from Berlin consented to enter the Directory on Reubel's retiring,

be formed by reading Reubel's speech in the *Moniteur*, An VII., col. 1012, in which he replies to the immediately preceding report of Dubois Dubois.

* In these journals it is said that Mirabeau had been the first artisan of his *réputation colossale*; and he is reported to have said: "J'ai affublé Syeyes d'une célébrité sous le poids de laquelle il faut que je l'écrase." . . . The writer of the same article further observes: "Celui qui 1790 métaphysiqua sur la liberté de la presse, 1791 métaphysiqua sur la liberté des cultes et sur l'établissement de deux chambres dans la législation, en 1792 nia la possibilité de la république,—en 1793 fut l'oracle secret des gouvernans. . . . Il n'eut pas le courage de gouverner en l'an IV. Il aimait mieux être le délégué du Directoire Merlin que le délégué du peuple Français en l'an VI. Il renversa en l'an VII. ce directoire pour se mettre tout entier en sa place."

although on its establishment he had declined becoming a member. The conspiracy which was on foot in favour of Napoleon Bonaparte was concealed by spreading reports,—one while that Joubert, another that Sémonville, and again that even a Prussian prince was to be placed at the head of the government. It has only become possible to form any judgment respecting the real connexion of Bonaparte's departure from Egypt with the expulsion of three directors from the Directory, or with the revolution of Prairial, year VII., since the publication of the documents appended to the 5th part of Menneval's Memoirs.* This connexion is as follows:—Admiral Brueys had received orders to sail to Egypt in order to convey to Bonaparte letters from the Directory, in which he received full powers to return to Europe: he did not, however, receive these letters till he was already in France, and when the Directory had recalled their permission. There are seven letters printed in the Appendix to which we have referred. The first, signed by Laréveillère, Barras and Treilhard, contains the command to return; the second, signed by Merlin, commissions Brueys to sail to Egypt with the combined French and Spanish fleet—the rest are from Talleyrand to Brueys, from Brueys to Talleyrand and to Bonaparte.

Sieyes had scarcely taken his seat in the Directory in June, when he entered into a compact with the majority of the councils and with Barras against three of his colleagues. The councils had called upon the Directory to lay before them a report on the condition of public affairs; eleven days, however, elapsed before the report was presented. During these days the councils exhibited scenes of commotion, threats, railing and excitement, which called to mind the times of 1793.† Treilhard's admission into the Directory was declared illegal, because the law declared that a full year must elapse before any member of the legislature could become a member of the Directory; Treilhard was therefore compelled again to retire. The case of the other two was more difficult to manage;

* “Napoleon et Marie Louise. Souvenirs Historiques de M. le Baron de Menneval.” The documents about to be referred to (not anecdotes) are to be found in the Appendix to Part V. The first of these letters, of the date of the 26th of May, 1799, and signed by the three directors, had been previously printed. Laréveillère, however, denied his signature, and the letter has been regarded as apocryphal. Menneval, however, adds six others, and observes, moreover, that the *original letters* are preserved—and Menneval, though a pliant courtier and blind Bonapartist, was thoroughly honest. In the place above referred to, there will also be found proofs that the *Mémoires de Bourrienne* are not genuine.

† The report of the Directory may be seen in the *Moniteur*, An VII., No. 273, col. 112. In Bertrand's speech it is expressly said that credit was taken for the pay of 437,000 soldiers, whilst there were only 300,000 in service; that 133,000 guns, which were worth 20 francs each, were sold in Paris for 20 sous apiece; and last of all he addresses himself to the three directors as follows: “Pâliez, imprudens et ineptes triumvirs—je vais traçer une légère esquisse de vos fautes, que d'autres peut-être moins indulgents appelleront des crimes. . . . Je ne vous parlerai pas de vos Rassinat, de vos Rivaud, de vos Trouvê, de vos Faypoult, qui non contenus d'exaspérer nos alliés par des concussions de toute nature, ont violé par vos ordres les droits des peuples, ont proscrit les républicains, les ont despotaquement destitué pour les remplacer des traîtres,” &c.

it became necessary to compel their removal by revolutionary means, and recourse was had to the old method of a permanent sitting.* The Council of the Five Hundred declared its sittings permanent, till the report required was produced. This at last took place on the 17th of June, at 11 o'clock at night, and on the 18th the attack was commenced against Merlin and Laréveillère, with a view of getting rid of them also, after having succeeded in the removal of Treilhard. Bertrand, deputy from the department of Calvados, first raised his voice against the profligate expenditure of the public monies, and against the nepotism of the Directory, although neither was nearly so bad as they have now become under Louis Philippe. The division now came to a formal breach; a commission was named of which Lucien Bonaparte was a leading member, and it soon became evident that the two obnoxious directors had neither partisans nor importance enough to enable them to maintain their places. This revolution of the 30th of Prairial, or this crisis, as it was called by François de Neufchateau (*Moniteur An VII.*, col. 1125), ended much more peacefully than the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor, for Merlin and Laréveillère resigned of their own accord.

The leaders of the Bonapartists, especially Sieyes and Lucien Bonaparte, adopted their measures with such skill and success, that three men without either influence or partisans were chosen into the Directory instead of those who had been expelled; so that, properly speaking, the whole government of France at that time fell into the hands of Barras and Sieyes. By far the most important of the new directors was Gohier, an able lawyer, who had been formerly a member of the Constituent Assembly, and at the time of his appointment was President of the Court of Cassation. The second was Roger Ducos, insignificant as an advocate, and insignificant as a member of the Convention. At the time of his election he was a justice of the peace, and a creature of Sieyes. The third was General Moulins, a man equally unknown in the field and in the army.†

Under the new Directory, the ministry found it advisable to re-

* Boulay informs us that the directors were desirous of again fructidorising the legislative bodies, and exclaims: "Cet inepte et atroce système est l'ouvrage de deux hommes, Merlin et Réveillère. Ce Merlin, homme à petites vues, à petites passions, à petites tracasseries, à petites vengeances, à petites arrêtés, a mis en vigueur le machiavellisme le plus rétréci et le plus dégoutant, et étoit digne d'être le garde des sceaux d'un Louis XV., et faut tout au plus pour diriger l'étude d'un procureur. Laréveillère Lépaux a de la moralité, j'en conviens, mais son entêtement est sans exemple; son fanatisme le porte à créer, je ne sais quelle religion, pour l'établissement de laquelle il sacrifice toutes les idées reçues, il foule aux pieds toutes les règles du bon sens, il viole tous les principes et attaque la liberté des consciences." Arena reveals the means which it was intended to employ against the legislature; and Lucien Bonaparte, whose speech may be seen in the *Moniteur, An VII.*, col. 1120, was not a whit less vehement than Boulay.

† Montholon, in his *Mémoires de St Hélène*, vol. i., p. 90, says of him: "Sous le Directoire il s'étoit attaché à Barras et avait commencé sa fortune dans des compagnies de fourniture, où l'on avoit intrigué de faire entrer un grand nombre d'hommes de la révolution; idée, qui avoit jetté une nouvelle déconsidération sur des hommes que les événements politiques avoient déjà dépopularisé."

sign their places; and this was especially the case with Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs, a man who was never embarrassed, never blushed, and never condescended to defend himself—and who on this occasion, in a paper published in his own name, made an open and ostentatious profession of his republican feelings and convictions. Cambacères was appointed minister of justice, because he was at that time regarded as a vehement Jacobin—that is, like his friend Sieyes, he wore the mask of liberty because it served his purpose, and he could at any moment cast it away. Robert Lindet, a man of the Reign of Terror, obtained the office of minister of finance. The talents of these two men no one can deny or question, and Bernadotte, who was appointed minister of war, and Reinhard, of foreign affairs,* were also persons who enjoyed the esteem of both friends and enemies. As soon as Democrats (for Bernadotte at that time played the Jacobin, and Reinhard was and remained a Girondist) were seen to occupy the benches of the legislature and all the high offices of government, there arose a general dread of the return of the times of 1793. On the 6th of July, 1799, there was even a new public Jacobin Club opened in the riding-school, accompanied with all the tumultuous language and violence of the old one. Augereau and Jourdan, in order to keep a check upon Barras and Sieyes, habitually declaimed in this club, and Bernadotte also acted as if he had been a Jacobin. The club indeed was compelled to leave the riding-school, because this was in the district of the Council of Ancients, who would not suffer its continuance there; its members therefore removed their sittings to the Church of the Jacobins in the Faubourg St. Germain. At this crisis the Directory had recourse to Fouché's assistance.

In order to keep Fouché at a distance from Paris, the preceding government had sent him to Holland; the present one recalled and appointed him minister of police. In this character he began to act according to his old fashion. He first suffered demagogic to become rampant and dangerous, in order to have good grounds on which he might show, even to the friends of liberty, that it was necessary to have recourse to force, and these grounds he repeatedly caused to be made obvious in the *Moniteur* of the time. It formed a part of Fouché's plan to suffer all the debates in the club—all the furious exclamations and mad denunciations of its members against certain deputies or officers of state to be printed in the *Moniteur*, as had been done in 1793, along with the discussions in the two chambers.* This club was the theatre of a continued series of vehement declarations against the four Directors, against Talleyrand, and against the bloodsuckers of the state, whose heads were demanded; and those who read the accounts carefully, will observe the manner in which

In the *Moniteur*, An VII., col. 1272, there will be found a passage under the head of *Séances des Jacobins*, which is quite sufficient to recall the reign of terror, by the exclamation: “O Romme, Goujon, Soubrany, Darthe et Babeuf! vous serez vengés, oui, bientôt vengés!”

the double spies distributed by Fouché among its members by degrees gained the field and caused divisions among its leaders. When everything was prepared for action, the Directory at length sent a message, on the 4th of August, to the Council of Ancients respecting the Jacobins. On this occasion, it is true, the Council of the Five Hundred took part with the club, but the police soon found means to work out its own objects. The police encouraged quarrels, collected mobs, and caused acts of violence to be perpetrated, till at length all the dreadful countenances of 1793 again appeared in the streets. Afterwards, when it came to measures of force, the Directory secured the military for itself. Fouché caused the Jacobin churches to be closed on the 13th of August, and put an end to the club; but did not further prosecute the Jacobins, sparing them in order that on occasion he might make use of them against the royalists.

In order to make Sieyes an object of hatred, the authors of Bonaparte's Memoirs ascribe the whole of these things to him, and not to Fouché. At the same time a still more violent storm burst upon the royalists than upon the Jacobins, who still continued to be the predominating party both in the government and the legislature.

While the Jacobins were carrying on these tumultuary proceedings in Paris, the royalists excited popular commotions in Lyons, Lille, Amiens, and Bourdeaux, in the departments of Vaucluse, Ardennes, and Aube. In the departments of the west the cause of the Vendéans and Chouans was revived; the old bands were organised, dépôts of arms and ammunition were established, expeditions and conveyance of military stores took place nightly, and everything wore the appearance of the speedy breaking out of open war against the government of the country. This was the pretence used by the Jacobins of the councils, as a justification for having recourse, on the 13th of July, to an unexampled measure against the relations and families of the nobility and *émigrés*. The law passed at that time, and usually called the Law of Hostages, was precisely similar to the law passed by the Convention respecting suspected persons.

By this law all the departmental authorities were fully empowered to arrest without further process all nobles and their families, as well as the relations of *émigrés*, and to take possession of their estates, as soon as any disturbances whatever broke out. In any case in which a citizen who should have bought national property, or any one who had been either in the military or civil service since the revolution, should be killed, the directory of the department was authorised in every such case to banish from France four relations of any *émigré* whatsoever, or four former nobles. The hostages in every department were made responsible for the fines imposed in any case in which blood might be shed. Any one who aided in the arrest of a murderer or of a deported priest, was to receive a reward varying from 200 to 2400 francs. On the 30th of July a law was at length passed, on the motion of Jourdan, respecting a new oath to be taken by every citizen, by which it was intended at the same time to strike

terror at once into the royalists and the Jacobins. Every citizen was to swear that he would, by all the means in his power, resist the restoration of monarchical power, and also every kind of tyranny. The revolutionary police of the time was quite in keeping with such revolutionary laws.

On the 13th of August domiciliary visits were renewed in search of persons, who were very indefinitely characterised (as *embaucheurs, des emigrés rentrés, des égorgateurs et des brigands*), and, finally, recourse was had to a *coup d'état*, which announced the despotism of Barras, Sieyes, and their colleagues—of men who, in fact, were completely contemptible. On the 2nd of September, 1799, the Directory, supported by Lucien Bonaparte and the majority of the Council of Ancients, issued a condemnatory decree against 155 journals, caused sixty-one editors to be arrested, and demanded their deportation, which in those times was to be sent like criminals to the most unhealthy climate to perish. This decree excited a great sensation and outcry, and the discussion in the Council of Five Hundred gave rise to scenes similar to those which were enacted in the Convention from 1793 to 1795, and converted it into a field of battle. In these scenes Jourdan was always one of the chief actors, and it became necessary, in consequence of this excitement, to bring more troops into the capital, and to remove Bernadotte from the office of Minister of War, because he had attached himself closely to the Jacobins. This took place on the 13th of September, so that every one, even after Massena's victory in Switzerland, regarded the situation of the nation as desperate, because all the public money had been squandered away, and Barras, sunk in indolence and sensuality, favoured everything bad, and persecuted everything noble. Matters went so far that measures were taken to raise a forced loan of 100,000,000 precisely as in a conquered country: this loan was to be made by the *rich*, but no test was given to point out who those were that were to be called rich. Under these circumstances, Bonaparte's unexpected appearance in Paris must be regarded by every one as an interference of Providence to deliver France from anarchy, to protect Lower Italy against the fury of Queen Caroline, and to rescue Upper Italy and Germany from the dark intrigues of Lehrbach, Thugut, and their confederates.

The two legislative bodies of France were at issue with one another and with the Directory; all the armies and all the generals were dissatisfied, and the anarchists began to raise their heads in all quarters. Not only Jourdan, but also the vulgar and miserable Augereau, were laying themselves out to deceive the demagogues and to fish in troubled waters, under the appearance of partaking in their views, when the astounding intelligence came to Paris that Bonaparte had arrived in France from Egypt. We have already observed that the directors' letters first reached him in France, but we know, also, that letters were brought to him when before Acre, from which he saw the dangers that were impending over France,

and that the English journals, together with the *Journal de Francfort*, sent him by Sir Sidney Smith to Alexandria, made him fully acquainted with the real state of affairs. The story, that Roberjot, as early as November, 1798, had sent him, by means of a Prussian ship, from Constantinople to Egypt, a paper showing the necessity of his return, as well as many other accounts, are not worth time or notice, because they appear to us to have very little, if any, foundation. There are, however, two points which we cannot pass over. First, that he very quickly resolved upon his departure, and carried out his resolution; then, that, whilst in St. Helena, he is reported to have said, that he had received full powers from the government to return if he should think fit or necessary.* In addition to this, his brother Joseph says, that when he himself was appointed secretary of the Five Hundred, he sent a Greek to Syria, to inform his brother Napoleon that the state of affairs was such that nothing could be done for him or his army.†

It does not fall within our province to give a circumstantial account of his departure and voyage, during which that fortune which never forsook him, till he grossly abused her favours, preserved him from falling into the power of some of the English ships and frigates which were at that time very numerous in the Mediterranean.

On the 25th of July, he proved victorious at Aboukir. Immediately after the battle he returned for some days to Cairo, and drew up instructions for Kleber, to whom he was about to entrust the command in Egypt. Under a merely delusive pretence, he avoided a meeting with this violent-tempered general. He made the Marquis de Menou the medium of communication between them. Menou had gone over to Islam under the name of Abdallah Menou, and in consequence of his change of religion, as well as his corpulence, had become an object of contempt to the soldiers. This Marquis, by God's disfavour and Bonaparte's favour, had come as a general to Egypt, and, after Kleber, was the senior in command: he was sent in Bonaparte's stead to Rosetta, whither Kleber had been directed to repair for an interview. He was the man who was chosen to convey the commander-in-chief's directions and plans to his successor, whilst Bonaparte himself went on board the frigate *Minion*, on the 22nd of August, and, accompanied by the frigate *La Carrière* and the zebeques *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*,

* Mémoires de Napoléon, Mélanges, vol. i., p. 62: "Il obéit au cri de la France, qui le rappelloit en Europe (which is not true), il avoit reçu du Directoire en partant carte blanche pour toutes ses opérations, soit pour les affaires de Malte, soit pour celles de Sicile, soit pour l'Egypte, soit pour la Candie. Il avoit des pouvoirs en règle pour faire des traités avec la Russie, la Porte, les régences et les princes de l'Inde, et il pouvoit ramener l'armée nommer un successeur revenir quand il lui conviendroit."

† In "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, volontaires et involontaires," Charles Heidelof, Paris, 1830, there are, as is well known, many authentic documents deserving of confidence relating to the history of Bonaparte, and among these the historical notices of his brother Joseph. The passage above referred to, and which cannot be considered as an error, is to be found there. Vol. i., p. 345.

left the roads of Aboukir on the 24th. Bonaparte excused his rapid departure to Kleber, who was altogether disinclined to undertake a command to which he saw no probable favourable issue, by the accident of the springing up of a favourable wind. In company with Lannes, Marmont, Murat, Androssy, Berthier, Bassières, Monge and Berthollet, Bonaparte arrived safely in the harbour of Ajaccio. He was detained there for some time by contrary winds, but on the 9th of October effected a safe landing in the port of Fréjus. We leave it to special historians of Bonaparte, or to those who treat the general history of France, to give a detailed account of all the intrigues which preceded his arrival in France; as we could not enter upon the subject without a close examination and detailed notice of every single point, we shall confine ourselves to the undisputed and indisputable facts.* He was undoubtedly received with universal rejoicing by the people from the place at which he landed till he reached Paris. This joy was a thing neither artificially excited, nor, as is usual with princes, a matter of mere traditional court flattery, but sprang from a sincere feeling of regard, admiration, gratitude, and lively hope. In Paris, soldiers, officers, and generals, went in crowds to do him homage, the leaders of the National Guards looked to him, and everything invited him to take up the cause of the state, whose sale Barras was at the very time negotiating with the Bourbons, and which Jourdan at the same moment was about to deliver up to the men of terror of 1793. In order to lead to a catastrophe, Jourdan proposed to the legislature to issue a public declaration, that the state was in danger. This proposal, it is true, was rejected by 245 against 171 votes, and the Jacobins had also at length been ejected from the town council of Paris. Every one felt, however, that if there was not to be an unhappy restoration, or the nation was not to fall into the hands of the Orleanists, Bonaparte alone could become the delivering angel of France.

It was said, indeed, that Sieyes had fixed his eye upon Joubert; but even before this general was killed at Novi, he had attached himself to Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte. Gohier and Moulins were more disposed towards the Republicans than towards the Bonapartists, because they were simple-minded enough to believe in the possibility of a Republic in times such as these in which we live. Roger Ducos blindly followed the advice and bidding of Sieyes, and Barras was completely occupied with his detestable revolutionary plans.† There was not the slightest necessity for any secret con-

* This course is indeed our duty, as an accurate account of the sources, and a careful examination of the particulars, is contained in an article of the "ARCHIV ZUR GESCHICHTE UND LITERATUR," entitled "Zur Beurtheilung Napoleons und seiner neuesten Tadler und Lobredner," which is also published in three small volumes.

† The secret negotiations carried on by Barras with the Bourbons would have been brought to light by the seizure of his papers after his death (under the Restoration), even had not Fauche Borel, in his well-known book, the royalistic Michaud's "Biographie des Hommes Vivans," and the "Fastes de l'Anarchie," vol. ii., p. 222, given a full account of the whole matter. We would not, however,

spiracy in favour of Bonaparte. Everything might be done with complete publicity, for even at Hamburg, where the author of this history at that time resided, the news of Bonaparte's return filled every one with the most joyful expectations, because the German is by nature a visionary and cosmopolite. It was necessary, however, that the forms of law should be observed, and no military employed, for even Lucien had no desire to assist in founding a military empire such as that which his brother afterwards created. He knew well, that the Council of Five Hundred, of which he was the president, would not easily submit to having a monarch imposed upon them, under whatever name he might be presented to them, and he therefore found it necessary to avoid having recourse to the Council of Five Hundred. He was enabled to do this by obtaining the consent of the majority of the Council of Ancients to a new overthrow of the existing order of things by force. Considerable sums in ready money were easily obtained from the kind of people on whom Louis Philippe, and the few hundred thousand electors, who now bestow all places in France, rely for support. As there was then no Rothschild, the necessary millions were furnished by Recamier, Vanderberghe, Ouvrard, Collet, Seguin, and other contractors, money dealers, and usurers, who like vultures continually hover around falling states and licentious grandes. These, however, as well as Sieyes, miscalculated their power: Bonaparte, while in Italy, had learned to consider them as sponges, and knew how to squeeze out their contents. Behind the scenes stood Madam de Staël and the members of her coterie,—Talleyrand, and the whole band of those vain sophists who boasted of being the founders of liberty, as Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angeley, Volney, Réal, Roederer, Cabanis the physician, Fontanes, Baudin des Ardennes, Boulay de la Meurthe, Gaudin and Chazal, the two last of whom contributed very much to gain over the majority of the Council of Ancients. Bonaparte was too well acquainted with the vulgar minds and mean views of Augereau and Fouché, to entertain a moment's doubt that they would be on his side if fortune favoured his plans. Cambacères, a great jurist, but the contemptible slave of his appetites, was Bonaparte's right-hand: as minister of justice, he paved the way for his elevation; and like all jurists of his kind, he understood thoroughly well how to disguise a thing illegal in itself under the forms of law and justice.

Bonaparte was at that time a private man, and yet in his humble dwelling he was surrounded by distinguished men of all ranks; the directors were forsaken, and appeared at his levées, who already played the prince. Three regiments which had served under him, and then lay in Paris, begged him to review them, and the whole of the staff officers of the National Guard of Paris did him homage;

warrant the accuracy of the conditions. He is said to have required an oblivion of the past, and the sum of 7,000,000 in money, as a compensation for the salary which he would have received as director.

for every one regarded him as the saviour of the state. Even Moreau, who did not know him personally, but made his acquaintance at a dinner at Gohier's, offered him his services. On the 4th of Brumaire, then, it was no longer any secret that a complete alteration of the constitution was contemplated; but it afterwards appeared that neither Cambacères nor Sieyès were fully acquainted with Bonaparte's views. Barras had fallen out with Bonaparte, after having tried in vain to secure his co-operation; he had, however, long since lost all influence beyond Paris. Fouché remained undecided, and took his measures in such a way, that if the new party proved successful, he might be able to boast of having lent them his aid; and if it failed, he might be able to act against its promoters and chiefs.* Because Barras had great power in Paris, and it was necessary to compel the Council of Five Hundred to acquiesce in the projected changes, it was found expedient to remove the sittings of the council to St. Cloud, where troops were to be assembled. For this purpose recourse was had to the 102nd Article of the Constitution of the year III. By this article a power was given to the Council of Ancients, under certain circumstances, to change the place of sitting of both councils. This was effected without even admitting the whole of the Council of Ancients into the secret, because there was a committee called *Hall Inspectors*, whose office and duty it was to watch over and provide for the safety of both councils. On the 18th of Brumaire (November 9th), these Hall Inspectors called about 147 members of the Council of Ancients into their hall of assembly at seven o'clock in the morning. Whilst this was taking place, Bonaparte was already engaged in making arrangements in his own house with the general officers and commanding officers of the troops at that time in Paris, as well as with the chiefs and adjutants of the National Guards; he had even sent for the commandant of Paris, and given orders for the disposition of the troops. In spite of the resistance made by some of the members of the Council of Ancients, who had not been invited to the meeting, but had hastened to the assembly unbidden, the two proposals of the Hall Inspectors were agreed to—first, that the meetings of the two councils should be held on the next day at St. Cloud; and secondly, that Bonaparte should be appointed commander-in-chief of the city guards and of the whole of the troops in the interior. Fouché despatched quick accounts of this intelligence before it was formally made public, so that the three regiments of cavalry then stationed in the Champs Elysées and the regiment of dragoons in the city might be now legally distributed by the general-in-chief according to his pleasure. Immediately afterwards, Cornet, the President of the Council of Ancients, presented himself at the general's house, and

* We here found our views especially on the notices of Boulay de la Meurthe, published in the collection of refutations of the idle stories printed under the name of Bourrienne ("Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," &c.), for in many things they deserve implicit credit.

called upon him to appear at the bar of the assembly, there to accept the terms of the decree. The councils, according to the words of the decree, after its publication on the ensuing morning, were to be no longer allowed to hold their consultations in their usual place of assembling, but immediately to go to St. Cloud, and there to continue their sittings. Bonaparte received the commission to enforce the execution of this decree, and for this purpose he was entrusted with the supreme command of the troops of all kinds in and around Paris.

Bonaparte had long before everything prepared, and surrounded by a brilliant suite, among whom were Generals Moreau, Macdonald, Berthier, Lefebvre, Murat, Moncey, Serrurier, Marmont, Beurnonville, and others, went into the hall formally to hear the decree and accept the commission. Everything which was said in the journals of the time, and has since been recorded in French books with all the pomp of poetical rhetoric, respecting Bonaparte's reluctance, appears to us not a whit more worthy of credit than what Gourgaud, Montholon, and Las Casas have put into his mouth as oracles delivered by him in St. Helena, although undoubtedly in some of the latter there are occasional traces of his mode of thinking and expressing himself. They all, however, appear to us to be as little deserving of the name of history as the lies which the Restoration caused to be compiled under the title of "Bourrienne's Memoirs," and for the confutation of which we have received two volumes of public documents ("Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, 1830").

In the afternoon of the 18th of Brumaire, military arrangements were made, as it were on the eve of a battle; and on this occasion Berthier guided the pen as if the case were that of a foreign enemy. On the 19th Sieyes and Roger Ducos, two of the directors, hastened on horseback from the Luxembourg, where they held their sittings, to the Tuilleries, whilst their three colleagues were taken prisoners, and that by their own guard. On the 18th, immediately after receiving his commission, Bonaparte had called all the troops together, addressed them in a speech, gained to himself the guard of the Directory, and sent strong detachments to St. Cloud. Moreau himself, at the head of 500 men, kept guard over the directors in the Luxembourg. On the 19th (10th), the Council of Five Hundred assembled at ten o'clock in the Tuilleries, were then informed of the resolution of the Council of Ancients, and, in compliance therewith, proceeded to St. Cloud, where their sitting was to be held in the Orangery; this sitting, however, could not be opened till two o'clock. Barras, who sent his confidant Botot to Bonaparte, failed in his object. Botot was publicly very rudely treated, and Barras himself was denounced in the *Moniteur*, and overwhelmed with the strongest accusations. All this, however, was merely a means to fill him with apprehensions, and to render him incapable of mischief; for he was allowed to retain the beautiful national estate of Grosbois, received very considerable sums of money, and continued to indulge in luxury

and sensuality afterwards as well as before, although, indeed, in obscurity. The two other directors disappeared, and were forgotten.*

On the evening of the 18th, a general council of the military chiefs was held; the command of all the troops sent to St. Cloud was entrusted to Murat, and Ponsard was placed at the head of the mounted guard of the legislative councils. Posts were stationed in all directions, even upon the road, and orders were given to prevent by all means short of actual force the liberal deputies from taking their seats among the Five Hundred. It is said that this really proved successful in the cases of more than fifty. In the consultation above-mentioned it was also resolved to cause the councils to adjourn their sittings for three weeks. In addition to this, the plan of an interim government during the adjournment of the legislative body was agreed upon, and Lucien Bonaparte, Gaudin, Cabanis, and Chazot, were furnished with the necessary instructions respecting the tendency and nature of their speeches and conduct in the Council of the Five Hundred; whilst Regnier, Cornudet, Lemercier, and Fargues, were similarly prepared for their duties in the Council of Ancients.

At the opening of the sitting on the 19th, Bonaparte was with the Hall Inspectors in an adjoining apartment, from whence the whole operations were guided. In spite, however, of all their precautions, great dissatisfaction was loudly expressed even in the Council of Ancients, when it was shown, that on the preceding day 147 members only had been summoned to the sitting, to the exclusion of 53 others, who were passed over. The noise became so great that Bonaparte's speakers could not succeed in obtaining a hearing, and in the Council of the Five Hundred the scene was quite tumultuous. Lucien Bonaparte, the president, found it impossible to prevent a resolution from being passed, that every member should take anew an oath to the constitution, which was thought to be in danger. Two full hours passed away in tumultuous discussions on these points. The partisans of the projected changes therefore despaired of being able to carry through their plan as had been agreed upon on the preceding day, and recourse was necessarily had to force. This was first attempted in the Council of Ancients.

Bonaparte himself appeared in the council, whilst the Grenadiers by whom he was accompanied remained at the door. The bayonets seen in the distance and the uniforms in the hall caused vehement and general exclamations of alarm. The general was cried down; he became embarrassed, hesitated, and uttered an indistinct threat. His friends in the council relieved him from his difficulty by causing a

* An account of the scene between Bonaparte and Botot may be found in the *Moniteur*, *An VIII.*, col. 201. Bonaparte poured out the rudest invectives against Barras and his profligate expenditure. We set aside the question whether this was all true. Who would have ventured, had it been otherwise, at that moment to have opposed it? With respect to the other two directors, it is there said: "Gohier et Moulins avoient été consignés dans leurs appartemens au Luxembourg: Moulins s'est sauvé par la porte de son jardin vers quatre heures du soir."

resolution to be passed, that he should be invited to take his place in the Assembly. Here he at first expressed himself in a manner by no means worthy of his position, for he said, that the directors, and especially Barras, had besought him to put himself at the head of a conspiracy. This resource and this accusation, made behind the backs of the accused, gave a most unfavourable impression, and two of his sophists attempted in vain to come to his relief. Alphons, one of the members, merely reiterated the louder, that *he alone was the true conspirator*. Immediately afterward the old cry was raised, OUTLAW HIM, OUTLAW HIM. He then pointed to the grenadiers, whose caps, as he expressed it, he saw in the Hall, and to the soldiers, whose bayonets, as he said, he perceived in the distance. These threats proved effectual in the Council of Ancients, and they were afterwards changed into a high-sounding rhetorical address in the pages of the *Moniteur*.*

The Council of Ancients no sooner gave way, than he was obliged to hasten to that of the Five Hundred, where they were just about to pass a formal resolution against him and his undertaking. The body rose from their seats, when Bonaparte, surrounded by his generals, appeared in the Orangery, and the grenadiers were seen at the entrance. The deputies leaped up and vehemently protested against force of arms; and cries were uttered from all sides, *Down with him! down with him! Outlaw him, outlaw him!* The whole story about the dagger, in spite of the farce which Bonaparte and his wife played with Thomé, the grenadier, is probably a complete fiction. For in the investigation which took place, at the time of the restoration, respecting Thomé's pension, it was proved, that he had never received the slight wound on account of which the pension had been accorded him, and that so far from having received in his person the dagger aimed at the general by a Jacobin, he had merely accidentally wounded himself with his own bayonet. It is indeed possible that such men as Arena, who was very familiar with daggers, had exhibited one in the distance. Whatever may have been the fact, all the journals were filled with the name of Thomé; Josephine embraced him and gave him a ring; he breakfasted and dined with her and her husband, was brought forward in the theatre, and obtained a pension. The general, who was quite at home on a field of battle, but not amongst raving and noisy orators, was utterly confounded by this noise; at length Lefebvre and his grenadiers led him out of the Hall, and Lucien was obliged to undertake the part which Napoleon was to have played. Lucien no sooner saw that his brother had lost his presence of mind, and that the Assembly was about to pass a decree of outlawry against him, than he threw aside the ridiculous toga which was at that time the official dress of a legislator, hastened to

* "Si l'on parlait de me mettre hors la loi, j'appellerais à vous, braves soldats, que j'ai tant de fois menés à la victoire, à vous, braves défenseurs de la république, avec lesquels j'ai partagé tant de perils pour affirmer la liberté et l'égalité, je m'en remettrais, mes braves amis, au courage de vous tous et de ma fortune."

the grenadiers, who, under the command of an officer, were marched into the Hall for his protection, went out into the midst of them and mounted his horse. In the mean time his brother had already addressed the soldiers, who were drawn up without; Lucien rode up to them and said, that he, the president of the council, had been threatened by factious agitators with daggers, and he therefore, in the name of the law, called upon his brother the general to drive these factious men from the Hall, and declared the Council of the Five Hundred to be dissolved. The general answered, that **HIS DESIRES SHOULD BE OBEYED.** The execution of the business was left to Murat, who was admirably fitted for such duties. Murat sent a brigadier with a company of grenadiers, and he was janissary enough to drive the representatives of a country, to whose free citizens he himself belonged, out of the windows of the Orangery, which were level with the ground.

About half-past five o'clock the old constitution was abolished, and it became necessary to appoint an interim government in order to adopt suitable measures for drawing up and adopting a new one. Here again it became desirable to preserve at least the appearance of legality, and avoid that of military force. For this purpose it was necessary to supply the sophists and publicists of the *Moniteur* and of the *Journal de Paris*, at that time edited by Roederer, with the materials to enable them to state to the public, in fine words and phrases, how properly and legally the whole had been resolved and transacted.

A sufficient number of the Council of Ancients had been won over to favour the innovation; every law, however, according to the constitution, must originate from the Council of the Five Hundred, and it therefore became necessary to get together a number, great or small, of the members of that body who were to be made to represent the whole council. This could not be effected before nine o'clock, and even then the number assembled was very small. The Council of Ancients had met at eight o'clock, and great care had been taken not to allow any one to enter the meeting from whom a vigorous opposition was to be feared. Speeches were made as usual: Lucien poured out his views, partly in most ridiculous phrases, concerning a matter which had been already really settled in the evening of the 18th. The farce of a debate, however, ended by the shadows of the two councils appointing a number of persons, already fixed upon, to be a committee, which, in high-sounding phraseology, was entitled a **COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE.**

On the very same night Boulay de la Meurthe brought forward what he called the result of the deliberations of that committee. His proposal, however, merely affected the interim constitution of France till the restoration of the legislature, which had been dissolved. The points determined were:

That three persons, to be called **Consuls**, should direct the government of France. That, during the deliberations concerning the new

constitution, Napoleon Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger Ducos, should be created consuls. That the legislative bodies should be adjourned till the 2nd of Ventôse (the 20th of February, 1800). That if at that time the legislative bodies were not summoned by the temporary authorities, it was to be lawful for them to meet of their own right. That, in the mean time, the members were to enjoy their allowances, and to retain the privilege of freedom from arrest. That each of the two councils was to name twenty-five from its own body, who were to form a committee of legislation. That this committee of fifty was not only to make a draft of a new constitution, but all the necessary preparations for drawing up a new code of laws. From this moment the republic was changed into a military monarchy, and this would have been to the great advantage of France and of all Europe had the great mind which created this new order of things persevered in that plebeian way which had made him a hero, and not renewed the ancient knighthood and the Byzantine throne.

E.—CONDITION OF THINGS IN ITALY AND GERMANY IN THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1800.

1.—ITALY.

We have already given an account of the manner in which the Neapolitan territory was evacuated by the French; we have further stated that the Emperor of Russia remained well-disposed towards the Neapolitans when he seceded from his connexion with Austria and England, and finally, that England too supported the King of Naples, when he, or more properly speaking his wife, endeavoured to snatch from the Austrians a portion of the expected booty. At that time the Neapolitans and the Austrians, in the absence of the Pope, thought to take possession of the states of the Church; with this view the Austrians sent General Fröhlich into the Marches, who besieged Ancona and sent a division of his army to Civita Castellana, in order to march from thence to Rome, where the French general, Garnier, still maintained himself, although he had but a very small number of troops under his command. The English assisted the Neapolitans to anticipate the Austrians, by disembarking some troops at Civita Vecchia, whilst very numerous bodies of Neapolitans pushed forward from the Abruzzi towards Rome; Fröhlich's bands appeared before Rome almost simultaneously with the Neapolitans, but Trowbridge, who commanded the English force, succeeded in inducing Garnier to conclude a capitulation with him and not with the Austrians; the French general did not, however, adopt this course for nothing. By virtue of this capitulation Trowbridge became master of the harbour and coasts, and the Neapolitans were suffered to send their troops from the Abruzzi to Rome, but the Austrians went away empty. The Neapolitans took

possession of Rome and the fortified town of Tolsa, and the English of Civita Vecchia and Corneto; in return for this the French garrisons were to be conveyed to Corsica in English ships. Fröhlich at first exhibited great vexation and annoyance, but he was obliged to be content, and sought to indemnify himself by taking possession of the Marches. He therefore prosecuted the siege of Ancona with redoubled vigour, and was assisted in his operations by some Russian ships in the Gulf of Venice.

The Neapolitans, under the command of General Burkhard, a Swiss, having entered Rome from the Abruzzi on the 30th of September, 1799, behaved precisely as if the inheritance of the pope had fallen to them. The French had removed the aged Pope Pius VI., then eighty years of age, from the rude climate of Briançon to the milder temperature of Valence, where, however, he died, on the 29th of August, and the chair of St. Peter continued vacant till a conclave was held in Venice. In the mean time the King of Naples conducted himself in Rome as if he were in reality the rightful sovereign. He established a government altogether after the Neapolitan model, with this exception, that this new tyranny was not founded in blood, as the new order of things in Naples had been.

In October, Burkhard was replaced by Diego Nasseli, Prince of Arragona, who assumed the title of generalissimo of the troops and head of the civil administration; and who was no sooner installed in office than he declared himself, quite after the Neapolitan fashion, respecting the republic which had been erected by the French. On the 9th of October he issued an edict, in which he announced that he had received full powers completely to eradicate the infamous republic, and to purify this portion of Italy from the democratic pestilence. He proceeded to confiscate estates, banished peaceable citizens, and imposed arbitrary penalties. He organised the police after the Neapolitan model, and erected a court for the trial of political offences, in precise conformity with the principles of the similar tribunal in Naples. In the same manner he established a court for civil, and another for criminal causes, which, united, were called the Royal Supreme Court. In all this no mention whatever was made of the pope by Nasseli, who, however, showed himself to be a most zealous defender of the old dead faith and of the mechanical services of religion, without at the same time failing to assist his pecuniary resources by imposing oppressive taxes upon the clergy and church property. The same people of Rome, who had previously proclaimed the republic, received with the loudest acclamations the army of the faith under Burkhard, and were much more troubled at the fall of Ancona than at the entrance of the Neapolitans into their city. Ancona surrendered to Fröhlich in November, after a siege of six months, and after its capitulation the Austrians looked upon the Marches as a conquered province.

After the withdrawal of the Russians, the war was prosecuted by Melas according to the traditional method of olden times and the

miserable and petty views of the Austrian cabinet. Instead of directing the whole of his forces against Championnet on the Var, and, by a speedy and effectual victory over him facilitating the operations against Moreau in Genoa, he split his army into fractions, in order to gratify the petty and covetous views of the Austrians, by taking possession of foreign states. Fröhlich was sent to a great distance to act against Rome, or, more properly speaking, against Ancona; Kray was obliged to continue the siege of Tortona till the middle of September, and then to make an expedition into the valley of Aosta, in order to make himself master of the Piedmontese fortress of Bard, and the main army delayed till his forces were again united with it. Whilst all this was taking place, the remains of the army defeated at Novi, which Moreau had collected together in Genoa, where he was kept pent up by Klenau's division alone, not only gathered strength and obtained reinforcements, but Championnet had succeeded in raising his force in the Var to 24,000 men. During this time Melas, according to ancient custom, was busy in reducing one town after another, laid siege to Coni, and therefore remained with his whole army lying between the Stura and the Tanaro.

In the mean time Moreau was recalled from Genoa, in order to make an inroad into Germany at the head of the army collected on the left bank of the Rhine; and for a short time the command of the army in Genoa was united to that in the Var, in the hands of Championnet. The French general announced this union by a proclamation dated the 21st of September, and the distribution of the Austrian army afforded the generals under his command various opportunities of reviving the courage of his soldiers by some advantages gained over the Austrians. General Victor, afterwards created Duke of Belluno by Bonaparte, undertook some bold and successful expeditions, and General St. Cyr, whom Championnet left behind him in Genoa on his own return to the army on the Var, on the 16th of October surprised some thousands of Austrians under Karacsay near Bosco, between Gavi and Novi, and took the half of them prisoners. This at last compelled Melas to venture a decisive battle, because on Karacsay being obliged to retire after the engagement at Bosco, Championnet at length resolved to descend from the mountains into the plain of Lombardy to the relief of Coni. Melas then advanced to meet the French, and, in consequence, the armies met, and a battle was fought on the 4th of November at Fossano or Savigliano, in which the French general lost the one-half of his army of 24,000 men. The result of this battle was the surrender of Coni by capitulation on the 3rd of December, and the French now only remained in possession of Genoa, the counties of Nice and Tende, and a part of the province of Mondovi. Precisely at that time, however, the selfish policy of Austria paved the way for Bonaparte to Italy, where he had an immense number of connexions, and where the first families in the country were attached to him, whilst

thousands of Italian emigrants who had taken refuge in France were ready to be led back by him into Italy, and hoped by his instrumentality to obtain the restoration of their properties and estates.

The Austrian aristocrats and bureaucrats regarded the Marches as a conquest; they neither restored the Duke of Modena nor the Grand Duke of Tuscany; they prevented Suwarow from bringing back the King of Sardinia to Turin; they took possession of all the Sardinian fortresses and the whole country; and preferred giving mortal offence to the Emperor Paul to acquiescing in his just demands. What Italian could be attached to, or place any confidence in them?

2.—GERMANY.

In Germany, fortune continued not altogether unfaithful to the Austrians, even after Massena's victory in Switzerland, and the withdrawal of the Prussians. The Archduke Charles, having evacuated his positions in Switzerland to the Russians, drove the French back across the river in the whole district of the Middle Rhine, and again wrested Mannheim out of their hands. After Korsakoff's defeat, he was obliged to remove his head-quarters to South Swabia, and the army of the Rhine, having received reinforcements, sought to take advantage of his retirement. At the end of the year 1799, and up to the period of Moreau's arrival in the spring of 1800, this army was commanded by General Lecourbe, who again passed over to the right bank of the Rhine in the middle of October, when the archduke's head-quarters were fixed at Donauschingen. The French at first advanced from Mayence, and afterwards crossed the river at Oppenheim—took possession of Heidelberg and Mannheim—pushed forward as far as Heilbron and Pforzheim on the one side and to the mountains on the other, and for the fourth time closely invested Philippsburg. The investment of Philippsburg compelled the archduke to send a division of his army, at the end of November, under the command of General Sztarray, to its relief. The French were driven back, defeated in an engagement at Wiesloch on the 3rd of December, Philippsburg relieved, and, finally, Mannheim also recovered. Lecourbe was obliged to recross the Rhine.

The Empire took no part in this war, for Prussia was devoted to the interests of France, in order to obtain compensation for the house of Orange Nassau at the expense of the Empire, and to extend its own territories: no one put any confidence in the Austrians, for they gave abundant proofs in Italy of the price at which they protected their friends. In the mean time Bavaria, driven by necessity, continued faithful to the emperor, even after the death of Charles Theodore in February, 1799. The only person who played the patriot on this occasion, though after a singular fashion, was the unfortunate Gustavus IV., King of Sweden. In his character of Duke of Pomerania, he caused his minister to declare in Ratisbon,

as early as the 20th of May, 1799, that as the congress for a peace at Rastadt was broken up, the imperial war must necessarily be renewed. For this purpose he offered to send his contingent ready for service in Pomerania. Every one regarded the feeling and spirit which prompted this offer as noble and kingly, but lamented that it only served to bring to light the miserable condition of the German empire. It proved that the Empire, with good reason, had no confidence, and could have none, in the emperor, and that it was betrayed by the most powerful of its princes. The Bishop of Eichstadt, who, as well as the other ecclesiastical members of the imperial Diet, was threatened with secularisation, immediately joined Sweden, and thus furnished an example to the other spiritual princes. This encouraged the emperor to make an appeal to the Empire. On the 12th of June, 1799, he addressed an imperial requisition to the Diet at Ratisbon, in which he called upon the estates of the Empire to raise a quintuple contingent, according to the decree of the Empire, and to furnish the necessary funds.

The immediate consequence was the exhibition, usual in Germany as in ancient Poland, of long and vehement disputes, of tedious protocols, till at length it appeared that the unity of the Empire was altogether lost, and the French in reality more powerful in Germany than the emperor. The spiritual princes alone, and the petty courts of South Germany, declared themselves favourable to a compliance with the emperor's requisition, whilst on the other hand the north, together with Baden and Hesse Darmstadt, were of a decidedly contrary opinion, and steadily refused to take any part in the war. On this occasion the Bavarian palatinate was reduced to great difficulties, for the whole of Bavaria was occupied by the Austrians, although the elector, Maximilian Joseph II., knew well that Lehrbach, Thugut, and Cobenzl had sold him in the peace of Campo Formio, and would sell him anew as soon as a favourable opportunity offered. Moreover, Maximilian Joseph owed it entirely to France and Prussia that the mistresses and bastards of Charles Theodore did not at last completely sell him to Austria.

In the last year of his life Charles Theodore had sunk constantly deeper, and, at the expense of the state, had enriched not only the Prince of Bretzenheim, his favourite son, and many others of his illegitimate children, but every one who had married any of his numerous natural daughters. Among the latter, the Count of Leiningen Guntersblum especially drove a regular trade in Bavaria with places, offices, honours, law and justice, as well as Count Oberndorf in the palatinate of the Rhine, where the latter, in addition, sold the livings of the Protestant churches to the highest bidders. In addition, the Count of Leiningen, the Prince of Isenburg and Count Holnstein, who had also married daughters of mistresses, were favoured in such a way, that at last the miserable payments of the state could no longer be produced. Austria took advantage of this perplexity, and never hesitated to sacrifice a young princess to the

advantage of the house of Hapsburg, or, more properly speaking, of Lorraine. The old sensualist of seventy, who had always been, and continued to be, surrounded by women of the lowest character, was married in 1795 to the Austrian Princess Maria Leopoldina as his second wife, she being only eighteen years of age. It was therefore conjectured, even at that time, with what reason we know not, that Charles Theodore had not been wholly unacquainted with what had been determined on in the peace of Campo Formio to the disadvantage of Bavaria. At all events, the French had taken care that Charles Theodore's successor should be informed of the secret articles. The elector, however, once more took the field in favour of Austria, in return for English subsidies, because he was in great need of the money, but it was quite impossible he could be serious in his operations.

The articles of the peace to which we have referred secured to Austria not only the possession of Salzburg, but of all that portion of Bavaria which lies between the Inn where it emerges from the Tyrol and the Austrian province on the same river, and also of Wasserburg, with its surrounding territory. The fulfilment of these conditions would have deprived Bavaria not only of considerable iron-works, but of all its salt mines. Charles Theodore died as he had lived, being struck with apoplexy, on the 16th of February, 1799, as he was seated at the gaming-table. Charles Duke of Deuxponts, whose son, Charles Augustus, had died in 1785, died in 1795, and his rights had therefore passed to his brother Maximilian Joseph. The latter also inherited his claims to the Duchy of Deuxponts; he had been previously in the service of the King of France, could therefore hope for little favour from the Jacobinical government of the directors, and was consequently obliged to attach himself to the cause of the emperor because he had reason to fear the vengeance of the French. In 1796 Charles Theodore, when he learned that Moreau had been obliged to retreat, refused to confirm the shameful suspension of arms concluded at Pfaffenhofen, near Munich, on the 7th September, 1796, and the French threatened to exact the arrears in money and contributions which he owed.

Baden and Wurtemberg had completely separated from Austria; and Baden and Darmstadt had moreover in such a way sacrificed the interests of the Empire to its determined enemy, that they were necessarily obliged to attach themselves to the Prussian conspiracy. Baden promised to assist the French to get possession of the imperial fortresses of Kehl and Philippsburg, and to help them to a district for fortifying Huningen, on the right bank of the Rhine. Moreover, Charles Von Dalberg, coadjutor of Mayence, and Maximilian Joseph's representative at Rastadt, together with Edelsheim, the same Baden minister who afterwards, in conjunction with Dalberg, the Baden ambassador, whom Bonaparte at a later period created a duke, and who played such a faithless, un-German part on the carrying off of the Duke d'Enghein, had already, in connexion with Prussia, negotiated

with the enemy of the Empire in Rastadt. It is therefore no wonder that the imperial requisition produced no result. It was quite in vain that the Archduke Charles issued a circular to the estates of the Empire on the 15th of August, in which he represents, in the strongest colours, the enormities which had been perpetrated by the French in Germany. The majority of the Diet at length indeed came to a resolution; but as this majority consisted of princes of the Empire and imperial counts and barons who acted under threats, whom Bavaria and Würtemberg only joined when English money was to be gained, precisely the most powerful of the members of the Empire refused their consent. A pretended imperial army was indeed raised, which was said to amount to 30,000 men; but, examined a little more closely, it will soon be perceived that the quintuple contingent which was agreed upon in the resolution of 16th of September, and the contributions which were to be paid, were not taken into account, but that the Germans suffered themselves to be paid by the English for the defence of their own country. The English Parliament, of which Thugut and Austria were the tools, paid 500,000*l.* for the Emperor and the estates of the Empire. Of this sum Würtemberg received so much, that it sent 7000 men, who were completely useless as soldiers to itself; the circle of Swabia also raised 10,000 for money; Bavaria as many; and Mayence 4000. The Archduke Charles urgently recommended the formation of a local militia and volunteers for the defence of the country, and even offered to send able officers for training and exercising the force; but every appearance of patriotic enthusiasm was ridiculous in the eyes of the pedants, lawyers, and scribes who governed Germany; in Mayence alone Albini, and in the palatinate Wrede, effected a general arming of the people. The tyrannical, selfish, and dreadful, but clever and energetic Duke of Würtemberg, whom a diplomatist of our own times has recently cynically described in a few words, was shameless enough to allege that his subjects, whom he afterwards used like dogs in his kennels, could not be induced to defend their properties, or even lives, against a foreign enemy. He had indeed good reason not to venture to put arms into their hands.*

* Baron Von Hormayr, in his "Characteristics," vol. ii., p. 397, speaking of this stout Frederick, says with fearful sharpness, but with truth—"Frederick (he is speaking of 1809), King of Würtemberg, a Vitellius in figure, a Louis XI. in feeling and disposition, the sharpest touchstone of German honesty, forbearance, and patience, was in favour of Napoleon, to whom he was honestly devoted, to whom he owed the highest gratification of his ambition, full power, and arbitrary rule over the necks of the free-minded and cheerful Allemanni," &c. &c.

SIXTH PERIOD OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

SECOND DIVISION.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE TILL THE
PEACE OF PRESBURG.

FIRST CHAPTER.

FRANCE, ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AUSTRIA, TILL THE PEACE OF
LUNEVILLE.

§ I.

FRANCE.

IN the very first sitting of the consuls, Bonaparte assumed the precedence and took the chair. Every one immediately perceived, that the commission of fifty deputies appointed on the 19th of Brumaire, and which was to be regarded as the representative of the whole legislature, would be nothing else than a kind of council of state to Bonaparte. The servile deputies were to give him the advantage of their knowledge, but he alone wished to select and to retain whatever he might judge useful to the state and not prejudicial to himself. At first, these two objects were very often consistent with one another; afterwards they became always progressively less so, and at last the very reverse. The cunning priest Sieyes immediately perceived, that he must again hold his peace, as he had previously done in the Convention when matters came to a dangerous issue, even although he may not have expressly said, as anecdote hunters affirm,* that France and he himself had now found a master. As Sieyes allowed Bonaparte to do as he pleased, it never occurred to Roger Ducos to contradict him; we therefore altogether pass over the debates respecting the constitution, because

* What Thiers has borrowed from Montholon's compilation of lies may therefore be true; but Thiers ought not, vol. i., pp. 18-19, to have suppressed the concluding words. In Montholon's *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vol. i., p. 83, it is said: "Sieyes dit le soir en entrant chez lui en présence du Chazal, Talleyrand, Boulay, Roederer, Cabanis, etc., 'Messieurs, vous avez un maître, Bonaparte veut tout faire, sait tout faire, peut tout faire. Dans la position déplorable où nous nous trouvons, il vaut mieux nous soumettre que d'exciter des divisions qui ameneroient une perte certaine.'"

Bonaparte willingly left the whole theoretical or systematic portion of it to Sieyes, who was a metaphysician, which is obvious from the text of the constitution itself, whilst he took care to introduce such points throughout the whole document affecting things essential and practical, as rendered the remainder a mere empty form. This was at that time very salutary, and rescued France from the horrors of anarchy; even before the draft of the constitution was ready, Bonaparte had also put himself in communication with the most distinguished men of business in France, and particularly with those who combined the academical training and knowledge of the times before the revolution with the greater industry and experience of the revolution itself. Upon such persons he was able to reckon with certainty, for their objects had been gained through the revolution; they were fond of a good table, high play, splendid society, laughed at high feelings of inspiration for a cause, and soon returned to the old devotion to the court. Among these we may especially name Maret, a man of iron industry, whom Bonaparte immediately appointed secretary-general to the consular government, and afterwards created Duke of Bassano. In this number, too, we may reckon Lebrun, who, in the reign of Louis XV., lent the aid of his pen to Chancellor Maupeou, to frame edicts against the parliaments—was afterwards received into the Roland ministry as a Girondist, and finally selected by Bonaparte as one of his colleagues in the consulate. Bonaparte even at that time appeared to have adopted the principle, in which all Frenchmen who write concerning him agree, that he knew everything, understood everything, and only stood in need of people who were able to carry into execution what he desired. In this he was partly right. Berthier, for example, as a general, was not worth much, but as chief of the general staff, he was incomparable; he was Bonaparte's right hand, and he therefore made him minister of war. He selected Gaudin, minister of finance under the consulate, with such judgment, that he was able to retain his services afterwards under the most difficult circumstances—even till 1814; wherefore Gaudin also, whom he afterwards created Duke of Gaëta, is to be regarded as one of the main supports of Bonaparte's rising empire, as well as Berthier and Talleyrand. Gaudin worked incessantly, and always at first in conjunction with Bonaparte, who was an admirable financier, in order to restore order to the finances of the country, which had been thrown into utter confusion and ruin under the Directory by speculators, contractors, usurers, and gross profligacy. La Place, whom Bonaparte at first made minister of the interior, was a great mathematician and astronomer, but no man of business, and it therefore soon became necessary to appoint another; the same was the case with Forfait, minister of marine. Fouché, indeed, was born with a police nature, particularly for political and secret police, just as Talleyrand had received from his Creator the very mind and soul of a diplomatist; and yet Bonaparte would scarcely have appointed him minister of police had he not

found him already in the office. Unfortunately, however, Bonaparte had such a great idea of Fouché's connexions with persons of all parties, of his extensive knowledge, and the power of his smooth language, that he always employed him anew, although he never completely trusted him, and even suspected that the man was his evil genius. This was the case, too, with Talleyrand, whose diplomatic talents of the old times, and want of all principle, made him quite indispensable for carrying on diplomatic negotiations with all the great and small courts of Europe. As early as November, Bonaparte sent Duroc, his adjutant, to Berlin, because he was a man after Frederick William III.'s heart, and born for the court nobility of Prussia; the object of his mission was to form connexions in Berlin, and he was again always employed when Bonaparte wished to induce the King of Prussia to adopt any particular course. Talleyrand was appointed minister of foreign affairs as early as the end of November, 1799, and in December immediately sent the talkative Beurnonville, who was full of all the prejudices of noble birth, to Berlin, where he was at that time very useful, because in Berlin the nobility alone enjoyed any influence at court. He was afterwards married to a Dürfort, but at that time was a suitor for the hand of Mademoiselle de Sabran. This emigrant lady, her relative the Marquis de Custine, and the courtly and poetical Marquis Boufflers, were at that time the oracles of the high and polite world, who were still completely un-German, and only spoke or read the French language.

Although Bonaparte treated each and all of the Jacobins with friendly attentions, who showed themselves ready to do him homage—as to the rising sun—and though his ablest men of business, his colleagues and the most distinguished of his suite were all men belonging to the reign of terror; yet from the very first both he and his wife exhibited an obvious and surprising inclination towards those who had been initiated in and practised all the old arts of court flattery. He immediately relaxed the rigour of the measures adopted against the clergy and the unexampled law respecting hostages, which made the innocent responsible for the guilty; and he even adopted measures against the men of the reign of terror similar to those which the Directory had adopted against the royalists. Indignant at the resistance which the Jacobins had offered him in his councils on the 19th of Brumaire, he was desirous at the first, without further forms, of rooting out like weeds that part of them whom no man would lament. On the 16th of November there appeared a consular decree, by virtue of which a number of persons contained in a list arbitrarily determined, and who were regarded as the most unimprovable and notorious revolutionary visionaries and enthusiasts, but who were at the moment guilty of no legal offence, were to be forthwith arrested and banished. On one list stood the names of thirty-seven persons, among whom were Felix Lepelletier, the foolish Prince Charles of Hessen-Rothenburg, Brutus Maignat, Rossignol, and other men of their stamp. These were sent across the ocean to

the unhealthy climate of Guiana. A second list contained the names of twenty-two persons, who were to be conveyed to the Lower Charente, and there kept under *surveillance*. Santerre also was arrested on the 13th of November. As early, however, as the 25th of November all these measures were recalled, and the persons whose names had been inscribed in both places were merely kept under the observance of the police—which also was put an end to in the following month. Fouché afterwards found out the means of making an admirable use of the men of the reign of terror, for even Bonaparte would have promoted Barrère, the inexhaustible and unwearied report-maker of the Committee of General Welfare, to the highest offices, had not the officers of his own government, formerly Barrère's colleagues, who were indispensable to him, warmly protested against it. This alone was the reason why he did not think it advisable to give him a place either in the senate or the council of state.

Great expedition was made with the drawing up of the constitution, in order as quickly as possible definitely to settle the new form of government. The Committee of Fifty had been divided into four committees, of which the duties and rights of the hall-inspectors were allotted to one—a second devoted its labours to legislation and the preparation of a code of laws—the third was engaged with the regulation of the finances—and the fourth exclusively with the constitution. The members very soon came to an agreement on the fundamental articles ; Boulay de la Meurthe undertook, according to the custom in such cases, to reduce them into form in academical words and phrases, and to trumpet them forth officially in the *Moniteur*.* We do not, however, dwell on this constitution, partly because it was of short duration, and partly too because, even whilst in existence, it was only observed in as far as it did not stand in the way of the government. The most important fact is, that Bonaparte, with wonderful sagacity and tact, allowed Sieyes, his colleague, and the other profound men, to go their own way in all those cases which were indifferent to him, and altered only where there was any point which might be obstructive to *his own designs*, respecting which he did not at that time clearly express his views. When the committees on legislation and the constitution, whose articles Bonaparte had often altered, were at length ready with their labours on the 12th of December, 1799, and Boulay had trumpeted forth the merits of the new constitution in the speech to which we have already referred, and which was to be regarded as a manifesto, their drafts were still subjected to alterations, by Bonaparte's command, on the night before they were submitted to the Council of Fifty. The new constitution was still republic in name and appearance, but monarchical in fact, the latter concealed, by the government being committed, not to the hand of one individual, but of three. The

* *Mon., An VIII.*, col. 325. The draft of the constitution is printed in Posselt's *Europäischer Annalen*, Jahr 1799, 4 Quartal S., 254 ff.

three persons so fixed upon were denominated consuls, and appointed for ten years;—one of them, however, was really ruler, although he only obtained the modest name of First Consul. The rights which Bonaparte caused to be given to himself made all the rest nothing more than mere deception. The First Consul was to invite the others merely to *consultation* on affairs of state, whilst he himself, either *immediately* or *through* the senate, was to appoint to all places of trust and authority, to decide absolutely upon questions of peace or war, and to be assisted by a council of state. Bonaparte afterwards availed himself with great skill and prudence of the labours of the latter, in order to obtain credit to himself for that wisdom and experience which was, properly speaking, the result of the whole of that intelligence which had been developed in France at the end of the 18th century and during the revolution. As he possessed the right of appointing the members, he chose the most distinguished men in every department, caused them to draw up and digest laws—to bring them into the legislative body—and there defend them. In order to cover and conceal the power of the First Consul, especially in reference to the appointment of persons to offices of trust and authority, a senate was created, which neither belonged to the people nor to the government, but immediately from the very beginning was an assembly of courtiers and placemen, and at a later period became the mere tool of every kind of despotism, by rendering it easy to dispense with the legislative body. The senate consisted of eighty members, a part of whom were to be immediately nominated from the lists of notability, and the senate to fill up its own body from persons submitted to them by the First Consul, the tribunate, and the legislative body. Each senator was to have a salary of 25,000f.; their meetings were not public, and their business very small. From the national lists the senate was also to select consuls, legislators, tribunes, and judges of the Court of Cassation. Large lists were first presented to the communes, on which, according to Roederer, there stood some 500,000 names, out of which the communes selected 50,000 for the departmental lists, from which again 5000 were to be chosen for the national list. From these 5000 names selected from the departmental list, or from what was termed the national list, the senate was afterwards to elect the members of the legislature and the high officers of government.

The legislature was to consist of two chambers, the tribunate and the legislative body—the former composed of 100, and the latter of 300 members. The chambers had no power of taking the initiative, that is, they were obliged to wait till bills were submitted to them, and could of themselves originate nothing: they were, however, permitted to express wishes of all kinds to the government. Each bill (*projet de loi*) was introduced into the tribunate by three members of the council of state, and there defended by them, because the tribunate alone had the right of discussion, whilst the mere power of saying *Yea* or *Nay* was conferred upon the members of the legislative

body. The tribunate, having accepted the bill, sent three of its members, accompanied by the members from the council of state, to defend the measure in the assembly of the legislative body. Every year one-fifth of the members of the legislative body was to retire from office, being, however, always re-eligible as long as their names remained on the national list. The sittings of the legislative body alone were public, because they were only permitted to be silent listeners to the addresses of the tribunes or councillors of state, and to assent to, or dissent from, the proposed law. Not above one hundred persons were, however, allowed to be present as auditors; the sittings were not allowed to continue longer than four months; both chambers, however, might be summoned to an extraordinary sitting.

This contrivance of Bonaparte's clients furnishes a remarkable example of the worthlessness of every constitution merely existing upon paper, and guaranteed by paper or parchment; for not more than two years elapsed before the First Consul, on two occasions (in May and August, 1802), made essential alterations; after the lapse of four years, in 1804, he caused an entirely new and very restricted constitution to be framed, and, finally, this too, on the 19th of August, 1807, was completely mutilated. When the constitution was ready to be brought into operation, Sieyes terminated merely as he had begun, and Bonaparte saw with pleasure that he showed himself both contemptible and venal. He became a dumb senator, with a yearly income of 25,000f., and obtained 800,000f. from the directorial treasury, whilst Roger Ducos was obliged to go away contented with a douceur of 120,000f.; and, last of all, Sieyes condescended to accept from Bonaparte a present of the national domain of Crosne, which he afterwards exchanged for another estate. For colleagues in his new dignity Bonaparte selected very able and skilful men, but wholly destitute of all nobility of mind, and to whom it never once occurred to offer him any opposition; these were Cambacérès and Lebrun. The former, a celebrated lawyer although formerly a vehement Jacobin, impatiently waited till Bonaparte brought forth again all the old plunder; and then, covered with orders, he strutted up and down the Palais Royal like a peacock, and exhibited himself as a show. Lebrun, who was afterwards created a duke, at a later period distinguished himself by being the first to revive the use of hair powder; in fact, he was completely a child and partisan of the olden times, although for a time he had played the part of a Girondist. His whole career was that of a courtier. He distinguished himself first as a poet, by a translation of the "Iliad" and "Jerusalem Delivered;" then as an orator, by his eulogies upon the Abbé de Terray, the worst bloodsucker of all the finance ministers of Louis XV.; as a man of business, he was known for the services which he had rendered to the Chancellor Maupeou. As early as the 25th and 26th of December the First Consul took up his abode in the Tuilleries. There the name of citizen altogether disappeared, for the consul's wife caused herself again to

be addressed as *Madame*. Everything which concerned the government now began to assume full activity, and the adjourned legislative councils were summoned for the 1st of January, in order that they might be dissolved. It is very difficult to say whether Bonaparte ought to be praised or blamed for the unhappy mixture of old and new with which he commenced his rule, and whence first a mongrel state, and afterwards all the evils of our age, have proceeded and will proceed. He was right, in as far as for the moment he created quiet and order, for he thereby secured the means and opportunity of undertaking great things, and as long as he was successful he reaped the fruits both of honour and advantage from his zeal to revive everything old; but as soon as fortune forsook him, he was delivered into the hands of his enemies by the friends of the old system whom he had so highly favoured.

Starting from his principle of the reconciliation and blending of parties, he first of all recalled forty-three of those who had been exiled on the 18th of Fructidor, as he believed they would be useful to the interests of their country, and not prove a hindrance to his designs. Carnot also was suffered to return, and was even made minister of war, because Berthier was indispensable to the army. Fouché found Barrère and Vadier indispensable to his system of *espionnage*, and to his political operations and writings;—only Pichegru and some others, who it was obvious would always prefer the old dynasty to the rule of Bonaparte, were not allowed to return to France. The *émigrés*, who had been driven on shore on the coast of Normandy, first threatened with death, then kept four years in prison, and among whom there were Choiseul and other considerable men belonging to the old nobility, were set at liberty and permitted to leave the kingdom. The festivals observed in honour of the abolition of royalty were discontinued, and only two national festivals—those of the 14th of July and of the 22nd of September—were retained for a time, for appearance sake; the festivals of the 10th of August and of the 21st of January were altogether abolished.

In the same manner as Bonaparte deceived the French, who are both easy to be deceived and easy to be excited respecting the internal state of affairs and their loss of liberty, he calmed their fears respecting his eager desire of conquest and his military dominion, by the exhibition of a well-feigned love of peace, on his first entrance on the duties of the consulate. The two steps which he took with this view appeared indeed ridiculous to the few who were really acquainted with the state of public affairs, whilst they were perfectly satisfactory to the many who pay respect to words, but at the same time universally create a public opinion. Without the least respect to the nature or forms of the English constitution, he wrote a letter personally to King George III., as if the matter in question was some private affair of the king's, or as if his own new dignity had been formally recognised, offering him, in smooth speech and high-

sounding phrases, the hand of peace. Even had not King George been obliged to submit to the burdensome yoke of the imperious Pitt, neither he nor his bosom friend, Count Münster, the pearl of Hanoverian aristocrats and quintessence of all their prejudices, would have been inclined to deal in such plebeian fashion with a man of inferior birth. Grenville replied in the king's stead, and the grossly rude language in which the English secretary conveyed his rejection of the offer, formed a remarkable contrast to Bonaparte's somewhat romantic letter, written to suit the taste of the French. The journals were thus furnished with an occasion for abusing England, of comparing the dry Grenville with the valiant Bonaparte, of again awaking all the feelings of national hatred and making the war popular. In the same style Bonaparte addressed himself to the emperor, and in this case the form of reply selected was quite suitable. According, however, to the terms of the subsidy treaty, the emperor could not negotiate without England, and Bonaparte must have known the policy of the Austrian cabinet too well not to have smiled at his own proposal, in which he appeared to suppose that the emperor, before he had tried his fortune in the field, would give up all his conquests and come back to the stipulations of the peace of Campo Formio.

In the mean time Bonaparte, being very desirous of restoring quiet in the west and north of France, and of being able to employ the royalists, as well as the troops employed in suppressing them, against the common enemy, contrived to give currency to the opinion amongst the royalists that he could be readily prevailed upon to restore the church and state after the form of olden times. The Directory, and the Jacobinism reigning in Paris, the persecution of the royalists and of the priests, together with their friends and relations, had again revived the war on the Loire, in Brittany, and Normandy; the royalists in Brittany, called Chouans, had instituted a regular system of plunder, and made inroads into the very neighbourhood of Paris. Not merely the districts of La Vendée got on foot new armed masses, but insurrectionary committees were organised in Bourdeaux and Toulouse, and, in the latter city, the father of Count Villèle, minister of finance to Louis XVIII., had had the boldness to take his seat as royal treasurer. Bonaparte was therefore at first obliged, by a decree of the 15th of January, 1800, to suspend the constitution which had been just announced, in the departments of the North Coast, Isle and Vilaine, Moribhan and Lower Loire, and to confer absolute military and civil power on the commander-in-chief of his armies in the north and west. Thiers seems to us to have exaggerated the strength of this army in stating it at 60,000 men. There was also an extraordinary tribunal established, which exercised revolutionary powers and passed summary judgments, by which many were ordered to be forthwith shot. General Hedouville and Bernier the priest, afterwards made a bishop by Bonaparte,

found means, however, the one to gain over and deceive the nobility, and the other the clergy. Bernier and Bourmont, the latter of whom afterwards distinguished himself very much in Bonaparte's armies, but betrayed him to the Bourbons at a decisive moment before the battle of Waterloo, were especially active in bringing about peace. The war in La Vendée, properly so called, on the right and left bank of the Loire, was terminated by an agreement concluded on the 18th of February, 1800, at Montfaucon, in the department of Maine and Loire, not far from Beaupreau. In the Lower Loire Bourmont succeeded in inducing his numerous royalist friends, to whom privileges were secured, to withdraw their support from the war. Bourmont's long negotiations having been at length concluded, on the 24th of February even the officers who were inseparable from the exiled princes, such as Georges Cadoudal, Sol de Grisolles, and other leaders of bandits, were no longer in a condition to carry on their system of murder and pillage. Frotté was defeated in February, taken prisoner, tried, condemned, and executed; and the herculean Georges, together with the undaunted Sol de Grisolles, who were powerful in Lower Normandy and Brittany, became reconciled to the Consulate and came to Paris, but withdrew again without having renounced their fanatical zeal for the Bourbons. The suspension of the constitution as regarded certain departments, which was decreed in January, was cancelled as early as April. The old nobility now began to revive, and the more rapidly, as Bonaparte and his wife, in order to bring the old tone again into their saloons, laid great stress upon old forms and historical names. This, however, also facilitated the operations of the old princes, who were supplied with English money by Pitt and his Tories, and enabled continually to form new conspiracies, inasmuch as the number of those who lived at their ease in the midst of this new, mixed, or completely citizen society, was continually increasing. The list of *émigrés* was altogether closed, and there was a variety of means for obtaining the erasure of names; it is said, therefore, that during Bonaparte's rule, this list, which contained originally some 80,000 names, was reduced to not more than 1000. A court was formed, and with it an etiquette, whose oracles made themselves not a little merry at the *bourgeois* and military usages of the new court, and at the occasional outbursts of nature which took place. From that time arose that tone and taste which now universally prevail among the rich and people of distinction; since that time, in such circles, earnestness, nature, and truth, have more and more disappeared, or become objects of ridicule. The palace of the Tuilleries again exhibited all the decorations of royal splendour. Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant again held their conversational circles in its saloons, again talked about freedom, and made themselves objects of admiration by the elegance of their language and the fluency of their discourse; Lacretelle and the aged Palissot raved against Voltaire and Rousseau. They preached up Jesuitism

as the fashion (especially Palissot, as his favourite pupil Menneval informs us) to the high ladies of the court, and in the social circle of Joseph Bonaparte.

In the very commencement of the Consulate, the whole of that part of the administration which was not properly speaking political, or did not affect the unlimited power of the government, was admirably regulated under Bonaparte, and especially everything connected with the administration of law and justice. Bonaparte enjoyed the assistance of such men as Merlin, Cambacérès, Lebrun, Rœderer, and others, to whom no man can deny great reputation and ability in their department, and it was only necessary for him to separate the good from the bad of all the innumerable mass of laws passed in France since 1789 by the most skilful men of business, though sometimes contradictory to one another; and thus France obtained a judicial system and code of laws such as was utterly impossible in any state rotten from age, and sickly and infirm from adherence to historical law and the Byzantine learning of its jurists. At that time the foundations were quietly laid in the administration on which Bonaparte built up the despotic power which has now passed over to the ministers of Louis Philippe. He created prefectures and sub-prefectures, and the whole hierarchy connected with them, which could be from time to time easily altered; he brought the whole country again under the power of the old intendants under other titles, and delivered it up, bound, into the hands of the government and its creatures.*

* Rœderer was the man who introduced into the legislative assembly the plan of dividing the country into *départements* or prefectures, and *arrondissements* or sub-prefectures, and who there defended it as a counsellor of state. The manner in which this kind of administration was at first regulated, clearly shows how easy it was afterwards to convert it into an instrument of despotism or of *doctrinaires*. It is said: "Il y aura dans chaque département un préfet, un conseil de préfecture, et un conseil général de département, lesquels rempliront les fonctions exercées maintenant. Le préfet sera chargé seul de l'administration. Le conseil de préfecture prononcera sur les objets contentieux. Le conseil général fera la répartition des contributions directes, et déterminera dans les limites fixés par la loi le nombre de centimes additionnelles affectées aux dépense du département. Dans chaque arrondissement il y aura un sous-préfet et un conseil. Le premier consul nomme les préfets, les conseillers de préfecture, les membres des conseils généraux, les sous-préfets, les membres des conseils d'arrondissements, les maires et adjoints des villes de plus de cinq mille habitans, les commissaires de police des villes où il en aura établi. Les préfets nomment les maires et les municipaux dans les communes d'une population inférieure.

§ II.

AUSTRIA AND FRANCE.

A.—CONTINUATION OF THE WAR TILL THE TRUCES OF ALESSANDRIA AND PARSDORF.

IN the winter of 1799 Bonaparte sent Massena to Genoa, and gave the command of the army on the Var to General Suchet; on the other hand, Massena's army in Switzerland was to form the right wing of the army of the Rhine, the command of which was destined for General Moreau. Bonaparte kept carefully concealed his plan of making a sudden incursion into Italy over the chain of the Alps which extends from the St. Gothard to Mount Cenis, at the head of an army which, although dispersed, was so placed as to be capable of being suddenly united; and there was the less reason to suspect that he himself would go into Italy, as the terms of the constitution, to which, however, he attached little importance, expressly prohibited the First Consul from going beyond the limits of France. A very small part, and that the worst, of the troops destined for Italy, which the English ridiculed in their caricatures, and the Austrians despised, was placed as an army of reserve at Dijon. This was regarded as the main body, which, however, in reality was dispersed along the Rhone. The main army, before it marched to Genoa and into the Pays de Vaud, was collected together by Berthier, the minister of war, by virtue of a resolution of the 8th of March—organised and fully equipped. Carnot was appointed minister of war. Every one at that time pressed around Bonaparte, in order to share the glory and the advantage of his victories, which were regarded as certain; and he himself formed the kernel of what afterwards became his imperial army. He collected together all the soldiers and officers whom he personally knew, and whose courage and talents he had tested in his campaigns, and formed them into a consular guard, which he afterwards converted into a complete army of veterans, by constantly adding new battalions of picked troops. Jourdan and Bernadotte no longer talked about a republic, but served again in the army; Augereau's miserable soul prompted him to use the most earnest entreaties again to obtain the favour which he had lost; and he received the command in Holland.

If we compare Bonaparte's equipments and preparations with those made by the Austrian cabinet, which was under the leading of a very ordinary diplomatist—that is, a man without soul and without spirit—we shall not be surprised that the generals and the brave armies of the Emperor of Germany always shed their blood to no purpose. The Archduke Charles, and even the empress, at last felt that Thugut, Dietrichstein, and their colleagues in the cabinet, constantly undid and ruined what the generals gained in the field, and they therefore raised their voices and exerted their influence against the court council of war: Thugut, however,

adhered closely to the English, and the archduke was obliged to give way. Dietrichstein and the other pedantic wiseacres, whom Suwarrow habitually ridiculed, prevailed, and Melas was compelled, as he had been all his life long, to relinquish his own well-digested plan for a bad one which Thugut had concocted and agreed upon with the English. Melas should have fallen with his whole force upon Genoa, quickly conquered the city, and then hastened to the north of Italy, in order to anticipate the French; but the plan suggested by General Willot, who had escaped from Guiana, to Lord Keith, who commanded the fleet before Genoa, and which was supported by the Bourbons, determined it otherwise. Willot, who commanded in Provence when Bonaparte made his first campaign in Italy, and who lived in a state of continual disagreement with the commanders appointed by the Directory, maintained that the partisans of the Bourbons in Provence would fly to arms if they received the support of Melas and Keith; on this belief Lord Keith formed his plans. Melas very unwillingly agreed to a scheme which he regarded as wholly unsound. He was obliged to divide and weaken the few troops which he had in the north, in order to occupy all the passes of the Alps as far as the Tyrol; and had he even imagined that it was possible for the French to have crossed the Great St. Bernard, he would have relied on the road through the vale of Aosta being sufficiently stopped by the fortress of Bard. In accordance with the plan of the council of war in Vienna, he himself was obliged to remain in the south of Piedmont, and to separate his army into two parts. Generals Ott and Hohenzollern had at length succeeded in driving Massena's army, in which Soult also served, out of the Bocchetta and the narrow strip of land along the coast, and closely shut the French up in the fortifications of Genoa. In this they were supported and assisted by Lord Keith. Melas was desirous of marching with his whole force to Genoa, in order quickly to reduce the city, but the cabinet in Vienna was of a different mind. He was obliged to send Ott alone to Genoa, and by that means the siege was prolonged till Bonaparte's preparations were complete. Melas himself was directed to turn his arms against Suchet, who was in Provence, and to direct the march of his troops along the coast, in order to receive the assistance and support of Lord Keith. Nothing could be more favourable for Bonaparte than the fact that the main body of the Austrians had marched from the extreme south of Northern Italy against Provence, at the time at which he undertook and effected his extraordinary march over the Great St. Bernard.

In Germany, General Lecourbe, it is true, had been driven back completely behind the Rhine; all the strong points, however—Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel over against Mayence, Kehl, Altbreisach, and Kleinbasle—were still occupied by the French. Switzerland, too, remained in the hands of the French, whilst the Austrians occupied the Grisons; and both parties employed the concluding months of

the year 1799 and the commencement of 1800 in making new preparations. At this time, too, Bonaparte wrote the letter to the Emperor Francis, to which allusion has already been made, and which the latter caused to be answered by Thugut, but not with as good reason as George III. had caused that addressed to him to be answered by Lord Grenville; a man, however, of Thugut's character did not write in such harsh and severe terms. The Archduke Charles, having been compelled to retire, had recourse as usual to the pretext of the state of his health, and left the command in Germany to General Kray, who had gained a victory in the previous year before the arrival of Suwarrow. General Kray reached the head-quarters at Donauschingen in the middle of March.

The French recruited their army not only by means of the conscription which was introduced, but a feeling of enthusiasm in favour of Bonaparte drew many volunteers, and particularly royalists from the west, to the army; the First Consul, moreover, understood how to reinforce the army by other means. He formed the consular guard already mentioned as the kernel and reserve of the army, declared all furloughs to be void, and by means which he understood better than any man, incited all military men again to enter the service. He established a corps which he called *gendarmerie*, and collected volunteers, who presented themselves in numbers, because the nation looked for a rapid termination of the war through Bonaparte. Moreau, it is true, was to begin the campaign; but Bonaparte wished to strike the main blow in Italy, and Moreau was therefore to regulate his plan so as to be subordinate to that of the First Consul; which he would not consent to do. The authors of Napoleon's pretended memoirs ascribe to him every possible evil—and depreciate him in every way in their power. He was, indeed, no genius, and no great character such as Napoleon Bonaparte; but the Bonapartists malign and abuse him for reasons very different from the real historical ones. Both the ministers of war, first Berthier and after him Carnot, were obliged to try to prevail upon Moreau to fall in with Bonaparte's views. When Berthier resigned the office of minister of war, and proceeded to Dijon in order to organise the army of reserve, he had an interview with Moreau in Basle, on the 16th of April; the discontented general was not, however, to be moved, and Bonaparte was constrained to change his plan of operations. Subsequently Carnot himself took a journey to Ulm for the express purpose of having a conference with Moreau, and prevailed upon him to relinquish a division of his forces to the army of Italy.

Eleven days after the conference in Basle, Moreau crossed the Rhine and surprised Kray. He directed his left wing, which crossed the river between Basle and Kehl, towards the valley of the Kinzig; Kray therefore imagined that the main attack would be made in this quarter; but when Lecourbe passed the river with the right wing five days afterwards, the whole plan of operations was

suddenly changed—the French marched towards Freiburg, and on the 2nd of May the whole army was on its way towards Stockach, where Kray arrived too late. He attempted in vain to reach Stockach before the French, and was obliged, under unfavourable circumstances, to risk the issue of a battle near Engen, on the 3rd of May. The Austrians fought with great courage and perseverance till ten o'clock at night, but they were at last obliged to retreat, with the loss of between 3000 and 4000 men, with a few pieces of cannon and some standards; and the French allege that they took 7000 prisoners. Moreau followed the enemy with such rapidity with his whole army, that Kray was compelled to fight a second battle near Möskirch as early as the 5th. Here, too, the engagement continued from early morning till eight o'clock in the evening; and yet, even according to the boasting and exaggerated reports of the French, the Austrians did not suffer any very considerable loss either in killed or prisoners, in colours or artillery, though they were obliged to evacuate the field of battle. They directed their march towards the Danube, in order to protect themselves in a fortified camp which was constructed before Ulm. On their route thither, however, they suffered a new defeat on the plain of Mettenberg, and lost 1500 men in Memmingen. The two armies lay in face of each other for some weeks in the neighbourhood of Ulm, each seeking to gain the most favourable position; and during this time Bonaparte commenced his expedition to Italy.

The expedition to Italy, which was attended with such rapid and splendid results, in consequence of the simplicity and despondency of the Austrians, made Bonaparte the idol of the whole French nation, which idolised itself in him and with him, and especially trumpeted forth the passage of the St. Bernard by the most romantic and extraordinary descriptions. It was, no doubt, a most remarkable and adventurous enterprise; and Bonaparte was at that time an undoubtedly great man, especially when compared with the reigning pygmies and their aristocratic ministers. Before leaving Paris, he bound all France to himself by the measures which he adopted and the appointments which he made, in which he chose and mingled the persons to be appointed from all parties, provided only they possessed abilities equal to the duties to be performed, and were loyal to his government. Before his departure from Paris he named the whole of the prefects, high officers of state and judges—in short, the whole army of *employés* dependent upon the government; and on this occasion, for the first time, he filled up by nomination the offices of secretaries, and the executive departments of the law and government, all which had been previously disposed of by sale. He thus attached to himself those whose pecuniary interests were promoted by the gift of these offices. Berthier had so distributed the army of reserve from Martigny to Dijon and Lyons, that it was impossible to determine what portion of it was destined for Italy and what for Germany, when Bonaparte left Paris on the

6th of May, and proceeded in all haste through Geneva to the foot of the Great St. Bernard.

Bonaparte's march across the Great St. Bernard, on whose summit stands the celebrated *hospice*, amidst snow and ice, was unquestionably a great and wonderful undertaking; but the French writers, and all who look for romance in history, or seek to turn this enterprise into an *epos*, have created many wonders by their mode of representation, which, on nearer examination, prove to be very much less than they are described to be. Even Matthew Dumas, who is in other respects an intelligent and critical historian, from the very first exaggerates the difficulties of a march in which Bonaparte had not to fear an enemy at hand, as Suwarow had in his passage over the St. Gothard and the Flimser.* The rhetoricians altogether overlook the fact that only a small division of the army clambered over the mountain into the Valley of Aosta, whilst at the same time the main part of the troops marched through all the great and small passes. One portion of the army crossed the Little St. Bernard, another the Simplon, a third Mount Cenis, a fourth Mount Genevre, and one over the St. Gothard. The last-mentioned division consisted of the troops which, as we have already mentioned, Moreau allowed to be withdrawn from his army. When Moreau was obliged to march towards the Danube, he left Lecourbe in the mountains, who, as soon as the commander-in-chief had a wing free on the Lech, was obliged to reinforce Moncey, who was to cross the St. Gothard with 18,000 to 20,000 men: for this purpose Lecourbe detached General de Lorges.

As regards Bonaparte's passage over the St. Bernard, the ascent of the steep mountain, covered with snow and ice, from Martigny, and the descent over precipitous and dangerous rocks into the valley of Aosta, we can admire the boldness of the enterprise and the courage of the leader, without falling into those absurdities which French writers commit when they compare the difficulties of the three days on and over the St. Bernard with Hannibal's march from Spain over the Pyrenees and Alps, through the countries of the savage nations of Gaul and of the Alps, into the plains of Lombardy. Bonaparte was accompanied by whole crowds of Italians and people

* The author must refer his readers for a more minute examination of the authorities concerning this and other points till the year 1805, to the third part of his "Zur Beurtheilung Napoleons," &c., as this little book was expressly written by him, in order to enable him to compress his materials here as much as possible. The most difficult thing was the transport of the artillery, and the accounts given in the "Mémoires de Napoleon," vol. i., p. 206, correspond completely with that of Matthew Dumas:—"Le passage prompt de l'artillerie paraît une chose impossible. On s'étoit pourvu d'un grand nombre de mulets, on avoit fabriqué une grande quantité de petites caisses, pour contenir les cartouches d'infanterie et les munition des pièces. Ces caisses devoient être portées par les mulets, ainsi que des forges de Montagne, de sorte que la difficulté réelle à vaincre étoit les transports des pièces. Mais on avoit préparé à l'avance une centaine de troncs d'arbre creusés de manière à pouvoir recevoir les pièces qui y étoient fixées par les tourilleurs. A chaque bouche à feu ainsi disposée 100 soldats devoient s'atteler et les affûts devoient être démontés et patés à dos de mulets."

from the Vallais, who acted as guides, and facilitated the march of the troops; he had at his command all the resources of France and Switzerland to assist and prepare his troops; enthusiasts of all kinds, republican and royalist, rushed to his standards; and he was surrounded by hundreds of Italians, whom he was leading back to their homes. He himself had no enemy to dispute his passage, and Lannes had already appeared in Piedmont, to assail and take the fort of Bard from the other side; he was, however, repulsed, with a great loss in men, of which the French, after their fashion, make no mention. Bonaparte's passage of the St. Bernard was effected from the 17th till the 20th of May, and on the 21st he reached Aosta. He therefore appeared in the most northerly corner of Northern Italy on the very day on which Melas, in the extreme south-west of the same country, learned that the French had shown themselves in Piedmont. Whether it be true, as is alleged, that Melas knew nothing of all these immense preparations for this passage over the Alps, which Bonaparte had been making for more than three months before, we do not stop to inquire; that he commenced his movement too late is proved.

When Melas at length broke up, Ott was still detained before Genoa, because Massena and Soult, both, as is well known, destitute of a single spark of feeling, not only suffered their soldiers to die of starvation—that might have been their duty—but gave up thousands of unfortunate Genoese to the same fate, for the purpose of holding Genoa a few days longer. The French are unable to find language strong enough to magnify the heroic deeds of Massena and Soult in their defence of Genoa, whilst our whole nature revolts when we read and learn at what cost of human suffering and human life the delay of those few days was purchased. These two monsters looked coolly on for weeks, whilst the unfortunate inhabitants of Genoa, their prisoners, and their own soldiers, were either dying of hunger, or suffering the most dreadful torments from bad food. The murmurs and lamentations of thousands, who were slowly falling victims to want, might have touched the heart even of a stone; and the number of Genoese who are said absolutely to have died of hunger is given at 20,000, which is probably an exaggeration. The extent, however, to which the two generals pushed the matter, may be learned from the fact, that when they at length capitulated on the 4th of June, not more than two ounces of very bad food were being served to each of their own soldiers daily. The 8000 men who remained at the surrender were therefore like so many skeletons.

Melas delayed the commencement of his movements till the 24th of May, and when he set out on his march he left the half of his army, under General Elsnitz, to oppose Suchet on the Var, and only recalled him when he at length learned, in Coni, that Bonaparte himself had advanced with an army into Italy. By his order Ott would have raised the siege of Genoa, and joined the main army

with the troops under his command, had not that city capitulated at the very moment.

Melas marched to Turin; Bonaparte directed his steps straight to Milan, where he arrived on the 2nd of June. The Italians had quite as little good to expect from him as from the Emperor Francis; for the Austrian general, when he entered Genoa by the assistance of the English, who had disembarked their marines, never exhibited the slightest appearance of a desire to restore the republic,* and Bonaparte acted very little better in Milan. The First Consul was received with unbounded rejoicings, and the restoration of the Cisalpine republic was announced; in fact, however, a provisional government alone was established, and immediately after the battle of Marengo, it became publicly known that the independence which the Lombards expected from Bonaparte was an empty shadow. The Consul, moreover, remained in Milan only till the 6th of May, in order to secure and occupy all the passes on the Adige and the Po, and to restore the Cisalpine magistrates and officials, and then proceeded to meet Melas, who had descended into the plain between Alessandria and Piacenza, and in the neighbourhood of the former was waiting for General Ott, in full march from Genoa to join him. Bonaparte was here obviously favoured by accident, and this favour was ascribed by his idolaters to his own great and indisputable abilities, which, however, clearly contributed nothing to the lucky arrival of Victor and to the too precipitate advance of General Ott. Ott had advanced with almost incredible haste, having made four days' march in two, and arrived just at the proper time in the neighbourhood in which the decisive battle of Marengo was afterwards fought, but he put his force in motion precisely at the time he ought to have remained quiet. Murat had occupied Piacenza, Lannes was encamped at Stradella, and offered Ott battle on the 9th of June, between Montebello and Casteggio. Ott should have declined instead of accepting the challenge, because he did not know whether Melas might find it advisable to come to his aid, as Bonaparte did to that of his generals. The French were at first very hardly pressed; but Bonaparte sent Victor, Geney, and Rivaud, one after another, with fresh troops—nay, he came into the neighbourhood, himself, accompanied by Berthier, whilst Melas remained perfectly quiet. Ott was therefore driven back, but not, as the rhetoricians allege, completely defeated. The boasting memoirs of St. Helena are, therefore, more correct than Berthier in his report of the battle, than Norvins in his bombastic prose, and than all the innumerable rhetoricians, for the memoirs are not, like the rest, liberal with thousands, and fully confirm what we give in a note

* We cannot express this better or more truly than in the language of Botta. In vol. v., libro xix., p. 117, he observes: “Creava il generale Tedesco una reggenza imperiale e reale . . . del rimanente nessuno cenno ne da parte di Hohenzollern ne da quella di Melas per l'indipendenza ne per la restaurazione del antico governo.”

from Botta.* The battle of Montebello lasted from eleven o'clock in the morning till six o'clock in the evening, and the Austrians maintained their ground till fate brought thither Bonaparte and Berthier, who sent for Victor and Rivaud. Ott threw a garrison into Tortona, and then retired in good order to Voghera. The same fortune which assisted Bonaparte in the battle of Montebello, led Dessaix from Egypt, at the decisive moment of the battle of Marengo; and his presence contributed largely to the victory. In consequence of circumstances which will be subsequently detailed, Dessaix was long detained in Egypt and prevented from obeying Bonaparte's orders to follow him to France. When, however, this was accomplished, and he at length landed in Toulon, he found orders awaiting him to hasten immediately to Piedmont. He set out forthwith, and met Bonaparte in Stradella two days before the battle of Marengo.

Melas, who occupied a fortified camp at Alessandria, was as anxious for a speedy and decisive battle as Bonaparte himself, who as yet had not got possession of a single fortified town, not even Arona or the citadel of Milan; both, therefore, advanced, and met on the 14th of June at Marengo, not far from Alessandria. We are designedly very brief in all our notices of mere military operations, because the results and facts of chief importance alone are necessary for the object which we always keep expressly in view, and therefore, in reference to the battle of Marengo, we content ourselves with remarking, that all the accounts of it agree in affirming that the Austrians were victorious as long as Melas remained in the field; nay, more, a courier was ready to be despatched by the French to Paris with the news of the loss of the battle. The French add, that General Dessaix afterwards, by availing himself of a fault committed by Major-General von Zach, who had previously contributed very largely to the success of the Austrians, turned the fate of the day, and snatched the victory from the enemy. Melas, then nearly eighty years of age, exhausted by weariness and long-continued efforts, left the field and retired to Alessandria, because he looked upon the battle as won. The command devolved on Major-General von Zach, who either gave way to his own impetuosity, or was involuntarily carried by his horse, and advanced too far before his troops. He did not observe that Marmont, by Dessaix's orders, had so placed his artillery as to make repeated gaps in the ranks of the incomparable Austrian grenadiers. Dessaix, having first taken Von Zach prisoner, plunged with his infantry into these breaks; and Kellerman, with a brigade of cavalry, afterwards completed the defeat of the Austrians.† Dessaix fell; the Austrians were partly driven into

* Botta very correctly observes: "Morì in questo fatto e fu presa gran gente agli Austriaci, ma la metà meno di quanto portarono gli scritti di Berthier. Morì anche gran gente di Francesi; e poco meno che agli Austriaci; pochi restarono prigionieri."

† Homayr, in his "Sketches of the War of Liberation," vol. iii., p. 106, alleges that the French won the battle of Marengo not through Dessaix, but of the short-sighted-

the Bormida and partly succeeded in getting across; but Bonaparte afterwards, through his own skill, the diplomatic ability of those whom he employed, and the incapacity and narrow-mindedness of the Austrian generals with whom he had to negotiate, obtained a far more splendid and advantageous victory in the cabinet than he had won in the field.

After the battle Melas undoubtedly found himself in a dangerous, but by no means desperate position; he and his advisers, however, had obviously lost their understandings. The battle had cost him a third of his army, but Bonaparte had lost the fourth part of his, and had not a single fortress in his power.

The suspension of arms after the battle of Marengo, and Mack's capitulation in Ulm, best prove what was the result of the Jesuitical policy of Austria, whose principle it was to discourage and keep at a distance every description of genius. Nothing but mere memory work, and a cold, calculating prudence, was patiently endured. All the higher offices of the state were filled by the nobility, and the middle ones were completely in the power of their mechanical chanceries, whilst a foreign apostate was employed for things which required other capacities and powers than those which the mere mechanical training of Austria furnished. Enthusiasm was and is a thing proscribed as dangerous, and on this ground alone is it possible to explain Melas' conduct; for treachery is entirely out of the question. Melas, instead of adopting a rapid and bold determination immediately on the day after the battle, sent a messenger into the enemy's camp, to make overtures for a suspension of arms. In the mean time Bonaparte had received Major-General von Zach, who had been taken prisoner, with friendly words, with magnanimity, with apparent respect, sorrow, and regard for the brave Austrian army; in short, with all those arts of which he was so consummate a master, and succeeded in making such an impression upon Von Zach, that he was persuaded to return with Melas' flag of truce to Alessandria, and made an instrument of alluring the veteran general into the snare.* Bonaparte persuaded him, that from pure generosity of dispo-

ness of Von Zach and his unmanageable Limousin charger, which bore him against his will into the hands of the enemy, and by the slight wound and the weak and inactive condition of Melas.

* The best account which we have read of this incomprehensible capitulation is contained in the "Mémoires d'un homme d'Etat," vol. vii., p. 301. This agreement is there called "un énigme qui ne saurait être expliqué que par l'affaiblissement des facultés mentales (which he never had) de Melas, ou la corruption de son état major." There too, at p. 340, circumstances are related which we never quote on the authority of a book, which we never trust except when corroborated by other sources. Although we do not introduce them into the text, they may properly be given here. In the evening of the 14th, it is said, nothing was really lost:—"Car le prince de Rohan arrivait avec un renfort de neuf mille hommes, qu'on pouvoit de Gênes en recevoir un de dix mille et être joint par l'armée Anglaise de Mahon. Melas étoit inattaquable dans la position qu'il occupoit; avait, en perdant une nouvelle bataille, ce qui n'étoit pas probable, sa rétraite assurée sur les places fortes du midi de l'Italie, où il eût été ravitaillé par la flotte Anglaise; tandis que

sition, he was ready to agree to a peace upon the conditions which he had laid down in his autograph letter to the emperor before the beginning of the war. This appeared to General von Zach and to the vain Count St. Julien, whom Melas employed in diplomacy, the very most which the Austrians had any reason to expect. These negotiators never dreamt that Bonaparte, in granting a suspension of hostilities till the conditions of peace should be determined on, would require things whose concession would render it impossible for the emperor to renew the war with any prospect of success.

According to the conditions of the truce to be granted, the whole Austrian army was to withdraw behind the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, and the Po; the whole country south of these rivers was to be evacuated to the French. Peschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, Ferrara, and Tuscany, were to continue under the power of the Austrians, and the district between the Chiesa, Oglio, and Po, to remain in the hands of the French. Neither Austrians nor French were to be allowed to occupy the country between the Chiesa and the Mincio. Tortona, Alessandria, the castle of Milan, the citadel of Turin, Pizzighettone, Arona, Piacenza, Coni, Ceva, Genoa, Savona, and the fortress of Urbano, were immediately to be given up to the French. The Austrians were to be allowed to take away with them the artillery which they had brought into the country, whilst that originally belonging to the several cities and fortresses and districts, was to remain in the hands of the French. It is supposed that by this article alone the French obtained 12,000 cannon and 2,000,000 lbs. of gunpowder. All Europe were astonished that Melas ventured to send this article to Vienna by Count St. Julien, and that in such an irresponsible manner he even surrendered and hastily evacuated Genoa, which the English had helped him to conquer.

In Germany, such a man as Sztaray, even on the march from Engen to the Danube, had completely neglected all proper means of care for the brave soldiers. An indescribable indifference prevailed in the whole commissariat department; confusion and want of discipline became universal. It is reckoned, that in the few first days of May some 20,000 men were taken prisoners, killed, and wounded; and the German accounts of eye-witnesses state that the neglect of the wounded was in the highest degree inhuman. They lay under any kind of shelter, in the most melancholy condition, or were scattered about in wretched hospitals from Winterthur to Ingolstadt. In addition to the wounded, some ten thousand able-bodied men took up their abode in the hospitals and in other places from sheer want, and a total relaxation of discipline. Between the middle of May

Bonaparte, ayant à dos une rivière débordée (the Scrivia), et sur ses flancs des forteresses ennemis, ne gagnait rien par une victoire, et étoit perdu sans ressource par une défaite."

If what Thiers, vol i., p. 351, says of Bonaparte's address to Melas' representative be true, how small has this sophistical intriguer made his hero, who, after the fashion of a common bully and cheat, works upon, and, by boasting, excites the fear of the weak simpleton whom he overreaches and deceives!

and the middle of June the French got possession of the whole country bounded by the Rhine, the Danube, the Iller, and the Lake of Constance; Kray, however, maintained himself firmly in his position at Ulm, and Moreau could not allure him from his trenches till he made an attempt to cross to the left bank of the Danube. By this attempt he meant to force Kray to an action or compel him to retreat, by exciting his fears lest he might be cut off from his magazines in Donauwörth and Ratisbon. Moreau himself failed in his attempt to cross the Danube above Ulm; Lecourbe, after a series of actions from the 16th till the 19th, was more fortunate below the city, although the brave Kray, who had not become a general as a member of the high nobility, renewed the contest in the field on three successive days. These engagements, which issued unfavourably to the Austrians, took place on the same ground on which they had gained such a splendid victory under Marlborough and Prince Eugene in 1704—near Hochstedt and Blenheim. Moreau, who was less accustomed to exaggerate than Bonaparte, wrote from Dillingen on the 20th, that in the course of the three days, from the 16th till the 19th, the Austrians had lost in killed and prisoners 5000 men, 20 pieces of cannon, 5 stand of colours, 1200 horses, and 500 waggons laden with provisions. This loss would have been insignificant in itself, had it not brought with it that of the position on the Schellenberg and of the magazines in Donauwörth. The only thing which remained for Kray after this loss was either to risk a decisive battle, or to retire behind the Isar. He chose the latter, and as early as the 22nd had taken up a position with his army at Nordlingen. Moreau followed him up quickly, and would pay no attention whatever to the suspension of arms agreed to at Alessandria, of which Kray informed him, but sought, before he should receive official intelligence of its conclusion, to drive the Austrians over the Inn, in order to open up a communication between his army and that of Italy over the Voralberg. He attained this object by driving Kray, who had tried to maintain his ground at Braunau, out of his lines at the foot of the Tyrolese mountains and across the Inn. The Austrians then found themselves compelled to give up their position at Feldkirch, which had been so long and so bravely defended; and Moreau agreed to enter into negotiations for a suspension of hostilities throughout the whole of Southern Germany. General Lahori and Count Dietrichstein, whose imaginary universal wisdom formed such a frequent and fruitful subject of ridicule to Suwarow in his correspondence, agreed upon the conditions of the truce at Parsdorf, near Munich, on the 15th of July, and the whole of South Germany was again given up to the plunder, oppression, and extortions of the French. We shall not enter into details of the manner in which they practised them, but remark only, as Moreau's disposition and habits did not allow him to practise such extortions of millions as were practised by such men as Massena, Soult, and others, this office fell into the hands of the

subordinate officers, who harassed and tormented the people. The main conditions of the truce signed in Parsdorf were: that the space between the Isar and the Inn was to be occupied neither by the Austrians nor the French. The boundary line between the two armies was to run from Balzers in the Grisons close to the Tyrol, to touch the Danube at Vilshofen—to ascend the Danube as far as the mouths of the Altmühl—to follow the course of the Altmühl to the Rednitz—and from thence down the Maine to Mayence. Within this space the fortresses of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt were to remain invested by the French, but from fortnight to fortnight were to be allowed to be supplied with the necessary provisions for that interval of time.

B.—NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR TILL THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE.

Count St. Julien was sent to Vienna with the preliminaries of peace, which Melas thought so favourable and worthy of acceptance that he concluded the unexampled truce of Alessandria without hesitation. Bonaparte put into St. Julien's hands a second autograph letter to the Emperor Francis, which he himself, in one of his letters to the two other consuls, his colleagues, pronounces to be a very original affair. The emperor sent him an autograph, though very laconic reply, but suffered his cabinet, in his name, to have recourse to a very dishonourable trick, the approval of which does but very small credit to the Emperor Francis, and which threw him completely into the hands of Bonaparte. Thugut, who, at the very moment of St. Julien's arrival in Vienna knew not what counsel to adopt in the field, and wished to draw some money from the English, acted on the one side as if he was willing to accept of Bonaparte's preliminaries, and therefore to conclude a peace without reference to England; and yet, on the other, he prevailed upon the emperor to ratify a subsidy treaty with England on the 20th of June, 1800, by virtue of which he bound himself not to enter into any negotiations for a peace till February, 1801, without the consent and participation of England. In order to gain time till preparations were made, and the breaks in the army filled up, Thugut sent to Paris two officers, quite unused to diplomatic business, with a view to sign preliminaries in that city, which might afterwards, with some appearance of right, be disallowed, on the ground that they had exceeded their commission, which was so equivocally expressed as readily to afford the Austrian government an opportunity for saying that it had been exceeded. In order to deceive France, Austria, by virtue of the agreement with England, received 24,000,000 of florins as a *loan*, and, by the third article of the same agreement, Austria promised, in connexion with England, zealously to prosecute the war against France. In the fourth article, again, England consented that the Bavarian, Württemberg, and

Swiss troops in English pay, should be placed at the disposal of the emperor for the prosecution of the war in Germany; and, in the fifth, the emperor pledged and bound himself not to conclude a peace, without the approval of England, till the end of February, 1801.* Under these circumstances the English were obliged to allow the Austrians to deal with Genoa as if they alone had conquered it, although Lord Keith, and the English fleet under his command, were, in fact, mainly instrumental in its fall, because the garrison could not have been reduced to starvation without their aid. When Ott took his hasty departure from Genoa he transferred the command to Hohenzollern. Immediately after the battle of Marengo Lord Keith urged the Austrian general to deliver up Genoa to the army which the English had assembled in Minorca, in order to wrest Egypt from the French, and which they were anxious first to bring to Genoa. Lord Keith was desirous that this should be done before the French should be able to take possession. The arrival of the army, however, was delayed, and Suchet insisted so strongly on the evacuation of the city, that Hohenzollern was obliged to admit the French, because they threatened him with a serious attack. They, in fact, obtained possession on the 24th, just when the English transports appeared in sight of the harbour, and at the moment when the English ships of war, threatened by the guns of the fortress, were obliged to leave the port.

As to Thugut's trick to deceive the French by signing preliminaries of peace, the same Count St. Julien, who was the bearer of Bonaparte's singular letter to the emperor, was sent to Paris with powers, cautiously and equivocally drawn up, apparently empowering him to sign preliminaries of peace on the basis of the conditions of the peace of Campo Formio. Count St. Julien was accompanied by a colleague—by Count Neipperg—a vain and very narrow-minded man, who was wholly unfit for business, although he afterwards very well fulfilled the duties of a husband to the Austrian Princess Maria Louisa, when she was separated from Bonaparte; perhaps for the very reason that he had served a good purpose in his other position. Every one was astonished at the time that two such persons should have been sent to Paris to negotiate with a ruler like Bonaparte and a minister like Talleyrand: it very soon became obvious, however, why these very men were chosen. They had been both so thoroughly accustomed, in the subordination school of the Austrian systematic military service, to be mere dead machines, that they could not take it amiss that the cabinet should deal with them as it had done with Count Fröhlich, who, too, had done nothing more than he was ordered to do. After the conquest of Ancona, Fröhlich had caused the standards planted by the Russians to be removed, and thereby given grievous offence to the Emperor of Russia, and filled him with indignation against Austria. In order to appease his resentment, the

* See Martens' "Recueil," vol. vii., pp. 387-398.

Austrian cabinet caused Fröhlich to be tried by a court-martial and condemned, but afterwards awarded him a liberal compensation.

In the emperor's autograph letter in reply to Bonaparte, which St. Julien brought to Paris on the 21st of July, the truces of Paris and Alessandria were recognised, and St. Julien, after the Italian custom, which had prevailed in Vienna since the 17th century, was empowered to sign preliminaries of peace. The following facts are usually differently related; in this case, however, for good reasons we adopt Thiers' account, and put confidence in his pretended authorities, which in other cases we very rarely do.* Thiers appeals to the still existing minutes of Talleyrand's negotiations with the simple St. Julien, in order to prove how inconceivably the Austrian plenipotentiary suffered himself to be hoodwinked in Paris by Talleyrand, whom for once Thiers does not commend for his duplicity and knavery on this occasion. If we may believe him, there were so many loopholes for escape in the letter which Thugut and Lehrbach had manufactured for the Emperor Francis, that no one but a vain simpleton like St. Julien, who was eager to have the honour, on any terms, of having brought to issue the most important affairs in Europe, could have fallen into the pit which Talleyrand dug for him. We must read Thiers himself to see how mean and petty he makes his great hero and the much lauded Talleyrand, by representing them as entrapping and overreaching St. Julien, just as the lowest cheats entrap and overreach common fools.† St. Julien, in short, was formally talked over to sign the preliminaries in Paris without asking for further advice or instructions from Vienna. With these preliminaries so signed, and accompanied by Bonaparte's Duroc, he set out for Vienna, where, according to the plan arranged before his mission to Paris, his precipitancy apparently caused much displeasure.

Duroc was not allowed to pass beyond the Austrian outposts in Bavaria, whilst St. Julien and Neipperg were accused in Vienna of having overstepped their powers, and the one was sent to the

* The matter would be very different from what is related in the text had the emperor's commission been worded precisely as it is printed in the "Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat," vol. viii., p. 311. The document as given by Thiers, on the other hand, is so equivocally expressed, as to justify us in supposing that such a paper would be drawn up by such men as Lehrbach and Thugut; and the account given by Thiers in the following pages bears such marks of Talleyrand and Bonaparte, that we believe in the genuineness of his account.

† We shall here give the commencement of the passage to which we refer, that those who have any judgment in such things may see that the account given in the text is by no means exaggerated: "M. de St. Julien," he observes, vol. ii., p. 57, "que le désir de jouer un rôle considérable entraînait au delà de toutes les bornes raisonnables, avait de tems en tems des scrupules sur l'étrange hardiesse qu'il se permettait. Mais pour le rassurer, M. de Talleyrand consentit à promettre sur sa parole d'honneur, que ces articles préliminaires resteraient secrets, et qu'ils ne seraient considérés comme ayant une valeur quelconque qu'après la ratification de l'Empereur." On this occasion, as well as on others, Thiers gives up his master, Talleyrand, but throws the shield of his sophistry over his idol, Bonaparte.

fortress of Karlstadt, and the other to Mantua, but afterwards richly compensated. The Austrians, as usual, were by no means in a condition to be able to renew the war, when the period for the termination of the suspension of arms was announced to them as early as September; and they were therefore obliged to submit to shameful sacrifices in order to obtain a short delay.

It was at that time all-important for Bonaparte to relieve Egypt and Malta, or at all events to supply his troops, which were lying there, with necessary stores and provisions; he therefore offered, immediately on Duroc's return from Bavaria to Paris, on the 15th of August, instead of instantly giving notice of the termination of the truce, to wait till the English had declared whether they, in common with Austria, would consent to enter into negotiations at Luneville for a peace. In order to please Austria they did not at first absolutely decline this proposal, but it soon appeared that they were much too prudent to be willing to pay the penalty for the mistakes of the Austrian cabinet. The Emperor Francis suffered himself at that time to enter into the unworthy intrigues of his miserable cabinet, and was led into all sorts of mean and dishonourable courses by Lehrbach and Queen Caroline of Naples, who came to Vienna in company with Lord Nelson and his precious Lady Hamilton. In order to appease Bonaparte's indignation at Thugut's last piece of knavery, he first of all entrusted the conduct of foreign affairs to Count Louis Cobenzl, who was half a Frenchman, and had been a fellow-student of Talleyrand's: Thugut, however, still retained his influence. Cobenzl was afterwards sent to Luneville, and in the mean time Lehrbach, who was Thugut's double, undertook the department of foreign affairs.

Although Cobenzl afterwards remained in France on account of the negotiations in Luneville, nothing whatever at first resulted from the congress, because Austria was bound to England, and the English minister's reply to Bonaparte's proposal enraged him to the highest degree. Bonaparte required, that if he should agree to prolong the suspension of arms with the emperor, and admit the English to take part in the congress at Luneville, a suspension of hostilities at sea should also be concluded. The English, in order to retard matters, appeared as if they were not altogether indisposed to listen to this proposal; but they wished to make a specific exception of the cases of Egypt and Malta, about which the First Consul was mainly anxious. He then proposed that the two French possessions, which were closely blockaded by the English, should be treated, whilst the truce lasted, as Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philippsburg were treated, and be allowed to receive supplies every fortnight. At length Grenville, in a note dated the 20th of September, expressly declared that England would not consent to relinquish for its ally's sake any single advantage which it had gained. We subjoin in a note the precise words, simply as Lefebvre has given them, without any of the sophistry of a Thiers or

a Bignon.* Bonaparte now therefore caused the emperor to make good the sins committed by the English, who finally took Malta on the 5th of September. He had profited by the interval of the truce to organise a completely new army in Germany under Augereau, and to send immense reinforcements to Moreau. The plan-makers and intrigue-forgers in Vienna had thrown the Austrian army into a state of complete confusion, and rendered it both discontented and useless. The imperial army had only been reinforced by recruits, and the Archduke Charles had declined the command, because he could not consent to follow the conceits and intrigues of the council in Vienna, which had at length succeeded in removing the valiant Kray and thirty others of the higher officers from the army. Nothing had resulted from the general rising in Hungary. The so-called Bohemian legion to be raised by the Archduke Charles, then in command in Bohemia, had not been organised, for the call made by the local government in Prague upon the militia had produced no effect. The discontent in the Austrian army in Bavaria had reached so great a pitch as early as July, and despondency and cowardice were so generally manifested and to such a dreadful extent, that the council in Vienna came to the mad determination of inspiring courage into a cowardly and terrified army by a revolting execution, which was in fact carried into effect on the 25th of August. Even before the expiration of the truce two battalions of borderers laid down their arms in the presence of the enemy. When the war again threatened to begin, forty-three of these men were seized upon: four of them hanged, and the remaining thirty-nine cruelly tortured by flogging with rods.

This made a very bad impression in the army—an impression which endeavours were afterwards made to remove by the appearance of the emperor himself in the army. He arrived there from Vienna on the 6th of August, but unhappily brought with him Count Lehrbach, the worst and most wicked of all his court intriguers, who had undertaken the department of foreign affairs, either till Cobenzl returned, or till Thugut might again come from behind the scenes upon the public stage. The emperor, on his arrival, found everything in such a completely confused and disorganised condition, that even he saw that an extension of the truce, whose termination had been announced, must be obtained at any cost: he therefore caused negotiations on the subject to be opened at Hohenlinden. The result of these negotiations was, that in order to obtain a delay of forty-five days, it was found necessary to sacrifice the bulwarks of Southern Germany and the property of the Empire in a scandalous manner. The respite of forty-five days was

* "Histoire des Cabinets d'Europe pendant le Consulat et l'Empire, écrite avec les documents réunis aux archives des affaires étrangères, 1800—1815." Paris, 1845. 2 vols. 8vo. In vol. i, p. 82, he gives Grenville's words, as follows: "Sa majesté ne saurait admettre qu'on lui demande une compensation pour les avantages que son allié pourroit retirer de la continuation de l'armistice en Allemagne."

granted on condition of Ulm, Philippsburg, and Ingolstadt being surrendered to the French. In the agreement there was not a single word concerning the maintenance and preservation of the works, or the valuable materials, which in fact did not belong to the Austrians. The French immediately razed the whole of the fortifications, and took possession of the valuable stores of ammunition and artillery. They derived more than 1,000,000 of florins from the sale of the iron and materials of the razed fortifications. The prolongation of the truce having been obtained in this melancholy way, the emperor returned to Vienna, on the 24th of September.

The changes in the Austrian army which were at this time made, gave sure anticipation of the victory to the French; for a prince, still a minor, under the guidance and advice of General Lauer, whose name no man beyond the limits of Germany had ever heard, was to be pitted against such a general as Moreau. Even the general was not altogether free, because he was surrounded by and associated with members of the Austrian aristocracy, who had neither calling nor responsibility. This will be best understood by learning the manner in which the several commands in the army were distributed. The commander-in-chief of the whole army, in name at least, was the Archduke John—with General Lauer as his Mentor. Together with Lauer commands were also conferred on Count Kollowrath and Baron von Simbschön. The latter was placed at the head of the forces on the left bank of the Danube, and was supported by Duke William of Bavaria, who was certainly no hero, with a corps of 3000 Bavarians, driven together in all haste. In the Tyrol, General Hiller, who was undoubtedly a good general, was opposed to Macdonald, who had gained a very high reputation by his march from Naples to the Trebbia. When we bear in mind how much in every war depends upon the renown and character of the general, and that soldiers feel courage and confidence only in leaders well known and much spoken of, we have only to compare the most noble, but obscure, names of the Austrian leaders, with those of Augereau, Moreau, Lecourbe, St. Susanne, Grouchy, Ney, Richepanse, Grenier, and others who were opposed to them, to be convinced that the issue of the contest could not be for a moment doubtful.

Augereau had even at an earlier period ascended the Rhine from Holland to the neighbourhood of Mayence, and when the time of the new truce was expired, he was obliged to begin the contest. Augereau, having announced the determination of the armistice, took possession of Aschaffenburg, and proposed to push forward through Würzburg and Bamberg into Bohemia, where the Archduke Charles, as has been already observed, was at that time endeavouring in vain to raise twenty new battalions. On this occasion, the army of Italy was merely to play a subordinate character, and the chief issue was to be decided in Germany. When, therefore, Massena again began to give himself intolerable license in Italy, Bonaparte did not hesitate

to remove him from his command and replace him by Brune, who was mainly indebted for his military renown to the incapacity of the Duke of York, to whom he was opposed in Holland. At the time of the battle of Marengo, Massena was extremely indignant at Bonaparte because he did not relieve him and his army at Genoa, but, on the contrary, founded his own good fortune on their sufferings and fall; but notwithstanding this, when Bonaparte left Italy after the battle of Marengo, he was appointed commander-in-chief, however much the First Consul disapproved of his shameful system of plunder, extortion, and violence. He at last, however, carried his robbery and tyrannical violence so far, that the discipline of his army became wholly relaxed, as was previously the case in Rome, because his generals, officers, and soldiers, imitated the example of their commander. Brune was therefore nominated in his stead, but was unable to advance into the enemy's territory till Moreau had gained his splendid victory.

Moreau had positively declined all negotiations, and four days after Augereau proclaimed the termination of the armistice. He renewed the war on his part on the 27th of November. The concluding days of this month were occupied in bloody skirmishes, because the Archduke John had positive orders from Vienna to run the risk of a general battle. According to the traditional usage in Vienna, a plan of operations had been decided on in the cabinet which may have been very systematic and good, but which never could be sufficient, because the Austrian generals were totally unable to change it according to the changing circumstances when opposed to the most distinguished French generals. The beams of good fortune which shone upon the youth who was at the head of the army on the last day of November, completely dazzled him. The archduke himself, at the head of about two-thirds of his whole force, had succeeded in driving back two divisions of the French which were posted at Haag, so that Moreau himself was obliged to hasten thither to restore order to his army, which was thrown into confusion and suffered a partial defeat. The archduke and his wise advisers thought it was now all over with the French, and were eager to follow up their advantage; Moreau profited by this feeling in order to draw them into the plains of Hohenlinden, and there to offer them a decisive battle. All parties agree in stating that the whole disposition of the Austrian army in the battle of Hohenlinden was very bad; and to such universal testimony we must yield our assent; but we are ashamed to repeat what Bonaparte's idolaters and other Frenchmen bring forward in order to diminish Moreau's share of the credit of the victory, for very few victories won by the French were more splendid or glorious than that achieved by Moreau at Hohenlinden.

We do not mention the number lost by the Austrians, because we give little heed or time to matters of mere military detail. Eleven thousand were taken prisoners, among whom were 179 staff-officers,

some of very high rank; and 100 pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the French. Thugut and Lehrbach were now at last compelled to yield; the Archduke Charles, whom the French esteemed and confided in, undertook the command, but confessed, as he had done in 1797, that the council of war in Vienna had brought things to such a pass in Austria, that the country could only be saved from destruction by peace, and not by war. The archduke assumed the chief command just at the time when the main army was completely cut off from all communication with the Tyrol, when they were driven back up to the 21st of December towards Austria, constantly losing cannon, soldiers, and baggage, in skirmishes on their march, and were expelled from Salzburg. The French were now within twenty-four hours' march of Vienna, and had occupied Steyer, when Thugut was obliged to leave Vienna and to retire to the estate which the emperor had given him in Hungary. The Archduke Charles was encamped at Kremsmünster, when he was obliged to beg Moreau to grant another armistice, and to make further concessions, which enabled Bonaparte to dictate at his pleasure the articles of the peace of Luneville. This armistice was signed on the 25th of December, in Steyer, and by virtue of its conditions the emperor was obliged to give up the whole of Franconia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria to the extortions, pillage, and tormenting impositions of the French. He was obliged to relinquish all those narrow passes which the French general wished to occupy, in order to open up communication with the army of Italy through Carinthia and Styria. Among the places which were relinquished to the French in Steyer, were the fortresses of Wiürzburg, Braunau, Kufstein, and Scharnitz, and all the entrenchments and narrow passes in the Tyrol.

Brune had not been at first very successful in Italy, but Bonaparte had no hesitation, even during the suspension of arms, in making hostile inroads into Tuscany; for which indeed the Austrians and the levy *en masse* announced in the Grand Duchy furnished him with an excuse. The Austrian general, Sommariva, had been placed at the head of this levy, and together with the Neapolitan general, Roger Damas, with 12,000 English, who were to be landed at Leghorn, would have formed a dreadful army in the rear of the French in Lombardy; this furnished the French with the desired pretext to invade Tuscany, notwithstanding the continuance of the armistice. Murat, Dupont, and other generals, with their divisions, were ordered to Tuscany, in order to prevent the English from effecting a landing; but particularly to carry off large quantities of English goods lying at Leghorn, on the faith of the observance of the truce.

On the northern frontiers Brune was opposed by Bellegarde, to whose assistance Hiller sent Laudon and Wussakowitsch from the Tyrol. The cessation of the armistice had been later proclaimed in Italy than in Germany, and even after the announcement neither

Brune nor Bellegarde had exhibited any eagerness to undertake anything important. Brune was to wait till he was joined by Macdonald from the Grisons, by a road which a well-trained traveller would scarcely have ventured to take in a time of peace. Macdonald's march deserves to be noticed in this place, because it furnished materials to the rhetoric of the French for some very romantic descriptions and poetical eulogies on their deeds, although the quiet observer will regard the means as much too dangerous for the object to be attained. Macdonald's march, undoubtedly, excited universal astonishment, but the life and health of the many admirable veterans which were sacrificed in this undertaking of Macdonald and Moncey, an undertaking bordering on the incredible, would have been all to no purpose, had not Moreau gained his splendid victory and come to their assistance from the north through Carinthia. Macdonald was to push forward from the Grisons over mountains, at that time absolutely pathless, into the valley of Camonica, or to the sources of the Oggio and the Adda, in order to form a junction with Brune's army in the neighbourhood of Trent. For this purpose he and his soldiers, with their cannon and baggage, clambered over snow and rocks, by the very borders of the perpetual snow, where even now the way is impassable for months, although carriage roads have since been made at an immense cost. The easier part of this march was that across the Splügen into the Valteline, which was then without a road; incomparably more difficult was the way over the Priga into the valley of Camonica or to the Oggio, and afterwards over the Tonale to the Adige. At the very time in which Macdonald attained his object and reached Trent, Moncey crossed the Julian Alps, and by threatening Bellegarde in the rear, and occupying Chiusa, Corona, and Alla, facilitated General Brune's operations against Vicenza and Treviso.

The intelligence of the armistice concluded in Steyer, and of the opening of negotiations for a peace at Luneville, determined Brune at length to accept the proposal for a suspension of hostilities in Italy also. Negotiations for this purpose were accordingly carried on in Treviso from the 14th till the 16th of January, 1801, and on the conclusion of the terms, as is the case in all armistices which have no political aims to accomplish, but only affect the armies, no right of ratification by superior authority was reserved. Bonaparte's conduct, therefore, has been, and is, regarded as highly unworthy and dishonourable in having declared a ratification necessary and refused it, in order to take advantage of the difficulties in which Austria was placed, and to extort from them in addition the possession of Mantua. By the terms of the armistice, the fortresses of Peschiera, Porto Legnago, Ferrara, the castle of Ancona, and Verona, were evacuated to the French, but Mantua, by virtue of an express stipulation, was still to remain in the hands of the Austrians. The conditions of the armistice concluded in Treviso were quite in accordance with the demands which Bonaparte had hitherto caused to be made through his brother Joseph, who was employed to negotiate with Cobenzl in

Lunéville. He was, therefore, doubly wrong in now coming forward with a new and unheard-of claim, after he had completely shut up Austria and separated it from the English. He incessantly assailed the court with demands and threats, and although Cobenzl understood very well how to recite verses, pass social jests, and tell amusing stories, he was in no respect qualified and fitted to maintain any serious bearing in opposition to a superior mind. As early as the 20th of September, Cobenzl had suffered himself to be so completely driven into a corner, that he conceded Mantua to the French, and when Bonaparte pretended to be so indignant with Brune as to refuse to ratify the armistice agreed to in Treviso, he purchased a short respite on the 23rd of January, 1801, by concessions which were shameful to the emperor and extremely disadvantageous to the German Empire.

Mantua was to be immediately evacuated to the French; the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena to receive compensation in Germany, and the emperor to be altogether excluded from the negotiations respecting Naples and the King of Sardinia, which were to be carried on and determined solely between Russia and France. Cobenzl, moreover, promised in the name of the emperor what the emperor, properly speaking, had no right to promise—namely, that he would sign a peace for and in the name of the Empire. As a consequence of this peace, the princes and potentates whom the contracting parties desired to favour were to be compensated, or rather favoured, by having bestowed upon them the properties of those who had no protection amongst the great powers. The parties having once agreed that the decision of all questions concerning compensation should be referred to the Diet in Ratisbon, where it was certain they never could be brought to an issue without an absolute influence from without, it became very easy to agree upon the terms of a peace.

The peace of Lunéville was therefore very quickly concluded, and in fact signed as early as the 9th of February, 1801. The emperor completely sacrificed Italy and the Empire, in order to obtain some advantages for himself and his house. He left the future fate of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla entirely to Bonaparte's discretion, and in the name of the Empire subscribed conditions which decided the fate of Germany, and which were then formally accepted by the Empire on the 7th of March. Spain was at that time to be spared, as the Duke of Parma was nearly related to the King of Spain, his son being married to a Spanish princess. Bonaparte did not, therefore, take immediate possession of Parma, but left the government apparently to the duke, and gave compensation to the son for the inheritance of which he was to be deprived. The old duke vegetated for a few years in Parma, whilst a Frenchman, for appearance's sake, in his name administered the government; his son was afterwards invited to Paris, and there, as was said, to do him honour, but properly speaking to exhibit in his person a Bourbon as a pitiful

simpleton, he was treated with great distinction, and afterwards established in Tuscany as KING OF ETRURIA.

Whilst disputes and wrangling were being carried on in Ratisbon for sixteen months respecting the partition of the German Empire, the compensations in Germany were in reality quite publicly sold, as cast off clothes, by Talleyrand in Paris to the highest bidder. Some idea of the manner in which the diplomatists and princes at that time conducted themselves, what they submitted to, and the manner in which the ambassadors, in order to make themselves agreeable, even carried the lap-dogs in Talleyrand's house, may be learned from the account of Herr von Gagern, who was at that time in Paris on behalf of Nassau, as given in his book entitled, "MEIN ANTHEIL AN DER POLITIK." We can place the greater confidence in his accounts, because he formed a very different judgment of the matter from ourselves, and only looked upon those as true diplomats, who, by any means whatever, secured for their masters the largest territory and greatest number of subjects; for, as he observes, such always obtain the greatest share.

As to the peace of Luneville, it was founded upon that of Campo Formio, except that the before-mentioned oppressive conditions were added thereto.* By the second article the emperor ceded Belgium and the county of Falkenstein. By the third, the channel of the Adige was acknowledged as the southern boundary of the Austrian territory. The fourth and fifth contained the determinations concerning Parma, Modena, and Tuscany. In the sixth the question respecting the Rhine boundary is settled; and the seventh contains the agreement relating to the secularisation of the ecclesiastical territories and the compensations to be awarded.

* See Martens' Recueil, vol. vii., pp. 538-544.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORIES OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA—ENGLAND TILL THE PEACE OF AMIENS—ITALIAN AND HELVETIAN REPUBLICS—SAINT DOMINGO.

§ I.

RUSSIA AND THE CONSULATE.

A.—BONAPARTE'S FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW MONARCHY IN FRANCE.

BONAPARTE'S idea of not restoring the old monarchy with all its old faults, but of creating a new monarchy under the appearance of a republic, which should not rest upon the old foundations, but be firmly established on the institutions and laws formed and passed since 1789, and in accordance with the spirit of the age, was highly approved of by every friend of moderate freedom, such as the circumstances of our times permit. There was a general feeling of satisfaction at the plan of having at length a monarchy suited to the spirit of the age; but it became immediately obvious that the First Consul, in order to carry it into execution, must have recourse to the men of the old *régime*, and unite around him a number of the former privileged classes, who, like the mass of Frenchmen, cleaving to that to which they are accustomed, liked what was old simply because it was so. Bonaparte, therefore, soon introduced one portion of the old constitution and its forms after another, in a slightly altered character, and continually went farther backwards instead of forwards. He was told, and probably with good reason, that he could never satisfy the French and their vanity without pomp and luxury, without a court and splendour, without courtiers, nobility, a state religion, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy. This was obvious to him; but at first he tried to conceal the reality under an appearance, and he was therefore obliged to favour a system of general falsehood and deceit, because, for the accomplishment of his colossal plans, he had need of all the diplomatic arts of the olden times, together with all the sophistry of the revolution. He never acted intentionally ill, was often good-natured and kind, did and promoted what was good and honourable, as he hated what was bad; but his contempt for the miserable men and governments with which he had to do, and the lofty aspirations with which his mind was always filled, suggested to him the idea that men were only to be used as mere tools, and that a great end sanctified evil means. In this way, he first became the

idol of all enthusiasts, and then the enemy and persecutor of every noble-minded man.

From the very first establishment of the Consulate it was easy to divine Bonaparte's monarchical tendency, and his inclination towards autocracy, from all that he did; but after the battle of Marengo these were no longer to be mistaken. However unwillingly we avail ourselves of anecdotes, even although they are to be found in all books respecting Bonaparte, we believe that that which is related concerning the cause of the disfavour into which Kellerman fell with the First Consul after the battle of Marengo is well founded. Kellerman thought he had been mainly instrumental in gaining the victory; when, therefore, the First Consul greeted him and congratulated him on the field of battle, but not so warmly as the general expected, Kellerman said to him with great boldness, *You have indeed reason to praise me, for this victory will place the crown upon your head.* Bonaparte was deeply offended that any one should dare not only to fathom his plans, but even openly to express his secret thoughts. The very men who were afraid of public opinion, or who were not in a condition to despise the outcry and abuse of the miserable journalists of the day as Bonaparte might have done, had prevailed upon him at a single stroke to annihilate the liberty of the press. By the decree of the 17th of January, 1800, any disapproving judgment was rendered very dangerous indeed; the tendency of the decree was to declare that journals and newspapers were only allowed to praise, and not to censure, whatever was done by or affected the government and its servants.* The censorship of the old *régime* was therefore also restored, but under a new form. True it is that this step might be excused by the necessity of putting some curb upon the licentious clamours of the press, in order merely to be allowed to begin to govern; but it was quite intolerable that at the same time the most scandalous, cynical, *sans-culotte*, abuse should be heaped by the official journals of the government upon every person and government, princes and queens not excepted, who happened to displease the First Consul.

In precisely the same manner as under the consular government, the unbridled licentiousness of the press was succeeded by the absolute suppression of every free opinion; public neglect and even contempt of all religion was succeeded by a dead ceremonial service and a hierarchy. It was universally expected that the man upon whom it depended whether there should be a state religion or not, would have restored the Catholic religion only on the condition that it should be brought back to the principles and doctrines by which it

* Seront supprimés sur-le-champ tous les journaux qui inséreront des articles contraires au respect dû au contrat social, à la souveraineté du peuple et à la gloire des armes, ou qui publieront des invectives contre les gouvernemens et les nations amis ou alliées de la république, lors même que ces articles seraient extraits de feuilles périodiques étrangères."

had been characterised before the time of Gregory VII., and which were at least still partly maintained by the Gallican church in the eighteenth century. Instead of this, however, nothing more took place than the restoration of Popery and the whole system of ceremonies. The first step towards a union between the First Consul and the pope, in order to secure mutual monarchical rights, the one in the church and the other in the state, was made at the time in which Bonaparte made a short experiment of playing the king in the Cisalpine republic, before he returned to Paris after the battle of Marengo.

Even before the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte, in his endeavours to pacify the fanatical royalists of the western and south-western departments of France by means of the Abbé Bernier, had taken measures to effect, by the instrumentality of the pope, what he ought to have effected by a synod of Italian, French, and German constitutional bishops, had he not been determined to pursue an absolutely monarchical course. In the conclave which met in Venice for the election of a new pope he had several friends, among whom was Cardinal Gonsalvi, who afterwards played a very important part, and always displayed a great admiration of Bonaparte. The men of the French party, to which also Cardinal Maury belonged, were acquainted with the views of the cabinet of Vienna, and laboured to frustrate them. The Austrian government used all possible means to delay and protract the election, because they were anxious to share the states of the church with Naples, whilst Gonsalvi contrived to make the election fall upon Cardinal Chiaramonti, who, in 1796, as Bishop of Imola, had astonished and horrified all Christendom by printing and publishing a Jacobinical sermon, but on the other hand had thereby rejoiced Bonaparte and the Directory. Chiaramonti was made pope on the 14th of March, 1800, under the name of Pius VII. The court of Vienna was highly displeased with an election which was evidently influenced by, and calculated for the French, and especially for Bonaparte; it did not suffer the new pope to be crowned in the church of St. Mark, and detained him in Venice till the time arrived when no idea of the partition of the states of the church could be any longer entertained.

Shortly before the Queen of Naples, distressed at seeing the whole of her kingdom occupied by the French, first fled to Vienna, and when the emperor also became alarmed, she hastened to Petersburg, and the new pope quietly took his departure from Venice in order to return to Rome, relying confidently on the protection of France, of which he had been assured. He landed in Ancona, and reached Rome as early as the 9th of July. No attempt was made to refuse him the temporal sovereignty, but it was only conceded on condition that the states of the church should continue under military occupation. This afterwards procured to General Murat, who, as he afterwards proved, when king of Naples, loved nothing more than pomp, dress, and splendour, the pleasure and honour, under a commission from the

First Consul, of solemnly restoring the pope to all his ancient rights and privileges. At the time when this event took place, Bonaparte had allowed all those ceremonies by which homage is done by the clergy to the temporal sovereign to be employed towards himself, both in Milan and Paris. He did this, as he states in a letter quoted by Thiers, and addressed to his two colleagues, to show his contempt for the Paris philosophers who were opposed to the church, and whom he, as is now become the universal custom, abuses, in the language of the *sans-culottes*, as Atheists.* In order to make the celebration of the victory at Marengo as splendid as possible, Bonaparte went to Milan, and appeared there in the same way as the former rulers of Milan were accustomed to appear. The Italians, who indulged in poetic ravings about Roman virtue and the republic, fell on their knees before him in the dust. At the entrance to the cathedral he was met with fragrant incense and holy pomp by the very same archbishop who had received Suwarow the year before as the happy restorer of all that had been lost. He was present at a solemn mass, and received all those honours which on such occasions are usually paid to princes. He gives an account of all this in a letter to his colleagues, in which, moreover, he displays far more contempt for the democrats than respect for the religion whose services he was about to restore. On this same occasion he made trial of a princely audience, or, as it is called, he held a *levée*, and received in a formal ceremonial manner those who already assumed the manner of subjects. This *levée* was the scene of courtly eulogies and bombastic and academical addresses, which, as on all similar occasions, were responded to in a similar flowery and panegyric strain. We do not for a moment dwell on such addresses and answers, because such things always partake of a diplomatic character, and we intentionally avoid giving to this history even the slightest tinge of a diplomatic work.

The First Consul remained only ten days in Milan, because he was eager to return to Paris in order to introduce there what had continued to be the traditional usage of the olden times in Milan. In Paris, the numerous courtiers of the former monarchical period whom he and his wife had assembled around them, proved extremely useful, for ceremonies and etiquette had been the sole study of these people during the whole of their lives. Till it was found advisable to restore the different grades of nobility, it was at first deemed expedient, after the Russian fashion, to establish different gradations of military and civil rank. All ideas of rank and condition had been destroyed in the revolution by the farces of republicanism and democracy, and they were now to be restored by those of the old *régime* and monarchy. Public and solemn audiences were now given in the Tuileries, in which all the ceremonies and distinctions of court etiquette and privileges were carefully observed; and the members of

* According to Thiers, he wrote from Milan to his colleagues as follows: "Aujourd'hui malgré ce qu'en pourront dire nos *Athéens de Paris*, je vais en grande cérémonie, au TE DEUM, qu'on chante à la métropole de Milan."

the senate, the legislative council, the tribune, the high courts of law, the whole prefecture of the Seine, all the high civil and military officers, the directors of the bank, the members of the institute, and other learned societies, were all received according to their respective offices and ranks. These audiences were occasions on which, as of old, addresses were presented full of rhetorical compliments and flattery, which were afterwards printed and regarded as the outpourings of grateful and deeply affected hearts, although not a single trace of heartiness or sincerity is to be found in the whole of this rhetorical jingle, with which the newspapers were filled. At this time flatterers and prattling pettifoggers were again raised to honours ; and at the very same time communications were opened with the pope with a view to restore the hierarchy.

Bonaparte had made the first communication of his views to the pope through the Bishop of Vercelli, who belonged to the College of Cardinals; the bishop afterwards sent his nephew, Count Alciati, to Rome, in order to make the pope fully acquainted with Bonaparte's plan. He was desirous of coming back to the resolutions adopted by the National Assembly before their breach with the pope. His plan was to pay the clergy, reinstate the bishops, with the whole ecclesiastical body which belonged to them, again to acknowledge the pope as the absolute ruler of the church, and to surrender to the pope's mercy, which was much the same as to say, to fanatical vengeance, all the clergy who had been more obedient to the laws than to the pope; that is, all who had done homage to the ancient rights of the church and not to papal usurpations. In return, the pope, acting in the same autocratic spirit as Bonaparte, was completely to separate the church from old France, and from the rights of the old Gallican clergy, from the recollections of old names, and from all connexion whatever with the old reigning house. The first was to be accomplished by a complete change in the names and extent of the dioceses, and by the creation of new ecclesiastical departments and new prefects for the spiritual kingdom; as the National Assembly had created new departments, and Bonaparte new prefects for the state. The second, the complete dissolution of all bonds between the clergy and the Bourbons, was to be effected by the resignation of their places by all the former bishops, who for the most part had been chosen from the ancient nobility and fled to England, or by their removal from their offices by the pope. By this means the old bishops were either reduced to a state of disagreement with the pope, which rendered them no longer orthodox, or they were compelled to accept places under the new arrangement, which Bonaparte alone had power to bestow; then they either split with the royalists, or lost all the influence which they had hitherto possessed. The details had afterwards to undergo long and tedious negotiations. We shall give the results below, without suffering ourselves to be led into an examination of all the arts and intrigues by which a concordat was arranged, which was to serve the objects

both of Bonaparte and the pope, because this would oblige us to go by much too far into particulars. We touch upon the subject in this place merely because it was an instrumentality by which Bonaparte separated a vast number of Frenchmen from the cause of the Bourbons, in the same manner as he induced all the considerable men of the revolution, all the sophists and jurists, and distinguished prodigals and spendthrifts, who had used the revolution as a speculation, to admit and declare that a new aristocracy was one of the wants of the nation, in order that they might obtain places in its ranks. The most vehement democrats, who had enriched themselves by the pillage of the revolution, occupied and revelled in all the first places in the civil administration, whilst the most renowned generals found it difficult to wait for the time when the plundered wealth might enable them to play the prince ; they all quickly threw away the mask of democracy.

As to the renegades from democracy who accepted of civil offices under Bonaparte, we make no account of such men as Lebrun, Cambacérès, and Talleyrand, who never felt any serious attachment to the cause of liberty ; but even Carnot, Thibaudeau, and others, who never forsook or belied their principles, became convinced that the severity and simplicity of their views were totally incompatible with the vanity of the nation. Bonaparte very soon came to an understanding with the generals, of whose services, in fact, he stood most in need, for although he had no desire to establish a purely military government (which he never did), yet his new kingdom must of necessity mainly be founded on the army and on conquest. When, moreover, we allege that many of the men of the republican times whom Bonaparte employed in his senate, his council of state, and other high civil offices, made sacrifices of their principles, we must admit also that there were many who maintained them till the last, and that Bonaparte was great and wise enough, if they only served him, not to require them to flatter him, or sacrifice their convictions. We allege what we have heard from several of these very men. Pelet (the elder) and Thibaudeau in the council of state, and Carnot as minister, made no secret of their opinions, and never missed any opportunity of declaring their dislike to autocracy, and yet they supported the Bonaparte system, because they thought this was the duty of patriotism—because they regarded a dictatorship as necessary—and because they believed that their countrymen were so constituted as to find the pomp and ceremonies, the empty and vain pageantry of the old *régime*, whose re-introduction we condemn, indispensable. We have personally received repeated assurances of this fact, both from Pelet de la Lozere and Thibaudeau in their old age, in the time of Louis Philippe; and on this same ground there are still persons whose political sagacity we as highly admire as we honour their noble feelings in favour of constitutional liberty, who on this same ground excuse all the monarchical and aristocratic steps of their honoured hero and great ruler. As to Lafayette's

refusal to attach himself to the First Consul, or afterwards to the emperor, the thing itself is of small importance, because, although Lafayette, like Neckar, was, as a man, deserving of high respect, he was never qualified for filling any great place as a public man or a statesman. Among the generals who fell away from the republic Bernadotte had long ceased to feel any interest in its stability.

Augereau obtained the command in Holland, and afterwards in Germany, in conjunction with Moreau, and that made him at once quite ready for servility and flattery. Brune was appointed commander-in-chief in Italy, and afterwards was one of the very first of the peers created under the Empire. Jourdan was appointed lord and master of Piedmont, and held princely court in Turin, under the name of a commissary-general, because the First Consul neither wished to offend the Emperor of Russia nor to give up possession of Piedmont. The King of Sardinia, relying on the treaty formerly concluded with Bonaparte, and on the recent friendship between the Emperor Paul and the First Consul, the main condition of which was the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia, went to Rome, where, however, he was detained by mere empty excuses. By Jourdan's mission to Turin, it was, in fact, as it were, openly declared that the whole of Upper Italy was to form a part of that new kingdom which Bonaparte thought of establishing there with French institutions and French laws. Whilst Jourdan was engaged in transforming the whole administration of Piedmont and its dependencies by degrees into a correspondence with French principles and forms, Suchet governed in Genoa, where, it is true, there was an apparently independent municipality; but Suchet, and the French by whom he was accompanied, alone gave laws. In Milan, too, the newly restored framework of the Cisalpine republic was a mere delusion, for the real administration was carried on by the French plenipotentiary Petit, who had been for some time minister of war in Paris, and who remained behind in Milan when Bonaparte took his departure.

B.—RUSSIA IN CONNEXION WITH FRANCE.

The rapid steps taken by Bonaparte since 1800 for the establishment of monarchical forms, of a strict police, and established church, a hierarchy and a system of administration hostile to publicity and the free expression of thought, confirmed the high opinion which the singular and versatile Emperor Paul had suddenly formed of the First Consul, and especially since he had broken with England and Austria. The First Consul and his able and experienced men of business of all kinds afterwards understood so well how to take advantage of the emperor's weakness, and to flatter him in such a manner that, even before any peace was concluded or treaty made, the emperor treated the Austrians coolly and the English with hostility, whilst he gave unequivocal proofs of his kindly feelings

towards France. On this occasion, the connexions which Fouché and Talleyrand had made and still kept up in Petersburg, were not without their importance; for Fouché had such confidential correspondence even with ladies in the Russian capital, that he afterwards received the earliest and most correct intelligence of the emperor's murder. Two persons at the court of Petersburg were next gained over to France, or rather to Bonaparte's rising empire; these were the minister Rostopschin, and the emperor's favourite, the Turk Kutaisoff, who had risen with unusual rapidity from the situation of *valet-de-chambre* to the emperor to the rank of one of the first Russian nobles. He was also nearly connected by relationship with Rostopschin.

The Russian minister, Rostopschin, first found means to send away General Dumourier, who, as is well known, had a pension from England, and drew up plans of campaigns and expeditions against France, from Petersburg, whither he had come for the purpose of carrying on his intrigues in favour of the Bourbons; he next sought to bring Louis Cobenzl also into discredit with the emperor. He succeeded in this, at the time when the cabinet of Vienna was called upon, shortly before the opening of the campaign in Italy in 1800, to give a plain and direct answer to the questions peremptorily put by the Emperor of Russia. Paul required "that the cabinet should answer, without *if* or *but*, without circumlocution or reserve, whether or not Austria would, according to the terms of the treaty, restore the pope and the king to their dominions and sovereignty." Cobenzl was obliged to reply, that if Austria were to give back Piedmont to the King of Sardinia it must still retain Tortona and Alessandria; and that it never would restore the three legations and Ancona. The measure of the emperor's indignation was now full; he forbade Count Cobenzl the court, and at a later period not only ordered him to leave the country, but would not even allow an embassy or a *charge d'affaires* to remain.

It was now the turn of England, which was at that time represented by Lord Whitworth as its ambassador in Petersburg. The emperor proceeded much more slowly in his measures with the English. He at first acted as if he had no desire to break with England; and he even allowed the Russians, whom the English had hired for the expedition against Holland, to remain in Guernsey under Vioménil's command, in order to assist their employers in an expedition against Brittany. The government, however, at length deeply offended him by excessive selfishness. It refused to redeem the Russians who had been made prisoners in its service, by giving in exchange for them an equal number of French, of whom their prisons were full; they refused to listen to any arrangements respecting the grand mastership of the Knights of Malta, or even of the protectorate of the order, and gave the clearest intimations that they meant to keep the island for themselves. Bonaparte seized upon this favourable moment for flattering the emperor, by acting

as if he had really more respect for Paul, who had almost incredible notions of his own power and dignity, than the two powers for whom the emperor had made such magnanimous sacrifices. Whilst the English, who lately refused to redeem the Russians made prisoners in their service by exchange, Bonaparte set them free without either exchange or ransom; the Emperor of Germany had broken his word, and neither restored the pope nor the King of Sardinia, whilst Bonaparte voluntarily offered to restore the one and give compensation to the other. The first steps towards a reconciliation of Russia with France were taken in Hamburg, where a French agent was commissioned to make some proposals to the Russian minister Murawieff. Murawieff communicated these proposals to the emperor, who made it a preliminary to any kind of agreement whatever, that Bonaparte should secure complete independence and a favourable treaty of peace to the kingdom of Naples, and restore Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. Bonaparte acceded to these preliminaries, and immediately assailed the singular emperor in a masterly manner on his weak side. He caused the 6000 or 7000 Russians, whom the English refused to exchange, to be provided with new clothing and arms, and wrote a letter to Panin, the Russian minister, in which he says "*that he was unwilling to suffer such brave soldiers as these Russians were to remain longer away from their native land on account of the English.*" In the same letter he paid a second compliment to the emperor, and threw an apple of mortal strife between him and England. Knowing as he did that his garrison in Malta could not hold out much longer, he offered to place the island in the hands of the Emperor Paul, as a third party. This was precisely what the emperor desired; and Sprengporten, who was sent to France to bring home the Russians, whom the First Consul had re-provided with arms and officers, as well as to thank him, was, with these same Russians, to occupy Malta. The Russians were either to be conveyed to Malta by Nelson, who up to this time had kept the island closely blockaded, and was daily expecting its surrender, or at least he was to be obliged to allow them to pass; but both he and the English haughtily rejected the Russian mediation.

The Emperor Paul now came to a complete breach with England. First of all he recalled his Russian troops from Guernsey, and on this occasion he was again deceived by the oligarchs of England. It was of great importance to the English cabinet that Bonaparte should not immediately hear of the decided breach which had taken place between them and the emperor, and they therefore prevailed upon Vioménil, an *émigré*, who had the command of the Russians in Guernsey, to remain some weeks longer, in opposition to the emperor's will. The emperor was vehemently indignant at this conduct; Vioménil, however, entered the English service, and was provided for by the English government in Portugal. Lord Whitworth, as Count Cobenzl had previously been, was next obliged to leave Russia. The Emperor Paul recalled his ambassadors both from the

courts of Vienna and London, and forthwith sent Count Kalitscheff to Paris to enter into friendly negotiations with Bonaparte. In the mean time, the English had recourse to some new subterfuges, and promised, that in case Malta capitulated, they would consent to allow the island to be administered till the conclusion of a peace by commissioners appointed by Russia, England, and Naples, in connexion with a commissioner to be named by the grand master to be appointed. Paul had already named Bailli de la Ferrette for this purpose; but here he was once again deceived by the English, who refused to acknowledge Bailli de la Ferrette, and even to receive the Neapolitans in Malta. Before this took place, however, the emperor had come to issue with England on a totally different question.

C.—RENEWAL OF THE ARMED NEUTRALITY—CONSPIRACY IN RUSSIA.

The idea of a union among the neutral powers in opposition to the intolerable allegation of England, that she was entitled, when at war with any power whatsoever, to subject the ships of all neutral powers to examination and search, had been relinquished by the Empress Catherine in 1781, to please the English ambassador at her court; the Emperor Paul now resumed the idea. By the channels of communication, which he had succeeded in opening up with the court of Petersburg, Bonaparte gave an intimation of his views, and the Emperor Paul followed up the matter with great energy and zeal, as in this way he had an opportunity of exhibiting himself in the character of a noble and imperial protector of the weak, a defender of justice and right, and as the head of a general alliance of the European powers. Prussia also now appeared to do homage to him, because the three intriguers of the times of the Countess Lichtenau had the weak king completely in their net. They made him believe, that by a close alliance between Russia and France, they might be able to help him to an extension of territory and an increase of subjects, without danger or cost to himself, or without war, which he abhorred beyond everything else. The first foundation, therefore, for an alliance between Russia and France, was laid in Berlin by the instrumentality of these intrigues in the Prussian cabinet. Haugwitz, and Lombard, the secretary to the cabinet, pushed the matter in Berlin, the Marquis Lucchesini was sent to Paris in 1800, accompanied by Lombard's brother as secretary to the embassy, and Beurnonville, the French ambassador in Berlin, was commissioned to enter there into negotiations with the Russian minister Von Krüderer. The Emperor Paul, who was an honourable and upright man, although sometimes not completely master of his understanding, was on this occasion deceived by the French and Russian diplomatists, just as he had been previously deceived by the Austrians and English—that is, promises were made which there was no intention of ever fulfilling. Beurnonville, in order that

Kalitscheff might be commissioned to enter into negotiations in Paris for a formal treaty (which, however, did not take place during Paul's lifetime), promised, in Bonaparte's name, that the Russian mediation in favour of Naples and Sardinia would be accepted, and that, in the question of compensations for the German princes, particular regard would be had to the cases of Baden and Würtemberg. As to the armed neutrality by sea against England, Prussia could easily consent to join this alliance, because she had in fact no navy; but it was much more difficult for Sweden and Denmark, which caused their merchant ships to be always accompanied by frigates. In case, therefore, the neutral powers came to an understanding that no merchant vessels which were accompanied by a ship of war should be compelled to submit to a search, this might at any time involve them in the necessity of having recourse to hostilities. In addition to Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, which, under Paul's protectorate, were to conclude an alliance for the protection of trading vessels belonging to neutral powers against the arrogant claims of England, Bonaparte endeavoured to prevail upon the North Americans to join the alliance. They were the only parties, as we have already stated, who, by a specific treaty in 1794, had acknowledged as a positive right what the others only submitted to as an unfounded pretension on the part of England. On that occasion we observed that the Americans had broken with the French republic on the subject of this treaty, and that Barras and Talleyrand had been shameless enough to propose to them to come to an agreement with them, in order to the renewal of their old friendship with France, which proposal, however, they treated with contempt. When Bonaparte made his proposals concerning the alliance, he said nothing about money and bribes, and never hinted that he would require back the advantages which the Americans had promised and conceded to the French in 1778, but withdrawn from them since 1794. The Americans consequently gave full powers to their ambassadors, who came to enter into negotiations with Joseph Bonaparte, concerning the renewal of the former friendship between the two nations. On the 30th of September, 1800, their ambassadors concluded an agreement at Bonaparte's country seat of Morfontaine, which referred especially to the resistance which all the neutral powers under the protectorate of the Emperor of Russia were desirous of making to the pretensions and claims of England. The North Americans first of all declared that neutral flags should make a neutral cargo, except in cases where the ship was actually laden with goods contraband of war. It was afterwards precisely defined what were to be considered goods contraband of war. The fourth article, however, is by far the most important in the respect just mentioned. By this article it is determined that neutral ships must submit to be detained, but that the ships of war so detaining a merchantman with a view to search shall remain at least at the distance of a cannon-shot, and only be allowed to send

a boat with three men to examine the ship's papers and cargo; and that in all cases in which a merchantman shall be under convoy of a ship of war, no right of search shall exist, because the presence of the convoy shall be regarded as a sufficient guarantee against contraband. Inasmuch as England and Denmark were at open issue concerning this last point, the North Americans would have been inevitably involved in the dispute had they immediately ratified the treaty of Morfontaine: these grandchildren of the English were however far too cunning to fall into this difficulty; and they did not therefore ratify the treaty till the Russian confederation had been dissolved.

Sweden had first come to issue with England concerning the right of search in 1798, when the latter began to prevent merchantmen of the former from passing through the English Channel, except under convoy of a ship of war. The English appeared at first to take no notice; but as early as July they fell into an open quarrel with the Swedes, and afterwards with the Danes. They carried their pretensions so far as to compel those frigates which would not submit to the right of search to strike their flags by firing upon them. In this way, four frigates, two Swedish and two Danish, were brought into English ports, as if they had been regularly captured in time of war. True, indeed, they were afterwards given up, but without any satisfaction, because the English insisted upon the right of search. The dispute became most vehement in the case of the Danish frigate *Freya*, which, together with the merchantmen under her convoy, were brought into an English port, after a sharp engagement on the 25th of July, 1800. At that time, the agreement of the armed neutrality was already in existence, and the English acted as they are always accustomed to do when their interests require it; they undertook a predatory invasion of Denmark, without previously issuing a declaration of war.

Sixteen English ships of war suddenly appeared before Copenhagen, and most unexpectedly threatened the harbour and city with a destructive bombardment, if Denmark did not at once acknowledge England's usurpation of a right of search at sea. Had this acknowledgment been made, Bonaparte's and the Emperor's plan would have been frustrated in its very origin; but Denmark, during the revolutionary period, had the good fortune to possess, in its minister Bernsdorff, the greatest diplomatist of the whole revolutionary era, who contrived to save Copenhagen without the surrender of any rights. It was quite impossible to resist by force, but he refused to enter upon the question of right or wrong; and in the agreement which he made and signed with Lord Whitworth on the 25th of August, 1800, he consented that in the mean time all occasion for dispute should be avoided, and thus the difficulty be postponed or removed. Denmark bound herself no longer to send her merchantmen under convoy—whereupon the *Freya*, and the vessels by which she was accompanied, were set at liberty. On this occasion the Emperor Paul offered himself as arbitrator; and when

Lord Whitworth rejected his interference or arbitration, he immediately laid an embargo on all the English ships in Russian ports.

The news of the agreement entered into at Copenhagen, however, no sooner reached Petersburg, than this first embargo was removed, and the dispute carried on merely in a diplomatic manner. If any one will read through the mass of papers, which were at that time written on a very simple subject, as they are to be found collected in Martens' second supplemental volume of diplomatic documents, he will be convinced that rights are never more in danger than when they are to be decided on by diplomatists. In this dispute the English, like their advocates in the courts, proved themselves inexhaustible in sophistry, rich in resources technical, as their *pettifoggers* call them, and material, and constantly adhered to their principle, that whatever has once occurred becomes a right. The Danish and Swedish ministers quietly carried on the controversy with powerful reasons, and, considering that they had to deal with a dreadful and superior power, with admirable firmness; the Prussians with cowardly smoothness and duplicity. The Emperor Paul put an end to this paper war, when Vaubois, who had defended Malta since July, 1798, against the English, Russians, Neapolitans, and sometimes also the Portuguese, at length capitulated, on the 5th of September, 1800. The island was taken military possession of by the English without any reference whatever to the Order, to Naples, to the promise which they had made to the Emperor, or to Bailli de la Ferrette, whom Paul had named as the representative of the Order. As soon as this news reached Petersburg, Paul's rage and indignation knew no bounds. On the 7th of November, he not only laid an embargo upon three hundred English ships then in his ports, but sent the whole of their crews into the interior of Russia, and allowed them only a few copecks a day for their support.

At this time the English had pushed their disregard for the law of nations on many occasions to the utmost, and given numerous proofs that their usurpations at sea were founded on mere brute force. This strong and severe accusation may be fully justified by the conduct of their naval officers in a case which occurred at this time, and which was not condemned by the English Admiralty. The port of Barcelona was watched by the English frigates *Minotaur* and *Niger*, and every Spanish ship which showed itself, captured; in the harbour, however, there were two corvettes under repair, which the English, on account of the batteries, were unable openly to approach and seize. In order to effect their purpose they misused the neutrality of Sweden, in order to be able by a device to make themselves masters of the Spanish ships. They took forcible possession of a Swedish merchantman, called the *Hope*, concealed their people on board, entered the harbour under cover of a neutral flag, seized upon the corvettes, and towed them out to a place where they could be captured by the frigates without danger. They had besides, as early as October, taken, off the Texel, a Prussian vessel laden with timber for ship

building, and, in consequence of contrary winds, carried her into Cuxhaven, and there sold her. This was a new cause of difficulty to the Hamburgers, who, like all other traders, are accustomed to play fast and loose, to be on good terms with every one, and at the same time bound to none. Shortly before, Bonaparte had deservedly humbled the Hamburgers, and made them pay a heavy penalty for their meanness in delivering up two Irishmen, who held commissions as French officers; and now they were threatened by Prussia. The senate, it is true, bought the vessel and gave her back to her Prussian owners, but it was not allowed to escape so easily. Prussia forthwith took military possession of Cuxhaven and the whole district of Ritzebüttel. The persons who at that time conducted the government of Prussia, made their king play very much the same character as that which was played by the senate of Hamburg; they adhered to the Russian alliance on the one side, without wishing to bring matters to a crisis with England on the other.

When the Prussians, pressed on either side by the Emperor of Russia and the First Consul, who were neither of them to be disregarded, took possession of Cuxhaven and the district of Ritzebüttel, Haugwitz and his companions attempted to find a means of excusing themselves in the eyes of England. They pretended that they had caused their troops to occupy the town and district solely for the advantage of the English; for they declared that this had only been done with a view to **MAINTAIN UNIMPAIRED THE NEUTRALITY OF THE NORTH OF GERMANY**. This miserable, vacillating policy, which made Prussia an object of contempt to both friends and enemies, and which was continued till 1806, was carried so far, that even when Prussia formally entered into the alliance in favour of the rights of neutral nations, it was done in such a way that neither England nor Russia could believe Prussia to be in earnest. England proved that such was her view of the conduct of Prussia; for when, on the 14th of January, she laid an embargo, without declaring war, on all Russian, Swedish, and Danish property within her empire, and that solely on account of the alliance against her pretensions on the right of search, she took no measures whatever against the Prussians. In fact, Haugwitz and his faithless cabinet gave such answers to both parties, that it is impossible to feel anything but contempt for a court which thus publicly set at nought all regard for honesty and good faith.

Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador in Berlin, was unable for six weeks to obtain any answer from the Prussian government with respect to its connexion with the Northern Confederation, although he insisted strongly upon it; and yet Stedingk, the Swedish minister, and Rosenkranz, the Danish minister, had signed the agreement for an armed neutrality in the form of that of 1780 as early as the 17th of December, 1800, in Petersburg, and the Prussian minister, Von Luft, in the name of his king, had signified his acceptance of the alliance on the 18th. When Lord Carysfort at length obtained an

answer, on the 12th of February, to his demands, so long and repeatedly urged in vain, Haugwitz had drawn it up so equivocally, both in form and contents, that we have only to subjoin the original in a note, to give intelligent readers some idea of the game which four or five intriguers at that time played with the narrow-minded King of Prussia.* The Emperor of Russia was so indignant at the ambiguity, that he not only expressed his feelings on the subject warmly, but also took some hostile measures against Prussia. On the other hand, the emperor invited King Gustavus IV., a man who was already generally considered, like the emperor himself, not to be always master of his understanding, to Petersburg, where he was received with the greatest splendour. He arrived at Petersburg at Christmas 1800, and immediately, as if to insult the English, a grand meeting of the Order of Malta was held; the king himself was loaded with marks of honour of every possible description, and at the end of December he signed a new agreement, by which the objects of that of the 16th of the same month were greatly enlarged. In the former alliance defensive operations alone were contemplated; but now offensive measures were also agreed upon, with the reservation indeed, *if they should become necessary*. The Emperor Paul took measures to refit his fleet, and an army was equipped which was to be placed under the commands of Soltikoff, Pahlen, and Kutusoff; the Danish fleet was in good condition; Lucchesini, who was in Paris, appeared to regard the circumstances as very favourable for gaining Hanover to his master without danger or risk; and Pitt himself considered the state of affairs so unfavourable, that he seriously contemplated the propriety of retiring and making way for a new ministry, in order to render a peace possible. This close confederacy against the selfishness of England and against the exercise of her brutal tyranny at sea, was, however, dissolved at the very moment in which the First Consul appeared to be disposed to favour Naples and Sardinia, in order to gratify the wishes of the Emperor of Russia.

We have already stated that attempts were twice made by the Austrians and the Neapolitans, in the year 1800, during the armistice, to lend military support to an insurrection in Tuscany, and that these attempts were frustrated by several divisions of French troops. General Miollis having suppressed the second insurrection in January,

* “La convention (the confederacy of Russia, Denmark and Sweden, which Prussia had joined on the 18th of December, 1800,) dont on se plaint n'a été provoquée que par les mesures violentes de l'Angleterre contre les puissances du nord. Le traité n'a pas pour but comme le prétend le gouvernement Britannique de former une ligue hostile. *Les stipulations portent que les mesures ne seront ni hostiles ni au détriment d'un pays, mais uniquement tendantes à la sûreté commune et de la navigation de ses sujets.* La déclaration du Comte de Bernsdorff, portant, que le cour du Copenhague n'avoit aucun projet incompatible avec le maintien de la bonne harmonie entre les cours, est claire et précise à cet égard. Enfin la conduite arbitraire de l'Angleterre est seule la cause d'une accession à la convention du 16 Décembre et qui oblige la Prusse à prendre part aux évènements qui intéresseraient la cause commune.”

1801, and taken possession of Tuscany, Austria was obliged to give up Tuscany and Naples, and at the moment in which Murat was advancing with a new French army, the French were already close upon the frontiers of Naples. Queen Caroline, whose praise we prefer recording in a note, in the words of Colletta, to expressing it in our own, was at that time in Vienna, and in the middle of winter had the courage and resolution to hasten to Petersburg, in order to appeal for protection to the gallant emperor. In Vienna, they were glad to be rid of the queen and her intrigues, which she had woven as well against Thugut and Cobenzl, as against the Archduke Charles, against Kray, and against every one who held or expressed any honest opinions; in Petersburg, the emperor was greatly flattered by a visit from a queen of such a thoroughly Russian spirit as the Queen of Naples. Even during the presence of the queen in Petersburg, Paul commissioned Count Lewascheff, his master of the horse, to mediate in her affairs with Bonaparte and Murat. The queen then returned to Vienna, and Lewascheff afterwards pursued his way from Austria to Paris, having first held long conferences in Vienna with the queen, with whom, according to Colletta, he was very much pleased.* Lewascheff, who was only sent on account of the Neapolitan affairs, other matters being under the care of Sprengporten and Kalitscheff, was received in Paris and almost everywhere with ridiculous pomp, partly to flatter Paul, and partly to show to the whole world what a good and intimate understanding there existed between the First Consul and the Emperor of Russia. He immediately afterwards left Paris to see Murat, who took good care that his presence in Florence and Naples should be notified by the same means as had been adopted in Paris.

Bonaparte at that time had no intention of occupying Naples, and had already offered, through Miollis, to reinstate the king, provided he would agree to close all his ports against the English, and comply with some other conditions; on his refusal to adopt these conditions Murat was sent with a new army. Murat then for the first time appeared in all that pomp and splendour of dress, which, as is well known, has always been characteristic of those born near the Garonne; and the management of what was, properly speaking, the business of the state, was committed by his brother-in-law to Salicetti, who had been formerly a member of the convention. Murat led about the Russian master of the horse everywhere, as if in triumph, and first granted the Neapolitans an armistice of thirty days, which was concluded on the 28th of February, 1801, in Foligno.†

* Colletta, after his fashion, has given an account of the state of things, and described the character of the Queen of Naples in a few words, vol. i., p. 305: "Il Conte Lewascheff vista in Vienna la Regina Carolina, e preso di riverenza e di ammirazione donna grande e rispettabile nei precipizii della fortuna, quanto volgare e peggio nelle felicità, andò caldo intercessore a Parigi ed ottenne comando di Bonaparte a Murat per trattar accordi con Napoli."

† It is said that the King of Naples on this occasion paid the sum of 800,000 francs to Murat, and a like sum to Salicetti.

Lewascheff was at that time obliged to figure in an almost incredible manner in Bologna and Florence, for besides his mission regarding Naples, Murat was commissioned to reinstate the pope, to attend at all the solemn ceremonies of the church, and again to bring the hierarchy into honour. Orders were given to all the generals to spare the pope and the states of the church, and to play their parts in all the grand religious solemnities, which both Murat and Soult most zealously did, however far both were from a real conviction of, or attachment to, true Christianity.

Lewascheff went to Naples, and was received both by the court and the people as a deliverer; whilst the same Colonel Micheroux who, on the part of Naples, had concluded the armistice at Foligno, was sent to Florence in order to sign the peace, which, properly speaking, Alquier, the French ambassador, had brought with him from Paris ready made. This peace, which was granted apparently to the mediation of Russia, was concluded at Florence on the 28th of March. With the exception that only a small portion of territory was ceded,* the conditions of the peace were as hard as the First Consul could possibly make them with any regard whatever to Russia. The main conditions were: The exclusion of all English ships from the ports of Naples; the reception and support of 12,000 French troops in Gallipoli, Brindisi, Ortranto, Chieti, Aquila, and Tarento. The troops were to be furnished not only with the corn necessary for their support, but also to be paid a sum of 500,000 francs monthly. In this way Bonaparte became master of all Italy, for he got complete possession of the Neapolitan fortresses and ports; the existence of the pope depended solely on his will, and the new ruler of Tuscany, the first king whom Bonaparte created, was under his guardianship. We have already stated that Bonaparte allowed the old Duke of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, to remain quietly in his capital till his death, which occurred in October 1802, whilst Moreau, St. Méry, and other Frenchmen afterwards governed the country as Bonaparte's commissioners. On the same occasion it was also observed, that in order to make compensation to the hereditary prince for the loss of Parma, he gave him Tuscany, with the title of King of Etruria. This new king went to Paris in March, 1801, where he was exhibited as a spectacle, and cut no better figure than the Spanish princess, to whom he was married. Bonaparte hesitated, and created delays respecting Piedmont; he even detained Count de St. Marsan in Paris, as an ambassador from the King of Sardinia,

* The only stipulation respecting the cession of territory is contained in the 4th art. (Martens' Supplement, vol. ii., p. 389). "S. M. le roi de deux Siciles rénounce à perpétuité pour elle et ses successeurs premièrement à Porto Longone dans l'isle d'Elbe, et à tout ce qui pouvoit lui appartenir dans cette isle; secondelement elle rénounce aux états de préside de la Toscana et elle les cède, ainsi que la principauté de Piombino (tous situés sur la mer du grand duché) à le republique Françoise qui pourra en disposer à son gré." The other articles prescribe what pardons the king is to extend towards his unfortunate subjects, and stipulate for his restoration of all that he had carried away with him from Rome.

and first offered this, and then that, as a compensation for Piedmont, till it was at length divided into six departments (in 1801), and added as a military division to the other military divisions of France.

In the same manner as the French continued to make new conquests by land in the midst of peace, so did the English by sea. On the 14th of January, 1801, they laid an embargo on all Russian, Danish, and Swedish ships in English harbours, and caused all vessels of the same powers, with which they fell in at sea, to be brought into their ports; negotiations, however, were still continued. The ships were not confiscated, and war was not declared, when news suddenly reached Denmark that a great expedition was being equipped in England, in order to attack the Danish fleet before the Swedes and Russians could send their ships to sea, in consequence of the ice. Denmark immediately took steps to put in order the forts which commanded the Sound, for the purpose of making a vigorous defence, and called upon Sweden to erect batteries on its coast; and at the same time the most admirable measures were adopted for the defence of the harbour of Copenhagen and the fleet which it contained. The national feeling, patriotism, and sacrifices of the Danes, became the admiration of all Europe, for the crown prince, the students, citizens, and men of all ranks and classes, were ready to make every sacrifice. At length Prussia, too, constrained and alarmed by the threats of Russia, was obliged to make a demonstration; but it was a demonstration and nothing more. Because the Weser, Ems, Elbe, and Trave, were to be closed against the English, the Danes took possession of Hamburg on the 10th of March, and of Lübeck on the 7th of April, and laid an embargo on all English goods in those cities; Prussia conducted herself as she had always done. No steps whatever were taken to occupy Hanover, until the Emperor Paul threatened that he would proceed to take possession of it by Russian troops. Even when 25,000 Prussians advanced into Hanover, Lucchesini, in Paris, on the one hand tried to obtain the reversion of Hanover from Bonaparte, whilst, on the other, Haugwitz assured the English that the country was merely occupied for the advantage of King George, in order to prevent its occupation by the French, Swedes, or Russians.

The large fleet which the English had fitted out against Denmark, in the mean time, sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, 1801, under the command of Sir Hyde Parker and Nelson. On the 27th of March it appeared in the Sound. Means had been previously taken to make Denmark feel itself secure, by sending over Vansittart as a special ambassador. He, however, was the bearer of most outrageous demands, which were to be enforced by the confidential friend of the Queen of Naples and of Lady Hamilton, by murder, burning, and desolation. The only kind of declaration of war which preceded was, that the commander of the fleet sent a message to Cronenburg, stating, that if his ships were fired upon by any of the ports in the Sound, he would regard this as a declaration of war. This certainly took place, but none of the shots reached the fleet,

which kept close to the Swedish coast, where no measures had been taken to bar the passage of the Sound. This neglect on the part of Gustavus IV. is ascribed by some to a mere whim on the part of the king, or to the national jealousy of the Swedes; we cannot pretend to offer any decisive opinion on the point, as we merely state what we heard stated at the time in Altona, and still read in Lefebvre.*

When the conduct and patriotic sacrifices of the Danes on this occasion are compared with the behaviour of the German princes from 1792—1814, every patriotic German must feel ashamed of the men who governed his country. What a noble zeal for honour and nationality did the small kingdom of Denmark exhibit on this occasion, as well as afterwards in 1807! The Danes well knew that they could not successfully resist such experienced naval heroes as Parker and Nelson, the immense superiority of the ships and artillery under their command, and the skill and courage of their sailors; but they preferred an honourable defeat to a mean and shameful capitulation. They had not only erected two large land batteries upon Amack and Crown Point, in order to defend the harbour, but converted a number of ships of war into huge and dreadful floating batteries, in order to bar the entrance into it. The crown prince, who, since 1784, had governed the country in the name of his unfortunate father, called upon the whole male population under forty-eight years of age to take up arms, and was ready to make every sacrifice. Nobles, citizens, students, artisans, and labourers all flew to arms, and, what is more, stood manfully to their posts, when Nelson spread death and Vandal destruction through the city. The English fleet arrived off the port of Copenhagen on the 30th of March, and when the Danes refused to accede to Vansittart's outrageous demands, and to renounce the alliance for the defence of the rights of neutrals at sea, a murderous struggle commenced, on the 2nd of April. Nelson made a masterly manœuvre, similar to that which he had executed with such signal success at Aboukir; and after a continued and dreadful cannonade for four hours, thought he had reached a position from whence he could completely annihilate all the means of defence, the defenders, and the city itself. Admiral Parker was of a different opinion from Nelson, and consented to an armistice. During the dreadful cannonade of four hours' duration, the Danes had suffered severely; the English artillery was superior to theirs, notwithstanding all their floating batteries of ten ships, and their land forts on Amack and Crown Point, on which eighty pieces of the heaviest

* Lefebvre, in the “*Histoire des Cabinets de l’Europe pendant le Consulat et l’Empire*,” vol. i., p. 134, pronounces a very correct judgment upon this undertaking of the English against Denmark: “Si les deux rives avaient été également armées de batteries suffisantes, et que les Suédois eussent fait leur devoir comme les Danois, la flotte Anglaise n’aurait pu franchir le détroit que sous une grève de bombes et de boulets, et certainement ce passage lui eut été fatal, mais soit surprise, corruption ou lâcheté, les batteries Suédoises restèrent silencieuses devant la flotte Anglaise.”

calibre were mounted. According to their own report, the English lost, in these four hours, a thousand men; and the three ships, *Monarch*, *Edgar*, and *Isis*, alone lost no less than 455 men. The English, it is true, had broken the line of the Danish floating batteries, and separated one part from the other; but the weight of their guns far exceeded that of those of the Danes; and their ships amounted to fifty sail, amongst which were seventeen ships of the line, which had, moreover, 10,000 troops on board. Nelson himself was commissioned to go on shore, in order to conclude an agreement, which might satisfy the English ministry, without being disgraceful to the Danes. As Nelson passed through the capital, in the midst of the slaughter and desolation which he had caused, he was received with loud expressions of the popular indignation and dislike, in consequence of his faithless attack upon the city; this the English writers have most unfairly converted into popular applause and admiration of their naval hero.*

The two parties came the more easily to an understanding respecting a preliminary agreement on the 9th, as about that time intelligence arrived of the murder of the Emperor Paul—an event which led to a complete alteration in the whole state of affairs. The terms of the agreement were, that there should be a complete suspension of hostilities between England and Denmark for two months and a half, on condition that Denmark should conduct itself precisely as it had done before the alliance with Russia and Sweden, without determining in anywise the question of the right or wrong of the claim made on the part of England as to the right of search, or, as it is said, without prejudice to either party. The English fleet was afterwards reinforced by five-and-twenty ships, and it was then proposed to search for the Swedish fleet, in order to compel Sweden also to renounce the Russian alliance. The Swedish fleet had taken refuge in Carlskrona; although, however, the English threatened to inflict upon the Swedes the same calamities which they had just inflicted upon the Danes, Sweden still clung fast to the alliance, which afterwards dissolved of itself, if not immediately after the emperor's murder, at least as soon as Count Pahlen, who had been the leader of the murderers, was removed from the management of public affairs.

As to the murder of the emperor, Bonaparte, it is true, suffered the deed to be ascribed in the *Moniteur* to the English; we believe, however, that the Plutocrats have a sufficiently heavy load of their own iniquities to bear, without imposing upon them wrongfully those

* To be persuaded that the violence and brutality perpetrated by the English was in no respect less than that often exercised by Bonaparte, and that their commendations of heroic deeds are as shameless as his, we have only to read the accounts which their journals and histories contain of this desolating attack upon Copenhagen. One of these reports even converts the vehement outbursts of popular indignation into expressions of rejoicing and acclamation: "The prince acceded to the proposition with facility; and Lord Nelson, going on shore in person, was received by the gallant and generous enemies with the loudest acclamations."

with which they had no connexion, however intimately the Woronzoffs and others may have been allied with the English nobility, and however accordant the conduct and principles of the Suboffs and others may have been with those of the high English aristocracy.* The catastrophe in Petersburg is easily explained by the continually changing humours of the emperor, by his mental derangement, which had been constantly on the increase for several months previous to his murder, by the acts of violence and injustice which he suffered himself to commit, and by the dreadful apprehension which prevailed among all classes of society, from the empress and the grand duke down to the very lowest citizen. The emperor's sober and rational intervals became progressively rarer, so that no man was sure for an instant either of his place or his life; thousands of persons completely innocent were sent to Siberia, and yet goodness and mildness alternated with cruel severity, which, as is well known, was experienced by Kotzebue, and which, in "*the most remarkable year in his life,*" he has described in a manner that does him very little honour. The emperor one while exhibited the most noble magnanimity, and at another exercised the meanest vengeance; the case of the brothers Masson was an example of the latter. The beautiful and virtuous empress had patiently submitted to her husband's preference for the plain Nelidow, who at least, however, treated her with honour and respect—but she was obliged also to submit to his attachment to Lapuchin, who continually provoked strife. She endured those things patiently, lived socially with the emperor, slept immediately under his chambers, and yet neither she nor her sons, Alexander and Constantine, were able to escape the suspicions of his morbid mind. It was whispered, by persons in the confidence of the court, that the emperor had said he would send the empress to Calamagan, in the government of Astrachan, Alexander to Schiüsselburg, and Constantine to the citadel of Petersburg. It is not worth while to inquire what truth there may have been in these reports; every one felt that the time had arrived to have recourse to the only means which can be employed in despotic kingdoms to effect a complete change of the measures of government. This means is the murder of the despot, which in such circumstances was usually effected in the Roman empire by the Pretorians, in Constantinople by the Janissaries, or by a clamorous and infuriated mob, and in Petersburg by a number of confederated nobles; and in all these cases was regarded as a sort of necessary appendage to the existing constitution.

Rostopschin, the minister, who had long possessed the emperor's confidence, was dismissed and in disgrace; and Count Pahlen on the

* Were we to believe Bignon, the whole affair must be referred to the English, to Lord Whitworth, to the connexion of the Suboffs with the English aristocracy, to the saloons of Frau von Gerebsoff, Suboff's sister, &c. &c. See Bignon, vol. i., p. 433, following what Thiers, at the end of the first part, imparts with an *air d'importance*, which is partly known, and partly untrue.

other hand, who was at the head of the emperor's dreadful police, was suddenly and excessively favoured. He too observed, when he had reached the highest pinnacle, that he began to be suspected. The count was an Estonian by birth, and a man of a cold, deep, and faithless disposition; he was director of the police of the Empire, and of the posts, and the instrument of all the cruelties and severities which had been exercised by the emperor. He was also commander-in-chief of all the troops in the capital, and since the 10th of March had become a member of the ministry for foreign affairs. Up to this period he had been successful in discovering and frustrating all the real or pretended attempts at dethroning the emperor, but he now founded a confederacy against him, because he knew that Paul had called to his aid two dreadful assistants, to use them against himself in case of necessity. The emperor had previously sent away from Petersburg Lindner and Aracktschejef, two of his most dreadful instruments of violence, the latter of whom played a fearful character in Russia even during the reign of the mild and gentle Emperor Alexander; he at this time gave directions for their recal. Pahlen had previously taken his measures in such a manner, that a number of those to whom the murder of an emperor was no novelty, were at that time collected in Petersburg, and only waited for a hint, either with or without Pahlen, to fall upon the emperor, who had given them personally mortal offence.

Valerian, Nicholas and Plato Suboff, had first been publicly affronted by the emperor like the Orloffs, and afterwards dismissed; they remained under compulsory absence in Germany till they found a channel of securing the favour of the only person who had any influence upon the emperor. This channel was a *French actress*, called Chevalier, who ruled the Turkish Kutaisoff, formerly a *valet-de-chambre*, but now adorned with all possible titles, honours, and orders, with the broad ribbons and stars of Europe; and through him ruled the emperor. Chevalier's influence obtained permission for the Suboffs to return to the court, and Plato held Kutaisoff bound by his expressed intention of marrying the Turk's daughter. Plato had been previously commander-in-chief of the army, and could, therefore, in case of need, reckon with greater certainty upon the army, as it had been rendered discontented by the gross and ridiculous treatment of the generals, of the whole army, and even of such a man as Suwarow. Participants in a plan for setting aside the emperor were easily found among the nobles, as soon as it became certain that there was nothing to fear. It was necessary, however, to obtain the consent of the eldest grand duke; for not a word was said of the murder, but merely of the removal of his father from the government. Alexander was not easily prevailed upon to acquiesce in the deposition of his father, as, however numerous Alexander's failings in other respects may have been, both he and his mother were persons of gentle hearts. Pahlen undertook the business of persuading the prince, for which he was by far the best fitted,

inasmuch as he knew all the secrets of the court, and combined all power in himself ; he therefore succeeded in convincing the imperial family of the dangers with which they themselves were threatened, and of the necessity of deposing the emperor. He appears to have persuaded the Grand Duke Alexander, by showing that he could only guard against a greater evil by consenting to his father's de-thronement. Certain it is, at least, that Alexander signed the proclamation, announcing his own assumption of the reins of government, two hours before the execution of the deed by the conspirators.

The emperor with his family lived in the Michailoff palace; for good reasons the 23rd of March, 1801, was chosen for the accomplishment of the deed, for on that day the Semonovski battalion of guards was on duty at the palace. The most distinguished men among the conspirators were the Suboffs, General Count Benningsen, a Hanoverian, who had distinguished himself in the Polish wars under Catharine, Tschitschakoff, Tartarinoff, Tolstoy, Yaschwell, Yesselowitsch and Ouwaroff, together with Count Pahlen himself, who did not accompany the others into the emperor's bed-chamber, but had taken his measures so skilfully, that if the enterprise failed, he might appear as his deliverer. Very shortly before the execution of the deed, Pahlen communicated the design to General Talizin, colonel of the regiment of Preobratschweskoi guards, to General Deporadowitsch, colonel of the Semonovski guards, together with some fifty other officers whom he entertained in the evening preceding the night on which the murder was committed. Under these circumstances, armed and well known generals could meet with no difficulties from the guards on duty at the palace, who suffered them to pass—and they even made their way with facility through the chambers, more especially as they were preceded by adjutant Aramakoff, whose duty it was to make all presentations and announcements to the emperor. Even the two sentinels in the ante-chamber to the emperor's room allowed them to pass, and only a single Cossack of the body guard on duty at the outer door of the bedroom raised an alarm, defended himself, and was cut down.

We leave to others the description of the scene of horrors within, where the emperor was fallen upon in his bed. Lloyd, an Englishman, in his life of the Emperor Alexander, has, so far as we know, given a specially dramatic and romantic account of the scene; we are far, however, from guaranteeing its correctness. So much is certain, that, whatever he may say, Suboff and Benningsen were the first to lay hands upon the emperor, and that Aramakoff, the adjutant, lent his sash to strangle him. The deed was no sooner completed than Pahlen joined his confederates, and hailed Alexander as emperor, but at the same time, by his silence on a question being asked with regard to the fate of the emperor, indicated to him the cruel murder which had been perpetrated. The empress was inconsolable, and the young emperor proved by his visionary and melancholy character, how dreadful the impression was, and how deeply the

appearance of the murderers, whom he was afterwards obliged to have around him, had wounded his tender soul. He was afterwards accused of being as false as a Greek of the Byzantine empire; this will be easily explained and pardoned, when the contrast of the apparent autocracy with which he was invested is compared with the manner in which he obtained it, and with what he was obliged to do in order to maintain it.

He had supped with his father at nine o'clock, and as early as eleven he took possession of the empire, by a document which had been drawn up and signed two hours and a half previously. The most dreadful thing of all, however, was, that he was obliged not only to suffer the two chief conspirators, Suboff and Pahlen, to remain about his person, but to allow them to share the administration of the kingdom between them. It was a piece of good fortune that those two thoroughly wicked men were of very different views, by which means he was first enabled to remove Pahlen and afterwards Suboff also. Their associates, however, remained, and at a later period we shall find Count Benningsen at the head of the army which was to deliver Prussia after the battle of Jena.

§ II.

ENGLAND TILL THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

A.—REVIEW OF THE CONDITION OF ENGLAND TILL THE BATTLE OF THE NILE.

ON the conclusion of the peace which terminated the American war, England had been obliged for the first time to concede considerable advantages to her enemies, and every one believed that the establishment of a democratic republic of Englishmen beyond the ocean, would prove very disadvantageous to the aristocratic monarchical state at home; the very reverse, however, proved to be the consequence. The British people reached the very pinnacle of their power at this very time, whether we consider their commerce, trade, manufactures, or naval pre-eminence, for they inherited all that the Dutch had lost, by the transfer of the whole influence and power of capital from the latter to themselves. What was lost in America was not only replaced on the Ganges and Indus, but double and treble as great an extent of territory and resources was added to their dominion. The empire of Great Britain increased daily, till in our own times it has been extended even beyond the Indus. The Emperor of China himself has been compelled to consent to have his subjects poisoned by the opium extorted from the labours of its subjects in India and sold to the Chinese. The fleets of

England soon covered every sea from Petersburg to Japan, from New Zealand to Baffin's Bay and the Aleutian Isles, whilst their subsidies reduced all the princes of Europe, from the Emperors of Russia and Germany down to the Prince of Waldeck, to the rank of mercenaries; every one was intoxicated with the splendour of England, and dazzled by the brilliancy of her freedom.

At the end of the eighteenth century there were three evils, which deprived England of all those advantages which, in the beginning and middle of the same century, had made her sons the heroes of virtue and liberty in the novels and plays of all nations, and her lords the divinities of the stage even in the works of Rousseau. The ruling classes, who shared among themselves all the offices and advantages of the state, but always recruited their order by new adoptions from the middle classes, suffered under the same evils which weighed down the vigorous and powerful aristocracy of Rome when they had attained to the dominion of the world. The younger branches and relations of the nobility and higher gentry, promoted by the influence of their families alone, and appointed to the most lucrative offices in India and other Oriental possessions, returned with, and continued to propagate in their families the same ideas and views of themselves and of their relation to the other classes, which in ancient times were characteristic of the Roman pro-consuls, pro-prætors, and publicans. The wealth of these officials, who had become nabobs, the constantly increasing estates of the rich and noble, the decreasing wealth of the small landowners, the disappearance of every species of industry which could be carried on with small capital, and the miracles worked by great capital and machinery, together with the art of making those great speculations ruinous to the poorer classes, disturbed the whole condition and nature of the old institutions and old constitution of the country, whilst the appearance of them was still preserved. The constitution was not indeed endangered because a free people voluntarily changed itself into a machine, in which one series of spokes moved as tediously and monotonously as the other.

This first social evil, which no one suspected, because the state exhibited the appearance of all the vigour of health, was followed by another intimately connected with it. The whole landed property of England proper, having by degrees fallen into the hands of about seven thousand proprietors (often reckoned now at a smaller number), and the manufactories in the towns and villages alternately employing and dismissing numerous hands, drawn from the agricultural districts and from Ireland, the number of those who lived upon the proceeds of mere daily labour was immensely increased, and it was soon found impossible to preserve any definite or regular relation between wages and labour. This was nearly connected with the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few thousands, who alone derived all the advantages which spring from gigantic national

enterprises, wars and conquests, for the sake of which such an enormous debt was contracted. The national debt was an advantage to the rich, and made a means of increasing their income by lending their money to the nation, whilst the payment of the taxes, which, if they were to produce a large revenue, must be imposed upon the prime necessities of life, was oppressive to the poor alone.

A third disease under which the British empire laboured was the extraordinary and unsuitable proportion which subsisted in Ireland between a small number of English Protestant landowners and millions of starving Irishmen. This last point will be further referred to hereafter, for the French at the time of the republic, and Bonaparte also, cherished the absurd opinion and expectation, that in their undertakings against England they might rely upon the co-operation of the Irish. As to the national debt of England, the reports of a national bankruptcy were as empty and unfounded as the calculations of Mallet du Pan and the English knight D'Ivernois, who proved yearly, by tedious calculations to the very farthing, that France would not be able to go on with its revenue. During the war, Austria indeed several times became either wholly or partially bankrupt, as the democrats of France had become in the time of their *assignats and mandats*; but in both these countries, those who were at the helm of public affairs had either nothing to lose, or they could shift the loss to the shoulders of others; whereas in England, on the contrary, the parliamentary families were those who would have suffered the most. The incredible increase of the national debt was merely injurious, by tending to diminish the number of the comfortable middle classes, and to increase that of the people, properly so called. In proportion as the debt grew incredibly with every decennium, the middle classes became more and more weighed down with the burden of government taxes on the one hand, and local rates upon the other. According to a law passed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the support of the poor was thrown upon the parishes to which they belonged, and the inhabitants of which rated themselves for this purpose. These rates became more and more oppressive precisely as poverty increased, as the real poor were added to those thousands of lazy and useless persons who were satisfied to be supported in idleness at the expense of others.

In consequence of the abuses of the poor laws, and the oppressiveness of the public taxes, matters, as is well known, reached such a state in our own days, that it became obvious that a vast number of persons of small means would soon be obliged to apply for relief, instead of contributing to the rates for the relief of others; the whole principle of legislation was therefore changed. Poverty was made a crime; the country was filled with poor-houses, which were fitted up like houses of correction, and designated by the name which in Germany we apply to the milder description of prisons (workhouses). In these workhouses thousands of poor were and are shut up—children separated from their parents, and husbands from their wives—

and a meagre diet supplied, which is merely sufficient to sustain life, and is of a description inferior to that which criminals often obtain. Scarcely a week occurs in which poor persons do not intentionally commit offences against the laws in order to be sent to a criminal prison. Many of these changes were made, however, subsequent to the period of which we are now speaking. As to the cost of the war, the following statement of a few bare facts will best show that the war which Pitt, Grenville, and the Tories who supported them carried on, was completely a national war, because it sprung from genuine English prejudices, and was advantageous to English monopoly. The war by land, for which England paid the continental princes, was hateful, ruinous, and disgraceful to the people of the continent, and the English pride was proportionally more flattered as the war at sea was uninterruptedly glorious. Whilst the ruling party repeatedly paid the king's pretended debts out of the national purse, and showered favours of wealth upon his incapable and immoral princes, the paying English always comforted themselves with the idea that this was a necessary consequence of their happy constitution in church and state. In 1793-94, when his brothers had at least only proved themselves incapable, the Duke of York ruined everything in the field; and yet this did not prevent the ministers, desirous of pleasing his father, from afterwards sending him again to North Holland. The prince regent, at the time in which he exercised the royal power, during the period of his father's mental alienation, was anxious that the Bourbons might be enabled to follow their old courses in France, and the English ministry therefore spent unspeakable sums of money in supporting in and out of France a vast number of adventurers, impostors, and fools, as spies and conspirators, whose proceedings made England, the *émigrés*, and the Bourbons, at once ridiculous and contemptible. The corps of the Prince of Condé, in the pay of the English, incensed the republicans to the highest degree without doing them any considerable mischief, and the war supported by the English in La Vendée at enormous expense, was much more ruinous to those who carried it on, than to those against whom it was directed; it was quite otherwise at sea.

At the time in which the English and Austrian armies pressed forward from Belgium into France, a combined Spanish and English fleet was cruising off Marseilles and Toulon, and the inhabitants of these two towns turned to this fleet and the English admiral, who was sent as it was pretended to favour the royalist and monarchical power, for protection against the mad democrats, who threatened them with complete annihilation. With this view, Admiral Trogoff, who was a royalist, and commanded in the town of Toulon, offered to put that place into his possession, as a pledge of the sincerity of their purpose, but not as a booty. He expected also that the Spaniards would be regarded as a guarantee for the French, seeing that they would not have agreed to a robbery of the kind which followed. Admiral Hood, however, took a very different view

of the matter. He excluded the Spaniards completely, and took possession as of a prize of the arsenal, which was full of stores for the whole French fleet, and of the thirty-one ships of war then lying in the harbour. It is true, he could only take away three ships of the line, but he burnt the others, and by plundering or destroying the stores, effectually obstructed the operations and destroyed the means of a dangerous and active rival of his nation. This took place at the close of the year 1793, in the summer of which many colonies in the East and West Indies had already fallen into the hands of the English.

The island of Tobago was conquered; the dreadful war which had broken out between the mulattoes, whites, and negroes in St. Domingo, had brought Fort Jeremie and Cape St. Molé into the hands of the English, in a similar manner to that in which they afterwards got possession of the harbour, fleet, and arsenals of Toulon. The French fisheries in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence also became the prey of the English, as soon as they took possession of the islands of St. Pierre and Miguelet. In reference to the East Indies, the English ministry followed their usual course, gave a hint long before the event to their military authorities in that quarter respecting the possibility of an early disruption of the friendly relations with France, and the troops of the East India Company, under General Stewart, made no hesitation thus early in seizing upon Pondicherry, Mahé, and all the other French possessions on the coast of Malabar and Coromandel. In the following years, 1794-95, when Pitt's parliamentary majority began to fluctuate, discontent began to manifest itself amongst the seamen with the conduct of the aristocracy. Immense sums for the support of the navy had been from time to time obtained from Parliament; yet the seamen were both badly paid and furnished with bad provisions. This discontent first showed itself in the channel fleet: there was a general complaint that mere youths were promoted and paid in the navy as in the church, whilst the men who were the real ornaments and support of the service were obliged to be satisfied with very small privileges. About the same time the discontent in Ireland became daily more threatening, and as early as 1794 the French collected a fleet in Brest in order to effect a landing in Ireland; the port, however, was incessantly watched by the English, who kept a large number of ships cruising off the harbour. The French attempted in vain to surprise Admiral Cornwallis, as he was cruising off Belleisle on the 16th of June. He escaped the thirteen ships of the line which were sent out against him, and when the fleets came to an engagement on the 22nd, the English proved themselves far superior to the French. The French fleet lost three ships of the line, and were obliged to take refuge in the port of L'Orient.

During the year 1794 the French were for some time successful in the West Indies. The insurrection of the mulattoes enabled them to reduce St. Eustatius and St. Lucia to subjection, and also

to reconquer the island of Guadalupe, which had been wrested from them by the English; in the following year, however, the latter took an ample revenge. In the beginning of the year 1795 the English made themselves masters of the ships and colonies of the Dutch, who in the preceding year had been their allies. They seized upon three ships of the line, nine East Indiamen, and about thirty other vessels, which had sought for their protection, and caused the Dutch ships to be captured wherever they were met with, in every sea. In the following year, 1796, the English, it is true, were again obliged to evacuate Corsica, of which they had been in possession since 1793; but Admiral Elphinstone, on the other hand, wrested the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch, and captured a fleet of merchantmen, whose value was estimated in Holland at 10,000,000 of guilders. General Abercrombie reconquered St. Lucia; and the Dutch colonies of Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, in the West Indies, as well as those of Banda and Amboyna in the East, were taken possession of by English troops. In August of the same year Admiral Lucas's attempt to recover the Cape of Good Hope from the English was treasonably frustrated by the influence which the hereditary stadholder and the Orange party still continued to have over the seamen of the fleet. Admiral Lucas was compelled by the crews of his own ships to surrender his whole fleet to Admiral Elphinstone, who in this manner gained possession of seven ships of war, carrying from 26 to 66 guns, and having on board a great number of land forces.

The English took also the same advantage of the weakness of Spain as they had done of the misfortunes of the Dutch. Don Godoy, the miserable favourite of the Queen of Spain, for the purpose of pleasing France, by taking part in the war which that country was carrying on with England, had the folly to sacrifice to the English the rich ships laden with the produce of her foreign mines, which Spain was wholly unable to protect. This contemptible favourite not only sacrificed the ships laden with the precious metals, in order to retain the favour of France, but the whole of the Spanish fleet, for the same reason. The French proposed that a junction should be formed by the Spanish and Dutch fleets with their own, which was lying in the harbour of Brest, closely blockaded by the English, and that the combined fleets should afterwards attempt to make a descent upon the coast of Ireland. With this view the brave and able Spanish admiral, Don Joseph de Cordova, equipped a fleet of twenty-two ships of the line, succeeded, in February, 1797, in getting to sea, and, without obstruction, passing the Straits of Gibraltar into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Jervis was at that time cruising off the Straits and along the coast of Portugal, but no one expected that Jervis, with his fifteen ships, would venture to attack a Spanish fleet of nearly double his force. He did it, notwithstanding, and proved completely victorious. The Spanish ships had troops on board; they therefore lost about 6000 men; two

ships of 112 guns, one of 80, and one of 74, were taken; the others were severely injured and obliged to seek safety by running into the harbour of Cadiz. The English honoured Admiral Jervis in the same manner as the Russians are accustomed to honour those who obtain great victories; they created him a peer, and gave him the title of St. Vincent, after the name of the promontory near which he had been victorious. On this occasion Nelson was made an admiral, but the foolhardy attack which he afterwards made, in July, upon Teneriffe, must necessarily have proved a failure; and it cost the admiral one of his arms.

In the West Indies the English were likewise victorious; for, on the 18th of February, Admiral Hervey and General Abercrombie conquered the island of Trinidad, and the Spaniards were themselves obliged to burn four ships of the line and a frigate, which were lying in the Gulf of Paria, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; notwithstanding this, the English succeeded in capturing one ship of the line. In October, 1797, Admiral Duncan fell in with the Dutch fleet, under the command of Admiral de Winter, on the banks of Camperdown, defeated it, and of the seventeen ships of which it consisted, took ten and a frigate. We have already remarked, that in the year 1798 the dangers to which the English were exposed were very great, because a civil war of such a dangerous character was raging in Ireland, that the government was compelled to send over the most distinguished general whom the English at that time possessed, and twelve regiments of militia, and at the same time there was a great fermentation in England; the victories by sea, however, consoled the people; and, as long as they were able to sing “Rule Britannia” (*wir allein sind die Welt*), everything else was forgotten. In the beginning of August, Nelson annihilated the French fleet which had brought Bonaparte to Egypt in the Bay of Aboukir, and in October the island of Minorca was wrested from the hands of the Spaniards.

B.—ENGLAND, AND BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

Bonaparte's undertaking against Egypt proved far more advantageous to England, in reference to democratic France, than all the conspiracies which they had set on foot within the country itself, and supported by their money, and than all the expeditions undertaken by the mercenary princes in her pay. We have already referred to the pretext with which this expedition furnished them for aiming at the possession of Malta, for organizing the unnatural alliance between the Turks and the Russians, and, in connexion with these, for wresting from the hands of the French the possessions out of which the Greek republic of the Seven Islands was formed. They then employed the Russians before Ancona, Russians and Turks to restore the Queen of Naples to her capital, and finally, Nelson having destroyed the whole French fleet in the Bay of Aboukir, they took

upon themselves to conquer Egypt for the grand sultan. That, indeed, they were obliged to do, for the Turks had disgracefully failed in the two attempts which they had already made. A long contest sprang up between the Russians and the Turks respecting what were called the Ionian Islands, inhabited by Greeks, and the districts around the Gulf of Cattaro in the Adriatic Sea, which had formerly belonged to the Venetians; these disputes were first brought to an issue in March, 1800. The possessions on the main land, Perga, Prevesa, Vonito and Butrinto, were left in the hands of the Turks; whilst a republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was formed of the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Cerigo, Santa Maura, &c. According to the terms of the treaty, signed at Constantinople on the 21st of March, 1800, this republic was still to remain under the supremacy of the Turks, in the same manner as the republic of Ragusa, but its independence was at the same time to be guaranteed by Russia; both powers were to exercise equal rights of protection.

Bonaparte, as we have already stated, had left Kleber behind him in Egypt, having, before his departure, effectually frustrated the attack which the Turks had made from the promontory which is defended by the port of Aboukir. This attack, indeed, proved unsuccessful; but the grand vizier was assembling an immense army in Palestine, in order to march through the desert to Cairo, and Sir Sidney Smith was cruising with his fleet off the coasts of Syria and Egypt; Kleber was therefore extremely dissatisfied with Bonaparte for having taken all the honourable and glorious part of the expedition to himself, and for having left him to deal with all the difficulties and dangers to which the French army subsequently became exposed. We do not at all enter into the question in dispute between Kleber and Bonaparte, of which all French works are full, because we should be obliged to enter into details concerning the civil and military administration of Egypt and the army, which would be inconsistent with the design of this general work; we cannot, however, but smile at the difficulties in which all the French writers are placed, in order not to be obliged on the one hand to deprive their infallible hero of any of his military perfections, and, on the other, to be sufficiently tender of Kleber, who was also to remain a military idol for future plundering expeditions and wars. Kleber was seriously offended that Bonaparte, who left the whole civil and military administration to him, had invited him to a personal conference which he did not remain to hold, but sent the fat Marquis Menou, who, as is well known, was and always continued to be a mere courtier of the First Consul. Kleber was still more indignant, because the instructions which Bonaparte left behind were extremely indefinite and equivocally expressed, and because he had not allowed him, who was to be his representative in all things, to obtain the slightest idea of his intention of taking his departure for France. This would have been the more necessary, because Kleber, at Bonaparte's departure, entertained the most gloomy views of the undertaking and of the whole

state of affairs, whilst Bonaparte and his marquis looked upon everything as promising and splendid.

Kleber, it is true, took upon himself the whole administration, chose the government-house at Cairo for his residence, and showed great ability in the direction of the affairs of an Oriental government, which is much more nearly related to a military command than any civil government in the West. He complained that Bonaparte had taken with him the most distinguished men in the army, and had even left orders behind him for General Desaix, who was not present at the time of his departure, to follow him as quickly as possible. Desaix, indeed, remained for some months, and rendered Kleber essential services. He was employed, too, when Kleber saw clearly that it would be impossible for him to maintain his ground for any considerable time in Egypt, and that it was his duty to preserve a chosen army and most valuable materials of war for his own country.

Desaix had again succeeded in driving Murad Bey and his Mamelukes out of the Valley of the Nile into the desert, but there was nothing to prevent them from returning again and again; and Ibrahim Bey still kept his footing in Lower Egypt with the few hundred Mamelukes who remained to him, when the grand vizier, Jussuff, at length put his army in motion against Egypt, after having gathered together at Gaza a force of no less than 80,000 men: the numbers are no doubt overstated. Whilst the vizier was advancing from the west against El Arish, Sidney Smith was cruising with his ships off the mouths of the Nile, and from time to time put on shore parties of Turks. All this would not have been dangerous; but it made the possession of Egypt not only unproductive but burdensome to France, and Kleber therefore resolved to give up the struggle at the end of the year, provided he could obtain good conditions from the enemy. And because there was no possibility of negotiating with any security with the Turks, he opened a correspondence with the English commanders, in order that any agreement entered into with the Turks might be concluded under an English and Russian guarantee.

In order to justify himself to the Directory for evacuating Egypt, Kleber prepared a report, which, when it fell into the hands of the English, not only led them, but all Europe, astray concerning the state of affairs in Egypt. This report was drawn up under a strong feeling of bitterness against Bonaparte, drew the picture in the darkest colours, and gave a completely one-sided view of the whole of that general's conduct. Two copies of this report were despatched, one of which fell into the hands of the English, and was printed by order of the government, in order to mortify Bonaparte; the other reached Paris, where it came into Bonaparte's own hands, who had by that time driven out the Directory. Those who in St. Helena wrote down what Bonaparte in his dreams said and did not say of the past, Thiers, and those of his school, throw the whole blame of

the straits and difficulties to which Kleber was reduced upon the admirals, who proved unable to execute what the infallible general had commanded. Into this, however, we do not enter. Bonaparte's infallibility was precisely like the pope's—it had an existence for those who believed in it; but that Kleber's report was really one-sided and unfair may be gathered from the very fact, that a man who played such a character as Poussielgues did in Malta, was active on the occasion. The report too, which Regnier, one of the most distinguished of the French generals, published on his return to Paris, is also very suspicious,* but far more suspicious are the accounts which Bonaparte, Thiers, and the Bonapartists give of those affairs. On the other hand the account which was given by the honourable Count d'Aure, a few years since, of the circumstances of that time, appears to us admirable in all respects.†

Negotiations for the evacuation of Egypt were opened by Kleber with Sir Sidney Smith as early as the end of September, when the great Turkish army was approaching the frontiers of that country; these led to no result till the end of December. On this occasion the part of the negotiations which related to civil affairs was left by Kleber to Poussielgues, who was the head of the administration under Bonaparte, and the military arrangements were committed to Desaix; both of them, however, neglected accurately to inform themselves of the powers with which the English commodore was entrusted by his government in reference to the conveyance of the French army to Europe. Kleber came to the wrong conclusion, that the Turks would accept of the English commodore's mediation and acknowledge whatever he agreed to; and that his arrangements would also be ratified by the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, and by the English ministry, from whom their orders were received.

Kleber had at first agreed to an armistice for three months, during which the Turks were to provide the ships necessary for the transport of the French army with its arms and baggage; and besides he declared himself ready, by way of anticipation, to deliver up to them the whole right bank of the Nile, from Cairo to the sea, together with all the fortified places of the district. At the time in which this agreement was being concluded between the English commodore and the French plenipotentiaries, the vizier took El Arish and caused the garrison to be put to the sword; immediately afterwards the place of conference respecting a convention was

* "De l'Egypte après la Bataille d'Héliopolis par le Général Regnier, 1802." Paris, 8vo. His enmity towards Menou and prepossessions in favour of Kleber make the report very one-sided.

† This account is contained in the first part of his notices on the history of Bonaparte, published in 1830, 2 vols., Paris, under the title: "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs volontaires et involontaires, ou observations sur ses mémoires par Messieurs le Général Belliard, le Général Gourgaud, le Comte d'Aure (who was on the staff in Egypt), le Comte de Survilliers, le Baron Meneval, le Comte Bonacossi, le Prince d'Eckmühl, le Baron Massias, le Comte Boulay de la Meurthe, le Ministre de Stein, et Cambacérès."

changed to the Turkish camp before El Arish. For this reason, the conditions of evacuation on which they finally settled were called the capitulation of El Arish, or of Salahieh. Davoust and Savary, who were, and always remained devoted Bonapartists, disapproved of all negotiation, as well as Menou, because Bonaparte was altogether averse to any evacuation whatever; and there can be no doubt that Kleber was by far too precipitate, both in the negotiation itself and in the evacuation of the fortified towns. By the conditions, he was to ratify the convention within eight days; then, in the following eight days, to surrender the fortified places on the right bank of the Nile; and fourteen days after the ratification, Cairo itself, without having any other guarantee than the faithless Turks would keep their word than the verbal assurance of the English commodore that he would place no obstruction in the way of the return of an army of more than 20,000 men into their country. This, however, was precisely the moment in which the return of the army would have given a decided superiority to the French in the war upon the continent. In addition to all this, neither Sir Sidney Smith nor the Russian plenipotentiary signed the convention, although it was said in the document* that the commodore would furnish the necessary passports, and although he had at the very first allowed the scientific men and scholars who were with the army and the wounded to take their departure. It is true that the English commodore, at an earlier period, had been furnished with all the necessary powers; he now, however, declared, after three months' negotiation (without any such intimation), that all his diplomatic powers had been extinguished since Lord Elgin's arrival in Constantinople; that he could only act as commodore, and that everything which he did in that capacity must be confirmed, before it became valid, by Lord Keith, the commander-in-chief.

Sir Sidney Smith was perfectly honourable. He thought, as was afterwards confirmed by experience, that the convention of Salahieh was very advantageous; and moreover, in the commencement of March, he gave passports to Generals Davoust and Desaix to return to Europe; in the mean time, however, the English ministry, as early as the 15th of December, 1799, had issued very different orders to Lord Keith. He was ordered to insist upon the French surrendering as prisoners of war. Before Lord Keith's decision reached the commodore, who was lying off Cyprus, Kleber had ratified the capitulation, on the 24th of February, 1800, already put the Turks in possession of Damietta, Balbeis, Cotieh, and Salahieh, the fortified towns on the Lower Nile, and had allowed the grand vizier to march up the right bank of the Nile to the very neighbourhood of Cairo. Just as this had taken place, Sir Sidney Smith informed him, by a despatch from Cyprus, that he very much regretted to say he had received orders not to ratify the convention,

* Martens' "Recueil," vol. vii., pp. 380-86.

except on condition of the French army becoming prisoners of war. In addition to this, Lord Keith communicated, in their rudest form, to a general who was, with good reason, proud of being reckoned among the greatest commanders of his time, and of having the bravest soldiers under him, the demands of a brutal Grenville and of Dundas (Lord Melville), who was afterwards stigmatised with disgrace by the Parliament.*

Kleber, on this news, became vehemently indignant at the English, and in the field soon gave proof to the rabble of the grand vizier, which was reckoned at 80,000 men, that they could accomplish nothing by force against his 12,000 veterans; but even after his victory over the Turks he would still have fulfilled the convention of El Arish, and the French would have left Egypt, had his life been spared, and had not Menou, Bonaparte's eye-server, succeeded to his place. We shall first give some account of Kleber's last heroic exploit, which has been related by the French with such a profusion of rhetorical pathos, and then state the reasons by which we are convinced, that had it not been for Menou, who was eager to carry out Bonaparte's idea regardless of consequences, many thousand men would have been saved, and much misery and bloodshed have been spared, which were the results of an attempt to maintain possession of Egypt. The grand vizier, with his hordes, was at about an hour's distance from Cairo, near the villages of Elhanka and Matarieh, where, happily for the rhetorical historians, the French had discovered the ruins of the ancient city of Heliopolis; and they have therefore been enabled to give to the scene of Kleber's victory the magnificently sounding name of the battle of Heliopolis. Kleber knew well the nature of a Turkish army, and that it is, in fact, weaker in proportion to the vastness of its numbers; he therefore attacked them precisely in the same way as Rumianzoff, Repnin, and Suwarow, with a few thousand Russians, had before him attacked hundreds of thousands of Turks, and scattered them to the winds. He first cheered and animated his 10,000 veterans in Bonaparte's laconic style, and after Suwarow's manner;† he then attacked the Turkish army and camp on the 20th of March, completed the victory on the 21st, and routed the whole army. The victory was the more easily won, in consequence of the best part of the grand vizier's army—viz., Ibrahim's Mamelukes and a well-disciplined division under Nassif Pasha, who was second in command, having been sent to surround the French, instead of which

* Lord Keith, in his letter to Kleber, says that he had received positive orders from his majesty not to consent to any capitulation with the French troops which he commanded in Egypt and Syria, unless they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners of war . . . delivering up all the ships and stores in the port of Alexandria to the allied powers. Nay, he expressly subjoins the coarse words of the English minister, "That in the event of this capitulation, he could not permit any of the troops to depart for France before they had been exchanged."

† He first had Lord Keith's letter read aloud; after which his whole speech consisted of the words: "Soldats! on ne repond à de telles insolences que par la victoire. Marchons!"

they fell upon the city of Cairo, and exercised there the most shameful cruelties. The victory of Heliopolis cost the French, as had been always the case with the Russians, only a few hundred men, and they therefore followed up their success with great spirit. Kleber only sent at first very small assistance to the French, who were hard pressed by the populace and by the Turks, who had made themselves masters of every part of the city which was not fortified, whilst he himself first took possession of the rich camp of the Turks, with all their baggage and artillery, next drove them into the desert, where they were fallen upon by the Bedouins, left the pursuit of them as far as Syria to his generals, and returned again on the 27th of March to Cairo, which was in a dreadful condition.

Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim had not only cruelly plundered the city of Cairo, but encouraged the populace to rise against the French, and permitted the robbery and maltreatment of the Christians by the Mussulmen. Murder, bloodshed, and cruelties of every description continued for four weeks, and were greatly increased by the fire of the French from the citadel and from the fortified houses of which they had and kept possession. The re-conquest of the town was not effected even on Kleber's return, because his generals on the one hand continued to pursue the remains of the main body of the Turks, and, on the other, before they returned, they first re-conquered all those strong places (Damietta included) which had been given up to the Turks. As to the allegation of the French, that Kleber, after the victory of Heliopolis, had given up all idea of evacuating Egypt, we know it to be wholly unfounded, as we also know that the English ministry had altered their opinion as early as the 28th of March, therefore long before they could have known of Kleber's victory, and recalled their orders respecting the convention of El Arish. As regards Kleber's views, there is a letter which Desaix wrote on his arrival in Europe, and a communication addressed by Kleber himself to the caiamakan, the vizier's deputy in Constantinople, which give us a full and authentic account of them.*

* Desaix's letter may be seen in Bourrienne, vol. iv., pp. 12-15. This letter gives an account of the general's journey. He relates how he was detained in spite of his passports (English and Turkish), brought to Lord Keith at Leghorn, and kept a prisoner for thirty days, till at length it says: "*Enfin nous avons été relâchés et l'Amiral Keith nous a fait connaître que son gouvernement consentait à ce que la convention d'El Arish fût exécutée.*" In the letter which Kleber wrote from Cairo, on the 10th of April, to the caiamakan in Constantinople, he says expressly: "THE SUBLIME PORTE WILL FIND ME AT ALL TIMES INCLINED TO GIVE UP THE POSSESSION OF EGYPT ON THE CONDITIONS SETTLED IN THE CONVENTION OF EL ARISH, WITH ONLY A FEW MODIFICATIONS, WHICH HAVE BECOME NECESSARY THROUGH CIRCUMSTANCES." The second order of the English ministry to Lord Keith is dated March 28th, and is as follows: "That although the terms granted to the French by the last capitulation appeared to his majesty more advantageous to the enemy than their situation entitled them to expect, by restoring to the French government the services of a considerable and disciplined body of troops, besides that his majesty did not consider Sir S. Smith as having been authorised either to enter into or sanction any such agreement in his majesty's name; yet, as the general commanding the enemy's troops appears to have treated with him as a person whom he conceived to have possessed such authority, and as, by annulling this transaction, the enemy could not

Kleber first of all entered into a compact with Murad Bey, who looked on quietly at the engagement with the Turks, because Upper Egypt had been promised him as a fief from the French. The promise was fulfilled immediately after the battle, and Upper Egypt was transferred to the rule of Murad Bey, in consideration of the payment of a yearly contribution and a fixed number of auxiliary troops in case of war. On the 3rd and 4th of April a dreadful struggle was first commenced within the city itself, and without its walls, in order to suppress the insurrection in Cairo, and to drive the Mamelukes under Ibrahim, and the Turks under Nassif, again out of the city. The murderous contest, hand to hand, and a continuous fire from the guns in the fort, lasted from the 3rd till the 14th, and the most beautiful part of the city of Cairo, usually called the town of Bulack, was laid in ruins, and in every other part of the city nothing was to be seen but houses and public edifices in heaps of ruins, and the bodies of the slain. The French themselves report that many thousand Turks and Mahometans, fighting for their religion and their country, fell a sacrifice, and that not less than 600 houses were burnt down, before the unfortunate inhabitants of Cairo were again brought completely into subjection to the power of their spoilers from beyond the sea. Thiers adopts unconditionally the well-known philosophy of the French, which teaches that the enormities perpetrated by the Massenas and Soult's in Genoa, and in every place where they had opportunity, were heroic deeds, and that the people who demanded the restoration of those things of which they had been ruthlessly plundered, deserved to be branded as Vandals. He observes, with perfect coolness, that all the calamities on this occasion were owing to the fanaticism of the Moslems, who would not submit to the French yoke. In fact, the massacre and bloodshed continued till the 23rd of April, on which day an understanding was at length come to with Ibrahim and Nassif Pasha. They were to be allowed quietly to withdraw from Egypt to Syria; and General Regnier was commissioned to accompany them to the frontiers, and to watch their movements.

From this time forward Kleber played the sultan, as Bonaparte had done before him. In this case, we shall bring forward the language of an impartial eye-witness, attached both to Kleber and Bonaparte, to show to our readers what *all Frenchmen*, without exception, call Bonaparte's and Kleber's admirable administration of Egypt. These Frenchmen are, however, consequent, for they say precisely the same of Mehemet Ali. The clever man, whose words we subjoin in a note, because he himself was at the head of the administration, excuses the Eastern despotism practised by Kleber and Bonaparte by the usual plea of all despotic princes, ministers, and

be replaced in the same situation in which he before stood, his majesty, from a scrupulous regard to the public faith, has judged it proper that the officers should abstain from any act inconsistent with the engagements to which Sir S. Smith had erroneously given the sanction of his majesty's name."

officials—that of necessity.* Thiers goes still further; he even thinks it was great moderation in Kleber to have commenced his system of oppression of all those who were not French, and therefore, according to Thiers, very little worth, with having extorted *only* the sum of eight millions of francs from Cairo, after the city had been plundered for a month, and exposed to every possible mode of robbery and spoliation; and a like sum from other towns. Kleber's government did not continue quite two months after the re-conquest of the capital; for he was assassinated on the 14th of June, 1800, by a fanatical Mussulman, who had concealed himself in his garden, in order to gain a crown of martyrdom by his deed.

On Kleber's death, the supreme command fell by seniority to the Marquis Menou, although every one was well convinced of his military incapacity. Bonaparte, too, knew this quite well; but Menou possessed all the qualities of the officers of the guards and reviews (*officiers à talons rouges*) of the royal times before the revolution; he was one of those who, like Maret, Gourgaud, Savary, and Davoust, entertained an idolatrous admiration of Bonaparte, and were therefore mere tools in his hands. Besides, the other generals, even Regnier, who afterwards became so vehemently angry with Menou, willingly shrank from the responsibility of the chief command. Menou was acknowledged by the army as commander-in-chief, and on the 6th of November received the confirmation of his office from the First Consul. The most prudent thing would have been to have accepted the proposal made by the English, as soon as they saw that the Turks could never of themselves wrest Egypt from the hands of the French, and that it would cost them a great expenditure of men and money. Lord Keith had assured Desaix that the English ministry were ready to sanction and to give effect to the convention of El Arish.

The Turkish admiral (Capudan Pasha) in like manner offered the same conditions to the Marquis Menou, because he was afraid that the English would not only take, but keep possession of Egypt; Menou, however, believed, or acted as if he believed, that Bonaparte could do whatsoever he would, and that he was infallible even at sea and beyond seas. The First Consul had promised to send a fleet, reinforcements, and stores, with everything necessary for the army;

* "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," vol. i., p. 114. D'Aure says: "Vous avouez que le miry (the usual tax, which is very oppressive) ne suffisait pas aux besoins des troupes, et cependant vous blamez le général en chef d'avoir cherché à y supplier. (It may be here seen how easily Frenchmen are persuaded of what they wish to believe.) Qu'avaient donc de si étrange les moyens qu'il employa? A quelles mesures recourut-il que Kleber n'adopta bientôt après? Comme lui son successeur demanda des emigrants, frappa des contributions, exigea des avances de fermage; comme lui il pressura les Coptes, impéra les harems, convertit en amendes les peines qu'avoient encourues les cheiks. De plus que lui il institua des monopoles, obligea les fournisseurs d'accepter des traités sur la trésorerie nationale, évalua des droits inconnus, et condamna à la bastonnade les cheiks trop lents à s'acquitter." The able Bonapartist adds: "Je raconte, je ne blâme pas." That is straightforward. Thus a man becomes and remains a count !

he had, in fact, caused the fleet to be equipped, to put three times to sea, and, when it thrice returned without being able to accomplish its object, he alleged that the whole blame of failure was to be attached to the admiral, and all Frenchmen allege the same. Certain it is that the fleet did not reach Egypt, and that Bonaparte, with the same astonishing activity with which he pursued all his plans, and with the same clearness of mind of which he always gave proof, did everything in his power in order to maintain Egypt.

A fleet, with five thousand men and all necessaries on board, was collected in Brest; Admiral Gantheaume, however, with good reason, hesitated to put to sea during the winter storms, which are so severe in that district. In consequence of this hesitation, Savary, formerly adjutant to General Desaix, and now attached to the staff of the First Consul, was sent to Brest, with peremptory orders from Bonaparte for the fleet to sail. It fortunately reached the Mediterranean, where the commander learnt that Lord Keith was transporting an English army to Egypt, and that his fleet was occupying the place where Gantheaume must land his troops; this news induced the French admiral to run into Toulon. When Bonaparte was informed of what Gantheaume had done, he became furiously enraged, and a courier from Paris conveyed orders to the admiral to put to sea again without delay. Gantheaume obeyed; but had no sooner reached the extreme promontory of Sardinia than he observed the English fleet under Admiral Warren, turned back, and took shelter a second time in Toulon. As the English had disembarked before Alexandria as early as the 7th and 8th of March, in order to invest the city, and as Gantheaume first sailed about the middle of the same month—and as, moreover, only two of the four frigates which he had sent singly reached their destination, it may very reasonably be doubted whether Gantheaume, with his seven ships of the line and two frigates, could have attained his object, even had he followed Bonaparte's orders regardless of circumstances. The First Consul, notwithstanding, insisted upon obedience to his will; the admiral put to sea a third time, and without mischance reached the extreme western promontory of Egypt. He did not venture to disembark his army; we must, however, observe, that he did not reach Egypt till June, and from what followed, it will appear that all aid would then have been useless.

For the reasons above stated, we do not venture to pronounce any decision respecting the guilt or innocence of the French admiral, so severely blamed by Bonaparte and all his countrymen, whilst, on the other hand, Menou's deficiency in all military talents is beyond a doubt, although he was by no means deficient in administrative qualities. His corpulence and incapacity on the field of battle, his ridiculous conversion to Islamism, and the whole of his pretentious character, made him an object of contempt to the soldiers, whilst he was continually at issue and engaged in disputes with the generals under his command. The English had at length become convinced

that the French could not be driven out of Egypt without some considerable efforts on their own part, notwithstanding the appearance of the capitan pasha with a Turkish fleet on the coasts of Syria and Egypt, and the encampment of the grand vizier at Gaza with a small army. Both, however, were objects of but little fear to the French, till the English caused an army to be sent from India, which was to be disembarked from the Red Sea and marched across the desert to Cairo, whilst General Abercrombie was sent to Alexandria with an army which had been originally destined for Portugal.

The undertaking of the English, for which an army, to be brought from Bengal, was to form a junction on the Nile with another brought from Minorca, necessarily required delay; the army, however, which Lord Keith was to convey to Egypt, was commanded by the two most distinguished generals of the time (with the exception of Lord Cornwallis). General Abercrombie was appointed commander-in-chief, and immediately under him General Hutchinson. This army, of 15,000 men, was made up of men collected from all parts of Europe. The English composed but a small part, whilst the greater number consisted of Germans, Swiss, French *émigrés*, Scotch and Irish, who, however, being well trained and disciplined under English officers, were formed into an English army. This army was embarked in the concluding month of the year 1800, and first disembarked in the Bay of Marmorica in Caramania. It remained there for two months, till the news arrived that the force which had been collected for the expedition in the East Indies was on its way. When the time arrived for setting out for Egypt, the army, with its materials of war and stores, was embarked in seventy transports, accompanied by Lord Keith, with seven ships of the line; the capitan pasha took on board 6000 brave Albanians, who were to support the English army. With his miserable force, which was still lying at Gaza, the grand vizier united some thousands of Syrian militia, in order again to inundate Egypt from the side of Palestine with his mob.

When this fleet arrived, the capitan pasha announced to General Menou his readiness to agree to the departure of the French, on the conditions of the convention of El Arish; Menou again rejected the offer, but was too ignorant of military operations and the nature of war to adopt decisive measures, and too much enamoured of his own opinions to follow the advice of Regnier or the other generals. All are agreed that the courage, efforts, and perseverance of the French army and its generals were altogether wasted. Murad Bey, who was attached to the French, and a great admirer of their courage, would have rendered them most important services; but he died precisely at this decisive moment, and Osman, his successor, entertained views very different from his. All those among the French who were really acquainted with the state of affairs, maintain that Menou might have prevented the disembarkation of the English at Aboukir on the 7th and 8th of March, had he hastened

from Cairo to the coast, and concentrated all his forces at the place of landing. He, however, allowed the English to disembark, remained ten days in Cairo after the disembarkation, and then first made his appearance with all his troops. When he arrived, the French were already considerably weakened by the losses which they had sustained in the engagements of the 7th and 8th.

All his troops having been brought together on the 21st of March, with a view to attack the English, who were encamped near the ancient city of Canopus, he caused the plan of battle to be drawn up by others, because he himself was wholly incapable of the task. This plan unfortunately was treacherously communicated to the English; and during the engagement Menou displayed such want of skill, mental imbecility, and total want of military bearing, that no similar example of such incapacity on the part of a commander-in-chief was ever exhibited in the whole course of two-and-twenty years of warfare in which the French were engaged. The army, it must be said, in the battle on the 21st, called by the French the battle of Canopus, fought with that courage which they universally displayed, when they had able officers at their head. In this engagement the English lost General Abercrombie, on whose fall Hutchinson assumed the command. After the battle he divided his army, sent a portion of his troops back to the siege of Alexandria, where Menou tried to defend himself, and with the other followed General Belliard, who, with a part of the defeated French army, marched up the Nile to Cairo. The grand vizier was no object of apprehension to the French, and with his army, baggage, and followers, he was also advancing very slowly from Syria to Egypt. Belliard, therefore, at first took up a very favourable position near Rahmanieh, where he remained till he should send some transports with provisions to Alexandria, which was very badly provided. At the same time, he prepared to dispute the advance of the enemy, but he was attacked by the English and Arnauts on the 10th of May. In the battle fought at Rahmanieh he lost, it is true, many men, and very considerable stores intended for Alexandria; but in their report, the English, with great impartiality, ascribe to him the renown of having made a masterly retreat. He led his defeated army first to Djizeh, and then to Bulack, that is, Cairo.

The English under Hutchinson, and the Arnauts who accompanied them, then encamped on the left bank of the Nile around Cairo, whilst the grand vizier and his imperial army advanced along the right. Belliard attempted to intercept and stop the latter in the same way as Kleber had previously done; but Hutchinson had sent some English artillery officers and men to the vizier, and entrusted the command and direction of the party to Major Holloway, who gave such advice as was calculated to be useful to a Turkish army, which it was quite useless to draw up in the field to resist the attack of a regular and well-disciplined force. He pointed out to the vizier an advantageous position at Belbeis, advised him to remain in his camp, and posted the artillery in such a favourable

position, that Belliard was repulsed with loss in his attack on the 16th of May, and obliged to retire to Grand Cairo. Immediately afterwards Osman Bey, with his Mamelukes, joined the grand vizier, but neither he nor Hutchinson were possessed of heavy artillery sufficient formally to besiege Cairo. The grand vizier first approached sufficiently near to Cairo, on the 21st of June, to enable him to command the city, and on the same day Hutchinson took Djizeh. Thus threatened on both sides, General Belliard proposed on the following day to negotiate for the withdrawal of the French troops, because he saw that he should be obliged to sacrifice his people without any chance of success, if he attempted any longer to maintain a useless defence.*

An armistice was afterwards concluded, and the terms of a capitulation, honourable and advantageous to the French, were agreed upon as early as the 27th. Ten thousand men, soldiers, seamen, and all others who wished to share the destinies of the French, were to be landed at some port in the Mediterranean, with their arms and artillery, within fifty days. The men of science and naturalists who had accompanied the expedition, were to be allowed to retain their papers and collections, and the same conditions were to be conceded to General Menou, if he chose to signify his acceptance of them within ten days.

Immediately after the surrender of Cairo, General Baird arrived with his Indian army, which consisted of 2000 Sepoys and 5000 Europeans. The fleet by which this army was conveyed to the port of Cosseir, on the Red Sea, sailed from Ceylon on the 18th of February, and reached Cosseir in twenty weeks, after a very dangerous and difficult voyage. The march from Cosseir to the Nile was almost more difficult than the voyage, for the troops were obliged to traverse the desert of Thebes, and suffered extremely from heat and thirst, for ten days, till they arrived at Djernat, on the Nile. From Djernat they marched down the course of the Nile to Kennah, where they were embarked in boats, on the 28th of July. These troops finally reached Alexandria at the end of August, when Menou, merely to please Bonaparte, had suffered the bloom of an admirable army to fall a sacrifice to the plague, to destitution, and hardship.

Menou was as capricious and obstinate as he was unskilful, for he scornfully rejected the idea of availing himself of the terms of Belliard's capitulation, and yet took no pains to dispute with the English the occupation of those points which commanded the city. General

* Belliard says, with good reason, that it would have been impossible to have defended the fortifications, on account of their immense extent, against a powerful enemy, especially when he could not reckon on the aid or co-operation of the inhabitants. The Turks knew that the overflowing of the Nile in August would lay their camp under water; and Hutchinson says, in his report: "This was a long and arduous service, from the intense heat of the weather, the difficulty of procuring provisions, and still more from that of navigating the river, and bringing up the heavy artillery at this season of the year, when the bar of the Nile at Rosetta is frequently impassable for many days together."

Coote first got possession of the fort of Marabout, on the west side, by capitulation, while Generals Braddock and Moore captured by storm the heights on the west side, which commanded the town. Notwithstanding this, Menou remained as wilful as before, and generals and soldiers were the more enraged, as neither in the English nor in the French accounts is any one military measure related which he himself proposed; nay, it is expressly said that he was by no means fitted to put himself at the head of his troops, because of his corpulence and his bad horsemanship. True it is that the French, with charged bayonets, courageously made the sally which he commanded, but they were as courageously met and driven back by Colonel Spencer.

The French continued to lie in their fortified camp before Alexandria till the 26th, when the English erected four batteries, which spread fearful devastation; this at length compelled Menou to intimate his desire to surrender. On the 27th, the same conditions were without difficulty conceded to him which had been granted to General Belliard. On the 2nd of September, Menou, with 800 soldiers, 1300 seamen, and all those who wished to accompany the French, were put on board English ships. Wilson gives the number of those who left Egypt with Menou at 11,213 persons.

C.—ENGLAND, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN; PEACE OF AMIENS.

By driving the French out of Egypt, the English removed one of the great obstacles which had hitherto prevented the possibility of a peace with France; a second was put aside by the assassination of the Emperor Paul, or still more, at a later period, by the removal of Count Pahlen from the conduct of the government in Russia, because, in consequence of that event, all Bonaparte's views of annihilating the English trade in Germany and the north were completely frustrated.

Only three days had elapsed after the assassination of the emperor, when the Russian minister wrote to Admiral Parker, who was in command of the large English fleet in the Baltic, that Alexander, the new emperor, although he was not disposed to yield the main point at issue with England, wished to recall all the hostile measures which his father had taken against the English, and to enter into a friendly negotiation with a view to a peaceable settlement of the question respecting the right of searching neutral vessels. Bonaparte sent to the Emperor Alexander his adjutant, General Duroc, who afterwards became his grand chamberlain, and, being a man well disciplined in the measures of the olden times, was one of the chief persons of his splendid court just then coming into life; Duroc, however, proved unable to prevent or even obstruct the negotiations with England. Lord St. Helens was at that time sent as English ambassador to Petersburg. The Russian embargo was immediately removed, the Danish troops left Hamburg, and the negotiation com-

menced. As long as Pahlen remained at court the issue was uncertain, but when the emperor was induced, by English intrigues, to avail himself of the disagreement between the two chief instruments of his father's murder, to get rid of one of them, Suboff and Panin terminated the negotiation in favour of England by conceding the point which had always hitherto been reserved. Pahlen having retired to his estates, Suboff soon after began to feel that it would be prudent for him also to retire, and the English afterwards had an easy game with the young emperor. Sweden and Denmark, being powerless of themselves, were obliged to leave the whole affair to the Russians, who did not hesitate to surrender their rights. The agreement concerning the disputed right of search, which was concluded with England on the 17th of June, 1801, conceded everything which the two Scandinavian powers had always firmly refused. They, too, had moreover foreseen that Russia would neither demand nor insist upon anything for their advantage, and therefore they had terminated their dispute with England in May, before Russia signed the peace in June. Sweden was, besides, consoled for having been so shamefully deceived by a friendly treaty concerning navigation and trade. In the treaty which Russia signed with England, on the 17th of May, 1801, it relinquished, in express terms, the principle that an enemy's property or goods on board neutral ships during the period of a maritime war are to be regarded as safe from capture.* It was further settled that merchant vessels, even when under convoy of ships of war, were to continue subject to the right of search. We pass over four other points, as important as even these, in order to observe that the cunning mercantile authors of the treaty, in order to save the point of honour for Russia, made concessions, all of which, however, merely affected very secondary matters. If Prussia did not immediately withdraw her troops from Hanover, it was to serve and not to injure England. The north having been thus again opened up to Great Britain, Bonaparte conceived the design of wresting from the English, by force, the only state in the south of Europe which had remained beyond the reach of his influence, and continued in alliance with England. This state was Portugal, which, since 1640, had been regarded as an English province, or rather as a national domain of the trading community of Great Britain.

As England ruled supreme at sea, France could only reach Portugal, and have recourse to the hostilities which were intended, through the co-operation, or at least permission, of Spain, which was closely connected by blood with the reigning family in Portugal; and as there was a desire to avoid open force, this permission was to be ob-

* This concession is concealed by a vast redundancy of words and articles, and those who wish to find the true meaning and result of the agreement, must read completely through, and with care and attention, the "Convention Maritime entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne," in Martens' "Recueil des Traités," Supplément, vol. ii., pp. 476-84.

tained by intrigues. For this purpose Bonaparte made a tool of the man who, before the peace of Bâsle, was known as the Duke of Alcudia, and after that event, as Prince of the Peace, ruled the Queen of Spain, and at the same time the king and the whole kingdom, without his being possessed of either the rough courage and brutal insolence of the Orloffs, Suboffs, Potemkins, and other favourites of the Empress Catherine, or the suavity and elegance of a Pompadour or an Acton.

The weak-minded Prince John, who had been married to a daughter of the King of Spain in 1790, and governed Portugal, first in the name of his imbecile mother, and from 1799 as king, had joined in the war against the French republic, and furnished a division of the Spanish army; it was therefore proposed to him that he should be included in the peace of 1795: this, however, he absolutely declined. Portugal alleged that she had been, properly speaking, no party to the war, but had only furnished assistance to her ally; but notwithstanding this, she attempted to purchase a peace at the time in which Barras and Talleyrand (1799) drove a regular trade in reconciliations and alliances with France. This peace was in reality purchased by the Marquis d'Aranjo; but Prince John refused to ratify it, as by virtue of the treaty of Methuen he had received some thousands of English troops into the fortified towns of his kingdom. Portugal was therefore filled with dread in 1798, when such immense armaments by land and sea were in course of preparation by France for the expedition to Egypt, and a large fleet collected in Toulon; the joy of the Portuguese knew no bounds, when it was known that this fleet had sailed for Egypt. The danger was no sooner past, than the English employed a part of the troops lying in Portugal in the siege of Malta, when Portuguese ships of war were also combined with the English fleet by which the island was blockaded. In 1799, when the Prince of the Brazils at length assumed the title of Regent of Portugal and Algarve, the Marquis of Scabra, his secretary of state, was of opinion that there was reason to expect a system of hostility on the part of France, and wished to arm the whole nation. Scabra proposed to call a meeting of the Cortes, and to have a resolution passed for raising the militia and effecting a general arming; this, however, was regarded as a revolutionary measure, and the marquis was removed from his office. He was replaced in the office of secretary of foreign affairs by the Duke of Álfoëns, who was also appointed commander of the forces when an attack was threatened by the First Consul.

France behaved towards Spain as England did towards Portugal, and Godoy, who was really not as bad as he was destitute of talents and unfit to rule, became the mere tool of the Directory. Having no adherents in Spain, either among the high nobility or the people, he had sought and found a support in the government of France, for which, however, the Spanish nation was obliged to pay dearly with its treasure and blood. The family alliance between France and Spain was renewed, although the family bond established by Louis XIV. had been torn to pieces by the execution of Louis XVI.;

in consequence of the war, by which Spain could gain nothing, the whole naval powers of the country fell a prey to the English for the sake of the French; and the cargoes of the ships which were to convey the gold and silver, the produce of the Spanish colonies, from the New World to the mother country, also fell into the hands of their enemies. Spain sent her fleet into French harbours, and was then obliged to supply her ships with the necessary provisions and stores, whilst French ships often lay for months in Spanish harbours at the expense of the Spaniards. In 1798, Don Godoy, indeed, lost for a time the confidence of the French; he appeared to leave the conduct of the public departments to others, and partly to men who were by no means favourable to himself; he, however, still continued to have supreme influence over the queen, and notwithstanding that he lived a most licentious life, the king treated him as his friend, and therefore the reins of government remained in his hands. The different and partly able men who were intrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs—such as the Marquis Saavedra, Don Luis Mariano, and Dr. Urquijo, of whom the last entertained views very different from those of the Prince of the Peace, could never carry their better wishes and views into effect, when even the favourite found that they were not in unison with his private interests.

Urquijo soon perceived whither the system which had been hitherto followed would inevitably lead, how much Spain had already sacrificed to the ruinous alliance with France, and therefore he declined all co-operation in Bonaparte's demands respecting Portugal, although they became more and more importunate after the battle of Marengo. Napoleon had sent his brother Lucien to Madrid, who worked upon the miserable Prince of the Peace; and the object of the French was attained on this occasion, because the pope also sought to overthrow the minister Urquijo. The pope did not ascribe the clever autograph letter which King Charles IV. had written to him on ecclesiastical affairs to the simple-minded king himself, but regarded the minister as its author. Urquijo was therefore obliged to retire, because the pope made complaints respecting the king's letter; Bonaparte set on foot intrigues on account of the war with Portugal; and Don Godoy was personally hostile to the minister. On this occasion Godoy showed how much more powerful he was in the kingdom than the king himself. Supported by Bonaparte and his brother, he caused Urquijo to be invited to dinner, had him arrested, conveyed out of the city as a prisoner of state, and kept under arrest. Cevallos, a relative of the Prince of the Peace, was then appointed minister of foreign affairs, and both war and the downfall of Portugal appeared unavoidable.

The First Consul, in the beginning of his rule, had appointed his brother Lucien minister of the interior, because he soon saw that Laplace, the celebrated mathematician, was of no use whatever as a man of business; a misunderstanding, however, soon arose between the brothers, when Fontanes, the rhetorician, at Lucien's suggestion,

prematurely disclosed the dynastic views of Napoleon in a pamphlet, which excited extraordinary attention. Lucien was therefore obliged to relinquish his office as minister; but according to the usage in such cases, he was compensated for his loss by being appointed, in October, 1800, to the embassy in Madrid, which was a lucrative place. In Madrid he soon made himself master of the favourite, and in this way he made the *protégé* of the most miserable ruling house in Europe become the favoured co-operator of the only very great man of modern times, and of the most powerful government in Europe. From that time till the present, Spain has continued to sink deeper and deeper every year, and we must therefore dwell for a moment on the history and character of a man so insignificant in himself as Don Godoy, and on the elevation and influence which he attained, because he was really the origin of all those commotions which distracted Spain and greatly contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon's empire and dynasty.

Godoy was born in Badajoz, and was of that description of nobility of which, as is well known, almost all the Spaniards, as well as all the Poles, boast; at the time, however, of which we are now speaking, the Spanish heralds traced his descent from the Mexican emperor Montezuma, or from a Gothic grandee of King Wamba. By his influence, his uncles were made ministers; his brother, Duke of Almodavar del Campo and commandant of the Spanish guard; his sisters were married to Spanish grandees, and four ministers were provided as husbands for his female relations. Don Luis, the king's brother, had two daughters by his legitimate marriage, one of whom, Maria Theresa de Bourbon, as much distinguished for her beauty as her rank, was married to the Prince of the Peace, and the daughter of this marriage was destined by King Charles to be the wife of Louis II., King of Etruria. The sister of Godoy's wife was intended to be the spouse of the Prince of the Asturias, heir to the crown—but poor, miserable, and mean as he afterwards proved himself to be, he would not hear of a friendship or relationship with Godoy. The ill-educated favourite was as deficient in knowledge as in morals; it is, however, said to his credit, that he sometimes gave proofs of a sound judgment, and that his work would have been easy to him, had he not been so light-minded, hasty, and superficial. It is farther said to his honour, that he always showed himself kind, forbearing, sympathetic, and compassionate, and never cruel. On the other hand, from the time of his entering upon public life as a statesman, in 1793, he never displayed greatness of character on any occasion, but much vulgarity and indolence, which were manifest even in his bearing and gait. He was never known to have done anything honourable as a private man, and in war he had never drawn his sword. His elevation, apart from the post which he filled in the queen's household, with the knowledge of the king, deeply offended the better part of the nation and the whole body of the clergy.

The very manner of his being married to the king's niece was in

itself a matter of public offence. He had previously made one of his mistresses Countess of Castillefiel, and, to the great vexation of the queen, had been obliged to have his connexion with her recognised by the solemnity of a marriage, because she ruled him, as he ruled the queen. By this wife, Josepha (Pepa) Todo, he had two daughters, and she kept her establishment in Aranjuez. The queen conceived the idea of sacrificing her young and beautiful niece to her own paramour in order to free him from the trammels of his former marriage. Neither the laws, which treated bigamy as a capital crime, nor religion, which recognises marriage as a sacrament, was the least regarded in this new marriage, and that too in Spain, in other things so scrupulous.

Don Godoy managed the matter much more easily with the church, or at least he treated it with much more disregard, than has been done for some time past in Germany and in France. His wife complained of his desertion, and two cardinals, one after the other, refused to solemnise the second marriage; they were banished, and Manach, the patriarch of the Indies, performed the ceremony. Godoy's love of pomp, luxury, and extravagance, was as great as his licentiousness, and his avarice was therefore boundless. Like Thiers, King William of Holland, and Louis Philippe, he availed himself of his position to make money speculations, and suffered presents to be made him. All by whom he was surrounded were as venal as he was himself, and places, dignities, honours, and offices, were as merchantable as wares. His poverty in exile, moreover, seems to prove that he did not, as the most of such persons do, think of depositing immense sums in foreign securities; and that, in reference to his property, he displayed as great a lack of common sense as he did in those matters in which he sought his honour.

He was not satisfied with the title of Duke of Alcudia, but had conferred upon himself that of Prince of the Peace, although there was no example of any native Spaniard having enjoyed the title of prince. A part of the royal domains was bestowed upon him as a present, and he obtained the distinction of having his state carriage adorned with trophies. He appeared even in the royal palace as a member of the royal family, for he there enjoyed those privileges which, according to strict Spanish etiquette, were only conceded to members of the royal family; military honours were paid to him alone, and he had a particular guard to wait upon and watch over his person. The dignity of high admiral, which had been abolished because the privileges of the office appeared to trench upon the royal dignity, was revived in his favour; he was generalissimo of the army, and, besides, the highest general of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and a director of all the single departments in the war-office. By a royal cabinet decree (*cédula*) he was at length created protector of trade and of the colonies; and by another decree he was expressly appointed directing minister, or rather guardian (*consultador general*), to the king.

He obtained the dignities last mentioned, as well as the place of generalissimo, when he at length gave his active support to the French plans against Portugal. Bonaparte, by a decree of the 26th of December, 1800, ordered 25,000 French troops to be assembled at Bordeaux, in order to attack Portugal with a combined army of French and Spaniards, because the Portuguese government had refused to close their ports against English ships. It is very true, that the *consultador* of the King of Spain had no intention of giving a serious and vigorous support to Bonaparte's cause, for were we to enter at all into the history of the correspondence and verbal communications of the diplomatists, and of the intrigues of the courtiers, we should on this occasion have much to say of what was done by the sophists of the revolution on one side, and by the old Spanish school on the other, in order to deceive and overreach each other. Godoy certainly called upon Portugal to declare definitively, within fourteen days, whether she meant to have England or France for her ally; and when she declared in favour of England, a Spanish army was marched to the frontiers of Portugal, where Godoy played the generalissimo with immense pomp and expenditure, and even deprived the king of his guards, that he might make them take a part and figure in the display which he made; but every one knew that he put as little faith in Bonaparte, as Bonaparte did in him.

The First Consul had no idea of entrusting his cause to the father-in-law of the King of Portugal; he knew, also, right well, that the Prince of the Peace continued to have secret correspondents and connexions in and with England; and he therefore gave the command of the army which he was to send to the Portuguese frontiers to General Gouvion St. Cyr, who was not the man to yield implicitly to Godoy's orders. St. Cyr, indeed, acknowledged the Spanish generalissimo as such, but he kept completely in his own hands the chief command of the French troops. The Spanish *consultador* now sought to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, and to conclude a peace, even before he had been joined by the French army. War had been declared on the part of Spain on the 27th of February, 1801, and a great noise was intentionally made about the engagements fought at Arronches and Flor de Rosa. In May, Elvas and Olivenza were taken, without offering any considerable resistance; but it was, notwithstanding, generally said and believed that the war was a mere sham-fight. The Duke of Alfoëns, the Portuguese minister for foreign affairs, was at the head of the army, and it was the more confidently believed that he and the generalissimo had come to some secret understanding, because the war all at once came to an end in June.*

* Bignon, and Thiers in the third part of his diffuse work, book xi., p. 124, &c., informs us of the manner in which French diplomatists look upon the subject. Respecting the intrigues to which we have referred in the text, Matthieu Dumas, in his "Précis des Evenemens Militaires," vol. viii., p. 353, makes the following very just remark: "Bonaparte soupçonna, mais ne put pénétrer les intrigues secrètes du Prince de la Paix avec le Duc d'Alafoëns, la marche rapide de l'armée

It was as impossible not to see that the persons who then governed Spain were as completely lost to all sense of modesty and shame, and were and are sunk far below the most ordinary people in their notions and practice of morality, as not to come to the same conclusion from the history of Queen Christina and the journey of the young Queen Isabella into the Basque provinces. Godoy invited the king and queen to come to the army, and availed himself of their presence to celebrate his triumph: on this occasion, he conducted himself towards the queen, then fifty years old, as if his relation to her had been that merely of an ideal and Platonic affection. He caused her to be carried in front of the army in a litter, adorned with boughs in the purest style of pastoral fancy, whilst he himself paraded at the head of the troops in his most brilliant apparel, and, like a gallant knight, presented to his lady some oranges which had been gathered by the soldiers on the glacis of the conquered Elvas. Behind the litter came the king, as knight of the rueful countenance. In connexion with the peace between Portugal and Spain, which was concluded on the 6th of June, 1801, in Badajoz, Lucien Bonaparte, who was then French ambassador in Spain, and subscribed the treaty, as far as it regarded France, played a somewhat singular character.

The treaty contained no notice whatever of the exclusion of the English from the harbours of Portugal, but only referred to the payment of a certain sum of money to France, and the cession of a small district to Spain. Twenty millions of francs were to be paid to the French, and the fortified town of Olivenza, with its territory, to be ceded to Spain. Whilst the miserable generalissimo was celebrating these splendid fêtes in Badajoz, in presence of the king and queen, and as rejoicings at the peace, Bonaparte was by no means disposed to ratify what Godoy and Lucien had contrived to agree upon. The English, too, thought it advisable to place no confidence in the peace, and put in claims to the property of the Portuguese, that in the spoliation of the weak they might not go away empty. The English announced that if Bonaparte, whose army was still at Salamanca, and which he designed to march against Lisbon and Oporto, should attempt to execute his threats, they would immediately take possession of all the foreign possessions and colonies of Portugal; they afterwards really took possession of Madeira.

We must leave to our readers the task of reading elsewhere those violent letters to a weak ally which were written by Bonaparte's orders, and partly from his dictation; we must content ourselves with a statement of the facts, as we should otherwise be obliged, in speaking of these letters, to call the reproaches with which Bonaparte in his wrath overwhelms the consultador, gross and brutal: Thiers gives them his fullest approbation. On the other hand, Thiers regards it

espagnole, l'évacuation des places fortes, la retraite precipitée des Portugais, l'armistice, la cession à l'Espagne du district d'Olivenza, tout était combiné, convenu d'avance, et communiqué au cabinet de Londres."

as very bad on the part of the English to have treated their vassals, the Portuguese, as the French treated theirs. In the mean time, however, everything was secretly arranged with Bonaparte, because neither he nor the English wished to place any new difficulties in the way of the negotiations for a peace which had been opened. Talleyrand and his master obtained considerable sums from Spain; and Bonaparte's honour was satisfied by some changes in those points of the treaty which affected France: on this account the First Consul pardoned the Prince of the Peace. After long negotiations and disputes, the condition of excluding the English from the ports of Portugal was at length inserted in the treaty agreed to between France and Portugal, and signed at Madrid on the 29th of September, 1801; this, however, was merely done for appearance sake, because preliminaries were signed between France and England as early as the 1st of October.

On this occasion Spain again paid for the meanness and incapacity of the man to whom the nation was sacrificed, and who was compelled to purchase Bonaparte's favour at any cost. In the peace with Portugal, the French only asked for a perfectly useless and unhealthy district, in order to extend their territory in Guiana, and which was no loss whatever to Portugal; Spain, however, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, was obliged to submit to very burdensome conditions. In addition to other very heavy conditions in the treaty concluded with Spain on the 1st of October, 1801, it contained the following: that Spain was to restore to France the province of Louisiana, which had been ceded by the latter to the former in 1763. In making this stipulation, it was indeed foreseen that France might be in a condition not to be able to avail herself of the province, and in this case, it was agreed upon that she could only give it up to Spain; we shall hereafter see that Bonaparte paid no respect whatever to the stipulation, but sold the province to the United States of America, which were the most dangerous neighbours to Spain.

The threatening steps taken against Spain and Portugal contributed very much to strengthen the English oligarchy in their previous desire of giving to their nation a respite from war; no one thought of an enduring peace, for the Tories knew well that their old system would compel them to carry on perpetual war with the new order of things founded by Bonaparte in France. Both governments were grounded upon selfishness and force, both equally consequent in their proceedings, both equally assuming, neither scrupled at the adoption of any means, both regarded the people as a mere machine; they saw clearly through each other's views, and one placed no confidence whatever in the other. Such men as Pitt, and Grenville, and Dundas, who, in connexion with Trotter, the treasurer of the navy, was publicly convicted of having committed peculations on the money of the state, therefore retired for a time from the helm of public affairs, to make way for persons who had a little more regard for humanity than themselves. It was

also a convenient season for the intervention of a period of repose, because, as the following brief notice of the advantages gained by the English during the war will show, they had increased their power at and beyond sea as much as the French had increased theirs by land. They could not, however, foresee that Prussia, in its infatuation, would suffer Bonaparte to avail himself of the short continuance of the peace with England, in order, by favouring the love of rule amongst the German princes, to incorporate the German empire, and, by predetermined so-called constitutions, Holland, Switzerland, and the whole of Upper Italy, in his kingdom.

The power and riches of England had been tripled since the commencement of the revolution. The English Plutocrats reaped all the advantages of the revolutionary war, because the sums lavished upon subsidies, and in the support of the war, were partly recovered by a monopoly of trade, and partly by giving new life to the manufactures and commerce of the country, and the employment of the people; the whole burden of the war in reality fell upon those governments which sacrificed their subjects for English money. The English became at that time masters of the Carnatic, after having conquered Tippoo Saib, whose immense treasures were spoiled, and his collection of valuables of all kinds brought to England and incorporated with the crown jewels. They had for a long period been rulers of the whole basin of the Ganges, which was partly under their own immediate dominion, and partly dependent on the residents, who availed themselves of all the court intrigues in the capitals of the small princes and rajahs for the extension and establishment of English dominion. They afterwards conquered the Cape of Good Hope, and many other French and Dutch colonies, and took possession of the islands of Malta, Minorca, and Trinidad, which were very conveniently situated for their trade and smuggling. The English had, besides, no less than three times, got the Dutch navy into their power by treachery; had bombarded Copenhagen, and compelled the northern powers to recognise their intolerable right of search; and wrested Egypt again from the hands of the French, and thereby secured their vast preponderance in the East.

During the eight years in which the naval war was carried on, France lost 338 ships of war, of which 60 were ships of the line, 130 frigates, and 144 smaller vessels. We do not venture to express any opinion as to the loss in men which the French suffered at sea, as we never dwell upon the numbers of those who have fallen in battles; Matthieu Dumas, however, who has no reason to exaggerate the loss of his countrymen, reckons that this naval war lost them no less than 90,000 seamen. The Dutch, from the time of their union with France, lost 25 ships of the line and 22 frigates. The Spaniards tried, it is true, as much as possible to avoid a contest with a superior power, but notwithstanding this, from the time of

their unhappy alliance with France at the close of 1798 up till this period, they lost 8 ships of the line and 14 frigates.

We have already observed that Pitt and his unscrupulous companions in the ministry, who invoked all the powers of heaven and hell against France, supported conspiracies of all kinds with the toil and sweat of the English people, and gave pensions to men who were traitors to their country, found it advisable to leave the conclusion of a peace to others, who were indeed friendly to them, but who were not, like themselves, irreconcileable and declared enemies of every innovation or change; they easily found a pretence for retiring for a time from the helm of affairs. The hesitation of the narrow-minded king to approve of a measure which Pitt, whose love of rule had always been burdensome to the king, wished to bring forward in favour of the Catholics, was profited by for the object of the ministers, whose views met with opposition. King George was influenced by a kind of conscientiousness, which, alas! is by no means rare amongst the rigid adherents to a mere dead ecclesiastical dogmatic faith. He could not reconcile it to his ideas of the obligation of his coronation oath to grant those civil rights to his Roman Catholic subjects to which they were entitled by the rights of nature, whilst he had no conscientious scruples whatever in exacting from his subjects, to whom these Catholics belonged, taxes of all kinds, after the issue of a dreadful war (in 1802), to pay debts for the sixth time which perhaps he never really owed.

The measures which Pitt proposed to the king, and to which the king refused to give his consent, had become necessary, in order in some measure to console the Irish for the attempt again to deprive them indirectly of that which, with arms in their hands, they had directly wrung from the hands of the English oligarchy in 1782. Ireland had its own Parliament; the ministers now wished to make it wholly dependent on the English: this object was concealed under the pretence of establishing an Imperial Parliament from the three parts of the British empire, and for this purpose the Irish Parliament was to be incorporated in that of England. In other words, the object was, by receiving a few Irish members into the English Parliament, to wipe out even the shadow of Irish independence. As usual, however, everything was to be done in an altogether legal manner, or, in order to deceive the multitude, who never pay attention to the real substance of the question, legal forms were to be observed, and the union was to be accomplished apparently with the consent of the people of Ireland. As early as September, 1799, the plan was referred to in the king's speech in Parliament.* In

* The ministers make the king say, "That at the conclusion of the last session he had communicated to the Irish Parliament the idea which had been expressed by the Parliament of Great Britain, in reference to a corporate union between Great Britain and Ireland." They then add: "The experience of every day confirms me in the persuasion that signal benefit would be derived to both countries from that important measure; and I trust that the disposition of my Parliament will be found

February and March, 1800, the most vehement debates were carried on in the Irish Parliament on the subject of the faithless proposal made by the tyrannical English, and the people of Ireland, with good reason, exhibited the warmest indignation. The rights which were threatened, were those which had been wrung from the English by the people of Ireland with arms in their hands, who availed themselves of the favourable moment, in which they were armed as volunteers to protect the country from foreign invasion; under compulsion, Great Britain had agreed to a settlement, by virtue of which Ireland again obtained a part of its independence,* and now it was itself to beg that its representatives should be received into an assembly where they were sure to be received with contempt, cried down, and outvoted. The ministers, however, were sure of their cause; and the resolutions in favour of a union were carried in the Irish house of commons by 158 against 115, and in the upper house by 75 against 26.

The conditions on which the Irish Parliament was prepared to suffer itself to be incorporated with that of Great Britain in January, 1801, had been already communicated to the latter in April, 1800, and because the English Parliament had long recognised the principle that the union was necessary and useful, the debates on the conditions of the union having been continued till June, the Parliament came to a resolution on the subject, which, by the king's consent, on the 2nd of July, 1801, became law. The law was afterwards formally accepted by the Irish Parliament; in the sittings in November, some new points were, however, added to the original bill. Among the additions then made was also one which was regarded as an advance and concession to the French government, with which the English were even then in negotiation, although the negotiation was concealed under the pretence that the French ambassador was merely negotiating for an exchange of prisoners. The concession which was made for the gratification of France was, that the King of England should for the future cease to use the title of *King of France*. When Pitt withdrew, he yielded in reality to a division in the English cabinet, because a part of his friends were very anxious for a *peace*, and this party had for some time previously supported the king against, and especially disapproved of, the violent measures which had been adopted towards Denmark. Pitt, Grenville, and their partisans, therefore thought it advisable to yield the helm of the state for a time to their friends, lest it might be seized upon by their opponents. Besides, Pitt had special reasons for retiring from the ministry.

In order to modify or remove the resistance of the Irish Catholics to the union, Pitt quietly, and without consulting the king, had

to correspond with that which you have manifested for the accomplishment of a work which would tend so much to add to the security and happiness of all my Irish subjects, and to consolidate the strength and prosperity of the empire."

* By the agreement which is called "*The final adjustment of 1782.*"

promised the heads of the Catholic party, on this occasion, the restoration of those rights and privileges of which they had been deprived in the reign of Charles the First. The bishops and other inflexible and political Anglicans strengthened the king in his obstinacy, which led him to make himself so much the prop and support of his church, that when the question was brought forward for discussion in a cabinet council, he declared, in the strongest manner, that he would never consent to have the matter brought into Parliament in his name. A ministry was now, therefore, formed, at the end of March, under the leading of the Duke of Portland, which was agreeable to the king, and was supported by the seceding party as long as neither particular energy nor unbounded boldness was necessary. Such circumstances, however, no sooner arose, than recourse was necessarily had again to Pitt, who never shrank or quailed. The leading men in the new cabinet were Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, the son of that Jenkinson (Lord Liverpool) who played such an important part in the time of the American war—and in addition, that perfect *ideal* of English jurists, so inexhaustible in subtleties and forms—that Lord Chancellor Eldon, who, from mere anxiety not to do violence to justice, never terminated the suits before his notorious court—the man whose life is read in England like a novel, and is called a masterpiece.

The Portland ministry was no sooner in office, than Otto was sent as a plenipotentiary from France to England, as it was given out indeed, merely on account of effecting an exchange of prisoners. According to appearances, both parties were long in making any approximation to an agreement, and there several times appeared to be an intention of completely breaking off negotiations, which often languished, when at length, in September, to the astonishment of the whole world, a personal interview with the French *chargé d'affaires* led to a result which six months' interchange of notes had done little to effect. The preparations made by Bonaparte for the invasion of England, and the collection of vast numbers of flat-bottomed boats for the conveyance of troops, seemed to have made some impression upon the English ministry, for two attempts were made to destroy a part of them. These attempts completely failed; and even Nelson's bold cannonade of Boulogne, to the shame and vexation of the naval hero, proved useless. Bonaparte too, moreover, at length resolved, for the sake of a peace, to sacrifice a few of the possessions of his allies to England. He offered them the island of Ceylon, which they had taken from the Dutch, and the Spanish island of Trinidad, of which they were also in possession.

The preliminaries of a peace were signed as early as the 1st of October; on the 12th, the ratifications were interchanged, and it was agreed that Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte should negotiate concerning the conditions in Amiens. The negotiations were quickly brought to an issue, and the peace itself was signed on the 27th of March, 1802. The whole continent rejoiced at the event—

and none more than the English people; but this treaty was, in reality, the greatest triumph which Bonaparte had ever obtained;* still we remember well, that not merely statesmen, but (even in Germany) every man of sound understanding, regarded the peace merely as an armistice.

Bonaparte, with the consent of the English, negotiated for Spain and Holland, for although Schimmelpenninck and Azara were present, and also signed the treaty, yet this was a mere form. The English restored all their conquests, with the exception of Ceylon and Trinidad; and agreed also to give up Malta to the Order and to the grand master as soon as one should be appointed. The French gave up nothing, and even excluded the English completely from all share in the distribution of the ecclesiastical states in Germany, and from all the consultations respecting the fate of the smaller states of the continent.

§ III.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FRANCE—ITALIAN REPUBLIC—HELVE-TIC REPUBLIC—ST. DOMINGO.

A.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.

IN entering upon this section, we must first distinctly state, that our object is only to touch prominently upon that part of Bonaparte's conduct and proceedings which may show how he prepared the way for his own downfall, by endeavouring to combine the old and the new, instead of always creating something quite new; and how the necessary result of his course was, that, sooner or later, the old would obtain the victory, and those dissensions and antagonisms arise which constitute the character of our times. We will neither praise nor blame, but merely relate facts, although it may often appear as if we intended to defame or asperse the reputation of the greatest military commander and civil ruler of our century. Such, however, is by no means our design; and if it were, it would be quite in vain for a single insignificant writer to gainsay what has been recorded and affirmed by hundreds of orators, statesmen, poets, and historians. We leave him the whole merit of his services to France, in the restoration of order and the introduction of new forms and laws, and desire only to show how useless and dangerous the attempt is to try to reconcile and mix up the middle ages and its institutions with the views and social bearings of recent times. If, then, such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte failed to combine two things in their nature irreconcilable—that free movement of thought and action, which is a necessity of our age, with the rigid and exclusive system of courts, castes, and priests, and with the absolute principles of

* See Martens' "Supplément au Recueil du Traité," vol. ii., pp. 563-573.

government of the former half of the eighteenth century, how should the pygmies who are now intent on the same design, succeed in what proved impossible in the hands of a giant, without sowing new seeds of dreadful dissensions? He alone could have dispensed with all mere tinsel, show, and deception, because he was a truly great man, and because he delivered France from anarchy and democratic madness; he alone, with a mighty hand, could have assisted to supreme and absolute dominion the law, which, according to Pindar, is ruler over everything, and reigns over mortal and immortal with an all-powerful right; but he preferred another path; can we, therefore, feel any surprise that powerless rulers and their cringing servants choose to follow the same? We make these remarks because Thibaudeau and Bonaparte's nearest relations have verbally and in writing assured us, that everything which we blame as a retrogression towards the pitiful ostentation of former courts and princes was absolutely necessary; that everything was a mere necessity of the French in general. This we are ready to admit; we shall, however, nevertheless briefly run through the history of the Consulate according to our views, as the details of the history, and views differing from ours, are to be found in hundreds of books, and especially in those of Thiers and Thibaudeau.

The institutions established by the First Consul were in themselves admirable—they were the results of the councils of the most experienced and well-disposed patriots, men of business and of reflection among the French, who had had seats in the constituent and legislative assemblies, and in the convention; by means of the ablest and most clear-seeing men in his council of state, he caused the best to be selected out of the chaos of many thousand decrees. This is indisputable; on this, therefore, it is unnecessary to dwell; we have only to point out the tendency and direction which, from the very first moment, was given to the new rising monarchy of Napoleon. True it is, that the circumstances in which he was placed contributed very much to the autocratic and courtly direction which he took—for neither the mere Parisian prattlers on the one part, the vehement democrats on another, nor the remains of the old court and noble party on a third, would acknowledge any intellectual superiority, or endure any innovation or improvement which was not in complete accordance with their prejudices. The First Consul had scarcely established the legislative council, the senate, the council of state, the administrative authorities of the departments, arrondissements, and communes, the law courts, prefects and sub-prefects, the commissaries of police, the mayors and their deputies, the councillors of the prefectures, arrondissements, and communes, when he met everywhere with the most vehement resistance.

Next, a *doctrinaire* resistance was organised in the *salons* of Madame de Staél, where, at that time, Benjamin Constant was the leader of liberal magniloquence, and in other societies of fashionable gentlemen and ladies in the houses of bankers and *parvenus*. This

opposition embittered the mind of the First Consul the more, because, as a completely practical man, he was by nature hostile to the systems, the school, and the rhetoric of these liberal sophists—and only could and would avail himself of slavish and servile rhetoricians. True it is, that these vain talkers could have done him little harm, but by their speeches, to his great annoyance and vexation, they brought to light the fact that the kind of government which he alleged he was desirous of establishing, bore a very different aspect in his declarations concerning it and in the reality.* Whoever reads the long and singular description given by Thiers of the persons whom Bonaparte had collected around him, and forms a judgment of them, not according to the glorification or descriptions of their countrymen, but according to his own views, will, through all that Thiers has said upon the subject, be led only to the result that Bonaparte must infallibly very soon be found in contradiction with himself. If the persons whom Bonaparte employed were, in fact, desirous, by laudatory phraseology, of commanding a kind of English constitution to a people like the French, so totally different from the English in customs, religion, traditions, and, what is most important of all, so completely different in their prejudices, or by means of Bonaparte of forcing it upon them, he must necessarily have had recourse to that system of constitutional corruption, deception, and falsehood, which has obtained a consistency and footing in France since 1830, by means of Thiers and others.

Fouché and Talleyrand, both men of great worldly prudence, were indispensable to the First Consul; the whole of his family strained after splendour and royal luxury, and he loved them truly and well, which did him honour. What then was he to do? His wife, and very amiable daughter by her first marriage, completely belonged to the old school, to the court nobility and its usages; foolish extravagance required immense wealth, and the future empress's course of life, which was neither very regular nor chaste, gained for the clergy of the old *régime* an access to the new court, because they had abundant dispensations for all the sins of polite, fashionable, and courtly life. We cannot, therefore, wonder that Bonaparte, like his colleague Lebrun, when reduced to the necessity of choosing between democrats and royalists, preferred the latter, without, at the same time, hesitating to elevate the most vehement democrats, such as Merlin, Cambacérès, Barrère, and others, to the highest offices, if, like Fouché, they understood how to accommodate themselves to the time. Neither the wild democrats, nor the unimprovable royalists, had any just appreciation of the industry, the talents, the capacity for order and arrangement of the new ruler, who set the whole machine of state again in motion, regulated the finances, bridled the usurers, created a bank, and secured its credit; they merely talked and made speeches about utopian freedom, and about—God knows what—a Brutus, who

* See his declarations in the *Moniteur*, An. VIII., col. 396, which are quite admirable.

was again to restore it. The royalists thought that Bonaparte was to give place to the prince who lived in Warsaw, and was called Louis XVIII., and Louis himself wrote a letter to the First Consul on the subject, which was entrusted to the care of Lebrun. That, indeed, would have been a character for Barras or Pichegru to play, but not for Bonaparte. From this time forth the royalists became conspirators, and the First Consul, by their secret plottings, and those of the democrats, was driven to the adoption of that dreadful system which has been designated by the name of the *High Police*, but which was in fact nothing else than a system of terror under the Jacobins, and the inquisition of the middle ages.

As early as the commencement of the year 1801, a Prussian diplomatist, then in Paris, attached to the embassy of Lucchesini, informs us, that from September, 1800, another police had been established in addition to that under Fouché, and that the latter was regulated after a completely military system, under the direction of Murat, Bonaparte's brother-in-law, or, properly speaking, of his adjutant, Savary. A third police, he alleges, was placed under General Moncey, and a fourth under Duroc, Bonaparte's own adjutant-general, and subsequently grand chamberlain under the Empire. Arena and Ceracchi, both warm-blooded Italians, and fanatical adherents of an impossible democracy, first threatened Bonaparte's life. We do not dwell upon the conspiracy of which it was said they were the promoters, because many have alleged that the affair was really set on foot by Fouché himself. The origination may be doubtful, but it can be proved, from documents which are beyond suspicion, that Fouché, as early as September, 1800, by means of his confederates, took means to excite many of the terrorists, who had been at the beginning of the year arbitrarily arrested and afterwards set at liberty, and among whom was Rossignol, and then placed them under the surveillance of Barrère.* Meetings for the restoration of the constitution of 1793 were then held in the house of Demerville; this man was an acquaintance of Barrère, by whom Fouché was afterwards informed of all that was going on. By this means Fouché obtained an apparent pretext for ordering the arrest of some twenty Jacobins. These arrests were so managed, as to be brought into connexion with the accusation that the most prominent men among these friends of the constitution of 1793,—Arena, the Corsican; Topino Lebrun, the painter; Ceracchi, a most distinguished sculptor, born in Rome; with others whom the First Consul was anxious to put out of the way. The whole history of the conspiracy is so involved and obscure, that little can be said with certainty, except that the persons

* In the "Histoire de la Double Conspiration de 1800," &c., par Fescourt, 1819. As to what follows, the particular circumstances are often differently related, and to that we attach little importance. In Las Casas' "Memorial de St. Hélène," pp. 456-58, a different account is given of the history of Chevalier's infernal machine from that which is found in the text; in the "Mémoires de Rapp," however, who accompanied the ladies of Bonaparte's family, are to be found the most complete details concerning the events of the 24th of December.

whose names have been mentioned were undoubtedly capable of such a mad determination. Certain it is that these three were seized in the Opera-House on the 10th of October, 1800, and put on trial for being accomplices in the attempted assassination. Demerville placed his reliance upon Barrère, and surrendered himself for trial; three others were likewise brought before the court, and declarations were obtained from them and from Demerville, which were used as evidence against the three others; Demerville himself, however, was deceived. He was condemned along with Arena, Ceracchi, and Topino Lebrun, and executed on the 31st of January, 1801; the others escaped condemnation and punishment. Some other terrorists had projected another plan; they wished to prepare a new infernal machine, and to effect by powder what the others proposed to accomplish by their own hands. Fouché was, however, informed of everything by his old friend. He allowed the matter to proceed so far as to be able to furnish evidence of the fact, and then he made himself master of the two chief leaders of the plot. These two, Chevalier and Veycer, were arrested in the night between the 7th and 8th of December; the infernal machine, and the whole apparatus for its explosion, were found in Chevalier's house; the Jacobins were prosecuted as accomplices, many arrested, and others outlawed. When another murderous attempt was afterwards really carried into effect by an infernal machine, and all Paris filled with dread, no one doubted that it was the infamous terrorists who were again at work; although the very fact that Fouché had heard nothing whatever of the projected assassination, clearly proves that the affair originated and was executed by a party very different from his own.

According to many reports, which are confirmed by Fauche Borel's well-known book, the royalists were led by the example of the unsuccessful attempts of the terrorists to have recourse to the same means of getting rid of the First Consul, and an *émigré* bishop was the man who devised the plan. There may be some doubt as to this point, but there can be none that Windham and other English fanatics supported the project by English money, and that persons of noble rank in Brittany carried it into execution. Carbon, St. Réjant, formerly an officer in the navy, and Limoelan, a major-general in the former Vendean army, were subordinate assistants, while the chief direction was in the hands of Hyde de Neuville, who afterwards played an important character as minister of Louis XVIII., and was in close connexion with the English ministers. The conspirators had contrived to pack a quantity of powder, balls, and other fireworks and missiles so ingeniously in a vessel, that its explosion would destroy everything around it, and the explosion would infallibly have killed the First Consul on his way to the opera in his carriage, at a little past eight o'clock of the evening of the 24th of December, 1800, had not the coachman accidentally put the horses to a quicker pace at the very moment of its occurrence. The effect of the explosion was dreadful. It, however, as is usual in such cases, turned

to the advantage of him alone against whom the blow was levelled; he escaped, whilst the fatal blow fell upon the heads of a number of innocent people.* At first, great uncertainty prevailed respecting the authors of the scheme; Fouché became suspected before he came upon the actual track of the affair, because he accused the royalists, whilst a large number of terrorists was seized by Bonaparte's desire, and afterwards condemned to deportation, contrary to law and justice. The royalists were first discovered at a later period, and yet the true originators of the crime escaped comparatively harmless. Hyde de Neuville and Limoelan fled the country; St. Réjant, Carbon, Joyaux, and La Haye St. Hilaire, were arrested, tried, and condemned; the two former of whom, however, alone were executed in April, 1801. The same course of conduct was pursued towards the terrorists, who on this occasion were quite blameless, as had been pursued in the years 1793-4.

A hundred and thirty—properly, a hundred and thirty-eight—well-known terrorists were arrested; and without trial, and contrary to all law and equity, condemned to deportation, with the consent of the senate and the council of state, at the express desire of the First Consul, and without ever consulting the legislature, as has sometimes happened in troublesome times in England also. We must add, however, to the honour of the First Consul's two colleagues, that their consent was not given to these cruel and arbitrary measures without a long struggle.† The fanatics, among whom was the revolutionary general Rossignol, who, during his deportation, was accustomed to boast that he had cut down sixty-eight priests with his own arm, were to be put on ship board like wild beasts, and exposed to a lingering death under the equator: this fate, however, only befel the half of them, at a later period. Had they been executed in their own country, this would have been mercy in comparison with the treatment which they experienced.‡

The arbitrary nature of the police proceedings of the new consular government, provided with a quadruple coat of mail in its police, which even now never placed confidence in Fouché, with whom, however, it could not dispense, was not limited to the terrorists, but also affected Madame de Staél and her friends. As this lady was intimately connected with the members of Bonaparte's family, and

* The loss in houses and furniture was valued at 164,000 francs. Eight men were killed, twenty-eight severely wounded, and forty-six houses damaged.

† The best account of the contest in the council of state is given by Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," p. 37, &c.

‡ The whole proceeding was revolting from the commencement. Fouché caused to be put on the list of those arrested the names of 138 persons whom he had long known, as they were his tools, but who had now been for some time perfectly quiet; the senate declared their banishment to be necessary to the well-being and preservation of the constitution. This scandalous judgment of Caiaphas was acknowledged, although only 71 were in reality sacrificed. The particulars will be found fully detailed in Fescourt's work, already referred to, and there will be found a horrible account of the unspeakable torments to which these men were exposed from heat, thirst, and want.

with all those who were at that time leaders of the *ton* in Paris, her banishment was delayed for some time by the interference and mediation of her friends; but, on the other hand, the Temple, Ham, Vincennes, and other places were filled with royalist prisoners of state. Viscount Toussaint, a thoughtless young man of twenty years of age, was arrested because a white cockade had been found in his possession; and he was afterwards tried by court-martial and shot. The mediation of the First Consul's wife proved to be a few minutes too late.

At length the idea was adopted of making even the courts for the administration of the criminal law, in part at least, instruments of the police and government, or, in fact, suspending the administration of justice, in order for a time to substitute the terrors of the police. A bill was brought forward and passed into a law, by virtue of which power was given to the First Consul, until two years after the conclusion of a general peace (which never took place), to establish special courts for the trial of certain descriptions of offences, in places where they might appear to him to be necessary. These courts for the trial of political offences were to consist of a president, two judges of the criminal courts, three military and two civil officers, all of them selected and appointed by the First Consul, so that in fact he became at the same time accuser and judge. True, indeed, that a struggle was made against these and similar measures in the tribunate, not only by Benjamin Constant, who was incensed against Bonaparte from his first speech in the new legislature, but by others also, with such noble firmness and perseverance, that a Bonapartist sophist first maliciously attacked the defenders of the rights of the people,* and then Bonaparte vowed the suppression of the tribunate. He completely crippled its activity, in August 1802, by reducing its number one half. The law was, however, passed; but in order not to be unjust, we must not omit to state, that at that time a complete system of robbery and murder was organised in various departments, under political pretences,—a system which could scarcely be suppressed without recourse to summary justice and military tribunals.

Immediately after the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte relapsed very rapidly into the customs and usages of the good old times. He adopted principles which may have been very correct, but the carrying out of which was a matter of deep sorrow to every friend to the progress and advancement of civilisation and liberty. The statesmen of whom we speak alleged, and continue to allege, that the French were not satisfied or rendered contented by laws suited to the new conditions of life and their literal observance, but only by a return to their old prejudices. The persons and circumstances by which Bonaparte was surrounded, and the forms of outward life at his court and in his go-

* Benjamin Constant, as an orator, played at that time the most splendid part. His observations on these special courts may be seen in the *Moniteur*, An IX., col. 524. His observations on the diminution of the number of the *juges de la paix* in the *Moniteur*, No. 123, were most shamefully misrepresented by the Bonapartist sophist Girardin, in No. 126 of the same journal.

vernment, were not, his friends and relations affirm, so wonderfully and incongruously mixed from any feelings of vanity, but from a desire to meet the wants of the nation. In order to justify a return to the etiquette, the court dresses, and courtly usages of the eighteenth century, they were adopted by innumerable persons, who could not expect a return of the old customs and fashions. In addition to Bonaparte's family, we shall only mention the names of three individuals, as examples—Gaudin, the minister of finance, and afterwards Duke of Gaëta, appeared at the Tuileries, even before the peace of Amiens, with powdered hair, bag wig, and laced coat; the consul, Lebrun, in other respects a very estimable man, again dressed, as persons had been accustomed to dress at court at the time in which he drew up *ordinances* for Chancellor Maupeou. Cambacérès, one of the most vehement Jacobins of the reign of terror, and who was moreover as celebrated for his legal learning as Lucullian gluttony, as soon as orders and ribbons again came into fashion, made himself even ridiculous to the public by the fantastic variety of his dress. Covered with orders and ribbons, he was accustomed to strut up and down the Palais Royal like a peacock. It must be added, that the feelings of repugnance against this open retrogradation were very vehement, for the greatest jurist of the age could not at first carry out his views either with respect to the *code civile* or to the re-introduction of branding as a punishment in criminal cases; it was therefore thought advisable to withdraw the bill for this purpose.*

If the principle to which we have above referred be correct, and if, farther, as others allege, it was impossible to found anew a pure system of morals and true Christianity amongst a race that had become so degenerate, then Bonaparte was quite right in re-establishing at least the decent forms of outward worship, and the hierarchy or the mechanism of the public services of religion. We can, however, by no means concur in the eulogies pronounced upon his concordat with the pope, because the facts prove that by this step he not only involved himself in great difficulty, but gave a powerful impulse to Ultramontanism and Jesuitism.† As early as 1804, when the pope had crowned him as emperor, they separated dissatisfied with each other, because, of all the various demands of the pope, he granted none; he refused to declare the popish religion to be the *established* faith in France, or to suppress Protestantism, and he even refused the request of the pope, whom he met in Piedmont, in 1805, to compel the observance of Sundays as holidays by means

* On this point Bonaparte caused it to be said in the *Moniteur*, An IX., col. 417: “Que le gouvernement étoit convaincu, que le temps n'étoit pas encore venu où l'on porterait dans ces grandes discussions le calme et l'unité des intentions qu'elles demandent.”

† Everything which relates to the concordat has been treated both in detail and publicistically, first by Bignon, and afterwards by Thiers in the 12th chap. of the third part of his work, pp. 150, &c.; in order, therefore, to save repetitions, and in accordance with his main design, the author of this history treats very briefly on a point on which so much light has been thrown from all sides.

of severe laws. In 1808, he threatened the temporal sovereignty of the pope, and demanded the appointment of a patriarch for France. He afterwards drove the pope out of his dominions, and was excommunicated. He therefore really lost more than he gained by his concordat; for when he at last proposed to have recourse to a council, it was too late.

We cannot persuade ourselves that Bonaparte, as the Bonapartists allege, could not have newly founded the Catholic religion in France, without depending exclusively upon the assistance of the pope. The German church was by no means papistic. Carl von Dalberg, Wessemberg, and the illuminati would willingly have lent their aid to an anti-papistic council. The Elector of Bavaria and Mongelas were by no means favourable to the monkish system or to the hierarchy. In Italy, the principles of the synod of Pistoia were partly regarded as a rule, and partly the improvements introduced by Maria Theresa, the Emperor Joseph, and the noble-minded Firmian. Even at a later period, when Bonaparte concluded a concordat for Lombardy also, Melzi would not at first receive it at all, and afterwards only with some limitations. The constitutional bishops were holding a national synod in Paris, precisely at the very moment in which Bonaparte applied to the pope in a national affair.

It is besides remarkable that the pope, in the year of the introduction of the French concordat, on the urgent application of the well-known writer, Count le Maistre, Sardinian ambassador in Petersburg, first drew up a decree for Russia, the main object of which was to be a vigorous antagonism to all reforms in the church, the defence of the principles of Gregory VII. and Innocent III., respecting the authority of the pope.*

We have already given an account of the manner in which Bonaparte exercised an influence upon the election of Pius VII., by his connexion with Gonsalvi, Caprara, and Maury, entered through the instrumentality of the Archbishop of Milan, and of the Bishop of Vercelli, his nephew, into negotiations with the pope, and led to a reconciliation, whose immediate consequence was his appearance at religious solemnities and the restoration of the pope to his secular dominions. We pass over the intrigues of the Italians, who seized upon the favourable moment to give a new importance to all their formulas, forms, and arts, which for thirty years past had lost all their value. This was done to enable the great and the prudent, by means of these forms and creeds, securely to establish their dominion over the great multitude of the simple-minded and humble. We have no room to refer to all the numerous conversations and extensive correspondence which took place with the pope respecting the concordat to be concluded for France, nor shall we enter into any dispute with Thiers, whether Bonaparte on this occasion, as on all others, adopted the very best possible means, and proved himself to have a greater

* The bull, by which this order was restored in Sicily also was first published in 1812.

insight even in spiritual affairs, to which he was a complete stranger, than all other men. This would be completely useless, as it is quite clear that he stood in need of the pope's aid for the accomplishment of his objects. France was to undergo a new ecclesiastical division, as it had obtained a new secular one. Bonaparte needed monarchical instead of republican or constitutional bishops, and Bonapartists, instead of adherents to royalty and the Bourbons. He would neither, therefore, avail himself of a council which would necessarily be composed of democratic clergy, nor durst he venture to call in the aid of the Bourbon aristocratical adherents of the church. He wished to owe his rights to his own hand alone, or immediately to Providence; he was, therefore, obliged to recognise the pope as the representative of God in spiritual things, in order that, with his consent and approval, he might be able to lay claim to the secular dominion of the world. The bishops belonging to the old nobility, and who had taken refuge in England, were to be removed from their sees; and it therefore became necessary to relinquish the principles of the Gallican church, to acknowledge the papal system and the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, for this recognition was to be the means of carrying out the First Consul's ambitious designs.

Setting out from these principles, we shall be constrained to smile, as we are accustomed to do, at the rhetorician become a historian, who, with the tenderest touch and in heart-moving language, presents us with an oratorical account of the personages and the history of the negotiations concerning the concordat. In his hands the Corsican, who was born for the battle-field, for the conquest of the world and for the exercise of rule over mankind, and the Romish restorer of the Jesuits, appear in some measure as persons who had been foreordained by Providence to restore the church of Christ upon earth, which acknowledges no priesthood. If, however, the matter be somewhat more closely considered, it will be seen that by the conclusion of this concordat, the shepherd sold his sheep to the wolf, and the wolf negotiated concerning the number of the flock which the shepherd should be permitted to slaughter, or to exclude.

To speak without a figure, negotiations were carried on concerning the conditions on which a Catholic church should be restored in France—its support by the state—and the share which the pope and Bonaparte each were individually to reserve in filling up the places of the bishops—whose slaves the priests henceforth became. The conduct of this affair was at first entrusted to Cardinal Spina, who came to Paris for the purpose, and the Abbé Bernier, whom we have already mentioned in connexion with the war in La Vendée. Caprara and Gonsalvi, who had the matter in hand in Rome, were by far too good diplomatists not soon to perceive that Spina's Romish circumstantiality would exhaust Bonaparte's patience. They appeared, and in fact were the more willing, in the first instance, to sacrifice some secular advantages, in order afterwards to reconquer

those temporal benefits by virtue of their spiritual rights. Bonaparte, in truth, was already impatient; he threatened, and even adopted two threatening measures of a character differing from each other; he held out to the pope at a distance, *in terrorem*, the prospect of an orthodox but Gallican, and at the same time Jansenist church. On the one hand he had a plan of a concordat drawn up by Talleyrand and D'Hauterive; therefore by two men who had passed through, and were thoroughly acquainted with the whole school of theology and the ecclesiastical laws of the old French church; he next approved of a national synod in Paris, to consist of forty-five French bishops, chosen from those who were called constitutional, because they had accepted the civil constitution of the clergy. This national council declared that there was no schism or division in the church of France, and that, therefore, there was no need of the assistance of the pope to heal divisions which had no existence.

Spina was then indeed recalled, and Gonsalvi, the papal secretary of state, was sent to Paris. He was much more a man of the world than a theologian, had rendered most important services to the Roman states, and was by no means priestly in his notions, but, on the other hand, enjoyed the highest reputation among the diplomats, Catholic and Protestant, who had anything to do with him—an opinion expressed by them privately as well as publicly. Bonaparte now suffered the national council to fall to the ground, which will be easily explained, when it is known, that the visionary friends of inward religion and of ecclesiastical and civil freedom constituted the majority in it. That such was the fact, is obvious from what Thiers, the representative and defender of the Bonapartists and *doctrinaire* system of government, says of the Abbé Gregoire. He rails against him as narrow-minded, because he never, indeed, became as comprehensive and indifferent as himself. The good Bishop of Blois was, moreover, undoubtedly an enthusiast; he was narrow-minded and short-sighted enough to have some faith, in the midst of the convention, in virtue and religion, and to imagine that the constitution of the apostolic church could be organised in a purely military state; but as to the concordat, even Talleyrand and D'Hauterive, whose practical diplomatic minds no one will ever think were obscured by any enthusiasm or pious dreams, were of the same opinion with him, although for very different reasons. Nor could Talleyrand and D'Hauterive carry through their project, but were obliged to leave the questions concerning faith to the papal court theologian, Caselli, who was attached to Gonsalvi's suite, and the Abbé Bernier, who had reconciled the fanatical Vendean clergy to Bonaparte; these articles, therefore, still remained within the limits of the council of Trent. Ultramontanism—that is, intolerance and persecution—was therefore again legally recognised as orthodox Christian doctrine, and the seeds of discord were again sown amongst the professors of the glad tidings of great joy—of a religion of unlimited peace and love, which connects heaven and earth; and these dissensions in our days

bear abundant fruits of malice, and envy, and all uncharitableness. The temporal part of the question was, at least professedly, entrusted to the arrangement of Cardinal Gonsalvi and Joseph Bonaparte; the merit of the latter, however, if any merit there was in the case, must undoubtedly be ascribed to Cretet, one of the French council of state.

The concordat between Bonaparte and the pope, or the agreement concerning a monarchical constitution for the French church, which was concluded between Gonsalvi and Joseph Bonaparte, supported by the Abbé Bernier, Cretet, Caselli, and Cardinal Spina, without consulting any ecclesiastical assembly or synod, was signed in Paris on the 15th of July, 1801, in Rome in August, and the ratifications were exchanged as early as September.* For many reasons the concordat could not be immediately laid before the legislature; and this, in fact, did not take place till April, 1802 (VIII. Germinal, An X.). Nothing but a summary report of the arrangement was laid even before the council of state. Bonaparte committed the subsequent explanation and defence of the treaty to Portalis, Regnier, and Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely; they were to justify what had been done with all the arts of their eloquence and most refined sophistry. It is obvious from their speeches (*Moniteur*, An X., No. 196, col. 783) that the interests of religion formed no part of their concern, but merely a hierarchy, ritual and forms both of worship and faith for the masses, and these only as mere political levers. To the great offence of the pope, who afterwards, at the coronation, begged for permission to exercise intolerance as a grace, Bonaparte did not hesitate to give an ecclesiastical organisation to the Protestants and the Jews also. We only mention in passing, because it is not our object to describe such affairs, that the reconciliation of the military and spiritual autocracies by means of a concordat, according to which the bishops became the servants of the pope and the curés of the bishops, was celebrated by a theatrical procession to the cathedral, and the official solemnities of a Church-and-State *Te deum*.

The forty-five bishops of the national council had been immediately dismissed whenever it was found that there was no more occasion for their services; and those alone obtained any part of the fifty new sees which had been erected who sacrificed their principles and convictions to the pope and humbled themselves at his feet: these bishoprics were established in order to change a Bourbon into a Bonapartist church. The pope had great difficulties to overcome with the royalist bishops, who, in fact, had become *émigrés* from their attachment to him and to the church. Hitherto these bishops were the only ones whom he had acknowledged or regarded as orthodox, and as qualified for the administration of their functions:

* The concordat, with its additions, will be found in Martens' "Supplément," &c., vol. ii., pp. 519-531.

they were the incumbents of those sees which had been just abolished by the concordat. The negotiation, therefore, with the emigrant clergy was one of the great objects of Cardinal Caprara's mission to Paris, whither he was sent by the pope as his legate. The new division of the dioceses throughout France was indeed announced in 1801; but they could not be taken possession of by the new bishops until the royalist and constitutional bishops had resigned their places and dignities into the hands of the pope, or till they were officially removed from their offices. It was next necessary to be sure that the government would have a majority of votes in the legislative councils, in which there was reason to fear great opposition. This was effected by means of the senate, which was at that time a mere tool in the hands of the government, and which succeeded, in March, 1802, in outvoting the most vehement opponents of the government, and among them Benjamin Constant, from the number of representatives. Fourteen of the old bishops remained obstinate in their resolves in spite of all the diplomatic ability and refined sophistry of Cardinal Caprara, and were obliged to be deposed by the pope; the others, royalists and constitutional, laid their dignities and privileges at the pope's feet, and in April, 1802, the concordat was at length introduced to the notice of the legislature. We have already observed that the chapter in Thiers' work, and the speeches of those persons to whom Bonaparte committed the defence of the concordat, appears to us of very great importance in relation to the kind of doctrine and principles which are preached by the statesmen of modern France, who are not disposed directly to acquiesce in or sanction all the abuses of the old Romish-Jesuitical system. Our limits and the object of our work prevent us from going into details, and we shall therefore confine ourselves to a remark or two on Portalis' speech, because Bonaparte afterwards assigned to him the whole guidance of ecclesiastical affairs. He obviously feels that it is his especial duty to defend religion before his colleagues—which, to those who know religion, was quite superfluous—and those who did not, were by no means likely to be converted by mere Jesuitical reasons.* In order argumentatively and consecutively to arrive at the concordat, he first makes some remarks upon religion in general—then upon the Christian religion, and finally upon the Roman Catholic form of Christianity: all this is mere cool and bold sophistry. Ultimately he proposes an alternative, which is manifestly false. “It is,” he observed, “only possible to adopt one of two ways in the restoration of the French state—of its authorities and of the whole system of administration and government in reference to the church and religion—these must be either

* *Moniteur*, An X., No. 196, col. 783. “La morale sans preceptes positifs laisseroit la raison sans regle; la morale sans dogme religieux ne seroit qu'une justice sans tribunaux. (!!!) Quand nous parlons de la force des loix, savons nous bien, quel est le principe de cette force? Il réside moins dans la bonté des lois que dans leur puissance. . . . Les hommes en général ont besoin d'être fixés, il leur font des maximes plutot que des démonstrations”—and such other stuff

suppressed or persecuted, or else they must be used as political instruments; the latter of these has been adopted."* As the pope obtained the appointment, and Bonaparte the nomination, of the bishops, by the concordat, the latter appears to have thought that he had sufficiently secured his power over the clergy: we shall see, in the years from 1809-1813, he found he had been greatly deceived. We shall subjoin the new ecclesiastical division of the kingdom in a note.†

B.—HOLLAND AND SWITZERLAND UNDER BONAPARTE'S PROTECTION.

The negotiations of the First Consul with Russia, in order quietly to bring the German princes into subjection to himself by the assistance of the Emperor of Russia and his alliance with Prussia, and to be enabled to injure and make inroads upon Austria, as well as several similar operations, appear to us to be closely connected with the third coalition war; we shall leave these, therefore, to the next section, and only mention here the steps taken by the First Consul immediately after the peace of Amiens.

Bonaparte's proceedings were blamed by all the European nations with exactly as much reason, or want of it, as they were immoderately praised by the French: for he evidently intended to overthrow the system of the balance of power, which had till then existed on the continent, and to establish in its stead a system of French supremacy and despotism on his own part. We have no intention of wasting words in discussing the advantages of either system. No one, however, can deny that Bonaparte's system was equally agreeable to the national pride of the French, and calculated to extend their fame and the influence of their nation over the whole world. They were on the continent what the English are at sea; they subjected to their influence one state after another, and remained in reality, for three-and-twenty years, the *great* nation. However we may feel inclined to smile at the vanity and pride with which they brought forward their claims to this distinction on every opportunity, we cannot be surprised at their unbounded praises of Bonaparte; for it was he alone who gave them this fearful unity of nationality, and compelled all the neighbouring states to form parts of this unity.

Among the states, the slight bond of which with France Bona-

* *Mon. 1. c.*—"La religion Catholique est celle de la plus grande majorité des Français. Abandonner un ressort aussi puissant, c'étoit avertir le premier ambitieux ou le premier brouillon que voudrait de nouveau agiter la France de s'en emparer et de le diriger contre sa patrie." "The priests," he continues, "have influence; they must not, therefore, be allowed to be or to become independent, otherwise there would be a power in the state which is not the power of the state."

† The whole church of France was divided as follows under the archbishops:—
1. Paris with eight suffrages; 2. Malines with seven; 3. Besançon with five; 4. Lyons with four; 5. Aix with four; 6. Toulouse with five; 7. Bordeaux with three; 8. Bourges with three; 9. Tours with seven; 10. Rouen with four.

parte endeavoured to strengthen and render indissoluble, we first mention Holland. The republic of the Seven United Provinces was, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the monied power and the bank of Europe: when trade, and consequently riches, passed over to England, Holland became a sort of client of the British empire, and was entirely ruined by the influence of the English, and the party feeling to which this influence gave rise: in the year 1795 it only passed out of the power of the English into that of the French. The English took advantage of the conquest of Holland by the French to deprive their former allies of their trade, their colonies, and their fleets. The French first exacted from them large sums as contributions, and then compelled them to feed, clothe, and pay bodies of French troops as if they were their own; they sacrificed the remainder of their best ships of war to an enemy of superior force; and, finally, they took advantage of the state of parties in Holland entirely to destroy the independence of the country.

We have already noticed how, even before the times of the consulate, every political change in Paris caused a similar one in Holland: how coolly at one time a French ambassador, at another a French general, entirely changed the Dutch form of government. When the Directory was introduced in France, the Dutch were obliged to entrust the executive power to five men, and the legislative to two others; and there was even in Holland an 18th Fructidor. Daendels travelled from the Hague to Paris, bribed Barras, gained over a number of persons who had great influence in Paris, and procured full power to change the constitution of his country, by force if necessary. Armed with this authority he returned home, and on the 12th of June put a violent termination to the new constitution, which had only been established on the 28th of April of the same year (1798). Daendels drove out the directors, put the ministers, or, as they were then called, agents of the government, in their places, created another legislative body, and introduced an entirely new system.

This central government, and the constitution upon which it depended, were soon found to be worse than useless; the Dutch entreated Bonaparte, at the very beginning of his consulate, and also Augereau, whom he had sent into Holland as commander-in-chief, to help them in the preparation of another and better constitution, and Bonaparte knew none better than that of France, which he had helped to make. Instead of a first consul they were to have a president at the head of their state; a patriotic Dutchman, however, succeeded in preventing any absolute unity or monarchical government from being at first forced on the Dutch. (The effect of this measure only indeed lasted four years.) The Advocate Schimmelpenninck had been in Paris as Dutch ambassador from June, 1798, had many friends there, and enjoyed and deserved the esteem of the First Consul and of his brother Joseph, to whom he had

rendered important services in Amiens, where he had carried on the negotiations with him and with the English; and by the influence of the latter a remnant of the old federative constitution was left still in existence. The old provinces (or at least some of them) were re-established under the name of departments, and the government was entrusted, not to a president, but to a college of twelve persons. The legislative authority was entrusted to thirty-five persons, who were to assemble, however, only twice a year. This constitution, which was published on the 17th of October, 1801, was introduced with great difficulty, and was productive of continual contests among the several parties; it was, however, too democratic for the First Consul, and we shall see presently that in 1804 Schimmelpenninck was obliged to use his influence in accustoming the Dutch to monarchical forms and to royalty.*

Switzerland, or, as it was then called, the Helvetic republic, had become, since 1798, too poor either to form a monarchy or to excite the avarice of its neighbours; but by its position, and from the number of mercenary troops which it was capable of furnishing, it became important to any of its neighbours who should succeed in binding it closely to themselves. Bonaparte did this in a manner which was advantageous to him, and, at least, at first, not disadvantageous to Switzerland; afterwards, in the madness which appears to have seized upon him during the last six years of his active life, he threatened to make Switzerland also feel his caprice. All parties agree that the constitution which he gave them was better than that established by the allies after his fall, and that the Swiss would finally have agreed had the central government established by Bonaparte continued in force.

The first settlement of the Helvetic republic, unity of government by five directors, unity of legislation by two assemblies, a great council and a council of ancients, had been, as we have already remarked, dearly purchased: but the revolution of 1798 was, notwithstanding, the most beneficial change that Switzerland ever experienced. Switzerland, as divided into eighteen cantons, would have been quite free, if prejudice, party feeling, habit, and the French had not prevented this result. The French troops remained in Switzerland; generals, commissioners, and representatives of the French Directory ruled unquestioned, and treated the Helvetic directors as their subjects. All the patriots resisted them in vain: even the originators of the whole revolution, Ochs and Laharpe, were banished, when they attempted to oppose the insolence of the French commanders. We leave the history of Switzerland during 1798 and 1799 to others,

* Among the French writers whom we have consulted, Lefebvre alone speaks sincerely and candidly upon the subject. He says, in his "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," vol. i., p. 174: "En cessant d'être abandonné aux fluctuations des corps délibérants, le gouvernement Batave devint *dans les mains du Premier Consul un instrument plus flexible, et notre force extérieure s'en accrut.*"

and pass immediately to the period at which the First Consul took up the idea of including the Swiss among those nations whom he intended to subject to France, mediately or immediately.

Towards the end of the year 1799 the Helvetic directory and the two councils had become divided into two contending parties, just as had happened to these same bodies at Paris shortly before the 18th Fructidor. Dolder and Savary, the one deeply in debt, and living at a rate of expense which far exceeded his means; the other, a careless, merry fellow, stood at the head of the one party, which was by no means scrupulous as to the way in which they obtained their ends. Laharpe, Secretan, and Oberlin, formed the other party. Laharpe was at this time much too violent a democrat for his conduct to be agreeable to Bonaparte, who wished to bring back everything to its old condition; and although Laharpe's two colleagues were less democratic than himself, it did not at all suit the plan of the First Consul that these three should, by a *coup d'état*, remove from the helm of the state Dolder and Savary, who were devoted to the French interests; for Laharpe was too violent and too honest for his plans. Dolder and Savary were therefore informed that they might depend upon the assistance of the French, if they would anticipate the designs of the democratic party; and Dolder, supported by the majority in the councils, brought forward, on the 7th of January, 1800, the same proposal which had been brought forward in France on the 18th Brumaire. He not only removed Laharpe, Secretan, and Oberlin from the directory, but abrogated entirely the government of the directory. That this was not done without the knowledge of the First Consul, who always hesitated a long time in such cases before giving any decisive opinion, is clear from the fact that, upon the 11th of January, Bonaparte signified to the Helvetic ambassador in Paris his great satisfaction at the late Helvetic revolution. Laharpe, on the other hand, was so convinced that Bonaparte's principles were entirely the same as his own, that he came to Paris in July to escape his enemies in his own country, and to obtain assistance from the First Consul; the latter, however, merely gave him the very dry advice, that he would do well not to interfere, for the future, with state affairs.

The victorious party first chose a committee of seven members, and began to draw up a sketch of a new constitution: but the contest between the various persons of the government and between the government and the legislative assemblies prevented any very rapid advances, particularly as the secretary of the French legation threw all the hindrances he could in their way, at the express command of his superiors. To put a stop to this, a new revolution was organised, which broke out on the 7th of August. A new committee was chosen in a revolutionary manner: but, on the 9th, two days after its formation, it appeared that there existed in it a very decided difference of opinion respecting the constitution to be given to Switzerland. Frisching, Glayre, Dolder, and Savary were favour-

able to the system of union and to the founding of a new centralising government; Schmid, Rüttimann, and Zimmermann wished to retain as much as possible of the old forms. The revolution of the 7th of August was approved by Bonaparte on the 27th; but his ministers, or the secretaries of legation chosen for the express purpose, had to see that the contest should continue, so that there might be a continual necessity for the interference of the French.

Glayre, who played a very considerable part in the new committee, had been minister of the King of Poland at the time of the first division of Poland, and had afterwards been a member of the directory from the first foundation of the Helvetic republic: it was determined, therefore, that he should go to Paris in the name of those of his colleagues who approved of a centralising government, and endeavour to gain over Bonaparte to their side. The proposed constitution was an imitation of that of France: according to it, Switzerland would be governed by a president, a secretary of state, a cabinet council, and a legislative senate: but Bonaparte hesitated, because he wished to have a peace concluded with England before beginning to play the part of dictator in Switzerland, Holland, and Italy. Neither Glayre nor Rengger (towards the end of 1800 and beginning of 1801) was able to persuade the First Consul to approve of the plan of the friends of the new order of things. He saw very clearly that a sort of federal separation, and a government somewhat approaching the old aristocratical form, would serve his purpose much better than a young, powerful, and entirely free national union of feeling. This latter would have been able to preserve and defend itself; the aristocratical government would require his assistance; it, like the division of the cantons, had in its favour the opinions and habits of the more prejudiced; the plan which Glayre offered, found, therefore, no favour in Bonaparte's sight. Not only was the constitution, the approval and confirmation of which had been the object of Glayre's journey, and which was no ideal one, rejected, but he himself was obliged to return home as the bearer of directions for the arrangement of the new one. Bonaparte caused a short sketch, written upon a page and a half of paper, to be given to him, containing the outline of the new national constitution. Glayre could not of course refuse to be the bearer of this; but immediately on his return he resigned his office as a member of the committee.

The other gentlemen, four days after Glayre's return, on the 29th of May, 1801, took the paper sent from Paris as the principle of their new constitution, which in its form resembled exceedingly the old system of cantonal governments. The name which was given to the assembly of the deputies of the cantons (*Tag-satzung*) was also borrowed from ancient times: yet the plan, which, according to the new constitution, was laid before a general assembly on the 7th of September, differed considerably in some respects from Bonaparte's sketch. This circumstance was taken advantage of by some of those

incorrigible admirers of antiquity, who desire to retain all that is old solely because it is old, to reject the constitution altogether. The deputies of the cantons of Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden, and in particular Aloys Reding, a determined enemy of every innovation, although a man of intelligence, information, and experience, would not hear of the constitution from the very beginning. The deputies of these three cantons retired entirely from the assembly on the 9th, and on the 17th thirteen other deputies followed their example. Bonaparte, whose troops occupied the Valais at this time, for which reason also only seventeen cantons were mentioned in his sketch of the constitution, wished purposely to bring matters so far that he should be called in to the assistance of both parties. His object in this was to prevent Austria from accusing him of violating the treaty of Luneville. In this treaty one of the articles was, that the French troops should quit Switzerland, and that the Swiss should be allowed to come to some agreement among themselves as to the new form of their government. The English, too, when they made complaints respecting the treatment of Switzerland, were answered, that the Swiss had requested the interference of France, and were grateful for it.

The general assembly had in the mean time continued their labours, even after the retirement of the above-mentioned deputies, and had come to a conclusion on the 23rd of October. This was not, however, what the French government wished, inasmuch as they were unwilling that any constitution should be proclaimed without their direct interference. They therefore played a double game, and caused a revolution to be organised by their agents in Switzerland. The French general, Montchoisi, supported the revolutionary party with his soldiers: the French government afterwards refused to acknowledge the originators of the revolution or the general who had, by their own orders, supported them. Dolder and Savary, in connexion with some members of the legislative council, dissolved the general assembly, proclaimed the constitution formed on Bonaparte's plan of the 29th of May, chose (October 29) a new senate, and retained the executive power in their own hands until the senate had, according to the new constitution, chosen the executive council. This was done on the 25th of November, and the confusion was then worse than ever. The new executive council elected Aloys Reding, the most violent opponent of all reforms, both in temporal and spiritual affairs, to be landammann of Switzerland—that is, they resolved upon placing in his hands the whole executive power of the seventeen cantons. Bonaparte, who had evidently foreseen all this, disapproved of what had been done, and appeared as if he intended to overthrow the whole arrangement by force. General Turreau, a tremendous democrat, as he had shown in La Vendée, where he had commanded during the reign of terror, had been ordered into the Valais some time previously; General Montchoisi had been recalled from Berne, and replaced by Montrichard; so that it would be an easy matter to give effect to the orders from

Paris by a number of armed men. Aloys Reding, therefore, and those who had elected him, were in rather a precarious situation. The noble families of the olden time reckoned too much on their ancient connexions in Petersburg, London, Vienna, and Paris, where the Swiss patricians had exercised a considerable influence: but times were entirely changed.

The Emperor Alexander was too far off; England had just made peace, and could not break it for the sake of Switzerland; Diesbach, who had been sent to Vienna, found indeed plenty of good-will, but the court was afraid to enter into negotiations with him: Reding himself went to Paris. The supporters of the old Swiss form of government were numerous there: the new court consisted of persons very favourably disposed towards the Swiss patricians who had served the former government of France, and Reding remained there from the 15th of December, 1801, to the 17th of January, 1802. He was obliged, however, to leave without having obtained his object. The originators of the last changes, so decidedly favourable to the old form of government (Hirzel of Zürich, Frisching of Römlingen, in the canton of Berne, and others), were compelled to receive into the executive council six opponents of their system. Bonaparte commanded as dictator, and his sophists were obliged to deduce from antiquity, in rather a remarkable manner, his right of giving laws to the Swiss. It was clearly shown in the *Moniteur* of the day that it was very natural for a friend of humanity, like Bonaparte, to be anxious to extend his protection to the poor Swiss, and that this originated in the relations between the Gauls and the Helvetii of the time of Cæsar. Whether this last position were historically true or not, appears to have been of little consequence to the *Moniteur*.*

The six opponents of the federalists were merely forced upon them, in order that they might be able to consult with the French ambassador concerning a new revolution, which would render the armed interference of the French government necessary; for it was evidently useless to expect any submission from those who were defending old prejudices. Reinhard was no longer the French ambassador in Switzerland; he had given up to Verninac a part which no longer suited him. Under Verninac's direction, the opponents of Reding, Diesbach, Erlach, Steiger, Hirzel, Frisching, &c., after having dissolved the senate, which had established the federalist executive council, summoned a number of persons to Berne; and, in order to give the matter some appearance of justice, gave to these people so assembled the name of Assembly of the Notables. This assembly rejected the last draft of the constitution, deposed Reding from his office of landammann of Switzerland, proclaimed a new constitution, and appointed Dolder landammann.

* Bonaparte's letter to Reding, which does great honour to the talents of Talleyrand and Reinhard, who composed it for him, is to be found in the *Moniteur*, Year X., col. 533.

The whole of these changes were brought about by an assembly of the notables, which had received no powers, and were completed between the 17th of April and the 6th of July. It now became evident to all disinterested parties that it was the object of the French government to bring about a civil war in Switzerland, which would render the assistance of the French troops necessary.

Zürich and the smaller cantons, all the members of the former governments, and the inhabitants of those districts which had lost by the revolution of 1798, protested against the constitution of the notables, and took up arms against the new government; and this was precisely the period chosen by Verninac to declare, on the 18th of July, that he had received orders from his government to propose to the Swiss, as their constitution was now completed, that the French troops should be withdrawn from the country. The new government in Berne did not perceive the snare, and received the departure of the French as a favour: but exactly in proportion as the French troops left the several cantons, the friends of the old system rose in arms against them and against the new government which required their assistance. The event of the contest between the partisans of the system of centralisation and the defenders of the old cantonal government, was for some time doubtful. In a short time, however, when, in addition to the force in the east of Switzerland, where the smaller cantons had the superiority, although Zürich was besieged by the troops of the government, the old patrician families of Berne and Friburg, who had gained experience abroad, began to enrol their veteran soldiers, and Dolder and his party were obliged to give way. On the same day (the 18th of September, 1802) Von Erlach appeared before the capital (which he afterwards took) at the head of the militia (*landsturm*) of Berne, and Reding summoned an assembly to be held at Schwytz, according to the forms of the old Swiss Diet. In the course of the same month one canton after another joined the defenders of the old system, the central government of the Helvetic republic was compelled to escape into the Pays de Vaud, the old government was re-established in Berne, and a party of veteran troops was despatched against the Pays de Vaud.

This was exactly what the French government had been waiting for. The French ambassador in Berne refused to acknowledge the new form of government, and would have nothing to do with Reding's assembly; but he would not, on the other hand, promise Bonaparte's unconditional assistance to the fugitive Helvetic government in Lausanne.* In every part of Switzerland there was not only open division and contest, but even bloodshed. Bachmann, one of the above-mentioned Swiss officers who had made war in

* Bonaparte's proclamation, published in the *Moniteur*, Year XI., col. 113, makes the Swiss say: "Notre véritable intérêt est de demeurer neutres; ce ne sera jamais celui des Bachmann, des Watteville, qui depuis leur enfance servent les puissances ennemis de la France."

foreign service their profession (there were said to be at that time 50 or 60,000 Swiss in foreign service, and the officers were all obliged to be selected from the ruling families), defeated the army of the Helvetic government, and advanced rapidly against Lausanne, intending to take it before the French should arrive; but the Parisian government was too well informed to allow this to happen. Bachmann was on the point of entering Lausanne, when Rapp, the adjutant-general of the First Consul, met him like the “*Deus ex machinâ*,” and commanded him to retire. Rapp was the bearer of a proclamation, dated the 8th Vendémiaire (September 30th), and entered Lausanne on the 4th of October.

Bonaparte's peace-making proclamation began with a very correct description of the condition of Switzerland and of the conduct of the Helvetic government, which was by no means approved of in every respect; and all this served as a preparation for a decision from Paris. The proclamation goes on to declare openly that a word of power from the *great* man, in the name of the *great* nation (a sort of *quos ego* as it is called), is to put an end to the condition of the anarchy described at the commencement of the proclamation. In order to render this decision more impressive and emphatic, it was further stated, that if the contending parties did not immediately come to an agreement, Ney, at the head of 40,000 French, would enter Switzerland from Bâsle, and the south would be occupied by French troops from Geneva and Italy. The orders contained in the proclamation, and which were to be immediately obeyed, were the following:—

The Helvetic constitution, founded upon the instructions sent from Paris, although not quite corresponding to these instructions, shall in the first place be again generally received. And as a necessary consequence of this, all appointments made since the revolution shall be declared null and void; and all troops shall be dismissed who were not enrolled six months before that revolution. The subject of the constitution shall be finally settled in Paris. The whole of Switzerland shall send deputies thither, composed of supporters of the various systems of government, who then, under the eyes of the First Consul and the direction of persons appointed by him, will consult on the subject of the new constitution; *i.e.*, as it afterwards appeared, will receive from the First Consul himself orders as to how the constitution is to be framed. If, as was to be imagined, the orders contained in the proclamation were not immediately obeyed, Ney, with his army, was already on his way to compel their obedience.

The inhabitants of Berne yielded, separated from Reding's assembly, and sent Müllinen to Paris: Reding and his party, however, persisted in their opposition, and thus afforded Bonaparte the desired pretext for doing what he would have done at any rate. On the 21st of October, it was announced to the assembly that Ney's army had entered Bâsle and Berne, that it would occupy the whole of Switzerland, and that any opposition would be useless. Ney was appointed the representative of the First Consul in Switzerland, under

the name of minister plenipotentiary. - The Diet issued useless protests: it dissolved itself, however, immediately. Switzerland was inundated by 30 to 40,000 French, and the Helvetic government was re-established by them until the matter should be settled. Only such persons were sent to the meeting of Swiss deputies in Paris as had previously filled positions of trust in the several cantons, who were for the most part adherents of the old system, but were of too prosaic a nature to be enthusiasts. Only three deputies from the existing Helvetic government were admitted, and along with them were some inflexible aristocrats.

On this occasion the First Consul exhibited in a remarkable manner the two qualities which would have made him the best king in Europe, had not the unfortunate passion for war so entirely possessed him. These qualities were the exceeding amiability which he was able to infuse into his manner and address, the condescension expressed by his features and gestures, when he wished to please by his personal qualities alone; and, secondly, the ease with which he studied the reports of any matters made him by persons who understood them, and then reproduced them as his own thoughts in a different form. We know that he quite transported both the Parisians and Swiss by his speeches and behaviour to the Swiss deputies, not only from the accounts of French writers, who, like Thiers, Bignon, and others, ascribe to him omniscience and the knowledge of every peculiarity, but also from the accounts given by some of the Swiss deputies themselves. It is only necessary to read what is to be found on the subject in the life of Burgomaster Reinhard of Zürich, and in other accounts by the deputies of the various cantons. The readiness with which the great man made himself master of things which were before entirely unknown to him, certainly deserves admiration. We must, however, notice a few facts, which prevent our reception of the newspaper praises of the time, or the idolatry of a Thiers and a Bignon as current coin, or from staring in utter amazement like the worthy Swiss.

Bonaparte was accustomed to the government of large armies: he had organised a system of government in Italy, in Egypt, and, last of all, in France: how was it possible for him not to know all that was necessary about a little place like Switzerland from the reports of the councillors whom he had sent thither, and from Verninac's and Reinhard's special reports on persons and things? especially as the Swiss ambassador, Stapfer, had been assisting him for a year and a half, and a man like von Müllinen was giving him confidential advice at the very time. The number of the deputies assembled in Paris was not quite sixty: and we do not mention the tricks resorted to in order to make it appear as if everything had been done, before having recourse to positive commands, to induce the Swiss of their own accord to agree to a constitution such as Bonaparte intended them to have, but hasten to the conclusion. This was, that, after much quarrelling, and after those arrangements of which Thibaudeau has

given the best account in his "Memorabilia of the Consulate," after Bonaparte had long charmed the good Swiss by his speeches and influenced them by means of Fouché and Rœderer, the so-called act of mediation made its appearance.

The act of mediation, the introduction of which bears a strong resemblance to a ukase or to the old legislative formula common in France (*car tel est nostre plaisir**), was communicated to the Swiss deputies on the 11th of February, 1803, and Napoleon assumed the title of Protector of the Republic. In the introduction, nineteen cantons are enumerated in alphabetical order, although the Valais still remained in the occupation of the French; and it is ordered that these cantons are to be squared off and equalised by the mutual cession of certain towns and districts: then follow forty paragraphs respecting the centralising system of government. No one has denied, or will deny, that notwithstanding the favourable manner in which everything connected with the old system of government is treated, moderation, impartiality, and political wisdom are conspicuous in this document, which is certainly more than can be said of the changes made by the diplomatists of the allied powers after the fall of the Empire.† Those men among the Swiss, whose old Parisian acquaintances were beginning to give the tone at the new court, such as Müllinen, Watteville, and d'Affry, were busily employed in persuading the First Consul to introduce the old system under a new form, wherever this would not interfere with his plans. For the furtherance of these plans, moreover, the patrician families of Berne, Friburg, Soleure, and Lucerne, were absolutely necessary. Bonaparte wished to establish an auxiliary force of Swiss beside the French army, and in this none could serve him so well as those gentlemen who had made a profession of serving in the French army, and of enlisting soldiers for foreign service.

According to the wishes of the originator of the act of mediation, who was now called Protector of Switzerland, a commission of seven Swiss was to introduce the new constitution before the 15th of April,

* In order to exemplify this, we shall quote the concluding portion of the introduction as it stands in the *Moniteur*, Year XI., No. 151, col. 609. "Ayant ainsi employé tous les moyens de connaître les intérêts et la volonté des Suisses, nous, en qualité de médiateur, sans autres vues que le bonheur des peuples sur les intérêts desquels nous avions à prononcer, et sans entendre unir à l'indépendance de la Suisse, statuons ce qui suit."

+ We cannot here enter upon the special history of Switzerland: we have only to do with that which appeared unimportant and was yet of the very greatest importance, namely, the manner in which Switzerland was united to France. The abstract of the contents of the forty paragraphs may be most easily found by the reader in the "Handbuch der Schweizerge-Schichte," by Ludwig Meyer von Knonau, vol. ii., pp. 713-717. The constitutions of the separate cantons, as published in Switzerland on the 3rd of March, may be found in Martens' "Recueil," &c., Suppléments, vol. iii., p. 373. All the documents connected with these circumstances are to be found in the appendices to the life of the leader of the Zurich aristocracy, who played a principal part both in these matters themselves, and during the subsequent few years. Hans von Reinhard, Bürgermeister des Eidgenössischen, Standes Zürich und Landammann der Schweiz, von Conrad Muralt. Zürich, Orell, Fussli u. Compagnie, 1839.

1803. The First Consul named these seven commissioners, who were to be assisted by Ney, in case of necessity; he also named, provisionally, the first magistrates of the republic and of the cantons. That the patricians, who were now again the fashion in Paris, were not forgotten in these nominations, is clear, from the facts that d'Affry was made landammann of Switzerland; Mousson, secretary-general; and that Von Müllinen and Watteville were placed at the head of the modified government of Berne. The Swiss, however, were obliged to pay pretty dearly for the mediation of this omniscient hero. First of all, Ney, on his entrance into Switzerland, had obliged them to give up all their arms, and had taken these with him to the Valais; then a war tax of 625,000 francs had been levied for the support of the French troops on the 20th of November, 1802; and lastly, the French were not to evacuate the country till the treaty respecting the contingent should be so arranged as to satisfy Bonaparte.

This condition hastened not only the assembling of a Diet, but also, as soon as this had assembled on the 4th of June, the conclusion of a treaty, to which the name of an offensive and defensive alliance was given. Bonaparte, however, when the matter came to be discussed, allowed of some deviations from his original plan, and the real military capitulation, which was the most important part of it, was not concluded before the 17th of September. According to this, Switzerland agreed to furnish and maintain for Bonaparte's army a contingent of 16,000 men; and it had been further agreed in the treaty of alliance, that, if necessary, 8000 more should be furnished. As no one did or could threaten Switzerland, the promise to protect it with the whole power of France was merely a dead letter; and Switzerland was also compelled to purchase annually 20,000 cwt. of French salt. As the French actually did retire, Switzerland in the next few years was the only country which had not indeed gained by its dependence on France, but not seriously lost by it. Bonaparte at this time even made no objections to Aloys Reding sitting in the Diet as the deputy for Schwytz.

C.—THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC—PREPARATIONS FOR THE KINGDOM.

We consider it sufficiently clear that all that the First Consul did at Lyons in respect to the Cisalpine republic was merely a sort of preparation for what he already intended to do in France. We are inclined, therefore, to trust Botta's words rather more on this occasion than usual, when he asserts that Bonaparte only made use of his (Botta's) countrymen, inclined to exaggerations in everything, and particularly to exaggerated praise and flattery, in order to urge and spur on the colder and more reasoning French.*

* Carlo Botta, "Storia d'Italia," lib. xxi., vol. v., p. 226. "Voleva (Bonaparte) che le prime mosse vennero dall' Italia, perchè temeva che certi residui di opinioni e di

When Bonaparte quitted Italy after the battle of Marengo, the government of the Cisalpine republic remained in the first place in the hands of a so-called executive committee, consisting of three members—Visconti, Sommariva, and Rugo, and assisted by a legislative *consulta*. The *consulta*, as well as the executive committee, were all nominated by Bonaparte. As soon, however (at the end of 1801) as the preliminaries were agreed upon with England, and a monarchico-oligarchical form of government was given to the Dutch, Bonaparte resolved to govern Italy also immediately from Paris.

Up till this time, the French minister who resided in Milan had caused all the orders from Paris to be executed by the *consulta* and the executive committee; but now, even the appearance of independence was to be taken away. The plan of a new constitution was sent to the minister from Paris; and as soon as he had made his arrangements with the *consulta* and the committee, the latter published a proclamation, on the 14th of November, 1801, promising a new constitution. Although this new constitution was made in Paris, and a part of it even dictated by Bonaparte, it was necessary that it should appear to have proceeded from the Italians themselves. An assembly was therefore summoned to Lyons, consisting of all the principal people of Lombardy, no one considering it at all necessary, that although assembled for the express purpose of giving the people a new constitution, these latter should have any opinion at all as to the selection of the deputies. The persons summoned to the *consulta* at Lyons for the 31st of December, 1801, were the executive commission in Milan, a number of judges from the several tribunals, and deputies from the bishops, the academies, the artists, and the governments of departments. Each of the forty cities sent a representative; the army, the national guards, the chamber of commerce, sent their deputies; and then Bonaparte named 148 Italians, whom he wished to see among the notables at Lyons. The whole number of Italians forming the *consulta* was 452.

As soon as the various members of the *consulta* had arrived at Lyons, Chaptal and Talleyrand were despatched thither to exercise upon them the Parisian arts of conversation, hospitality, friendliness, and amiability, and at the same time to amuse them with the prospect of an Italian empire, which has had the same charm for the Italians, since the overthrow of the freedom of Italy till our own time, that a similar plan has always had for the Poles. They were of course deceived in this, for Bonaparte could not, and indeed ought not, to have contemplated making Italy independent. The

desiderii repubblicani in Francia non fossero per fargli qualche mal giuoco sotto, se la facenda non si spianasse con qualche precedente esempio. Sapeva che nella nostra razza imitatrice, cosa molto efficace è l'esempio, e che gli uomini vanno volontieri dietro alla similitudine. Deliberossi adunque, prima di scoprirsi in Francia, di fare sue sperienze Italiane, confidando che gl' Italiani, siccome vinti, avrebbero l'animo più pieghevole. Così con li armi Francesi aveva conquistato l'Italia, con le condiscendenze Italiane voleva conquistar Francia."

best account of these cabals, the conduct of which Bonaparte left entirely to Talleyrand, as he himself did not arrive in Lyons till the 11th of January, and in which Sommariva, the president of the Milan government, and Mareschalchi, who at that time resided in Paris, as representative of that government, took a considerable share, is that given by Count Bonacossi, who had very good opportunities of being well informed, and whose account, without any reference to his secondary intention, is very useful.* The Italians wished to have an Italian as the head of their state; Bonaparte would not yield the sovereign power to any one. A middle course, therefore, was chosen. An Italian was apparently made the president, who was able at any rate to represent the governor, but who, being an old courtier, was not very difficult to please, and who never could become dangerous.

The republic was to be a sort of monarchy, of which the monarch was to be called president. Bonaparte intended to be monarch himself; he had only, therefore, to seek for an Italian as his vice-president, and he found this man in one of the first families of Lombardy. Melzi, Duke of Lodi, had travelled through England, France, Italy, Holland, and Spain; he had all the manners of a man of high rank and dignity, and at the same time a great deal of Italian politeness and vivacity. He had remained a considerable time at the court of Maria Theresa, in the capacity of chamberlain; had inherited in Spain the manor of Erile; became grandee of Spain, and was called afterwards Duke of Melzi Erile. The Cisalpine republic had sent him as their ambassador to the congress at Rastadt: when this was interrupted by the war, he had retired into Spain, and was still residing there when Talleyrand conceived the idea that he was just the man under whom to mask Bonaparte's real plans. Talleyrand commenced the negotiations with Melzi through the Spanish secretary of state, and as soon as he had agreed to the proposals made to him, he was sent for to Paris, informed of the part he had to play, and sent to Lyons, to persuade his countrymen voluntarily to put themselves, like the Swiss, into Bonaparte's hands.

This was, however, no easy matter, because the Italians had a fear of becoming French subjects, whether mediately or immediately. Melzi collected around him in Lyons a circle of Lombard aristocrats, who, like d'Affry, Müllinen, Watteville, and others in Switzerland, saw in Bonaparte the man most likely to serve themselves; and these men brought about by cunning what it would have been very difficult to obtain in a straightforward manner.† They occupied them-

* In the collection, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," vol. i., pp. 291-300, Bonacossi relates some facts which throw a light upon the whole course of the business, although they perhaps do not prove all that they are intended to prove.

† Thiers does not mention these facts at all. No one knew it all better than Bonacossi, whom, however, he never quotes. The latter says in the passage, in which he disproves the assertion of the pseudo Bourrienne, that Bonaparte had been long agreed with Melzi, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," vol. i., p. 297—"Le général Bonaparte n'employa Melzi qu'en 1802, et dès son début il avait associé à sa fortune Aldini, Paradisi, Cicognara, Luosi, Costabili, Tontanelli, Prina, et une foule d'autres Italiens, qui ne cessèrent d'administrer ou de combattre que lorsque tout fut perdu."

selves apparently very busily with the debates on the constitution, and this appeared to be the reason for summoning the consulta: this was, however, a great mistake; the choice of Bonaparte for president was the great point, and, after this, the constitution was soon agreed to. The consulta in Lyons, like the congress of the Swiss in Paris, filled the world, which only regards the exterior of things, with new admiration for Bonaparte. The Italians and the French could not find words to express their astonishment and their joy. From the 11th to the 26th of January Bonaparte enchanted the Italians by his amiable conduct, by his splendour, by his apparently all-seeing, all-penetrating wisdom, which was praised in the most flattering speeches. The French were delighted beyond measure, because they were called, over and over again, the *great* nation by the consulta, and because a national assembly of the whole of Italy was held on their territory. The Italians rejoiced, and not without reason, at being again permitted, after so long a period, to discuss affairs of state, and to choose a chief magistrate for themselves; for Melzi and his aristocratic party alone knew whither Talleyrand and Chaptal wished to lead them. Their first duty was to consult respecting that point of the constitution, which had been communicated long before in Paris to the leading men, respecting the title and the person of the future head of the state. The proposers had been cunning enough, in order to satisfy the democratic portion of the assembly, to give to this chief only the title of president, and to limit his time of office to ten years. There could be few objections made to this; but Bonaparte's creatures soon said that the Italians—who, according to Botta's account, found the military pressure of the French government quite intolerable—would not be much inclined to choose for the president of their state, already groaning under the French rule, the military chief of the French nation. Talleyrand had recourse to one of those diplomatic tricks in which he was so rich. Count Bonacossi informs us in what manner he obtained his end; and we are the more inclined to trust him, as he was a zealous partisan of Bonaparte's, and was himself in Lyons as one of the Italian nobility: we therefore give his own words in a note.*

The effect had been very prudently reckoned on which would be produced if Bonaparte, who already figured in Lyons as legislator to a foreign nation, could also give a sort of theatrical exhibition as general among his Egyptian veterans: it had therefore

* Bonacossi says ("Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," vol. i. p. 299) that Bourrienne states, *le titre de président de la république Cisalpine fut accordé à Bonaparte sans difficulté*. He answers, that such was by no means the fact: "Loin de n'éprouver aucun obstacle, la nomination fut sur le point d'échouer tout-à-fait. Ce n'est pas que les Italiens ne rendissent justice à Napoléon, il s'en faut beaucoup; ils admiraient son génie, ils célébraient sa gloire, sa moderation, sa sagesse, toutes les belles qualités qu'il avait déployées parmi eux. Mais cet homme, qu'ils honoraient, qu'ils cherissaient à tant de titres, était le premier magistrat d'un peuple voisin. Déferer la présidence à l'un était à leurs yeux reconnaître la suzeraineté de l'autre, et pour rien au monde ils n'eussent proclamé la dépendance de l'Italie. La résolution à cet égard était telle, que désespérant de les ramener, on résolut de les surprendre."

been so arranged that the Egyptian army of French veterans, whom the English, according to the terms of the capitulation, had landed at Toulon, should, on their march to Paris, pass through Lyons while the First Consul was there. On the 26th of January he formally reviewed this remnant of his chosen troops, and every one hastened out of the town to see the spectacle. The opportunity was improved by Talleyrand: he hastily caused a meeting of the consulta to be summoned, at which, as he had foreseen, hardly a third part of the members were present. It had been previously arranged with Melzi's party, that upon this day, and in this numerically small meeting, the most important point of the whole discussion should be put to the vote. It was proposed, therefore, in the absence of at least two-thirds of the consulta, that Bonaparte should be named president of the Cisalpine republic for ten years, with the express addition that he might be re-elected at the end of that period.

Bonacossi adds, that Talleyrand would not have succeeded even in this smaller assembly but for another piece of diplomacy. Instead of collecting the votes by calling over the names separately, or by having the votes given in writing, as the importance of the subject demanded, he caused the decision of the assembly to be taken by causing the partisans of one side to stand up, whilst the others remained sitting: thus leaving the decision as to the majority for or against entirely to the president, who was perhaps not quite impartial.* The majority of the members of the consulta heard therefore in the evening, to their great astonishment, that in a meeting of the consulta, hastily summoned, and at an unseasonable hour, a certain number of the minority so summoned had chosen the First Consul of the French president of their republic. As some sort of compensation for them, Melzi d'Erlé was made vice-president, and their hopes of seeing Italy erected into a state were flattered by changing the name Cisalpine republic into Italian republic. Any one who admires the coolness of French sophists and newspaper writers, should read Thiers' account of the matter *in extenso*, and should particularly attend to the boldness with which he describes all the cabals of Mareschalchi, Petiet, Murat, and Talleyrand, which we do not think it worth while to notice at all.

In the same way as we omit the cabals which Thiers thinks so important, we do not notice the debates on the new constitution itself, partly because it was entirely changed about the beginning of 1805, but particularly because under Bonaparte the constitution, whether of France or of Italy, was never in the least regarded whenever it crossed in the slightest degree the intentions of the government. In general, this remark respecting the constitution may suffice, that by

* "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," vol. i., p. 310: "L'opposition fut vive, opiniâtre, elle était sur le point de déjouer l'artifice, lorsque le diplomate, précipitant la discussion, imagina de faire voter par assis et levée. Cette sorte d'expédient lui réussit, et la présidence fut proclamée; mais cette convocation furtive, ce moyen inusité jusqu'à là de constater les votes, prouvent, etc. etc."

their choice of a president the Italians placed themselves entirely under Bonaparte's military servitude; they were further obliged to raise him troops, and to pay, feed, and receive into their country and fortresses a French army. At the same time, it cannot be denied that they obtained great advantages in return. They were freed from the Austrian system, according to which, retrogradation is allowed and sometimes even a duty, progression on the other hand is forbidden, and becomes a crime. They were allowed to speak together openly; they threw off the fetters of the middle ages, and enjoyed at least the appearance of liberty of speech and of the press, which had previously never been suffered; they became useful soldiers in the French army, and might hope to gain honourable distinction, which could never be the case in the Austrian armies, officered as they were by archdukes and the very highest Austrian nobility. In respect to freedom, the principal gain was, that caprice did not prevail instead of law, as had formerly been the case; and that, although Bonaparte's police gave no one any peace, yet persons were not carried off to Hungarian fortresses, or immured in underground dungeons in the Spielberg. Notwithstanding the constitution, the president was in reality uncontrolled lord and master; and the council of state (*consulta di stato*) only derived its authority from being his organ. The number of legislative deputies was only seventy-five, and these could not even propose a law, but were obliged to wait till some of the organs of government proposed it, when they might accept or reject. The republic of Genoa, or, as it was then called, the Ligurian republic, was obliged about this same time, though apparently quite voluntarily, to make the first preparation for its union with France, which actually took place three years later. In June, 1802, namely, the Ligurian senate transferred to Bonaparte the right of naming the doge of the republic.

D.—ST. DOMINGO.

We cannot, in a work like the present, go at any length into the history of St. Domingo, the most important of the foreign possessions of France, which not only entirely supplied the mother country with all sorts of colonial produce previous to the revolution, but even sent them coffee and sugar for exportation. It will be sufficient here merely to mention those points in its history which are necessary to the understanding of the proceedings of the First Consul. The island, before the revolution, had been unequally divided between the French and the Spaniards; but at the peace of Bâle the smaller Spanish portion was ceded to France. At that time, however, the French were unable to take possession of it; and it was only under Bonaparte that commissioners were sent out for the purpose. The Spanish portion of the island was principally inhabited by freemen, whties, and mulattoes, and was much neglected, as were all the Spanish colonies. The larger French portion was excellently culti-

vated by half a million slaves, so that it looked like a garden. Even before the revolution the whites and the mulattoes lived in continual discord, but when the first French national assembly declared itself at first theoretically for the manumission of the slaves, and then in practice refused the mulattoes equal rights with the white population, a regular war broke out between them. The second, or legislative national assembly, endeavoured to put an end to this contest by granting equal rights to whites, mulattoes, and negroes. But the three commissioners who had been despatched to St. Domingo to put this law in force, met with great opposition. The whites refused to obey.

The authorities of the island opposed not only the manumission of the negroes, but even the admission of the mulattoes to share in the privileges of the whites; both sides took up arms, and the negroes exterminated the whites and all civilisation wherever they had an opportunity. In this war of extermination, which raged on the island since August, 1791, a negro, Toussaint Louverture, distinguished himself by his great natural talents. He had obtained particularly great influence among those negroes who excused their war against the authorities of the island by their obedience to the commands of the democratic government in Paris. He gained by degrees as much French civilisation as he considered necessary to his purpose, and was very favourably received by the commissioners after the destruction of Cape Francais, which was burnt to the ground on the 20th of July, 1793. He wished to organise an army of negroes, to whom the whites of the island continued to refuse their freedom, because they were dependent on them for food. Toussaint made use of the authority of the commissioners to induce the negroes of the various plantations to strengthen his army. Among the three deputies, Santhonax was particularly useful to him on this occasion. He announced that all negroes who should serve in the armies of the republic should enjoy equal rights with other French subjects. In this army Toussaint possessed naturally much influence; he allowed General Lavaux, however, as long as it seemed advisable to him, to retain the title of commander-in-chief, for he still had the mulattoes and many among the negroes to contend with. As second in command, he carried on the war with the negro general, Francois, with the English, who had been called to the assistance of the royalists in the island, against the negroes and the Parisian democrats, and with the Spaniards, who continued to defend themselves in their portion of the island. Lavaux had no French troops, and was much disliked by the whites in the island; he was obliged, therefore, to rely on the negroes, among whom Toussaint had much more influence than he had. The whites were almost exterminated, and Louverture was named by Lavaux vice-governor of the island. The three commissioners had been already recalled by the assembly; but the Directory found it advisable at a later period to send Santhonax to St. Domingo as commissioner, in order

to preserve Toussaint, who had reasons for being grateful to him, in his allegiance.

Santhonax and Lavaux, however, who had placed the negro in this position, experienced his want of faith as soon as he had made use of them for his own purposes. Santhonax obtained for Toussaint from Paris the title and rank of a commanding general of the French republic in Domingo. The latter, however, was hardly in possession of the document which gave him a legal right to command, than he contrived to send away the two French officers from the island, though in the most honourable manner. He caused Santhonax and General Lavaux to be chosen to represent the island in the council of Five Hundred, and expressed his wish that they should accept this office in such a manner that it was impossible not to perceive in his request a strict command for them to quit the island (August, 1797). After their departure, the southern portion of the island was governed by Toussaint, as general of the French republic; in the northern part Rigaud, at the head of an army of mulattoes, continued to make good his position; in the west the English, to their great eventual loss, had been in possession of several ports and fortresses since the 18th of September, 1793. We consider it necessary to prove here by facts how destructive to the English, eventually, their occupation of this portion of St. Domingo was, inasmuch as this shows better than anything else how absurd Bonaparte's attempt at reconquering the island was, since even the masters of the sea had only reaped disgrace and loss from their attempt. We see from the accounts of the English committees of supply from 1802 to 1806, that men had been sent thither at different times, the most of whom had died from the effects of the climate, so that this entirely useless undertaking cost the nation an immense sum.

The Directory despatched General Hedouville to St. Domingo to drive out the English, and he was joined both by Toussaint with the negroes, and by Rigaud with the mulattoes; the latter, however, alone meant honestly by him; the former merely intended deceit and treachery, in which he was perfect. Whilst he apparently was fighting with the English, in conjunction with Hedouville, he was secretly carrying on negotiations with them, because he wished to hinder any other places than Port au Prince, which Hedouville had already taken from the English, commanded by General Maitland, from falling into the hands of Hedouville or Rigaud. The English took advantage of this, and in May, 1797, surrendered Mole St. Nicholas, and all the other places they held, to Toussaint, who in return granted them the most favourable conditions for quitting the island. Hedouville, with his 4000 French, could not accomplish much; he left the island, leaving Rigaud, with his mulattoes, who continued faithful to the mother country, to contend against Toussaint and his negroes. Toussaint Louverture in the mean time asserted in his letters to the Directory, that he was fulfilling his duties towards the republic in the most zealous manner, and at the same time com-

plained bitterly of Hedouville. Rigaud could not long resist the power of the negroes; he disputed every foot of ground with them, and only yielded when he was no longer supported, but rather sacrificed, by the mother country. At the close of 1799 Toussaint had reduced both mulattoes and negroes under his power; but Rigaud still resisted in a single district (*aux Cayes*). Finding that he was still unsupported by the French government, he went himself to Paris, but soon saw that the French government was unwilling to undertake anything against Toussaint, who caused himself to be always considered as an official of the French republic. Rigaud did not return till he accompanied Bonaparte's expedition to St. Domingo: his companion, Pétion, who accompanied him to Paris, and afterwards returned with him to St. Domingo, became afterwards master of the island.

In the year 1800 Bonaparte had very much to do in Europe: he did not consider it advisable, therefore, to dispute Toussaint's right to the office of governor of the island, but confirmed him in it. He had no intention, however, of allowing him to take possession of the Spanish portion of the island which had been ceded to France by the peace of Bâsle. He sent out civil commissioners to take possession of this portion: the governor, however, hastened thither at the head of his army, and the Spaniards, notwithstanding the protestations of the First Consul's commissioners, were compelled to acknowledge the negro as principal commissioner of the French government, and to put into his hands, towards the end of February, 1801, the fortresses which they had themselves garrisoned up to this period. From this time, Toussaint, who could neither read nor write, and who had been a slave for the greatest part of his life, began to play in St. Domingo exactly the same part which Bonaparte was playing in France. He, too, availed himself of the assistance of French sophistry with such skill that it would be very easy to represent him as a great man. We make this remark here simply to show how difficult it is to form a correct opinion of political greatness, or indeed of external greatness in general. Every one, however, who is not involved in some sort of sophistry, can easily judge of moral greatness and of the consequences of highly praised measures on the part of those in power. The negro, to Bonaparte's great disgust, imitated exactly every step of the much-praised hero which he found in the newspapers, and even sometimes in a very ludicrous manner: at the same time, he created a form of government which would have restored the island to its former prosperity, had it been allowed to continue.* He also, as Bonaparte

* We shall quote the words of a French author in reference to Toussaint's merits and demerits, in an administrative point of view. He says: "Déployant une prodigieuse activité, des talents extraordinaires, il s'occupa aussitôt à rappeler sur tous les points la sécurité et l'abondance. Il relève les ateliers, établit le système des finances dont les résultats lui donnèrent en peu d'armées des revenus considérables. Ouvrant les ports, il ramène le commerce sur des rivages désolés par le carnage et l'incendie, il accroît ses ressources par des droits fixés suivant des tarifs judicieusement combinés. Il s'entoure de nombreux bataillons qu'il tient sous une discipline des plus rigoureuses. Il gouverne aussi dans les affaires civiles avec une extrême sévérité, mais rendant justice à tous sans distinction de couleurs ou de partis, sans

had done, appointed a commission to compile a constitution, and caused this constitution to be presented to himself for his acceptance; but, at the same time, went a step further. He did what Bonaparte even then intended to do, although he did not actually do it till a later period.

Toussaint, namely, not only caused himself to be proclaimed chief of the island, under the title of president, but to be authorised to name his successor. The First Consul was irritated at this proceeding of Toussaint's for two reasons: first, because the negro had guessed his own intentions, and had anticipated him; and then, because Toussaint, warned by the English against Bonaparte and Talleyrand, had declared in his address to his negroes that the promises, and even the written documents of the French government, could only be relied on by them so long as they had arms in their hands.* The colony flourished anew under Toussaint's government; but Bonaparte was the more irritated with his black representative, who imitated exactly everything that he did, as at the time he was founding colossal West Indian plans upon the possession of Louisiana, which had been taken from the Spaniards. The president, or really the unlimited monarch of the island, had made the terrible Dessalines, who afterwards practised such dreadful cruelties, and who had even previously been remarkable for his savage disposition, his representative in the western part of the island. Christophe, who has distinguished himself among all the negroes as an honest, well-meaning man, governed the northern portion. As soon as order was restored, Toussaint allowed the whites to return, let out the plantations of the absent, soothed the jealousy of the mulattoes, and restrained the ruder negroes by a strict discipline. In order to set some limits to the idleness of the negroes, he introduced a system which restricted them to the land, and obliged whole communities to cultivate it. The inhabitants of every district were divided for this purpose into classes; and each class obtained the fourth part of the produce of the ground, which was devoted to those who cultivated it, a share proportioned to the labour they had bestowed on its cultivation. The distribution of the shares and the division into classes was regulated by the negroes themselves, but under the inspection of what were called "*inspecteurs de culture.*" We cannot go at greater length into Toussaint's regulations for the internal government of the island; we merely wish to show, that those do not speak

rechercher le passé ni se venger de ses ennemis il lui suffit de les assujettir et de les faire trembler.

“A son tour il s'intimide en jetant les yeux sur la France. Il redoute le courroux du premier consul qui ne daigne pas répondre à ses lettres et qui dans les journaux le fait représenter en rébellion ouverte, qui n'envoie pas de commissaires civiles qui le laisse lui-même sans instructions, et néglige ses vives instances pour en obtenir le retour des anciens colons, l'envoi des anciens blancs versés dans l'administration, avec de bons artistes, pour faire promptement recouvrir à Saint Domingue ses richesses et sa prépondérance.”

* His words are: “Nous sommes libres aujourd’hui, parceque nous sommes les plus forts; mais le premier consul maintient l'esclavage à la Martinique et l'île Bourbon: nous aussi, nous serons esclaves, s'il devient le plus fort.”

without at least a show of reason, who assert that the democratic government of France ruined the colony the first time by an over-hasty proclamation of the freedom of the negro slaves; and that on a second occasion the restorer of monarchical and aristocratic institutions made it the scene of terrible barbarities by the threat of slavery.

When Bonaparte was named First Consul, he sent Colonel Vincent to St. Domingo with the proclamation, in which he announced that he had undertaken the duties of government. Eighteen months afterwards Toussaint sent back this same Colonel Vincent, whom he had retained in the island, with the constitution he had given. This constitution displeased the First Consul exceedingly. He was much offended with Colonel Vincent, because he, knowing the state of things in St. Domingo, advised him to be prudent, and he was not allowed to return thither, as he would have wished to do. He was not, however, banished, as Bonaparte's enemies assert, but obtained an honourable appointment in the island of Elba. In order to understand this, we must remember that Napoleon, in reference to his expedition against St. Domingo, was at the time acting under the advice of the royalists, who had lost their property upon the island, and that Barbé Marbois, who, as former governor, only knew the island as it had formerly been, was preparing instructions for the general who was to reconquer it. In these circumstances Colonel Vincent was no doubt in the way, and his friendship for Toussaint Louverture must have appeared suspicious.

The colonel had arrived in Paris with his despatches respecting the formation of the new independent negro republic immediately after the conclusion of the preliminaries with England (October 14, 1801). The sea was therefore open, and the First Consul proceeded immediately, in his usual manner, to prepare the public mind for his projected expedition against St. Domingo. He was in the habit of causing his adversaries, from emperors and kings down to Madame de Staël, to be libelled and calumniated in the most scandalous manner in his papers, even sometimes dictating the articles himself: and Madame de Staël complains more bitterly of this in her book of lamentations respecting her banishment from Paris, than of several other perhaps more important injuries. In these articles Toussaint, who had not thrown off his allegiance to France, and whom Bonaparte himself had confirmed in the office of governor of the island, is represented as a rebel, and several other statements equally false are set forth. At one time a civil war is raging in St. Domingo, at another it is called a second Algiers, which is evidently a mere calumny, whilst preparations were being vigorously made for the war. The expenses of the expedition were enormous. All the French historians are inexhaustible in their praises of Bonaparte's undertaking for the recovery of St. Domingo. The English, however, appear to us to have even then foreseen the event of the

expedition, from their having so quietly allowed the whole thing to proceed.

To recover for France a colony, to restore their property to the numerous French subjects deprived of their estates, to bring back commerce and opulence to the maritime cities of France on the south-west coast, said the proclamation, the whole of its naval force, and a large portion of its land army, shall be directed against a negro state, dangerous also, from its position, to England and to North America. The preparations, like everything that Bonaparte did in this way, were of such a kind that there was to be no idea even of resistance. But Bonaparte forgot that he had not got to do with men weakened in body and soul by civilisation, like the Italians and Germans, but with men in a state of nature.* Twenty-two thousand men, chosen from veteran troops, were to be embarked. It is, however, a calumny against Bonaparte to say, that he wished by this proceeding to get rid of those who had served under Moreau. It is true, indeed, that the army was principally composed of the army of the Rhine, but this simple fact by no means justifies the inference drawn. Bonaparte was good-natured and upright, whenever it was not absolutely necessary to his object to be cruel or treacherous. He was, however, justly blamed for following the old plan, on this occasion as on several others afterwards, of bestowing on his relations those offices which should have been bestowed on superior merit. His brother-in-law, Leclerc, who, according to the testimony of both the friends and the enemies of the First Consul, was not fit for so difficult a post, was placed at the head of the whole expedition. It is, however, creditable to the First Consul, that he obliged his sister, the beautiful Pauline (afterwards married to the Prince Borghese), who would very gladly have remained in Paris, where she was a good deal in the way, to accompany her husband to St. Domingo.

Immediately after the landing of the first half of the army, consisting of about 11,000 men, the French discovered with what sort of enemies they had to do, and what sort of a conquest they would make of St. Domingo. Cape François was considered the principal town, and the ornament of the Antilles; it had been burned down in 1793, but since rebuilt. When Christophe saw that he could not defend it against the French, he caused it to be set on fire. When the French advanced to invest the town (April, 1802), they only found a heap of ashes. In exactly the same proportion as the French advanced did Louverture and the generals under him fulfil

* The fleet consisted of thirty-five men-of-war and twenty-one frigates, viz.. from Brest, one of 120 guns and nine of 74 guns; from Lorient, one of 74, one of 44, and two smaller ones; from Rochefort, one of 80, one of 74, four of 44, two of 36, two of 26. And at a later period three of 74 from Brest, four of 44 from Havre, and seven Dutch ships, three of them of 74. From Cadiz, first one of 80, four of 74, one of 40, five of 36, and seven smaller ones; and afterwards three of 74 and three frigates. From Toulon four of 74, one frigate, and two smaller vessels.

their threat of converting the island into a desert. In this way, before the second division containing the contingents of Cadiz and Toulon arrived, the most blooming and fertile portion of the island was a barren waste; Port au Prince alone was spared. Many circumstances, however, conspired to induce Toussaint not to prolong the contest, and Leclerc wished, if possible, to save a portion of the island from devastation.

Several negro generals had allowed themselves by degrees to be enticed by the splendid offers made them by Leclerc; whole troops of disciplined negroes had deserted Toussaint, and were serving against him in the French army. Among these were some of the most influential generals in the negro army, of whom Maurepas, with his disciplined troops, had first entered the French service. Dessalines and Christophe followed, and obtained considerable rank in the French army. The commander-in-chief was at last afraid that he should be quite deserted, and entered into negotiations. He offered to lay down his office, but refused all the advantages which Leclerc offered him: he wished to retire entirely, and merely demanded permission to retire to his estate of Emery, and to live there in peace. Even as a private individual he remained the idol of the negroes, and kept up extended communication with them. These connexions became soon suspicious, because Leclerc, after having permitted this man, to whom the negroes and the island in general owed so much, to retire to his estate, insulted him by suspicion. He caused him to be narrowly watched by Generals Thouvenot and Brunet, who commanded in the neighbourhood.

As soon as Leclerc believed himself in possession of the island, he began to act according to the principles of the former government, which Bonaparte wished to introduce everywhere, the partisans of which, therefore, were the principal advisers of the whole expedition, and had laid down the rules which had formed the instructions of the commander-in-chief. Among the creoles who had lost all their property by the rising of the negroes were some of the nearest relations of Bonaparte's wife; Bonaparte was in the habit of choosing his court and the highest officials from that portion of the nobility who had been liberal at the time of the first national assembly, but had since been converted: all this had a great influence upon the consequences of the expedition to St. Domingo. Barbé Marbois, formerly a marquis and royal intendant in St. Domingo, a clever and worthy man, in whom Bonaparte justly reposed great confidence, but who, from having been in St. Domingo during the period of slavery, had very wrong notions respecting the state of things afterwards, made out the instructions for the commanding officers, among whom the second in command was Rochambeau, a friend and patron of the former possessors of the plantations. This latter, after Leclerc's death, proceeded to act exactly according to the same instructions, and treated the mulattoes and negroes according to the former custom, as races many degrees below the whites in every respect. Leclerc

had already made a beginning by irritating the negroes; he perceived also, after he had lost the greater part of his army in a few weeks from the effects of the climate and of the yellow fever, that he could not rely upon the treacherous character of the Africans, and was terrified at the close connexion kept up among the negro generals, and by them with Toussaint Louverture. He resolved to anticipate a general rising by removing Toussaint from the island, and accomplished this in a manner so treacherous as hardly to be excused even in Turkey. Toussaint had capitulated on the 8th of May, 1802; on the 8th of June a French general induced him to trust himself in his hands, and then caused him to be seized and conveyed on board ship. This conduct was the more atrocious, as Leclerc proclaimed, without even the shadow of a proof, that Toussaint had been organising a general rising, and as Bonaparte treated him as if this accusation had been formally proved. He was first confined in the Temple at Paris, then imprisoned for a considerable time in Fort Joux, situated among the cold and inhospitable summits of the Alps of Franche Comté, and finally he was brought to Besançon, where he died in April, 1803.

From the very beginning this treachery produced the effects which usually follow a breach of faith; it produced a want of confidence, but the first movement had no result. When, however, news was brought to St. Domingo of the events which had taken place in Martinique and Guadalupe, the negroes rose *en masse*. General Richepanse had successfully carried out his instructions, which were the same with Leclerc's, by military means: this roused the negroes of St. Domingo, and gave them a very good pretext for a revolt. Richepanse had promised no less expressly than Leclerc to leave everything as he found it; and yet, notwithstanding this, he not only re-established slavery in all its severity, but set up again all the old divisions between mulattoes and whites. We refer the diplomatic reader that he may profit by it, the unsophisticated reader that he may see something of sophistry, to Bignon's account (ii., pp. 427, 428) of Richepanse's perfidy, and of Toussaint's arrest. The negro generals who served in the French army remained in their service until sickness had made dreadful ravages in the French army during the summer; Clervaux then began the desertion with his division in October, and Christophe, Dessalines, and Paul Louverture followed his example. Leclerc finally took ill of the yellow fever, which was carrying off his soldiers in hundreds; the French were betrayed, deserted, and attacked at all points, until finally Leclerc shut himself up in Cap Français, where he died on the 2nd of November.

Rochambeau, whose prejudices, relations, circumstances, and, above all, instructions, were in favour of the old state of things, succeeded him in the command, and endeavoured to effect by force what could only be effected by kindness; he failed, therefore, although he was not altogether destitute of military qualities. He received reinforcements from France, and carried on the war, the changes and separate

events of which cannot be noticed in a work like the present, with some skill; but this only served to increase the loss which France suffered from the expedition. The honour it brought to France was still less than the profit, for both General Leclerc and his successor were blamed for faults and oversights which it is difficult to excuse. Their characters should have prevented the First Consul from making them his representatives in such a remote part of the world. Leclerc, the son of a merchant of Pontoise, and the creole relations who surrounded him, used extortion of all kinds, collected enormous riches, and exhibited all that pomp and luxury in which upstarts, especially when raised by no real merit to a superior station, are accustomed to indulge, in order to make themselves respected. Rochambeau, on the principle of carrying everything into effect by force, perpetrated cruelties at which humanity shudders, and caused thousands of negroes to be tortured to death. As soon as the war again broke out between England and France, it was impossible for him to maintain his position, being shut up in Cap Français by the negroes under Dessalines by land, and by the English fleet under Lord Hood by sea. At the end of November, 1803, he was reduced to extremities, and surrendered to the English to avoid falling into the hands of the negroes. The English took the remnant of his army on board, and in return he surrendered to them all the ships which were lying at that time in the harbour of Cap Français.*

The negro republic of St. Domingo, at present in existence, has existed since November, 1803; but its history does not come within the scope of this work. As is well known, the island has since been called by its original name of Hayti.

* An account, which may be somewhat exaggerated (we have not strictly examined into it), but which is certainly *upon the whole* correct, will show how much the admirers of Bonaparte overlook in the conduct of their idol, and what gain accrues to mankind, when great men undertake *colossal* undertakings. Altogether, exclusive of ships, France lost by the expedition against St. Domingo, in the course of two years, 40,000 soldiers, and 12,000 seamen belonging to ships of war and to merchant vessels. Most of the officers, both civil and military, perished; and above 3000 planters, who had been undisturbed under Toussaint, died a miserable death: and besides this, we do not reckon at all the losses of the negroes.

CHAPTER III.

EUROPE TILL THE PEACE OF PRESBURG.

§ I.

EXTENSION OF FRENCH INFLUENCE OVER GERMAN AND ITALIAN STATES—CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.

A.—DIVISION OF GERMAN COUNTRIES—DECEPTION OF RUSSIA.

THE peace with England, the influence which Napoleon had exercised in Bavaria since the death of Charles Theodore, the wish of the Duke of Wirtemberg to suppress the estates and the nobility, and to become a despotic monarch, and the wretched policy of the timid King of Prussia, combined to render it an easy matter to the First Consul to deprive Austria of all its influence in Germany, if he could only come to terms with Russia: it was, therefore, a masterpiece of the diplomatic skill of the consulate which united Russia, for a time, to the policy of France.

When Suboff and Panin, the latter of whom was minister of foreign affairs after the removal of Pahlen, had induced the Emperor Alexander to consent to the treaty of June, 1801, by which he sacrificed his Scandinavian allies to the English, Bonaparte had tried every means to prevent this. Whilst Lord St. Helens, therefore, was pressing the interests of England at the court of Petersburg, he sent to the emperor his adjutant-general and confidant, Duroc. This man, who was the son of a notary from Lorraine, appeared to be created for the Russian and Prussian courts: he was honest, but severe and cold, practised in all the forms of the old times like a diplomatist of the oldest and best family: he was, therefore, very agreeable to the King of Prussia, and even Alexander received him very graciously. It was even said, that as a mark of attention to Duroc, the emperor had purposely chosen the time when he was in Petersburg to remove from the ministry Panin, whose complete devotion to England was universally known. Panin was succeeded by Count Kotshubey, the friend of Alexander's youth, the enlightened sharer in his liberal views. By this minister, Markoff was sent to Paris to conclude a treaty, since no treaty had been able to be brought to a conclusion either in Paul's time, or by Kalitcheff.

The Russian minister had been irritated first by Bonaparte's pro-

ceedings against Naples, which owed its peace nominally to Paul, and was yet compelled to yield its fortresses and ports to the French, who were fed and entertained at the expense of its court, and afterwards by the exclusion of the King of Sardinia from his states: he therefore caused a note of rather threatening import to be handed in by the Russian minister in Paris. This irritated and offended the First Consul; the change of government in Russia then disturbed the intercourse between the two courts, and during the ministries of Pahlen and Panin the negotiations were entirely broken off, and were not resumed till Kotshubey's ministry, in the beginning of September. In the above-mentioned note, of April 26, 1801, Kalitcheff had peremptorily demanded that two promises publicly made to the former emperor, and three more secret ones, should be fulfilled, before there could be any further steps taken as to the treaty, which, notwithstanding the friendly relations which had continued to subsist, had as yet made no progress. The public promises related to Sardinia and Naples: the secret ones we can only guess at, but this is easily done without running any great risk of being mistaken. The Grand-Duke of Tuscany was to receive his compensation in Italy, not in Germany: the pope was to be re-established in his temporal supremacy: and the matter of compensation for the German princes was to be managed in common by France and Russia. According to the peace of Luneville, this latter point had been left entirely to the Diet; that is, the matter had been entirely left in Talleyrand's hands. Since the period at which Kalitcheff's note had been communicated, much had been changed. Markoff had only to set at rest the point concerning Germany, about which no difficulty was made in Paris, and to negotiate about Sardinia and Naples; the latter was certainly more difficult, but his treaty fixed nothing definite on the subject. The pope had been restored long previously, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had been referred to Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, and the affairs of Naples could easily be settled after the peace with England, for which negotiations had been commenced in September: there remained, therefore, only the point respecting Piedmont.

This point, upon which Russia decidedly insisted, was peculiarly difficult, because Bonaparte had taken steps which clearly proved that he had no intention whatever of ever giving up Piedmont. As long as Paul lived, he had caused it to be governed as a separate province, as if he still entertained the intention of restoring it to the king: but, on the 19th of April, it was ranked among the other military divisions of France, and divided into six departments, in which Abdallah Menou afterwards reigned as sultan, even when it was definitely united to France in September, 1802. As this might be considered as having taken place some time previously, and as a consequence of Russia's treaty with England respecting the rights of neutrals at sea, Markoff believed himself justified in only demanding compensation for it for the King of Sardinia.

As soon, therefore, as the preliminaries were concluded between England and France, Russia also concluded its so long delayed treaty with the last-named power; and three days afterwards (October 11, 1801) a secret treaty was agreed on respecting the share which Russia was to have in those portions of Germany which had belonged to spiritual princes. We give in the note the principal articles of this treaty, inasmuch as it is to be regarded as a masterpiece of French policy, and of Talleyrand's diplomatic skill.* It will be seen, on a closer examination, that by this treaty Prussia itself was placed under the guardianship of the two powers, and that yet, in point of fact, Russia was grievously deceived. We know very well how Napoleon and his family—Talleyrand and his creatures—every one who had any means of influence in Paris—bargained and speculated in German land and German subjects: and Thiers particularly refers to this in his book with great satisfaction (*fas est, et ab hoste doceri*). A single passage, which we give in a note, will show in what light Frenchmen are accustomed to regard such transactions.†

Egotism and cunning for their own advantage, which is most generally found in the rudest natures, at this period made good diplomatists of all Germans who had any fear of loss or any hope of gain. Instead of soliciting in London or Petersburg, in Berlin or in Vienna, all turned immediately to Paris. Bavaria had long since come to an understanding with France, and had nothing to hope from Austria, which had already three or four times since the

* In the first and second articles it is stated that France and Russia, in common (*d'un parfait accord*), undertake to arrange matters respecting the compensation to be given to those German princes who had lost their possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and to settle the affairs of Italy. The First Consul engages (Art. 4 and 5) to withdraw his troops from Naples, and to evacuate the country as soon as his army shall have returned from Egypt. In Art. 6 it is declared that the two powers will unite in a friendly manner (*de gré à gré*) to consult as to what is to be done (*les intérêts*) for the King of Sardinia, and, as it is ambiguously (or worse) expressed, “*y auraient tous les égards compatibles avec l'état actuel des choses.*” In Art. 7 and 8 France and Russia promise, in the sharing of Germany among the various claimants, to be particularly favourable to Wirtemberg and Bavaria. In another particular agreement, dated the same day, the same promise is made respecting Baden. In Art. 9 both powers acknowledge the independence of the republic of the Ionian Islands, and state definitively, that for the future no foreign troops shall be suffered in them. The 11th Article sounds strangely in reference to the other powers of Europe. This article declares that France and Russia would use all their influence in common to restore universal peace, to preserve the balance of power in all parts of the world, and to secure the freedom of the seas. In a special addition Russia engages to acknowledge all Bonaparte's usurpations in Italy. This document provides that none of the engagements of the present treaty shall make the slightest change in the condition of Italy, as settled by the treaties of Tolentino, of Luneville, and of Florence.

† We shall quote for this purpose a couple of lines from the work of this vain and frivolous Frenchman, vol. iv., p. 67:—“*Le Premier Consul s'inquiétait peu du mouvement qu'on se donnait autour de lui pour attirer la négociation tantôt ici, tantôt là. Il savait qu'elle n'aurait lieu qu'à Paris, parcequ'il le voulait ainsi, et que c'était mieux de tout point.*”

death of Charles Theodore endeavoured to prejudice his successor, the reigning prince. Baden, the two Hesses, and Wirtemberg, were willing to suffer anything, in order not to be obliged to be one worse off than the others; the smaller sovereigns were terrified by the avarice, the activity, or the influential relations of the more powerful; the free towns were threatened with incorporation with the countries round them, and sent their senators to Paris, at one time cringing and entreating, at another flattering and bribing. Even the Teutonic Knights, and the Knights of St. John, and with them the Knights of the Empire, proud of their line of ancestry, came in troops to Paris, where princes and free towns were begging by their ambassadors, each willing to *do anything*, or to *suffer anything*, which Talleyrand, or any Frenchman with sufficient influence, required of them, or even anything that they conceived would be agreeable to such persons. Several princes came in person; they appeared in the audience-chamber of the First Consul at St. Cloud, bending humbly and cringing before him, so that we are ashamed to describe the scenes of humiliation which the nation suffered through the fault of its princes. We would rather refer the reader to the account given by the ex-minister, Thiers, who describes the affair in diplomatic language, which we do not profess to be able to do. The former hereditary stadtholder of the republic of the Seven United Provinces sent his son, the Prince of Orange, who was received and treated with great distinction by the First Consul.

The Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian Joseph, and Mongelas, then became and remained till the end of their days entirely French; and this we are, unfortunately, obliged to excuse, by the fact that the German emperor, the King of Prussia, and all the new electors created in 1803, sacrificed Germany, as a whole, as soon as their particular advantage seemed to render this necessary. Hence the promise of Talleyrand to the Elector of Bavaria, after he had concluded a treaty diametrically opposed to the national interests of Germany, that France would do everything in its power to procure for the Elector of Bavaria, in such parts of Germany as might be most convenient for him, such compensation, that he should be fully indemnified for any loss that he might have sustained.

The King of Prussia, too, wished to increase his territory at the expense of Germany; he was anxious to subject to himself various free towns (for their own good, as he thought), and to obtain for his cousin a considerable principality; he therefore listened willingly to the trio of the times of the Countess Lichtenau (Haugwitz, Lombard, Lucchesini, and, afterwards, Beyme); and their advice was, in accordance with their own principles and the policy of the times of Lichtenau, that he should willingly acknowledge all Bonaparte's usurpations, in order that he, like him, might be enabled to oppress the weak. He did so; for he first persuaded the stadtholder to recognise the Batavian republic, or, in other words, to

allow Holland to remain entirely in dependence on France; and then acknowledged, not only the new Italian republic, but also the kingdom of Etruria, and, if not expressly, yet mediately, sanctioned the incorporation of Piedmont with France. Bonaparte gave out that the favourable way in which he treated Baden, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria, as well as his concession of some slight advantages to Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, was merely a consequence of the intercession of the Emperor of Russia; but every one perceived his object, which was to detach them from Austria, and to connect them with France. The Russian ambassador assisted in making his emperor believe that his opinion was really of some importance in Ratisbon, while in reality its effect consisted entirely in its coincidence with Bonaparte's orders.

The matter of compensation had been referred to the Diet of Ratisbon, because it was well known that anything discussed there might be doubtful for ever. Whilst the German deputies and public men were discussing and writing, the time necessary to determine the various benefits which France and Russia were to confer upon their *protégés* was gained, and then an end was very shortly put to all the discussion. This could not be done, however, until all the intrigues and treacherous diplomatic tricks, which the French historians praise as being the crowning point of the political wisdom of a Talleyrand, were exhausted. It appears to us, indeed, that these political campaigns of Bonaparte, which have been described at such length by Thiers, Bignon, and even by a very worthy man, Thibaudeau, are decidedly not creditable to the greatest man of the age, which we freely acknowledge the First Consul to have been. So great a general as he was should never have served under the colours of a Talleyrand. These tricks and deceits, which the French relate with so much satisfaction, appear to us so much the more unworthy, as the above-mentioned writers prove most clearly that, in the year 1801, all the princes and all the ministers of Europe were incapable of any great idea; that they were in every respect inferior to the French; that they were entirely destitute of any proper dignity, and did not even understand in what Bonaparte's real greatness consisted. In order to comprehend this clearly, it is only necessary to turn one's eyes upon Cobenzl and the class of diplomatists who at this time, with the most awkward cunning and tact, conducted the affairs of the Austrian empire, or those men to whom the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia entrusted the conduct of the most important affairs in Paris. Markoff and the Marquis Lucchesini involved themselves to such an extent with conspiring emigrants and royalists, with the English and the Bourbons, that Bonaparte was fully justified in his complaints of their duplicity. With regard to the Russian consul, Bonaparte was content at first (for at a later period he caused him to experience the effects of his anger) to make use of

his vanity and emptiness in deceiving the Emperor of Russia; but he so terrified the miserable Prusso-Italian, that he begged for mercy in the most abject manner, and, as we shall afterwards see, signed, in his terror, a most important document, without having any express authority so to do.

The organisation of a new constitution for the empire, by means of which the electoral college itself was almost entirely separated from Austria, and became partly Prussian (Hesse) and partly French (the electoral arch-chancellor, Wirtemberg, Baden, Bavaria), depended upon the distribution of the spiritual provinces among temporal princes. At the congress of Rastadt, the deputies of the German empire had agreed to cede the left bank of the Rhine, and had established the principle, that compensation should be made to those who suffered loss on the left bank, by distributing among them the spiritual provinces on the right bank. The peace of Luneville, which the emperor concluded for himself and for the empire, and which the latter afterwards formally ratified, was based upon this principle. After everything had been arranged in Luneville by France and Austria, the question as to *how the empire should give its consent to this distribution?* was discussed in the most energetic manner by the Diet at Ratisbon from February till September, 1801; public men, diplomatists and Romanist jurists, wrote and spoke on the subject interminably; and had not the French and Russians become impatient, the gentlemen in Ratisbon would probably have discussed this important question for a couple of years longer. When they were, however, definitely commanded to bring the matter to a close, the necessary clauses were appended to effect this result. The result was, that the distribution should be committed to a committee of the Diet; or, as the law language barbarously expressed it, a deputation of the Empire. This deputation was to consist of Mayence, Bohemia, Brandenburg, Bavaria, with the palatinate, the grand master of the Teutonic knights, Wirtemberg, and Hesse Cassel. This deputation did not, however, enter upon its duties till nine months after this time, when the separate princes had arranged their affairs privately with France, and when, consequently, France and Russia found it expedient to put an end to the writing and speechifying in Ratisbon. This was done on the 4th of June, 1802, on which day Markoff signed the treaty, which authorised the three Frenchmen—Laforest, Matthieu, and Bacher—who conducted the affairs of France in Ratisbon with a thorough knowledge (at least the two latter) of German law, to issue commands in the name of France and Russia conjointly. In this treaty concluded by the Russian and French governments, all the advantages which had been begged or bought by German princes in Paris were recognised by Russia. The document was formally laid before the Diet in June 1802, as containing the orders of the combined powers, without having been even confirmed by the Emperor of Russia. The Russian emperor was afterwards induced, by a fresh intrigue, to confirm on the 16th

of July a treaty which had been laid before the German Diet, as containing his will and pleasure, in June.* The Emperor Alexander perhaps agreed to this treaty, which Markoff had certainly concluded in too great haste, for the sake of the King of Prussia: he declared expressly, however, at the same time, that he must insist upon compensation to Sardinia for Piedmont, and to Oldenburg for the toll of the Elsfleth. Before this confirmation was given, and just at the time when the treaty was sent to him to Petersburg for this purpose, the emperor had his celebrated interview with the King of Prussia at Memel, in which the two young princes commenced a personal friendship, which lasted during their lives, although their ministers often disagreed. We do not intend to assert that this sort of sentimental friendship between two powerful monarchs now-a-days, even when celebrated with such pomp as at the meeting of Frederic and Alexander, in June, 1802, and afterwards at Sans-Souci, in November, 1805, is of itself ridiculous; but the two crowned heads would certainly have done better not thus openly to have exhibited feelings which, as men, they both undoubtedly possessed, or to have permitted them to be trumpeted abroad as they were. The sentimental bond did not become properly ridiculous till the reception of the entirely prosaic emperor Francis as a third member in 1813, and till the holy alliance of 1814 came into the world as the still-born child of this tender union.

Before what was called the general authorisation of the Empire had been prepared for the deputation, which happened on the 3rd of August, Prussia had taken military possession of Hildesheim, Goslar, Eichsfeld, Erfurt, Paderborn, and the district destined for the Prince of Orange. Bavaria and Wirtemberg followed the example, and Austria therefore thought herself justified in making use of her troops to occupy Passau for herself, and Salzburg for the Grand-Duke of Tuscany. This proceeding roused Bonaparte: not only did his threats terrify Austria from what he called an iniquitous undertaking, but his ambassador (Laforest), in conjunction with the Russian ambassador (Clüpfel), handed into the Diet that note, in which the imperial deputation which was about to be opened on the very same day (August 24) was treated as an entirely subordinate tribunal. Not only was the deputation desired, in very insolent terms, to make no changes whatever in the distribution of compensation agreed upon between France and Russia, stated even to the most minute points in the note,† but they were allowed only a period of two months entirely to complete their labours.

* How little Prussia, which is now so much for Teutonism, cared then for emperor or empire, how little Bonaparte regarded his treaty with the Emperor of Russia, may be seen from the commencement of the treaty signed by Lucchesini and Beurnonville in Paris, on the 23d of May: “S.M. le Roi de Prusse et le Premier Consul, pour assurer et maintenir l'état de paix, ont jugé convenable de mettre fin à toute incertitude et de fixer les indemnités dues au Roi de Prusse et à S.A.S. le Prince d'Orange.”

† Que la volonté de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et du Premier Consul était

It was at this time that Lucchesini, in order to be permitted to remain in Paris, allowed himself to be used by Bonaparte, who entertained a profound contempt for him, as an instrument for the purpose of expelling the imperial troops from Passau, and for harassing the emperor himself in every possible way, without the necessity of using force or even of calling in the assistance of the Emperor of Russia. Lucchesini had the audacity to conclude an agreement with the First Consul in the beginning of September, in the name of the King of Prussia, in which the king engaged to give effect to the threats of the First Consul, in case Austria should not unconditionally comply with his demand. Lucchesini had the audacity to sign this treaty on the 6th of September, and to allow it to be communicated to the cabinet of Vienna, without even waiting for an answer from Berlin. This opportunity of bringing about a complete rupture between the three principal powers of Germany was admirably improved by Talleyrand. Philip von Cobenzl, who was intriguing for the emperor in Paris, was made to believe that Prussia alone was in fault in the matter; and as a compensation, a portion of territory was granted to Austria, which was taken from Bavaria, in order to irritate the Bavarians against the Austrians. Austria obtained Trent and Brixen as compensation for the Breisgau and the Ortenau, and the Elector of Bavaria was obliged to share Passau and Eichstadt with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

Concerning the discussions and consultations which took place in the deputation, whose labours terminated on the 25th of February, 1803, we pass them over, as well as the different points of the distribution itself. The discussions were of the usual kind, and can therefore be of no interest except to statesmen of the old school: the division of the Empire and the changes in the constitution were altered and entirely done away with three years later. Besides this, the particulars are easily found in books which are in every one's hands.* We would merely remark, in reference to the constitution, that the former co-adjutor of Mayence, who became archbishop in September, was the only spiritual prince who retained his position as elector and temporal sovereign. He continued an elector, under the title of Electoral Arch-Chancellor, and, as Lord of Aschaffenburg and Ratisbon, retained out of the 117 square miles (German) and 350,000 subjects formerly attached to the archbishopric of Mayence, twenty-four square miles and 82,000 subjects, with a revenue of a million (florins) as before. We will not take upon us to decide whether the personal qualities of the new Arch-Chancellor Carl von Dalberg, well

qu'il ne fut fait aucun changement aux dispositions convenues entre eux pour les indemnité's; que la députation devait en conséquence s'abstenir d'apporter de retards à la conclusion de cette affaire.

* Full details will be found in Pfitzer's and Heinrich's German History, in Wachsmuth's work, and in the second part of "Bredow's Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century," p. 538, and following.

known as one of Napoleon's most enthusiastic admirers, and the assistance which he was expected to render against Austria, had any influence in obtaining him this favour: at any rate, he had a powerful friend in Paris. This was his nephew, at that time ambassador from Baden in Paris, afterwards senator and duke under the (French) Empire. He was Talleyrand's comrade and friend, gave his assistance to every scheme secretly contrived against the (German) Empire, and afterwards, when the Duc d'Enghien was brought from Ettenheim and murdered at Vincennes, he played at least a somewhat suspicious part. The Margrave of Baden was therefore also among the specially favoured. On the occasion of the new arrangement of the affairs of the Empire, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany became Elector of Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, after him Wirtemberg came first in the electoral college, then the Elector of Baden, and, lastly, the Elector of Hesse Cassel.

In reference to the other conditions of the deputation's report, which was ratified by the Diet on the 24th of March, 1803, we have to remark that at first, besides Mayence, the spiritual grand-masters of the Teutonic Knights and of the Knights of St. John, retained their places in the council of the princes: and that of the forty-five free towns, only six were spared. Four towns had been annexed to France, the rest had been sacrificed to the various princes; Frankfort, Augsburg, Lubec, Bremen, Hamburg, and Nuremberg alone retained their independence. Besides Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany received portions of Passau and Eichstadt, which bishoprics he shared with Bavaria. Austria ceded the Breisgau and the Ortenau to the Duke of Modena, and received in return Trent and Brixen. Bavaria received everything connected with the Bishopric of Würzburg which was not given as compensation to Löwenstein, Hohenlohe, and Leiningen; and besides this, Bamberg, Freisingen, and Augsburg, with all the towns and prelacies lying between them in Suabia and Franconia. Baden, which had lost very little, obtained the Palatinate of the Rhine, Constance, portions of the bishoprics of Bâsle, Strasburg, and Spires, two districts, and some towns and abbeys in Darmstadt: so that its territory was almost doubled. Wirtemberg obtained all the imperial cities and prelacies convenient to its territory, except those required as compensation for the counts of the Empire. Paderborn, Hildesheim, that part of Thuringia which had belonged to Mayence, a part of Münster, the abbeys of Hervorden, Quedlinburg, Elten, Essen, Werden, and Kappenberg, the towns of Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar, became the prey of Prussia: and that part of Münster which did not go to Prussia was divided between Salm, Aremberg, Croy, and Looz. Oldenburg obtained the districts of Vechte and Kloppenburg, and the Protestant bishopric of Lubec. Hanover ceded Wildeshausen to Oldenburg, and obtained Osnaburg instead. Darmstadt received the Duchy of Westphalia, and shared with Nassau that portion of the archbishoprics of Treves and Cologne situated on the right bank of the Rhine.

The Prince of Orange received Fulda and Corvey, the imperial city of Dortmund, and some abbeys, as compensation for the hereditary stadholdership of the Netherlands, and for his domains there.

Whoever ventures to distrust the deep-seatedness of the religious feeling which diplomatists, ministers, and princes profess and make a boast of in our days, may with perfect fairness refer to the fact that at that time the pious foundations, the property of the poor and sick, were legally given up to supply the expenses of the court. Diplomatists, ministers, and princes, impiously, and to the great grief of the people, laid their unholy hands upon funds left or accumulated for pious purposes, and even dared to render their robbery legal by a special law for the purpose. It was declared, in a decree published on this occasion, that *the property of all foundations, whether in the old or in the new possessions of the several sovereigns, whether belonging to Catholics or to members of the Confession of Augsburg, were to be applied*—not to charitable or beneficent, or generally useful purposes, but—at the free and full disposal of the sovereigns—to the relief of their financial difficulties. The only good about the affair was, that the Knights of the Empire came badly off: but this very class of persons was shortly afterwards overwhelmed with privileges of every kind.

B.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE ERECTION OF A NEW MONARCHY IN FRANCE, WITH ALL THE FORMS OF THE OLD ONE.

We have already stated above, in speaking of the consulate, that Bonaparte, surrounded by the whole intelligence of old France, advised by the most superior men who had sat in the two monarchical constitutional assemblies, urged on by his family, and led by his own monarchical instinct, had intended to introduce the old form of government and constitution under a new name. He proceeded to carry out this idea with much wisdom and moderation, allowed all the new arrangements to continue in force wherever they did not interfere with his intentions, and received favourably all persons, who, being like himself opposed to an ideal state of things, were willing to be made use of for any purpose which might produce outward honour or external profit. His penetration, his experience in Italy, in Egypt, and during his consulate, rendered all the improvements which he made easy to him. He had only to insert a little clause, or to strike out whatever displeased him, in the new orders, which had been selected by the most skilful statesmen in France at his command, from the numerous volumes of decrees made since 1789; that is to say, whatever militated against his idea of a central monarchical government. Quietly and without remark the state was again to become a machine of government, official persons and judges to be the wheels for setting it in motion. Bonaparte confided in the great qualities which he undoubtedly possessed, but he forgot that arrangements for the government of a state cannot

be grounded upon the personal qualities of the governing person. His invectives against England, and against men who, like Daunou, Grégoire, Carnot, Lafayette, &c., did not exactly choose to be made tools of, had their origin in this source. Hence arose also his three systems of police, hence what was called the *high police*. This latter, whatever Bonapartist sophists may say, was undoubtedly raised above the law and the tribunals in the period from 1801 to 1804: we are free to confess, however, that the French felt themselves fully consoled for any merely ideal loss by the fame which beamed over the whole nation through Bonaparte himself. That honour and fame actually could console the French nation for loss of freedom and of civil rights, was sufficiently proved to the new master by the praises and flattery which Voltaire, not to mention others, heaped upon Louis XIV. Bonaparte was referred to the national character by all his advisers; his defenders assert even now that France cannot exist without a nobility, a hierarchy, a number of orders, and a court spending millions annually. Can one wonder that he willingly believed them?

He himself was devoted, until the end of his career, to business, and remained militarily simple: but his purpose required a court, and the masters of the ceremonies of olden times: his wife and her daughter provided this. His brothers and sisters, and all who surrounded them, were too well read in the memoirs of the former courts not to be able to restore the ruins of the splendid folly for the edification of starers and chattering, and construct of them a new court. Even if they themselves had not been endowed with the necessary creative powers for such a purpose, care had been taken that a so-called *high clergy* should be there, and that historical names, historical manners and customs, should surround the new governor. There were again the Montmorencis, the Beauveaus, the Choiseuls, the Montesquieus, the Segurs, the Narbonnes, and God knows how many more. To pass from generalities to particulars, we shall quote some special points, beginning at 1801, referring to the form of the new French monarchy which Bonaparte created. If we noticed his great personal merits, his care for roads and canals, his attention to science and the arts, to the hierarchy of government, to the order of the administration of justice and of the finances, we should become too tedious, and should have to copy out the whole of Thiers' or Thibaudeau's work.* This is, however, unnecessary, for the simple reason that the *special* history of France is not what we have to do with in this work: we have only to notice what is important as regards Napoleon himself, in reference to the retrogradation which began to take place in 1800. We are upon these points entirely of the same opinion as the admirers of the great man, from whom, however, we differ very much on some others. It cannot be denied that

* When we mention Thibaudeau here and hereafter, we do not refer to his "Mémoires sur le Consulat," which is an original work, but to a compilation in several volumes, which he calls "Histoire de France et de Napoléon."

from 1801 to 1804 France enjoyed all the advantages of the revolution, which had cost so much blood, had so entirely changed everything, and had, until 1801, produced so much misfortune. It was now clearly shown that it had been a serious disease which had given new strength to the disturbed organisation of the body; a terrible thunderstorm, which had cleared the atmosphere. It is, however, a question which we shall not endeavour to answer, whether this regeneration of the French people, this new life and new employments and new industry, the new application of capital taken as it were from the hand of a corpse, the distribution of the troops of royal and princely lackeys among the armies, and the employment of them in trade or agriculture; further, whether the effect of the laws of the revolution which converted tenants and labourers into owners, and the system of taxes, according to which every one paid according to his capabilities; whether all this is to be attributed wholly and solely to Bonaparte, as is so often done.

It is certain that much which the admirers of every measure of the First Consul praise inordinately, proves to us that they are blinded enough to look upon a Mehemet Ali or a Harun-al-Raschid as a proper model for a European monarch of our days. Thus, for example, when they praise him for sending councillors of state and adjutants, and among the latter people like Savary and his fellows, to every part of the country to watch and be spies over official persons and tribunals; thus, for example, when they relate at length, and with evident satisfaction, how he organised a whole army as a consular guard, and made a pretorian cohort of them; or how well the cold and formal Duroc became his new office as superintendent of the court (*Gouverneur des Tuilleries*). It is quite in accordance with such ideas that these Bonapartists consider it a merit in Councillor Benezech that he regulated so well the etiquette of receptions at court (*des réceptions*), and consider it matter for rejoicing that at the court of the hero, as well as in that of the Bourbons, idlers with good names and titles, both gentlemen and ladies (*maison civile*), were hired for appearance sake, and were preferred in rank to any amount of merit, however great. Wherever a court is, there must also be flatterers, sophists, talkers, literati, for the amusement of ladies and idlers. The First Consul would have nothing to do with such people personally, though he did not disdain to make use of them occasionally; but his sister Elisa, afterwards called "the Semiramis of Lucca," and his brothers Joseph and Lucien, provided for a court-literature, court-poets, and court-orators. Elisa assisted in bringing forward Chateaubriand; and through him the romantic new-fashioned Christianity. Suard, Morellet, Fontanes, and other celebrated academicians of the Empire, were greatly favoured by her, and suited her very well. Joseph Bonaparte listened to Cobenzl's declamations, and received old Pallissot, as his grateful pupil, Bonaparte's secretary, Meneval, describes with amusing glee. This gentleman describes for us also, in his book entitled "*Napoléon et*

Marie Louise," what sort of furniture there was in the palace, what it was made of, and the pattern of the covers of the chairs and sofas. Wherever a court is, scandal and a "chronique scandaleuse" should not be wanting: this was provided by Murat's wife Caroline, by the beautiful Pauline, and Elisa, who afterwards contracted a *mésalliance* with a Corsican named Baciocchi, the remembrance of which was effaced by his being made a prince. As also Bonaparte's wife, Josephine, however excellent her disposition, was not distinguished for her conjugal fidelity; and as her daughter Hortense had been married against her will to Louis Bonaparte, and consequently was obliged to give her love somewhere else, there was always enough to talk about at the new court; and this naturally irritated the First Consul exceedingly whenever he heard of it.

We repeat what we have already said above, that we believe the admirers of Bonaparte, when they say that all the vanities he was guilty of were necessary to content the French nation: but the effect of all this was not the less destructive. No one ventured, after some time, to speak the truth; all scientific works, all the newspapers and histories of the time, all the speeches, addresses, and reports of those men whom he employed, are composed in the style used by the degenerate Romans of Cæsar's time, or by the miserable senators who idolised Augustus and Tiberius. Pelet has published some original documents from the papers of his father, formerly a *conseiller du parlement*, who had lived through the whole revolution, and whom, in his old age, the author of this work learned to know and to esteem.

These documents treat of the best part of Bonaparte's consultations, namely, those with the council of state, before it became merely a subordinate office, and show clearly that the First Consul knew very well that he was throwing dust in the eyes of the French.* It follows, as the result of what Pelet's father says of the council of state, in which all the most talented and most experienced men in France were assembled, that this council was merely an incomparable machine of the First Consul's. He had brought together the first men in every particular department, and arranged them in sections, and he made use of each separate section according to the subject he was engaged upon. The report and decree of his council of state was considered afterwards as a divine inspiration of Bonaparte's: and who would venture to contradict him? The younger Pelet himself, who, when he presented his work to the author of this history, was a friend of Salvandy's and one of Louis Philippe's and Guizot's doctrinaires, says plainly: "The preparations for the entire abrogation of the tribuneship were made immediately after the peace of Amiens.

* "Opinions de Napoléon sur divers sujets de politique et d'administration, recueillies par un membre de son conseil d'état, et récit de quelques événements de l'époque." Par le Baron Pelet (de la Lozère), membre de la chambre des députés (afterwards for a short time minister, now, after the death of his father, count and peer of France). Paris, Didot, 1833. For more particulars as to the internal administration (as a corrective for Thiers' sophisms) the reader is referred to Archive 6, § 77., et seq., where the matter is treated at length.

Even at this time the legislative body, which had been long compelled to be silent, was deprived of one privilege after another: the senate sank down into a college of courtiers, whose services were employed to give an appearance of legality to any capricious changes in the constitution, and to exalt the splendour of the court and of its creatures." To this passage, literally taken from Pelet, we would merely add, that those persons who wished to render themselves agreeable by their servility, actually persuaded the First Consul to give an example of how justice was to be abused for a momentary purpose. They did not remember that the French of the seventeenth century very soon discovered the destructive consequences to the whole nation of Richelieu's special tribunals. We see, therefore, that the First Consul, wherever he had reasons for dispensing with the regular tribunals and their formalities, established special tribunals or courts-martial, and when these did not appear suitable, caused some of his various police to interfere. Inasmuch, however, as he wished to give to the resolutions, decrees and laws proceeding from each separate section of the council of state, and which he intended to issue, in order to convert the republic into a military autocracy, which, in fact, still exists, a direction of action, which the sections themselves never dreamt of, he was obliged to possess a penetration and to apply a continuous industry, of which the generality of sovereigns would be entirely incapable. Everything, therefore, of which Pelet informs us in this respect, is as honourable to Bonaparte's genius and reigning power as it was destructive to the freedom and to the national rights of the French. "He was accustomed to preside," says Pelet, "in the different sections of the council of state from ten o'clock in the evening till sometimes five o'clock in the morning, and required all reports from the councillors of state to be given in regularly and with military precision, as if they had been adjutants." We must, however, add to his credit, that the military head of the government had a very different notion of economy from that of the bought and *doctrinaire* supporters of the house of Orleans. The latter raise from the inhabitants of the kingdom, now reduced to its ancient limits, a revenue of 1300 millions, and never have enough. At the time of the consulate, France, with Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Geneva and Piedmont together, paid but 900 millions annually, and of this 200 millions were contributed by the foreign possessions.

The kind of government, *surveillance* and police, which the First Consul introduced, would have become impossible if any one had had here and there the boldness to resist; much more if any one could have opened the eyes of the French to the relation between truth and the boasting of the bulletins, the exaggerations contained in reports to the government and the bombast of the speeches. Everything was therefore praised in pompous terms. This began with people like Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely and Fontanes, and became afterwards, as it had been before, the custom of the French people. Even in 1801 Bonaparte abused his talents by writing

newspaper invectives against any one who ventured to tell him the truth, unless indeed they allowed themselves to be silenced by a morsel thrown to them by the Consul. This was the case with Lannes, who consoled himself with the profitable embassy to Portugal for the loss of his republican freedom of speech. Hence, also, we can explain how it was that the Consul became weary of even that shadow of a representation of the people which survived in the councillors, when a single word, in the treaty concluded with Russia in October, 1801, caused such an uproar at the first sitting of the legislature in November of the same year, that he could not carry it through, in spite of all the exertions of his rhetoricians and jurists. It grieved him that he had been found out; that it had been discovered how his servile jurists and sophists had wished to accustom the French to consider themselves as standing in the same relation to him that the Russians did to their autocrat. In this treaty, namely, the word *subjects* had been used both of the Russians and of the French.

In this same sitting of the legislative body he learned, in another way, that that portion of the French who were not deceived by his sophists and journalists, were anxiously watching all his monarchical steps. As soon as the uproar respecting the word *subjects* had been with difficulty silenced, he caused the articles of his new civil code to be laid before the house, but was obliged to withdraw them also, as it was discovered that they had been treacherously dipped by his learned jurists in autocratic Byzantine poison. As the senate showed itself as miserable and mean on the occasion of the quarrel on the presentation of Daunou to the rank of a senator as the legislative body had proved itself firm and liberal, Bonaparte probably conceived the idea at this period of transferring a considerable portion of the duties of the legislative body to those pensioners of government called the senate. It is even said that he had intended, by a *coup d'état*, to put an end at once to all opposition on the part of the legislative body, but that Cambacérès appeased him and advised him to wait till, according to the constitution, the fifth part of the members should come to be replaced, when he would find some means of getting rid of them. Bonaparte, however, could not refrain from expressing his fixed determination of doing away with the tribunate, even before he went to Lyons, in December, 1801. He expressed the opinion that discussions *in plenum* came to nothing; that the tribunate must be divided into sections similar to those in the council of state, and each section take its particular department. The proposing of laws was to be no longer publicly, but privately communicated to the sections to which they belonged, and only three speakers and no more should be allowed to argue the question with the councillors of state. An apparent publicity only was to be left to the legislative body.

When Bonaparte went to Lyons, there, in conjunction with Talleyrand to bring the Italians also under his power, Cambacérès

received orders to alter the French constitution conformably to these three commands of Bonaparte. This jurist, exceedingly well read in Justinian though he was, yet called in to his assistance another very learned lawyer (Tronchet). In January, 1802, a letter suddenly appeared from the consuls to the obedient senate, respecting the retirement of a fifth part of the legislative body, the proper time for which, according to the laws and the constitution, was some months distant. The senate, in obedience to the orders received, decreed not merely that the fifth part should retire immediately, instead of some months later, but that the members who were to replace them should be elected, and not chosen by lot. By this means, not only did Bonaparte get rid of the sixty who retired from the legislative body, and the twenty who retired from the tribunate, but he brought into these bodies an equal number of his own partisans. Among these were his brother Lucien, and the rhetorician Fontanes, a favourite of Bonaparte's sister Elisa, and a man who practised flattery scientifically. The latter became a member of the legislative body, Lucien of the tribunate.

In order to understand why this exclusion of the fifth part of the legislative assembly was thus hastened by a *coup d'état*, instead of waiting till the few months were past, we must remember that the concordat with the pope was to be laid before them in the May session, and that particularly pliant representatives of the people were necessary to Bonaparte's success in this measure. As soon, therefore, as the assembly—now become loyal by its new fifth—had met, the new ultramontane order of the concordat was laid before them (in April, 1802). In the same sitting, the government system of schools, in which nothing was said of the education of the people, was made into a law. As yet, however, all the friends of an advance to something better were not completely silenced, for these two monarchico-hierarchical decrees of the government were opposed by all men of understanding in the country, and they were not carried till after a long contest in the council of state as well as in the legislative body.

From this period France rapidly retrograded to the old system: hence the idea, since it was too soon to venture upon creating a new nobility, which was not done till under the Empire, of strengthening the Bonapartists by means of members of the old nobility of the kingdom, and of creating a new order of knighthood. The submissive senate was again obliged to assist in increasing the number of friends of the old monarchy, and of all formerly connected with it. A decree of the senate proclaimed, on the 29th of April, 1802, that all laws then in force against emigrants were annulled, and that from that time forth only such Frenchmen should be excepted from the general amnesty as should have led a division or held some situation in the service of the late sovereigns. As regards the knighthood and the rewarding with ribbons and tassels, with stars and crosses, it certainly does appear that Bonaparte's defenders are right

in saying that the civilisation of the continent is not to be preserved without a number of ribbons of all colours, and stars and crosses of every kind. In comparison with later experience, when the number of orders has increased within the last thirty years to the excess of the ridiculous, it was very moderate of Bonaparte to create only two orders, one for France and one for Italy. He also afterwards connected with the ribbons, stars and crosses of the order—which he chose to call the legion of honour—some real advantages, which he called dotations, and put off the distribution of the merely courtly signs of honour till he should have established an empire in France and a kingdom in Italy.

When Bonaparte first proposed to his council, in May, 1802, a plan so completely at variance with the principles of the noble originators of the revolution as that of adorning serious men with childish orders in return for real deserts, and thus placing them in the same category or even below courtiers and favourites, who are reasonably dressed up in fancy ornaments, many voices were raised against it, and he was obliged to express his reasons. He did so, and on this occasion uttered *in the council* a truth which experience has since unfortunately too certainly confirmed in Germany. We learn from this speech how much better Bonaparte knew men *practically* than we can possibly make them out *theoretically*. We shall quote, therefore, what he says of the French, and what is equally true of the Germans:—“ It is with gewgaws that men are to be led (*c'est par des hochets que l'on mène les hommes*): I would not say this in public, but here in my council I may say it. I do not believe that the French really love freedom and equality. The French have not changed in character during the ten years of the revolution; they are still the same as the ancient Gauls were, proud and frivolous. They have only one feeling, the wish to be honoured (he says, *Ils n'ont qu'un sentiment, l'honneur*); and this feeling, which spurs them on, must be nourished: they therefore require outward distinctions: everything has been destroyed, *everything must be created new.*” After much more, he comes out, quite at the end, with his inmost thoughts. “ Do you (the councillors of state) believe that the people can be reckoned on? Everything is indifferent to the people: they cry out to-day, ‘ Vive le roi! ’ to-morrow, ‘ Vive la ligne! ’ The direction which they are to follow must be *given* to them; and for this purpose tools are necessary.” It was not, however, quite so bad. The Consul, indeed, found among his councillors of state men who defended his plan with great skill both in the legislative assembly and in the tribunate, and it was decreed that it should be introduced; but only by a majority of 9 voices in the tribunate, while there were 110 votes against it in the legislative body.

The opposition to the renewal of the knighthood, with its ribbons and its tinsel, may have been strengthened by the fact that steps had been taken since the 6th of May to bring Bonaparte rather nearer

the throne, before presenting him with the title of emperor or king, and at the same time to root out from the constitution of 1799 the few remnants of any pledge regarding the rights of the people that Bonaparte had left. The tribunate was induced to cause to be presented to the First Consul, on the 6th of May, 1802, an address previously sent to the legislative body and to the senate, which latter it curiously enough calls the *first* body in the state, having for its object to induce them to decree a national reward to the First Consul. All well-informed writers assure us that Bonaparte exhibited great dissatisfaction when the servile senate this time came short of his expectations, and did less than his brother Lucien had expected to obtain by the address of the tribunate. The First Consul shrouded himself, however, in a cloud of fine phrases, which we have no idea of quoting here. The offer was neither exactly accepted nor rejected. It consisted merely in an extension of the period fixed for the government of the First Consul. This period had been limited by the act of the constitution to ten years; the senate proposed to add another ten years, with power to extend it still further. The most learned jurists, Cambacérès, Tronchet, and others, were obliged to invent some plan, which might be improved by Fouché, Talleyrand, and a number of other sophists, into making the decree of the senate signify something more than was contained in it. The means of escape discovered by these jurists was adopted by Bonaparte, in order to be able to refuse any definite extension of his consulship under an appearance of great respect for republican principles. He replied, that as the decree of the senate implied a violation of the constitution, the opinion of the people must first be asked. It unfortunately was particularly discordant with this extreme conscientiousness on the part of Bonaparte that his two fellow-consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun, came to the conclusion of their own accord, on the 9th of May, that the people should be consulted, not as to the decree of the senate, but *whether Bonaparte should be consul for life?* They communicated this resolution of theirs to the council of state, which added the following sentence, *and whether he should be permitted to name his successor?*

It is a matter of little credit to the great diplomatists who invented this trick, that in all the numerous folios of the Roman law, they could find, amongst all the sophisms which they studied there, no better excuse for their change than that, as an *indefinite* extension of the period of consulship was spoken of in the decree, this must be understood of an extension for life. A second similar piece of trickery is to be found in the introduction to the resolution of the two consuls. The consent of the council of state, which was obtained *after* the drawing up of the resolution, is made to appear contemporary with a consultation held *before* this event.* A still more miserable trick is it to say in this same introduction that they did not consider

* The words are: "Le conseil n'étant plus réuni et ne pouvant pas être consulté sur ce changement, les consuls ont pris l'arrêté du conseil d'état entendu (what

themselves bound by the decree of the senate, because Bonaparte had appealed to the sovereign people, and that the people as sovereign had only to regard their own greatest advantage in their answer.* The consequence was, that in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of May was to be seen the decree extending the period of Bonaparte's consulship ten years, and in that of the 11th of the same month, the consular decree extending it to the end of his life. Every one saw that asking the people was merely a farce.

The intention through all this was to change the constitution entirely; hence all the fuss about consulting the people: as, however, two months passed over whilst this farce was being enacted, time was gained for preparing that which was proclaimed in August. During this period, the electoral members of the tribunate and the legislative body, which latter presented itself *en masse* at the Tuileries, gave the signal, by the bombast of their speeches, for innumerable addresses, requests, and entreaties to the First Consul, which, being printed in the *Moniteur* of May, June, and July, were to be considered as expressing the will of the people. As this machinery of servility has been since introduced everywhere, it is unnecessary to remark that this was only an introduction for the favourable answer of the people to the question which was announced two months later. The result was proclaimed on the 2nd of September by the senate; and the First Consul, whose Christian name was very significantly used by the consulta of Lyons, on his election as president of the Italian republic, along with his surname, was proclaimed Consul for life.† On the 4th of August a proposal for introducing some changes in the constitution was laid before the council of state, but not with the intention of allowing any alterations to be made. Bonaparte on this occasion made some very intelligent remarks in the council, in reference to the proposed change in the constitution. These remarks, written down by Pelet, may be read in his son's book; we, however, have no more to do with them than with the constitution itself, which was entirely changed in 1804.

Concerning the changes in the constitution, introduced on the 4th of August, we shall here merely make a few remarks in order to notice particularly those points which were intended to prepare the way for an autocratic form of government. First, the senate obtained unlimited influence;‡ then the two other consuls, who had conducted

a miserable excuse! they had communicated to them *afterwards* the resolution already taken!!!) comme cela s'est plusieurs fois pratique."

* "Les consuls de la république, considérant, que la résolution du Premier Consul est un hommage éclatant rendu à la souveraineté du peuple, que le peuple consulté sur ses plus chers intérêts ne doit connaître d'autres limites que ces intérêts même (this second that is quite inimitable) arrêtent ce qui suit."

† Le peuple Français nomme et le sénat proclame Napoléon Bonaparte Premier Consul à vie."

‡ The senate, it is said in the Act of Constitution, is the first tribunal; the First Consul elects the senators and presides in the senate. The senate can change or annul any existing law by its resolutions, can dissolve the legislative body or the tribunate, and can fill up anything left doubtful or incomplete by the constitution.

the revolution of May, obtained an extension of their office for life, though all the power was left with the First Consul. He alone was allowed to make war or peace, to pardon offences, and to elect the senators, whose number was reduced to 120. The senate had the liberty of twice rejecting a candidate presented by the First Consul; but the third time it *was obliged* to accept. The First Consul had the power of proposing laws. Instead of the list of notables which Sieyes had invented, and from which the legislature and the higher officers of the senate were chosen, another very cleverly-contrived system of election for judges, municipal councillors, district councillors, and departmental councillors, was introduced, by means of which the choice of these two latter officers, and hence also that of the legislature and of the tribunate, came into the hands of the government.* The tribunate was reduced from 100 members to 50, and was further divided into five sections; and it was rendered still more useless by the fact, that the council of state no longer consulted in the presence of the First Consul, but merely reported. Bonaparte formed for himself a cabinet council, very different from what the council of state had been. This latter had consisted of independent men, who felt their position and often ventured to remonstrate; the cabinet council consisted entirely of creatures of the First Consul. The legislative assembly, too, was reduced from 300 to 258, and was separated into five ranks.

From this time forward, the senate was exactly such a body as the imperial council of the czar; that is, it had legally, and, judging by what has been written and printed on the subject, very great power and many rights and privileges, but in point of fact had no power whatever, except when its opinion agreed with that of the First Consul. In order to prove this, we mention a few of the rights newly given to the senate, which were even increased under the Empire, and by means of which it was enabled in 1814, as an instrument of Talleyrand's, to overthrow its emperor. It was to be able to define and to order everything which was not definitely fixed in the constitution; to settle and fix all doubtful points; to have the power of dissolving the tribunate and the legislature, and to name consuls. The senators would become consuls, ministers, members of the legion of honour. Inspectors of public instruction might be used as ambassadors on extraordinary occasions and for short periods. All this

* When the sending in of the list of notables, from whom the deputies were formerly chosen, ceased, entirely new elective colleges were formed. The cantonal assemblies, it is said, choose for the office of judge two candidates, and two others for each office of municipal councillor in the towns containing more than 5000 souls. The elective colleges of the districts choose a member of the council for every 500 inhabitants, the colleges of the departments one for every 1000 inhabitants. *The electors are chosen for life.* The district assemblies name two candidates for the offices in the general council, and two citizens to prepare the lists from which the senators are to be chosen. The district and departmental assemblies have the right to name four candidates for the legislature. A chief judge is named, and the 258 deputies are to be divided into five ranks, retire according to these ranks, and are replaced by others.

gave the sovereign the power of gaining over the senators, exactly as deputies have been gained over in France since 1830.

The senate ratified this new order of things by a decree of the 8th of August, 1802, and announced it as a fundamental principle of the state. Bonaparte, however, perceived that the senate might come to organising resolutions in opposition to his will; he ordered them, therefore, to deprive themselves of the power of doing this. On the 30th of August, the senate came to the resolution, *that it was not legal for it to assemble, except at the summons of the consuls.*

From this period, the old state of things began again; here and there, perhaps, a little caricatured. The courts of justice and their hierarchy were arranged according to the old forms; the old official costume, and the red dress of ceremony of the councillors, were again introduced; and the supreme judge was distinguished, as in the middle ages, by a peculiar covering for the head. The court was again the centre of motion; national lands, and the domains of the conquered, were spent on dotations to the new knights, on princely grants to Bonaparte's family, or to greedy cut-throats and favourites, as in former times. The reader is referred to M. Thiers for an account of the manner in which the great world appeared in regiments at St. Cloud at the levées, and how there, as in an Oriental court, the republicans figured like puppets. (Comp. vol. iii., p. 428.) The consequence of all this was indeed a certain sullen discontent, which gave rise to grumbling among the people and in the army, and to new hopes in the bosoms of the royalists, and caused a sort of chattering in the *salons* of Madame de Staël, of Madame Recamier, and other ladies, so disagreeable to the great man, that he banished Madame de Staël from Paris and from France. This clever writer avenged herself by a book, in which she causes her absence from the country to be looked on as a great misfortune to the miserable French. We shall presently, when we come to speak of 1803 and 1804, have to refer to the excessive caprice and abuses of the police system. On the 10th of October, it appeared necessary to deprive the inhabitants of fourteen departments of the first right of the citizens of a constitutional state. A decree of the senate, bearing this date, suspended the trial by jury, in fourteen departments, for two years; and organised in them criminal tribunals, in accordance with the ordinance of May, by which they became a sort of courts-martial. A decree of the 3rd of August, 1804, afterwards added two more years to this period. From the 21st of December, 1802, the astronomico-republican calendar had been obliged to give place to a monarchico-Christian one; and at a later period, the 15th of August, properly the festival of the Virgin, was christened the birthday of Napoleon, and as such made a national *jour de fête*. When the news of Leclerc's death reached Paris, condolences were offered at court to the First Consul, as the brother-in-law of the general, according to the custom of former times, and a court-mourning was ordered. The time was now come when the Jesuits, who,

although they did not suit Bonaparte and his half-republican, half-military court, nor were, indeed, favoured by him, were in high favour with the ladies, and with the old nobility, which was becoming more and more numerous at court, and could no longer be dispensed with. They insinuated themselves on this occasion under the title of *Fathers of the Faith*.

C.—ANGLO-FRENCH CONSPIRACY, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE.

We think it the more necessary not to separate the two results of the new arrangements made by the First Consul in 1802 and 1803, as we consider it highly probable that Bonaparte acted intentionally in 1804 in contrasting the scenes to which the conspiracy gave rise, the terror excited by his police, by the murder of the Duc d'Engien, and by the executions and arrests, with the solemnities of the establishment of the Empire.

The war with England recommenced in 1803, and the English ministry were as little scrupulous as to the means employed by them to injure the enemy as Bonaparte and those employed by him. The French took possession of Hanover, and intrigued with the Irish in order to injure England; the English supported the malcontents in France in every way, supplied money for the most absurd plans of the supporters of the Bourbons, and caused the Chouans and other royalists, who wished to enter France secretly, to be transported thither in their ships, and to be landed by officers of their navy. The English consuls in Switzerland, in Stuttgart, in Cassel, and even in Hamburg, supported the French malcontents in every way. They were cheated in this way of enormous sums of money, but the number of the malcontents in France increased more and more, the more everything returned to the old Bourbon course. The police became stricter every day; the state prisons were filled with persons who were never brought to trial: it was no wonder, therefore, that the emigrant princes and the royalists of La Vendée and Brittany conceived the idea that the French would easily agree to receive a Bourbon in Bonaparte's place, if the latter could be got out of the way. It happened, too, that just at the time when the royalists began to form new plans in Paris, about the middle of 1803, the *high police* was bad, because it was divided among too many heads.

Bonaparte never had much confidence in Fouché; but he was important to him in reference to Talleyrand, in whom he as little confided, because the two hated each other thoroughly, and consequently observed each other closely: he had, therefore, made him a senator, when he established a ministry of police, among his other changes, because he foresaw that he should soon require his assistance. He had at first united the ministry of police with that of justice, placed it under the charge of the chief judge, and established a directory instead of a ministry of police, the head of which was

Réal. Dubois had the care of the special police of Paris. Murat, as Governor of Paris, had also a military system of spying, of which Savary, who afterwards rendered himself so terrible by his *garde-marie*, had the management. Moncey, also, and several amateurs, occupied themselves in watching their neighbours, and interfered with each other in their secret paths. All this rendered the designs of the royalists, supported as they were by immense sums of English money, and whom Pichégru had joined in England after his escape from Sinamary, much easier of execution. This plan was to make use of all that Bonaparte had done and continued to do, for the establishment of a *new* military monarchy, for the restoration of the *old one*. This was undoubtedly the plan of Georges Cadoudal and Pichégru; and we might assert this, even if Desmaret had not expressly stated it.* Bonaparte himself gave the Bourbons an opportunity of stating everywhere, that he himself did not believe that the will of the whole French nation, who were all, with the exception of those few who retained their old prejudices, undoubtedly in his favour, could give him a right to the crown, but that the French nation was a property of the house of Bourbon. Lucchesini and his colleagues, by means of the Prussian court, obtained that the first Prussian official at Warsaw, where Louis XVIII. then was, should propose to him, in Bonaparte's name, to give up all his claims on France, which the nation evidently had no intention of recognising. The forgotten pretender took advantage of this step to make proclamations all over Europe, to quote the testimony of his adversary in his favour, and to encourage all the princes of his house to similar declarations. Bonaparte, indeed, caused the whole matter to be denied; but he found no one who would believe him in preference to the documentary evidence of the Bourbons.

The share which the English ministers had in the attempts of the royalists to overthrow Bonaparte is not to be denied, and the French even procured, by an unfair and disgraceful stratagem, documentary evidence that all English ministers at German courts had orders to assist in every way the disturbers of the peace of France. Nothing, it is true, is said of the assassination of Bonaparte; but this must necessarily have been taken for granted before the object could be accomplished. The conduct of the whole affair was left to the innumerable agents who intrigued for money at the expense of the English cabinet and at their own risk. At the head of these was Wickham, who had rendered himself notorious in Tuscany by his barefaced intrigues with an Italian courtesan, and who, at a later

* In the "Témoignages Historiques," etc., of this "Chef de Haute Police du Consulat et de l'Empire," Paris, 1833, p. 84. "L'on aperçoit d'abord le but, fixe et avoué de détruire par une attaque à main armée la personne du Premier Consul. Un autre point aussi constant, c'est que le renversement projeté se liait à des moyens immédiats de remplacement. C'est à dire, qu'on était décidé à abattre le chef, sous la certitude de saisir dans sa main les rênes de l'état. La révolution resumée par lui à un pouvoir unique et à vie ne leur semblait plus qu'une question individuelle aisée à trancher en faveur des Bourbons."

period, as English minister in Switzerland, kept up a close connexion with the malcontents in the south of France. Drake in Munich, Spencer Smith in Stuttgard, Taylor in Cassel, and Rumbold in Hamburg, excused themselves on the plea of their zeal for legitimacy for squandering their influence and English money on the support of emigrants and adventurers. Bonaparte, indeed, went beyond them, and not only violated all laws human and divine in his pursuit of the English agents, but actually condescended to swindling by means of his ministers and agents, in order to be revenged on them. In reference to the first point, Napoleon's vassals, the sovereign princes of Germany, were obliged to banish the English ministers from their dominions; and Napoleon himself caused them to be sought for like criminals; caused the English courier, Wagstaff, to be murdered, and Rumbold, the ambassador to the circle of Lower Saxony, to be arrested in his own house, on neutral territory, and conveyed prisoner to Paris. He would undoubtedly have been tried before a court-martial and shot, had not the King of Prussia, for the first time in his life, manifested decision and firmness. Just at this time (beginning of November, 1804) Bonaparte could not do without the King of Prussia; he therefore sent Rumbold to England, but never forgave the Prussian monarch for having robbed him of his intended victim.

The second point, or the actual swindling of the English, deserves a little closer consideration, because that in this matter the English court, the ministry, and the whole high-church old aristocracy appear in no better light than the very heterodox Bonaparte, Talleyrand, his chief judge, and his whole new aristocracy. The most amusing part of the matter is, that the English diplomatists were this time decided, and that the French diplomatists disgraced themselves in the eyes of the whole world, without gaining anything beyond a miserable sum of money. As the documents are now all printed, it is clearly proved that the only two cabinets of Europe, who managed their affairs forcibly, consistently, and with good success, could make no reproaches against each other on the score of morality. In order to prove this without wearying the reader with knavery, we shall pass over all the other refugees, who all had the same fate, and only mention two, to whom Talleyrand despatched Mehée de la Touche, formerly a terrorist and afterwards an aristocrat. This same man, who immediately after the revolution of the 18th Brumaire was placed upon the list of incurables of the years 1793 and 1794, who were not to be brought to trial but at once transported, became afterwards a baron of the Empire and a *doctrinaire* of the *Moniteur*, after having obtained an unenviable notoriety as a spy in 1803 and 1804. His mission to England was in consequence of the plan which the French princes, except the Count of Provence and the French royalists in England, had conceived for overthrowing the existing state of things in France, and which Pitt's ministry, when

after the renewal of the war they again took the helm of state, furthered with all the money they could raise from England.

There were at this time together in England the Comte d'Artois (Charles X), the Dukes of Berry and Orleans (Louis Philippe), Prince Condé, the Dukes of Bourbon and of Rivière, two Polignacs, Leridan, Bouvier, de l'Ozier, Picot, Coster, and St. Victor. With these were connected the men who before the 18th Fructidor had exercised a great influence over new France, such as Willot, Lajolais, general of the army of the Rhine, and finally Pichegru. This royalist band was afterwards joined by several republicans, who had become dissatisfied with Bonaparte's monarchical steps, which we have noticed in the former section. These men kept France in a state of disturbance from England exactly as in our days Poland has been kept from France; but the system of conspiracies was not only carried on from London, where the head quarters of the so-called royalist government were, but also from Switzerland and Germany. Bonaparte sought to discover the traces of this universal conspiracy by means of his triple police in general; and besides this, Shee, the prefect in Strasburg, who was very willing to make himself necessary, acted the spy specially for Switzerland and Germany. The proceedings of the malcontents were then evidently considered more important than they really were, and Bonaparte and his chief judge caused several innocent persons to be arrested in order to extort confessions; but at the exact moment when the only conspiracy which might have been dangerous was organised, they heard nothing of it.

A comprehensive plan had been proposed in 1804 by Dumourier, Georges Cadoudal, and Pichegru, for destroying Bonaparte, and in his person the whole revolution. The last of these was to become reconciled with Moreau, who had served under him, but with whom he had been at enmity since he had sent to the directory some documents testifying against him, and to gain him over to their plot. Hammond, the English under-secretary of state, was in the secret, raised considerable sums of money for this purpose, and issued orders to all the English consuls on the continent to give any assistance they could in the matter. These orders could not be concealed from the French; and Regnier, the chief judge, who at this time had the supreme direction of the police, united with Talleyrand to deceive the English by means of a man who had formerly been a Jacobin.

Mehée de la Touche, instructed by Regnier and Talleyrand, was sent to England in 1802, in order to deceive the princes and royalist gentlemen by a proposal of forming a union between the royalists and the discontented Jacobins. This man informed Regnier of everything that he discovered in England; and one can hardly conceive that in order to make the English ministry odious, the French government were not ashamed to print papers in which they made

an open boast of their lying, their spy system, and their knavery. Mehée de la Touche did not return to France till September, 1803; and even then he did not know that Pichegru intended to come thither also, and that Georges Cadoudal intended to unite in Paris some hundreds of the men who had practised robbery and murder in Brittany, under the pretext of royalism, to dress them in the uniform of the consular guard, and to mock Bonaparte openly in his own palace.

That the English government was privy to and concerned in all this, and that at the same time the whole French system of police was incomplete, was shown in the beginning of 1804, when the plan, of itself rash and absurd, was put into operation. Ships belonging to the English navy, and captains in the English service, among whom the unfortunate Wright has obtained a melancholy celebrity, brought the conspirators over from England. As regards the French police, they were not aware, until three importations had been brought over, that at Béville, between Dieppe and Tréport, English ships regularly landed a number of persons, and that these persons found as good and safe lodgings every night from thence to Paris, as if they had been regularly provided with passports. Cadoudal himself was even five months in Paris, where he collected some hundreds of his adventurous comrades, purchased for them arms, ammunition, and uniforms, and prepared everything for carrying out his plan, without being discovered. With the third party, Pichegru, the Polignacs, and Rivière, arrived in Paris, on the 16th of January, 1804.

Pichegru did not entirely approve of Georges Cadoudal's plan; it appeared to him too rash and foolhardy: he thought that he should be able to gain over Moreau and a part of the army which he himself had commanded as a conquering general in 1793 and 1794; and, in fact, two of the best generals of that army, Desnoyers and Lajolais, were already gained for the projects of the friends of the prince. Moreau had not been spoken with up to the time of Pichegru's arrival in Paris; but his secretary, Fresnières, Georges Cadoudal's countryman, had spoken with this latter, and had not given information of his being in Paris. In reference to Thiers' account of the matter, he proves himself a thorough sophist in this as in other cases. He constantly refers to documents, but does not tell us at the same time that the same persons who were occupied in forging passports, credentials, and so on, for Mehée de la Touche, and who were connected with his swindling tricks practised on Drake and Spencer Smith, also interpolated these documents; that they are all suspicious; and that we know for certain that in the principal document, the so-called report of Count Montgaillard, which contains the announcement of the plot, and which the government caused to be printed, long passages were interpolated, and the whole tone of the report entirely changed. The ex-minister may very probably be right when he says that the First Consul was

unceasingly occupied with Fouché, Réal, Regnier, Savary, and Caulaincourt, in reading over the reports of the spies and of the *gendarmes*; and in selecting from the lists of the suspected persons, with a tact peculiarly his own, the names of those whose arrest might lead to disclosures of more importance than those which they had formerly obtained.

Such a disclosure was first obtained by the arrest of Pichegrus confidant, Querelle, who was detained as he was passing through Calais on his second journey to England. This man betrayed several of his friends, among them General Sol de Grisolles, who, however, was not arrested till February. The latter was tried, along with the forty-seven among whom Moreau was also included, from May 28 to June 10, and was acquitted for want of evidence. Bonaparte, however, acted according to his principle, that the law and legal proceedings are only of any force in a despotic monarchy so long as the monarch chooses to allow them to be so. Sol de Grisolles was arrested, thrown into a dungeon of the Bicêtre, where he remained ten years, and when the allies threatened Paris, in 1814, was conducted in chains to Saumur. After the restoration he became a lieutenant-general and governor of Pau. Querelle, who had intended to take part in the treachery at Besançon, was condemned to death, according to the common laws of the country, along with Picot and Lebourgeois; he saved himself, however, by betraying his associates as he was on the point of being led to execution. He said nothing, however, of Pichegrus, although he himself had carried messages between him and Moreau. He induced Moreau to hold a conference with him at St. Leu, in the valley of Montmorency, where, however, Moreau pledged himself to nothing. Bouvet de Lozier, one of the old nobility, was more contemptible than Querelle, and, therefore, of more use.

De Lozier had first offered to sell himself to Bonaparte, and when he was refused, had accepted money from Pichegrus and from the English. The chief judge had once done him a service, and now took advantage of this to address him as a friend and skilfully to draw him out. At length he obtained from him (on the 23rd of January, 1804) the information that Pichegrus and Georges Cadoudal were in Paris.* De Lozier afterwards repented having given this information, and attempted to hang himself in prison; he was, however, cut down, and finally gave full information, on the 14th of February, with the fear of death before his eyes; and, in fact, being at the time hovering between life and death.† When we read what falsehood, deceit, and treachery were practised at this time by the English and French cabinets, according to the official documents which are now all pub-

* “*Témoignages Historiques*,” &c., p. 96.

† “*Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, Volontaires et Involontaires*,” vol. ii., p. 78. “Bouvet conduit au temple ne se pendit que le lendemain. Ce n'est pas pour éviter de faire des révélations, mais de regret d'en avoir fait, qu'il cherche à s'ôter la vie. On réussit à prévenir son dessein, et c'est encore tout troublé de la tentative qu'il venait de faire sur lui même qu'il demande à entretenir M. Réal.”

lished, what knaves and knaveries these two equally prudent, equally firm and consistent cabinets encouraged, we must shudder at the civilisation which thus roots up all morality. It was at this time that Talleyrand's creature, Mehée de la Touche, practised the piece of swindling of which we have spoken above.

He returned from England in September, 1803, as a Jacobin missionary and as a plenipotentiary in reference to the proposed union of parties, and travelled, provided with the very best recommendations by the deceived emigrants and by the duped under-secretary of state, through Germany, where, under the directions of the minister for foreign affairs and of the chief judge, with whom he kept up a continual correspondence, he acted the spy upon the movements of Rumbold in Hamburg, Spencer Smith, and Drake, the last of whom was certainly not remarkable for penetration. We must, however, mention to the honour of Reinhard in Hamburg, and Otto in Munich, that they refused, notwithstanding the recommendation of the French minister, to have anything more to do with the rascal than they were actually obliged. We perceive this from the words of the man himself, whom the chief judge praises, and whose impudent reports he makes no scruple of publishing. Mehée de la Touche, in fact, did not learn much, although the English did not suspect that he was a double spy, a part which the notorious Schulmeister supported in such a masterly manner from the year 1805, when he deceived poor Mack to such an egregious extent. Mehée de la Touche not only deceived Drake, which was not very difficult, but also Spencer Smith and even Wickham, and cheated them all of considerable sums of money, which he pretended to employ on conspiracies. He was afterwards imprisoned for some time in France, because it was considered expedient to continue the swindling by means of another person: perhaps, also, because the French government did not quite trust him.

Shee, prefect of Strasburg, afterwards carried on the correspondence with the English resident ministers at the German courts, and cheated them of information and of money by means of pretended conspiracies and names of conspirators who never existed; and he employed Rossilly, an officer of the garrison, to deceive Spencer Smith, as Mehée de la Touche had done. This zealous prefect and police officer expresses in a letter to Caulaincourt (afterwards Duke of Vicenza) his great satisfaction that Rossilly had been able to obtain from the Englishman bills of exchange to a large amount, which he was hastily causing to be accepted and cashed, lest they might be protested on the piece of rascality coming to light. "The money," says he, "might be applied to building the ship, which Strasburg had to furnish to the fleet of vessels destined by Bonaparte for his invasion of England."* The whole affair was the more disgraceful

* In the "Témoignages Historiques sur la Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien." Compare with this a pamphlet entitled "Pichegru, son Procès et son Suicide, par C. M. Pierret," Paris, 1823. We there find Shee's letter to Caulaincourt, who

to the French government, to Talleyrand, to the chief judge, Caulaincourt, Shee, and whoever else was engaged in it, as even Savary is obliged to confess that the whole thing led to no result.*

That pearl and jewel of all spies and *gendarmes*, Savary, afterwards Duke of Rovigo, has described in his memoirs the confusion and terror which spread through Paris on Bouvet's announcement of the fact that Pichegru, Sol de Grisolles, Georges Cadoudal, and a number of stout fellows, were within its walls. No one knew where to find them, and the contrivances for this purpose, the police blockade, to which the Parisians were subjected, caused more fear than the apprehended danger itself. As regards the impression made in Paris, we have the testimony of eye-witnesses, to whom truth and falsehood were not merely means to be used according to circumstances, as they were with Savary. All the police was of no use, and traitors had to be bought to deliver up those who had entrusted their lives to their keeping. Thus, Sol de Grisolles was betrayed for a reward, and was arrested in the Boulevard des Italiens. Moreau was arrested on the 15th of February, on the road from his estate at Grosbois to Paris, but with some respect; and by this arrest the town, the army, and the whole empire were greatly irritated against the servility of the police. It was known that Pichegru and Georges Cadoudal were yet undiscovered in Paris; Moreau was not even suspected, and had showed himself openly: his arrest, therefore, could only be looked upon as an attempt to render the only opponent of a system, like that of the janissaries, harmless by a *coup d'état*. It soon appeared, however, that Moreau had been too weak and wavering to join the royalists in good earnest, and too much under the influence of his own military jealousy, and of his wife and mother-in-law, not to prefer a tacit acquiescence in the scheme to giving information of the plan, particularly as this latter course would have been treason against Pichegru.

The high police in order to secure the persons of the two chiefs of the yet undiscovered conspiracy, were obliged to sacrifice morality and policy, and to set a premium upon the knavery and treachery of friends and relations. Leblanc, the friend and adjutant of Pichegru, to whom he had entrusted himself, at first built for him a place of concealment in his own house in the Rue Chabanais, where he was quite safe; but when he was offered as much as 100,000

appears to have played rather an equivocal part during this period. P. 174: "Dans cette extrémité j'ai pensé (*i.e.*, he, the prefect, the manager of the whole swindling affair) que si les ministres n'avaient pas des fonds disponibles pour faire partir notre flottille, le Premier Consul pourrait nous tirer de cette perplexité en m'autorisant à employer les 80,000 et quelques cents livres provenant de trois lettres de change que je me suis laissé faire par l'officier qui les a reçues de M. Spencer Smith, et qu'il aurait fait protester à Francfort et à Zurich si je ne m'étais pressé de les faire accepter. Elles le sont heureusement toutes les trois, et seront payées le 25 Avril."

* "Mémoires du Duc de Rovigo," vol. ii., p. 25. "Les projets qu'il (Mehée de la Touche) signalait étaient trop misérables pour qu'on s'y arrêtât. Sa mission n'apprenait rien. On fut obligé de chercher d'autres sources d'information."

frances if he would deliver him up, he conducted six *gendarmes* and an inspector of police to the place of his retreat. During the days from the 15th to the 26th of February, on which the seizure was made, Paris was in a state of blockade, and every one full of anxiety. When, on the 26th, the police came upon the powerfully-made and very strong general in bed, they made use of a means to prevent his resistance which we are ashamed to relate, and which ought never to be applied even in the case of the commonest malefactor.

Georges Cadoudal had found it necessary, knowing that he was sold, to remove from his lodgings on the 8th of March, into others, which he had hired for 8000 francs, and drove out in broad daylight in a cabriolet. This was announced to the police, and he was arrested in the Place de l'Odéon. He shot one inspector of police, and severely wounded another, before he was secured. He declared in prison, without any attempt at concealment, that he had intended to contend in open fight, with arms in his hands, against Bonaparte and his party, and that he had been at the head of the whole conspiracy. Pichegru's sudden death caused a great sensation, and the writing of many pamphlets, *pro* and *con*. He was found strangled on the 6th of April, in the basement story where he had been confined, apparently by his own hand, but certainly in rather an extraordinary position. The next morning the matter was strictly investigated, and a commission appointed to inquire into all the particular circumstances; and from these it was proved that the general had strangled himself. This report was printed in the *Moniteur*, but no one believed it. We consider Bonaparte and even the police innocent in the matter, and leave to others the investigation of the various writings for and against. The whole history of the times upon which we are now engaged is, indeed, seldom satisfactory in a moral point of view; but it seems unjust to blame the greatest man of his time, who would have required no intrigues, no police spies, and no Jesuits, if he had not wished to renew the old system in all its points, for the murder of Pichegru and of Captain Wright, who was also found dead.

Already, however, before Pichegru's death, a political murder had been perpetrated at Bonaparte's command on the only really chivalrous member of a royal house degenerated and sunk in folly; and this too under an appearance of justice, though being at the time a violation of every natural right, and of all the treaties with the German Empire. Whether the murder of the prince is to be ascribed to the First Consul, or to those of his followers who were meanly subservient to his wishes, is a point which we do not undertake to decide; but the more disgraceful violation of justice and abuse of the tribunals is chargeable on him alone. He himself gave all the orders, and made all the others mere tools and instruments in his hands: ought he not, therefore, knowing their meanness and servility, to be considered rather as doubly in fault?

Bonaparte, however, really believed that the Duc d'Enghein was

speculating on his death. The princes and the higher nobility were conspiring against him: the best of the court nobility of the Bourbons were in Paris, namely, the Polignacs, Rivière, &c. Bonaparte and many others considered it probable that a member of the royal family might have been there too, and would come again, and make his public appearance at the moment of Bonaparte's fall. The Duc d'Enghien had resided for some time at Ettenheim, in the Baden territory, in consequence of a love affair with the Princess de Rohan, who became insane after his arrest, but was constantly surrounded by spies. Bonaparte suspected that this long residence had some connexion with the plans of the conspirators, and was confirmed in this suspicion by Savary and by the officer who had been despatched by him as a spy on the prince. The First Consul summoned his confidants to consult upon the matter. Every one who was afraid of the probable consequences of his answer kept silence; but Cambacérès and Talleyrand were in favour of the assertion of the author of the police reports. It was said in them, that one of the persons questioned had spoken of a mysterious person, who had appeared at a meeting of the conspirators, and who had been received with demonstrations of the greatest respect. This was sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the duke, who was accused, probably without reason, of having been thoughtless enough to go once or twice to Strasburg, had also been in Paris. It was now Bonaparte's turn, and he, with the violence and quickness of a threatened general, who causes a dangerous spy to be seized on neutral ground, gave orders for seizing the person of the prince, and conveying him to the citadel of Strasburg. We should be obliged to go through an immense number of pamphlets did we wish to investigate the guilt or innocence of the proposers, participators, instruments, and persons actively employed in the nocturnal invasion of a foreign territory, the violent seizure, the execution of the assassination itself; for on this occasion, at a time when it was useful to appear innocent, Talleyrand himself published a pamphlet in his defence. Besides this, the Duke of Dalberg, Caulaincourt, Savary, and the miserable Hullin, president of the court, constituted hastily and in mockery of all justice, which ordered the murder, have all printed their wretched excuses, and the defender of the government of Baden has endeavoured to make out as good a case for his government as possible. All these pamphlets, however, only serve to convince their readers that God never bestowed on their authors any idea of religion or morality. Our readers may find the particulars in the pamphlets themselves;* we shall here merely state the principal circumstances in the affair from the beginning.

Mehée de la Touche, who obtained peculiar protection in the time of Talleyrand, and shone among the barons of the new Empire, acted as a spy in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, and his reports were

* They are collected in an octavo volume of about 321 pages, entitled, "Mémoires Historiques sur la Catastrophe du Duc d'Enghien," Paris, 1824.

afterwards laid by Talleyrand before the privy council, to which he summoned the chief judge, the three consuls, and Fouché, although this last was opposed to him, and, as a senator without any special office, had in fact no business there. All this proves clearly that Bonaparte's violence had already resolved what was to be done, and that the subservient Talleyrand merely carried out this resolution and provided politicians, sophists, and lawyers, to give the business a legal appearance. The chief judge spoke first, the others (among whom Thiers, for reasons easily understood, particularly exculpated Cambacérès) agreed with him; the minister of war issued orders for this piece of highway robbery in a form similar to the ordinary despatches from his office. Caulaincourt, whom Thiers excuses by a beautiful piece of sophistry, was despatched to Strasburg, and from thence made a sort of expedition in search of emigrants in the direction of Offenburg, on the German bank of the Rhine, in order to mask the attack on Ettenheim. He was desired to demand the prince from the minister at Carlsruhe, after he had already carried him off. Oudinot crossed the Rhine not far from Rheinau, with 1300 men, surrounded the town and the house in which the prince was, and brought him, on the 10th of March, to the citadel of Strasburg, where he delivered him up to Caulaincourt. The prince, who had thus been carried off in the middle of the night and without having committed any crime, was not even allowed any rest there, but was conveyed, travelling night and day, to Paris, where he arrived on the evening of the 20th, about eleven o'clock. He was kept in the carriage waiting before the gate till four o'clock on the morning of the 21st, because it was necessary to send to Malmaison for the orders of the First Consul respecting the prisoner. These orders were to convey him to Vincennes, and to summon a court-martial for the evening of the same day, to give the murder an appearance of legality. This military commission which condemned the duke was entirely informal, as it consisted of the colonels of the regiments then stationed in Paris, its president being Hullin, the stupid stormer of the Bastille. The duke was allowed neither repose, nor time for consideration, nor defenders; and the only real accusation against him was, that he, whose obligations to his country had been long since legally dissolved, had led a corps of French troops in the enemy's service during the late war. This fact he neither could nor would deny; but the miserable robbers who were to judge him added that he was one of the conspirators against Bonaparte's life. This was of course without any foundation whatever, and yet they condemned him to death. The whole process was revolting, not because he was a prince, for we pay no regard to his being a prince, but merely in as far as the duke was a man. He was tormented with his trial and this farce of a legal tribunal from five o'clock in the evening till two o'clock the next morning; he was then allowed to sleep for two hours, while Savary's creatures wrote down the sentence condemning him to death; and was shot at four o'clock on the morn-

ing of the 22nd, in the moat of the castle of Vincennes. The female members of Bonaparte's family, his wife and her amiable daughter, were inconsolable at this step; all the true admirers of his greatness were horror-struck; and even the vainest of all vain romancists and new-fashioned Christians, Chateaubriand, who by the favour of Elisa had obtained the post of consul in the Valais, resigned his office and deserted the blood-stained ruler of France. The dregs of the revolutionary party alone rejoiced, for the founder of the new kingdom, the foundations of which were already laid, had clearly proved his adherence to the now universally followed system, which destroys all morality and justice, and substitutes expediency in their place.

Another disgraceful point about the affair is, that the wretches who at that time served the First Consul, took their measures so well, that every individual step was taken by Bonaparte's command, so that he alone bore all the blame, although in point of fact he was always led by them to the desired point. Savary managed the whole plan on the 20th, and yet with consummate sophistry he contrives in his memoirs to represent himself as being entirely innocent. Even the president of the tribunal excuses himself by the principles and doctrines of Caiaphas, which at least concerned him nothing in his capacity of judge.* Bonaparte himself afterwards endeavoured to make his friends believe that he intended by this piece of violence to annihilate for ever all the hopes of the Bourbons, and to show that he had transferred all their claims to himself. This is proved by a passage in his memoirs in some respects rather suspicious, but which is certainly founded on a speech of Bonaparte's.† Any one possessing judgment and some knowledge of human nature will perceive in Bonaparte's speech to his council immediately after the deed, as given by Pelet, in the absurd and confused statement made by the First Consul on that occasion, that he felt the difficulty of convincing his councillors of that which he did not believe himself.‡ The general impression made by the proceedings against the Duc d'Enghien was so unfavourable, that Bonaparte's advisers found it necessary not to insert in the later impressions of the *Moniteur* the account of his execution which is to be found in the earlier impressions.

In the trial of the persons accused of being participators in, or at

* This letter of Hullin's is to be found at p. 119 of the "Témoignages Historiques sur le Catastrophe," &c. In it he says: "Plusieurs pièces étaient jointes au dossier; des lettres interceptées, une correspondance de M. Shée, alors préfet du Bas-Rhin, et surtout un long rapport au conseiller d'état, où toute cette affaire avec ses ramifications était présentée comme intéressant la sûreté de l'état et l'existence même du gouvernement; en un mot, ce rapport contenait tout ce qui pouvait faire impression sur nos esprits, et nous faire croire que le salut de l'état dépendait du jugement qui allait être rendu."

† "Truguet demande, quel peut être le but d'un tel acte de rigueur? Bonaparte dit: 'Il était temps de faire finir les nombreux assassinats ourdis contre moi: maintenant on ne dira plus que je veux jouer le rôle de Monck.'"

‡ Pelet, "Opinions de Napoléon," &c., ch. v., p. 42, seq.

least acquainted with, Pichegrus's plans, there was no difficulty in proceeding openly; but there was some difficulty in including Moreau among them; for although he might have known of the plan, he certainly took no active part in it. In order, however, to justify in some degree the treatment of a man who, next to Bonaparte himself, enjoyed the highest place in the opinion of the French nation, it was necessary to make him appear to have been a participant in the crime. The ruling party did not wish to destroy him; and he would certainly have been pardoned had he been condemned to death. In Germany, where the Byzantine law concerning high treason, *lèse majesté*, and a neglect of giving information respecting such crimes, prevails partly from time immemorial and partly from being received into all later books upon criminal law, there would have been no difficulty in making Moreau a participant, seeing that he could not deny having had a conversation with Pichegrus and having given no information to the police; but in France it was entirely different. Moreau, however, behaved very weakly in the matter. Not long after his arrest he wrote a letter to the First Consul, in which he spoke of the proposals which had been made to him by the princes; and although he humbled himself unnecessarily, yet he did not confess everything. Bonaparte was angry at this, and behaved at least dishonourably; for instead of answering the letter, he sent it to the chief judge, and caused it to be treated as the principal document in the evidence against his rival. He appears, however, to have changed his mind afterwards, if we may sometimes believe Thiers, which he undoubtedly does not deserve in general. Thiers says that Bonaparte caused Moreau to be questioned and drawn out in a very cunning manner by the chief judge (Regnier) before his trial, but that the attempt did not succeed, because the lawyer managed the affair awkwardly.

We insert here the conclusion of the trials, although the trial itself was postponed till the establishment of the Empire. The tone-giving Frenchmen, the only ones ever regarded on such occasions, were consoled by the pomp of the imperial court, and by several new and richly-endowed places and dignities, for the odious proceedings of the police; for the executions of political offenders; and, lastly, for the autocratic behaviour of Bonaparte towards those who had been acquitted by the tribunal. We leave it still an open question whether the time was well chosen for the establishment of the Empire; whether it was politic to spend so many millions on empty court formalities and state follies in a year so stained with blood and so ruinous to Bonaparte's true honour; and also, whether it was not from evil intentions that Cobenzl and his fellows were so anxious and so willing to recognise the new dignity: it is certain that justice on this occasion was obliged to yield to policy and expediency.

It is true, that neither a military commission nor a special tribunal was appointed to try the forty-seven prisoners, who alone, of all who were confined in the various state prisons as participants in

Cadoudal's crime, were to be brought to trial: but the criminal court of the department of the Seine was made a special tribunal. A special law was passed, according to which this trial, which should have come before the assizes in ordinary course, was withdrawn from the court where trial by jury was employed, and transferred to the criminal court of the department of the Seine. The documents connected with this trial, which occupied twelve days, have been since printed, and fill several volumes; but at the time the public papers gave very little information on the subject, and even that very partial and one-sided. The crowd in the court was immense. It was even made very apparent in the court itself that the feeling of the public was entirely in favour of Moreau, whilst the contrary was asserted, and very positively, by the public papers, by all the sophists who wished to become great men, and by the hired *doctrinaires* of the Empire. On this occasion Bonaparte perceived, from the course of the proceedings and from the event of the trial, to his great astonishment, that there was still in France a remnant of republican feeling, and that there were still lawyers who deserved to be so. Up to this time he had judged them all by those enormously learned and unfortunately too clever men whom he had bribed with orders and titles and sinecures, and who afterwards became dignitaries of the Empire and senators. The lawyers in the senate had been audacious enough not only to suspend, by their own authority, and only eight days after Moreau's arrest, the mode of trial by jury, but even to proclaim as valid the law declaring misprision of treason equally criminal with high treason itself, which had been in force in the Byzantine Empire, and which even now exists in Germany. They had, therefore, brought back the French to the point at which they were at the time of the court lawyers of Louis XI. and Francis I.*

The criminal court was in perplexity between the new emperor and the public feeling, which was expressed decidedly and even threateningly in favour of Moreau: it twisted justice and right, therefore, in order to do what it considered expedient. The emperor wished Moreau to be condemned, and urged this frequently upon the judges, assuring them at the same time that he would remit the punishment. The judges, however, sought for another way of pleasing both parties. Should the judges acquit Moreau, his arrest, like the Duc d'Enghien's murder, would have been a blot on Bonaparte's name. Five of the judges, therefore, wished to pronounce sentence of death against him; seven of them, however,

* On the 28th of February the jury was suspended for all cases of attempts on the person of the First Consul during two years. The day after, it was proclaimed, that whoever had endeavoured to conceal Georges Cadoudal, or any of his accomplices from the police, should be punished as an accomplice. Then followed a definition of what was to be understood by concealing; and then, "Every one who, even before the proclamation of this law, has afforded a refuge to any of the accused, without having given the police immediate notice of the fact, shall be liable to six years at the galleys."

opposed this; and we consider it a duty to mention the names of these seven, although even they afterwards adopted a middle course, by which they sought to unite policy with justice. Such a union will ever be impossible, inasmuch as justice and policy are by their very nature incapable of any union. The seven judges were, Clavière, Lecourbe, Martineau, Desmoissons, Rigault, Laguillome, and Demeuve. It was evident that only one of two decisions, was possible. Either Moreau knew of, and was consequently an accomplice in, the conspiracy, in which case he was amenable to the most severe sentence, or he was not an accomplice, in which case he should have been acquitted. The tribunal declared him guilty, but admitted such mitigatory circumstances that merely a sentence of two years' imprisonment was pronounced against him. This sentence, however, placed him entirely in Bonaparte's power. All the accused who were found guilty were condemned to pay in common the inexhaustible costs of this enormous trial; and as the few hundred thousand francs found in the possession of Pichegru and Cadoudal had been already confiscated, and the other prisoners had nothing, all the expenses would have fallen upon Moreau alone. He allowed negotiations to be entered upon for him, accepted a pardon and a remission of the fine and costs, and, in return, engaged to retire to North America, and never to return. This termination of his trial proves, that although he may have been a skilful general, he was a man of no character. He proved this yet more clearly in 1813, when he went over to the Russians, who were then endeavouring to annihilate the colossal power of France.

Bonaparte had too much good sense to be cruel: when, therefore, five of the accused, whose trial had lasted for twelve days (from May 28th to June 10), and had kept all France in excitement, had been condemned to five years' imprisonment, and twenty to death, he only caused twelve to be executed, among whom Georges Cadoudal was one. He exercised, however, a proportionately great severity against those whom the tribunal had acquitted. He did not set them at liberty, but left them to the tender mercies of his high police. They were all confined in the dungeons of the several fortresses which he had converted into state prisons. The Polignacs and Charles de Rivière, who had been of the number of those condemned to death, were pardoned at the request of their old friends, who were now Bonaparte's relations or courtiers. These were, however, confined afterwards as prisoners of state in the fortress of Ham.

D.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE.

When we consider the nature of men, and the situation of France, it must be confessed that after all which had happened from 1801 to 1803, the establishment of a new hereditary monarchy in France may have been a necessity of the age. We neither allow ourselves to be influenced by what Thibaudeau says, nor by all that Thiers asserts,

in forming our opinion, that it was impossible for France to continue to be a republic, and that it would have been unreasonable to continue to govern it dictatorially, as had been the case under the name of a republic; neither would it have been right to expose the country to the charges of an elective monarchy. We cannot, however, agree with Thibaudeau, with Thiers, and several others, or even with the noblest of Bonaparte's adopted daughters, that it was necessary for him, in obedience to the ruling passion and vanity of the French, to bring back the whole of the absurdities of a court, and of a number of idlers, who necessarily brought with them an unlimited expenditure and a taste for pomp and luxury. He was a man great in war and in peace; was, with the exception of Pitt and Wellington, the only man of character in all Europe; he had rescued France from the hands of democrats and from anarchy, had repaired and again set in motion the machine of state, and deserved the station which he already possessed under an unassuming title. The miserable tricks which were resorted to to make him the idol of a temple were therefore clearly unnecessary. If he had merely assumed the title of Emperor, he would not have required the miserable, officious slaves, whom he was afterwards obliged to reward for their activity. If we were about to give a complete explanation of the establishment of the Empire, or were in a condition to penetrate more deeply into the special history of France, we should take as our fundamental principles the information we receive from Pelet de la Lozère, because Lefebvre has done so, and Thiers urges nothing against them. But we can only mention all this *en passant*.

We have already noticed the first steps towards absolute monarchy in the years 1802 and 1803. The senate approached more and more to the character of an imperial college, the tribunate was reduced to the half of its former number, lost by this means all its influence, and became a sort of council of state; the old court etiquette was again introduced; in a word, all the old absurdities, all the old trammels, were again introduced, and nothing was wanting but the old titles and dignities of the middle ages. The family of Bonaparte, particularly Lucien, and his orator, Fontanes, united therefore with Fouché to make what they themselves and the Consul wished, appear to be the wish of the highest bodies in the state. The practical statesmen in the council of state appeared to them the most difficult to bring over; the courtiers in the senate would be easily managed; in the legislative body Fontanes had been made president by a series of intrigues in January, 1804, and his protector, Lucien Bonaparte, had a seat in the tribunate. These two, and specially also Fouché, took advantage of the fear, the arrests, the murders, the civil inquisitions, and finally the trial, in the period from February to June, 1804, to cause their wishes to be expressed either by the senate or by the tribunate. Talleyrand and others caused their instruments to fish out from the archives of the kingdom all the old rubbish of the Byzantino-Roman system of dignities and charges of the Empire,

and were not ashamed to trammel with all this ragged finery, borrowed from the holy Roman Empire, and poked out of the dust by their creatures, the fresh and youthful empire of a great man.

In all this affair the revolutionary plan, which Fouché so thoroughly understood and so often applied, was strictly adhered to. All the papers were filled with bombast in reference to the rescue of the First Consul, which was a rescue of the state; and after all this followed the force of audiences, of circular letters, of solemn speeches from the several authorities of the state, while columns and pages of the *Moniteur* were continually filled with congratulations. Then followed, flowing in from all quarters, innumerable addresses expressive of devotion to the First Consul. It was Fouché, who was most active in urging on the establishment of the Empire, and who made use of every event in the affair of the conspiracy to bring about some step by which some one of the principal colleges of the Empire was made to request from Bonaparte as a favour something that he was most anxious to do. Bonaparte had already hinted at the throne in his answer to the address of the senate, in which they congratulated him on the discovery of the royalist conspiracy.* The hint which he gave in a few words on this occasion, that he had for some time considered himself included in that class of men who are appointed by Heaven to be shepherds of the people, either was not understood, or the senate did not choose to understand it. Another plan was therefore adopted. All the documents connected with the conspiracy were laid before the senate, and they were ordered to name a committee to examine them. When this committee afterwards merely proposed a formal congratulation to the First Consul on his escape from so great a danger, Fouché at last spoke out, and declared that something very different was expected from the senate in the Tuilleries. The senate showed itself to be accommodating, and appeared to request a change in the form of government; but, notwithstanding this, expressed itself rather darkly and indefinitely in its address to the First Consul of the 27th of March, 1804.† *The senate, namely, merely requested the First Consul—the general style of addresses—to render eternal the blessings of his government.* The well-sounding phrases which the senate employed were neither printed in the *Moniteur* nor answered by the First Consul; they were

* *Moniteur*, An XII., No. 149 (9 Pluviose, col. 605, b.). “J’ai depuis longtemps renoncé (he says, in his official answer to the address) aux douceurs de la condition privée; tous mes moments, ma vie entière, sont employés à remplir les devoirs que ma destinée et le peuple Français m’ont imposés.”

† More literally thus: The senate, which even then bore the pompous title of “le premier corps d'état,” which properly belonged to the legislative body, sent a deputation to the First Consul on the 27th of March, whose address contained the following phrases:—“Vous fondez une ère nouvelle, mais vous devez l'éterniser, l'éclat n'est rien sans la durée. Nous ne saurions douter, que cette grande idée ne vous ait occupé, car votre génie embrasse tout et n'oublie rien.....Grand homme,achevez votre ouvrage en le rendant immortel comme votre gloire. Vous nous avez tiré du chaos du passé, vous nous faites bénir les biensfaits du présent, garantissez-nous l'avenir.”

allowed to repose in silence, and were only brought to light after other means had been employed.

The intention was apparently to follow entirely the legal way; first to consult the council of state, then to give the matter a form by an apparently public discussion and resolution in the tribunate; and finally to bring before the public the determination previously kept secret from them. In the council of state, Thibaudeau and other genuine republicans spoke courageously and powerfully against the proposal of an hereditary monarchy: they have, however, since confessed that they were wrong, since the French nation did not participate in their view of human affairs. They yielded too at the time, but they insisted on not sacrificing to an autocracy the most important rights of the people, the only actual gain to the nation from the revolution. The council of state proposed, therefore, to Bonaparte's very great mortification, that with the establishment of the monarchy those principles should be proclaimed which were to secure the rights and the freedom of the nation. This was in direct opposition to his intention of allowing the continuance of a sort of military dictatorship, under the pretext of its being necessary during a time of war: it was found necessary, therefore, to put other wheels in motion.

The tribunate had been long since reduced from one hundred to fifty members, and had thus lost all influence; it was easy, therefore, for Lucien Bonaparte to persuade the other tribunes that, by taking the initiative in the affair of the Empire, they might at last acquire some favour for themselves before being entirely dismissed. The increase of salary to the tribunate, from 15,000 to 20,000 francs, also produced some effect. In the senate, Joseph Bonaparte was more active than his brother quite approved. For two months the enormous columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with petitions and addresses suitable to the wishes of the governing power; Joseph Bonaparte, Fouché, and Fontanes declared openly that an apparently voluntary proclamation of the Empire was expected; but it was hinted at the same time from another quarter, that neither the senate nor the tribunate was at all necessary in the matter. Soult declared openly, that if the senate hesitated, the army would proclaim an emperor; and Murat, as governor of Paris, appointed a period of eight days, at the conclusion of which he would himself proclaim the emperor at the head of his troops.

This threat did not fail to produce its effect; the matter was discussed at the same time in the senate and in the tribunate from the 23rd to the 30th of April. The same insignificant tribune, Curée, who had brought forward the subject on the 15th, laid before the house, on the 30th, three propositions on the subject of the Empire, which had been to a certain extent put into his mouth. Before making the speech (afterwards printed) in which he brought forward these proposals, he was obliged to send it in to the cabinet, whence he received it again with corrections and additions. His proposals were: 1. That Napoleon Bonaparte be made Emperor of France.

2. That the Empire be considered hereditary in his family. The third proposition was exactly the opposite of that made by the council of state. 3. That the existing state of affairs in France is only to be considered as preparatory to a constitution; that the existing state of things, therefore, must hereafter be perfected. That is, in other words, that the new constitution should be regulated exactly according to the good pleasure of the sovereign. These proposals were supported by a long catalogue of speeches, which were printed at full length in the columns of the *Moniteur*, and furnished the public with whole sheets of apologies for the future government. We must not omit to mention, however, that this servile mass, who only acted for their own benefit, was opposed by some men of strong principle. Among the latter we must particularly notice Carnot, whose speech was in every one's mouth, although, like all the other speeches against the proposals, it will be sought in vain in the *Moniteur*, where it is not even mentioned. Before the many long sophistical declamations of the tribunes were completely printed, the three proposals had been carried; and the senate had, in the mean time, also taken the necessary steps.

Bonaparte had taken no notice whatever of the senate's address of the 27th of March until the 25th of April, when he at last required them to explain their meaning more clearly. Even then a week passed over without anything making its appearance; but when about this time the tribunate appeared to be taking steps to be beforehand with them, the senate quickly made up their minds. The senate replied on the 3rd of May to Bonaparte's message of the 25th of April in exactly the manner he wished. Only four among all those men, who owed their dignity of senators entirely to the revolution and to the people, ventured even to mention the rights of the people at all. It is an understood thing in a nation where an academy of forty exists for the express purpose of praising and phrase-making, that neither the senate nor the tribunate failed to make use of the proper quantity of elegant phrases, flowers of rhetoric, and flattery, in officially communicating their decrees; and that the First Consul took care to reply, with the various affected phrases for such cases made and provided; but we have here only to do with facts.

Fourteen days elapsed after the audiences of the 3rd of May, before the decree of the senate was published establishing the Empire: for, from the 4th to the 16th of May, conferences were being held among the various persons devoted to the new Emperor, called senators, tribunes, members of the legislative body, and councillors of state. No one paid any attention to the fact that the legislative body was not sitting at the time: the president, Fontanes, got together some deputies, who happened to be in Paris, and sat with the tribunes, as if he had a right so to do. This pretended commission for arranging the constitution received their directions for the formation of the constitution direct from the cabinet. The result of every sitting of this

mixed commission was always deduced from certain fundamental principles laid down by the cabinet, and was afterwards sent back to the cabinet and there modified. Thus was produced the new imperial order of things, which was comprehended in a so-called organising decree of the senate of the 16th of May, and presented to the new Emperor at St. Cloud, with great solemnity, on the 18th. Immediately after this Napoleon was personally proclaimed Emperor of the French; and, at the same time with the executions of the conspirators, splendid festivals and theatrical processions were exhibited to the Parisians.

In all this a disgraceful farce was played with the French people: their consent was apparently asked to a change in the government, which gave the governing individual absolute power; and, in point of fact, the only question proposed to the people was a merely secondary one, *whether the imperial power should be hereditary in the family of Napoleon?* Because, as it was said, it was advisable to collect the opinions of the whole empire, but really because Bonaparte had been induced to act the part of Pepin and Charlemagne, to bring the pope to Paris, and to recal all the old court nonsense, with all the court dignitaries and great officers of the Empire; all the Byzantine tinsel and stiffness of the middle ages, the comedy of the coronation, &c., were not completely finished till December, 1804. We cannot delay over the separate scenes and acts of the months from June to December, but merely select some of the principal ones.

We must first remark, that the senate, which, because it was to do everything and to be everything in the new government, had granted itself all sorts of privileges, was very sparingly rewarded by the Emperor, jealous as he was of all that referred to his power as ruler. He committed the compilation of the imperial constitution, not to the senate, but to a mixed commission, consisting of the three consuls, several senators, and all the ministers. This commission met at St. Cloud, the new order of things was composed there, and this compilation was laid before the senate as a matter of form, in order that they might publish it as a decree of the senate, *i.e.*, might make it a law. The whole of this constitution, which was concluded and published on the 18th of May, would take up too much space; we shall, therefore, only quote here some portions of it to which we shall often have occasion to refer.

The new kingdom was first made a part of the private property of Napoleon, so that it was transferrable from him to his son or to his adopted son. Failing any son or adopted son of Napoleon, Joseph and Louis Bonaparte and their heirs succeeded to the throne. Lucien was excluded because, as his brother said, he had contracted a carnival marriage; that is to say, because Napoleon did not choose to acknowledge his brother's wife as a sister-in-law. Jerome only decided at a later period to declare his marriage contracted with Miss Patterson in North America null; the brothers and sisters of the new Emperor became princes and princesses, and received each a million annually, in order to set a destructive example to the French, and

at their expense of luxury, pomp, and extravagance. The Emperor obtained from the liberality of the senate all the privileges which the Constituent National Assembly had granted to Louis XVI. in 1791. He was allowed the use of all the royal castles that were left, the enjoyment of the crown lands, and a civil list of 25 millions annually. In order that the two other consuls, and all who had merited the thanks of the new Byzantine Emperor, might be rewarded as they deserved, the memory of Charlemagne's Paladins, and of the innumerable dignities and ranks of the Byzantine court, and of the romantic courts of chivalry, was revived.

The Paladins of the Holy Roman Empire, as revived by Bonaparte, were the chancellor of state, the chancellor of the empire, the grand elector, the grand admiral, the treasurer of the empire, and the constable. Each of these merely ostentatious dignitaries received annually from the treasury a third of a million, except where he was a prince, and therefore in the receipt of a million already. Joseph Bonaparte was made elector; Louis, constable; the Consul Lebrun was made treasurer of the Empire; and Cambacérès, chancellor of the Empire. The dignities of lord high admiral and of chancellor of state were at first not filled up, but Napoleon afterwards made his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, chancellor of state. Talleyrand had expected to receive this appointment, which was something of a diplomatic cast; he was therefore offended at being only rewarded with an office at court. He was made grand-chamberlain; Duroc, grand-marshal of the palace; Caulaincourt, master of the horse; Berthier, master of the hounds. The court clergy, and everything connected with them, were restored at a great expense: at their head was the Emperor's uncle, Cardinal Fesch, as grand-almoner. The generals who had created the new Empire, and who were to sustain it, were rewarded just as William the Conqueror rewarded the Norman barons who had assisted him in his conquest of England. Napoleon at first made eighteen generals, marshals,* but afterwards increased the number, and thus obtained a new means of urging ambitious generals to almost unheard-of exertions. All these appointments and nominations were made on the 19th of May: an army of officials without office, and attendants without dignities, was soon organised; the antechambers were soon filled, as they had formerly been, with titled lackeys, and troops of servants lived on the fat of the land. Our readers will perceive, from the following observations, what became of the constitution.

The senate had taken a conspicuous part in the whole establishment of the Empire, although the Emperor had rather shortly refused its four absurd demands for itself; and it now received, as the instrument of the Emperor, all the privileges which would have been refused to an independent body. The senate continued to be, as

* Augereau, Bernadotte, Berthier, Bessières, Brune, Davoust, Jourdan, Kellermann, Lannes, Lefebvre, Massena, Moncey, Mortier, Murat, Ney, Pérignon, Serurier, Soult.

formerly, a college of eighty pensioners; but was, moreover, endowed with estates and splendid residences in the departments. The senate had even previously chosen its members, inasmuch as they might present three candidates for choice to the Emperor; but the latter now obtained the additional right of naming senators immediately. Besides this, the six great dignitaries of the Empire, and the princes, on reaching the age of eighteen, were to have seats and votes in the senate. The duties of the senate had formerly been to select the members of the other colleges from the lists of notables submitted to them; to annul laws and decrees which were at variance with the constitution; and to change the constitution itself, if necessary, by means of organising decrees of the senate. Other duties were now added to these. From this time the senate was to unite with its servile functions the most important privilege of parliaments and states-general. It was required to name a committee, whose duty should be to watch over the personal liberty of the citizens and the liberty of the press; or, in other words, to see that no one should remain in prison without being brought before the proper judge; and that authors were protected from the interference of government. The effect of the senatorial protection of the liberty of the press was, that, from this time forward, not even the appearance of any liberal opinion was allowed to be made public; and the liberty of the subject was so little secured by the servile senate, that in the course of a few years all the prisons were full of persons accused, but never brought to trial. The tribunate, which had allowed itself to be rewarded by an increase of salary of 5000 francs for the service which it had rendered to the new Emperor, was allowed to remain a walking shadow till 1807. It was, however, entirely superfluous from the time when, in 1804, it had been divided, like the council of state, into sections. The publicity of the sittings of the tribunate ceased entirely; the fifty tribunes were divided into three sections, one for legislation, one for finance, and one for internal government. The sections consulted in secret, and apart from each other, with the councillors of state, who communicated to them the intentions of the government, and afterwards, in connexion with the councillors of state, defended these proposals in the legislative body. As the tribunate became by degrees entirely silent, it was thought necessary to preserve at least an appearance of publicity; but this was done merely by transferring the publicity to the legislative body. The members of the legislative body, it was determined, who had formerly merely the power of accepting or rejecting the proposals of the government, should in future be allowed to consult respecting these proposals, in secret session, with the tribunes and councillors of state. The whole publicity of the matter consisted in afterwards making the result of these deliberations known in a public session.

We refrain from any remark on the disgraceful farce acted with the French nation, its rights and its constitution, and content ourselves with quoting in a note the words of an intelligent and well-

informed French statesman, who, on all occasions where it is at all possible, sides very decidedly with Napoleon, his government, and administration.* Neither shall we dwell on the splendid festivities, which were employed to amuse the Parisians, from June till the end of 1804, further than to remark, that they were very dearly bought. In addition to the secret systems of police which the Emperor had formerly introduced, when First Consul,† a police of the Empire was introduced on the 10th of July, or in other words, the ministry of police, under Fouché, established, the abolition of which had been formerly considered a favour done to the people, and a yielding to revolutionary caprice. Fouché had under him four council-lors of state to manage his correspondence, and a large number of inferior officers, who conducted the consultation of the people regarding the hereditary succession. Lavalette was made post-master-general, solely in order that the violation of the secrets of private correspondence by the police, and the systematic opening of letters, might be fully carried out to its fullest extent, under his direction. This same man was regarded all over Europe as a martyr in 1815, simply because men are accustomed to judge from the impressions of the moment. The special tribunals were retained in operation, under the pretext of the war with England, and the trial by jury was suspended for two years in the departments of the Côtes du Nord, Morbihan, Vaucluse, Mouths of the Rhone, Var, Alps, Golo, Liamone, Po, Dura, Sesia, Stura, Marengo, and Tanaro.

The Parisians were consoled for all this by the new Byzantine arrangements, providing a privileged class with titles and orders, who, on public occasions, at court and church festivals, where every one appeared in uniform, and with various decorations, looked proudly down upon mere citizens, as formerly. The first of these theatrical court festivals was celebrated on the 14th of July, with extraordinary temporal and spiritual pomp. The cardinal-legate and a numerous suite of clergy figured in the spiritual portion; Napoleon distributed ribbons, stars, and crosses, to his new order of the legion of honour; and Lacépède, the natural historian, the chancellor of the new order, made a speech which would have done honour to Fontanes. When a serious man like Thibaudeau, who was himself present, calls the ceremony of the 14th of July majestic and imposing, we cannot venture on any remarks on it; though it appears to us that the whole

* Lefebvre, "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," &c., &c., vol. 1, p. 397. "Un Senatus-consulte, qui reglait toutes les parties du nouveau gouvernement, et qui fixait les attributions et les rapports de tous les corps de l'état, fut décreté le 16 Mai, 1804. C'était comme une troisième constitution appropriée au caractère et à la destination de la monarchie. Cette grande révolution dans le gouvernement s'accomplit en l'absence du corps législatif. Jamais on n'avait encore osé afficher un tel mépris des droits des citoyens et de la constitution; mais les esprits étaient déjà tellement façonnés à la dictature, que le défaut de concours des députés de la nation fut à peine remarqué."

† Duroc presided over the police of the palace, the military governor over that of Paris, and Savary, inspecteur-général de gendarmerie, over the secret police of the whole of France.

ceremony was much better suited to England or Germany, and the olden time, than to this mass of Frenchmen, and to the time of Napoleon. Lacépéde's speech, which probably pleased the French very well, appears to us nothing more than a piece of empty declamation. As regards the other powers of Europe, the servile diplomatists of Prussia made so little difficulty about recognising the new Emperor, that they even claimed a considerable share of merit for their king on account of his complaisance; just as they had not failed in claiming considerable merit from the French, for their yielding and complaisant behaviour on the occasion of the murder of the Duc d'Enghien. Austria, too, had been previously consulted, and had raised no objections; intending to take advantage of this circumstance to establish a hereditary Austrian Empire, inasmuch as the German elective Empire had lost all its importance, and for the future could only produce vexation, without any profit whatever.

But of all the fancies which the new Emperor took into his head, the most extraordinary was that encouraged by all those who dreamed of Charlemagne, and who were eager to introduce into France the tasteless etiquette of the Holy Roman Empire; namely, to be spiritually inducted into his office, and thus to render his person sacred. The whole of the negotiations with Rome relative to the pope's journey to Paris, for the purpose of anointing the new Emperor, appear to us nothing less than ridiculous. Napoleon was, on this occasion, no less deceived than the pope: the ceremony of anointing him did not render him holier than he had been, or his empire more durable than it would otherwise have been; and the pope gained nothing for the system of ultra-montanism by the part which Napoleon made him play in Paris. The principal reason for inducing the pope to come, and for spending so much time and money upon the ceremonies during the month of December, was no doubt a wish to eclipse the coronations of former kings in Rheims, and to contrast them with that of the new Emperor. The pope came to Paris in the middle of winter, because it was on the 1st of December that the senate caused to be presented to the Emperor, by one of its orators—the senator François de Neufchateau—the decree respecting the hereditary succession; and the coronation and anointing was to take place on the 2nd. A description of, or any observations on, the festivities on the second and following days—on the luxury, the expense, and the splendour of the various dignitaries of the court and of the Empire—on the ceremony itself, and the etiquette observed at it,—would not be suitable in a work like the present, which is written for very different purposes. We shall merely remark, therefore, that the festivities were said to have cost eighty-five millions of francs. We remember very well, that every one was full of astonishment, admiration, and joy, on the occasion. Such is the nature of man!

It has been noticed, as an instance of cleverness on the part of Napoleon, that he did not allow the pope to place the crown on his

head, but took it from the altar and placed it on his head himself. This appears to us merely childish, particularly after so much stress had been laid upon the pope's performing the ceremony. If circumstances had been favourable, the Roman diplomatists were clever enough to draw the same conclusions from the anointing as from the coronation, and to found the same rights upon it; and if circumstances were unfavourable, as they certainly were from 1805 to 1808, the new autocrat could not have considered himself more bound to ultra-montanism by the coronation, than he was already by the anointing.

§ II.

RENEWAL OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE—HOSTILITY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE CONTINENTAL POWERS.

A.—ENGLAND.

WHEN, shortly before the peace of Amiens, Pitt and his friends, with their immoderate zeal against France and everything French, retired from the government, a better relation between France and England existed for some time. The tone of Pitt's ministry towards Napoleon may be best judged of by the pamphlets, which procured for Canning, in his twenty-first year, the favourable notice of the minister, and a position in the ministry. Canning has since sufficiently proved that this tone, borrowed from Marat or Junius, was not made use of by him from fanaticism, but from a knowledge of the English national character, and from policy. Addington's ministry, too, was full of English prejudices, and influenced by the blind fear of George III. Even in 1802, therefore, it was greatly embarrassed by Bonaparte's activity. The most remarkable man in this ministry was Lord Eldon, the celebrated lawyer, and the friend of long suits and of the various tricks of the law; Addington, who had been speaker of the House of Commons, but was no statesman, was also assisted by a raving French-hater, Lord Hawkesbury, son of that Lord Liverpool, who, under the name of Jenkinson, had been for several years the friend and secret adviser of George III. The Duke of Portland and the Earl of Westmoreland, two representatives of the highest and most wealthy circles, such as are necessary in every English ministry to secure the votes of the parliament, had retained their places, as the new ministry was in point of fact of the same colour in politics as the former one.

The principal employment of the new ministry, as it had been that of the previous one, was to keep the king in good humour at the expense of the nation. The previous ministry had five times paid the pretended debts of the king, during a time when the taxes were

very oppressive and the finances in a very unsatisfactory state: the new ministry paid them for the sixth time, and also refused to indemnify the Prince of Wales for his revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall. This latter was not done because the prince was enormously expensive and a *roué* of the first class, but because his father had disagreed with him, and favoured the Duke of York, who was no less a spendthrift and a *roué* than his brother. During Addington's ministry, the ruling party actually and publicly insulted the misery of the people. The speaker of the House of Commons had been taken into the ministry to strengthen the ruling party, and had been made chancellor of the exchequer; and a lawyer (Abbott) was elected speaker. This man, as representative of the house, had the audacity, in his speech to the king, not merely to say, *that it had been a great pleasure to the Parliament* to pay the king's debts for the sixth time, but to add, that the king (not the people or the Parliament) was the chief support of English liberty.*

As the English, as well as the French, remained faithful to their original plans, notwithstanding the peace, a pretext for new quarrels was formed as early as 1802. The English had expected that France would have concluded a commercial treaty with them: they were deceived in their expectations. Bonaparte was naturally irritated, at finding that all the conspiracies, and treasonable correspondence of the royalists were assisted and supported by England. This was denied by the English ministers; but Bonaparte's police daily brought him confirmatory evidence of the fact. An emigrant named Peltier edited a French paper in London, intended for circulation in France, in which Bonaparte was constantly the object of the most virulent attacks; Bonaparte, on the other hand, who was almost ridiculously tender on this point, complained incessantly of the English for protecting this paper. He was also very severely handled in some of the English papers; and when he demanded that the conspirators should be banished from London, and that the papers should be suppressed and prosecuted, this could not be granted him for constitutional reasons. Peltier was prosecuted and fined; but Bonaparte soon saw that this trial had been more injurious to himself than to the accused: he took the matter, therefore, into his own hands. All the newspapers in France, and in the countries dependent on France, were full of the most violent language against England; and this, with the very strict censorship of the press exercised in France, was quite a different thing from the tirades of English editors, who were quite independent of the government, and who only gave publicity to their own often

* That every one may judge for himself, we give here Mr. Abbott's words to the king, on the 28th of June, 1802: "It has given the highest satisfaction to your majesty's faithful commons, to relieve those pressing demands, which the general difficulties of the times had cast upon the provision assigned by Parliament for the support of your majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of your crown. For this country has not now to learn, *that the monarchy is the best and strongest security for the liberties of the people*, and that the splendour of the throne reflects lustre and dignity upon the whole nation."

extravagant ideas. Bonaparte himself dictated some of the most violent articles, and compelled them to be received into German papers, by his influence with the German governments. The quarrel lasted from May, 1802, till January, 1803, when it had reached its height. In the course of the year 1802, Bonaparte had given a hint of his intentions, by converting the Cisalpine into an Italian republic, and causing himself to be chosen its president; Piedmont had been united with France, and General Sebastiani despatched to Egypt and to the East on a mission, involving important consequences to both England and Russia. The expedition against St. Domingo, the forced surrender of Louisiana by the Spaniards, and the demand that they should also cede the Floridas, had excited jealousy; and towards the end of the year 1802, the political contest had become a personal quarrel between Bonaparte, to whom nature had entirely refused any diplomatic talent, and the most obstinate portion of the English aristocracy, whom the rest blindly followed from habit.

In August, 1802, the contest respecting newspapers, respecting tolerated emigrants and assistance rendered to conspirators, was embittered by a contest respecting Malta, which gave rise to some violent diplomatic explanations. It had been agreed by the late peace, that the island should be given up, three months after the ratification of the treaty, to the Neapolitans, who should hold it temporarily, for the Knights of Malta. The French, who were quartered in the Neapolitan harbours and fortresses, were, on the other hand, to evacuate them. The English hesitated, and at first excused their hesitation, on the ground that a grand-master had not yet been chosen; it was known, however, that their intrigues in Rome hindered the choice of a grand-master; and that, by means of Queen Caroline, they delayed the departure of the 2000 Neapolitan troops who were to occupy the island. Naples was, however, at last obliged to send the troops. The English then sought for other excuses, and excluded the Neapolitans from the town. The interchange of ambassadors, who were to maintain the friendly relations between the two powers, was therefore put off from month to month; and when at last, in November, 1802, Lord Whitworth was despatched to Paris, and General Andreossy to London, every one anticipated a new rupture before long.

The English ministry had given express orders to the governor of Malta not to evacuate the place, and caused the king, in his address to Parliament, on Nov. 23, to make use of words very important under the circumstances.* These words appear expressly intended

* We quote the words here referred to: "In my intercourse with foreign powers, I have been actuated by a sincere disposition for the maintenance of peace. It is, nevertheless, impossible for me to lose sight of that established and wise system of policy by which the interest of other states are connected with our own, and I can, therefore, not be indifferent to any material change in their relative condition and strength. My conduct will be invariably regulated by a due consideration of the actual situation of Europe, and by a watchful solicitude for the permanent welfare of my people."

to raise the whole violence of the Old England party, in and out of Parliament, against Bonaparte and the French, on the occasion of the debate on the address; and, in fact, all those who exercised the greatest influence on their countrymen—Grenville, Canning, Windham—launched out on this occasion into the most violent invectives. Bonaparte answered these by much more violent invectives, which took up two whole columns in the *Moniteur*, and were reprinted, by command, in several other papers. Bonaparte had been at the same time deeply offended personally, by the manner in which Sir Robert Wilson and his history of the Egyptian expedition had been received by the king and the Duke of York, who were then at the head of that party which considered every ecclesiastical and political prejudice as a palladium of Old England. The book is full of unworthy accusations against Bonaparte; it contains the most malicious accusations, and evidently untrue accounts. The Duke of York, however, permitted it to be dedicated to him; and the king, who was not in general very amiable in that way, received General Wilson, who had served as a major in the Egyptian expedition, with distinguished condescension.

Bonaparte avenged himself for this in his peculiar way. He caused all the rhodomontades of Colonel Sebastiani, whom he had despatched to the coast of Africa, to Egypt, and to Turkey, and all his vituperations against the English, to be reprinted in the *Moniteur*, from his report, and even took care that his attack on England was a little sharpened. When Sebastiani's report, thus aggravated, appeared in the *Moniteur*, towards the end of January, 1803, the English national pride was deeply wounded; the war-party in England became all powerful, and it was definitely declared that Malta should not be given up. Under these circumstances, prudence would have required Bonaparte to have left the negotiations with Lord Whitworth entirely to Talleyrand; as he must have foreseen himself, that in a personal interview, the coolness and pride of the Englishman would rouse his own excitable and violent temperament to rage. Personally, however, he probably reckoned upon a rupture even on the 18th of February, when he apostrophised Lord Whitworth as he did—a rupture which his ministers, and he himself in his cooler moments, thought it prudent to delay.

Lord Whitworth wrote down the conversation which he had with Bonaparte, on the 18th of February, immediately after it had taken place, and it is to be found among the documents which the English published in reference to the renewal of the war. The scene which occurred between Bonaparte and Lord Whitworth can be better understood from this collection of documents, or from Bignon's report, than from the long talk that Thiers gives on the subject. The fact is, that Bonaparte, when he publicly attacked Lord Whitworth, as representative of his government, had a conversation with him, in which he did not show a particle of diplomatic skill; but so much the more the military violence of his Corsican nature. He boasted,

he threatened; he wandered from the point, as was his custom when he made speeches; he betrayed his weakness during the heat of his discourse, manifested ill-will, and, at the same time, showed clearly how difficult it would be for him to give effect to his threats. In order to be as concise as possible in the text, we cite in the note the few words in which Lefebvre gives the official account of the transaction.* This violence towards the representative of the English nation—his declaration that he still entertained the expectation of possessing Egypt—could have no other effect than that of urging an energetic government like the English, and one not at all inferior to Bonaparte himself in firmness, to oppose his designs. Lord Hawkesbury, therefore, declared to General Andreossy, on the 11th of March, that England would not cede Malta, and that, if Bonaparte insisted upon its cession, the ministry of which he was a member would be obliged to retire and make way for that which it had succeeded.

Bonaparte had in the mean time perceived that he had been too hasty, and had commissioned Talleyrand to make good the harm he had done by his violent scene on the 18th, and by an article in the *Moniteur* of the 23rd of February. This article was in the form of a report on the condition of the Empire; but was so violent in its expressions, so insulting to the English nation, that the English ministry, which wished to preserve peace, if possible, felt itself in a very embarrassing position.† We must not forget, that all this happened just at the time when Bonaparte was excessively irritated about Georges Cadoudal's conspiracy, which he attributed entirely to the English, and which was at least aided by English money, and by their consuls and navy.

Bonaparte's insulting article of February 23rd was answered by the

* Lefebvre, "Hist. des Cabinets de l'Europe," &c., vol. i., p. 270. "Il avait reçu, dit il, beaucoup de provocations des Anglais depuis la conclusion du traité d'Amiens, il ne s'en dissimulait aucun. On lui reprochait de penser à l'Egypte: s'il avait voulu la plus importante était leur refus d'évacuer Malte et Alexandrie. A cet égard, aucune considération ne pouvait le faire changer: il aimeraient mieux voir les Anglais maîtres du faubourg St. Antoine que de Malte. Le ressentiment qu'il éprouvait contre l'Angleterre augmentait de jour en jour, parceque chaque vent qui soufflait des côtes de ce pays ne lui apportait qu'inimitié contre sa personne. Si la guerre devait éclater, il était résolu de tenter une descente, quelque danger qu'elle offrir, et s'en emparer, il aurait pu le faire en envoyant 25,000 hommes à Aboukir. Mais il ne le fit pas, quelque désir qu'il pût avoir de la posséder comme colonie, parcequ'il ne croyait pas qu'elle valût la peine de courir les risques d'une guerre dans laquelle il pourrait être regardé comme l'agresseur, puisque tôt ou tard l'Egypte appartenirait à la France, soit par la chute de l'empire Tûc, soit par quelque arrangement avec la Porte."

† Bignon and his party are too good advocates of Napoleon to give the most objectionable part of this report, to be found in the *Moniteur*, An XI., col. 629:—"Tant que durera cette lutte des partis en Angleterre, il est des mesures que la prudence commande au gouvernement de la république. Cinq cent mille hommes doivent être et sont prêts à la défendre et à la venger. Etrange nécessité que de miserables passions imposent à deux nations, qu'un intérêt et une égale volonté attachent à la paix. Quelque soit à Londres le succès de l'intrigue, elle n'entrainera pas d'autres peuples dans les lignes nouvelles, et, le gouvernement le dit avec un juste orgueil, seule l'Angleterre ne saurait aujourd'hui lutter contre la France."

English on March 8th—not by words, but, according to their custom, by action. A royal message of this date required serious preparations for war; and the Parliament immediately acted upon the message.* This induced Bonaparte to give vent to his dissatisfaction against England, in an exceedingly insulting address to Lord Whitworth, at his next court-day, on which occasion he also attacked the Swedish ambassador in a manner quite unheard of in polite society. Before some two hundred persons assembled at his levée, he addressed the English ambassador harshly and insultingly, after having caused Talleyrand to read over to him previously a note full of threatening expressions and hostile intentions towards England.† These scenes and conversations, which are treated as very important in most books, appear to us to be only so in as far as they illustrate the personal character of the First Consul. In a political point of view, they were a subject of complaint, but by no means the reason of the war; for the English ministry had previously given orders to occupy Cape Town, which had been given up to the Dutch, according to the terms of the peace. The English, upon this, concluded a capitulation with the Dutch, by which the latter were so bound up, that the English could take possession of the town at any moment. This capitulation Bonaparte caused to be printed in the *Moniteur*, with the heading, “A capitulation in the midst of peace!” after having previously compelled the Hamburg papers to insert an article dictated by himself. This article was justly stigmatised by

* “His majesty,” it said, “thinks it necessary to acquaint the House of Commons, that, as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of Holland and France, he has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his majesty and the French government, the result of which must at present be uncertain, his majesty is induced to make this communication to his faithful Commons, in the fullest persuasion that, whilst they partake of his majesty’s earnest and unvarying solicitude for the continuance of peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on their public spirit and liberality, to enable his majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require, for supporting the honour of his crown and the essential interests of his people.”

† The First Consul, this note said, intended to send a fresh army to Holland; he would form a camp on the Hanoverian boundary, and several more along the coast of the Channel; his troops should continue to remain in Switzerland; he would re-occupy the Neapolitan territory, and particularly Tarentum; the whole of Europe should participate in his wars. Talleyrand’s note itself is to be found in the official papers. Lord Whitworth gives the following account of the termination of the conversation, to which we refer, in order that our readers may compare it with Thiers’ account:—Lastly, says Lord Whitworth, Bonaparte said, *Treaties must be observed; woe to those who do not observe them! they shall be made answerable for their conduct before all Europe.* Bonaparte, continues Lord Whitworth, was so violently agitated, that it would not have been prudent for me to prolong the conversation; I made no answer, therefore, and he returned to the private apartments, repeating his last words as he retired. I must also remark, he adds, that this whole conversation was aloud; that it was heard by some two hundred persons; and I am convinced that there was not a single one among them who did not feel, on this occasion, the extraordinary impropriety of Bonaparte’s conduct, and his entire want of dignity and manners.

the English government as the *coarsest and most disgraceful Pasquil* ever forced upon the Hamburg papers; and every one was astonished that Lord Whitworth and General Andreossy remained at their posts a day after its appearance. Even before the breaking out of the war, the Dutch were equally ill-treated by their friends, the French, and by the English; but their meanness and truckling had long deprived them of all sympathy. Bonaparte, not content with the absolute disposal of the so-called Dutch army, sent 7000 French into the country, whom he soon increased to 18,000. The English not only took Cape Town from them in the midst of peace, but took advantage of the enormous exertions they had made during the one year of peace to plunder them more completely. According to Ouwekerke de Vries, above 4000 Dutch ships traded with this port in the course of a year; the English therefore, according to their indefensible custom, granted letters of marque long before the real commencement of the war; so that nearly all these vessels were captured the moment war was declared. In the third part of his "Beurtheilung Napoleons," the author has treated at large, and critically, the correspondence, the diplomatic notes, and the negotiations, to which Thiers has devoted the greater part of his 16th book; he here, therefore, only briefly gives the result.

King George III. could not endure Pitt's domineering manner; but if a war should break out, there was no one else who could hold the helm of state. Lord Whitworth continued, therefore, to negotiate, when there was, in fact, no chance whatever of avoiding a war. Bonaparte himself wished to delay the crisis, although he perceived that a war was unavoidable; and had therefore sold Louisiana to the North Americans for eighty millions of francs. Finally, an end was put to all this diplomatic writing and talking, when Lord Whitworth, on the 23rd of April, definitely stated the demands, without a concession of which peace could not be preserved; or, in diplomatic language, handed in his ultimatum. These demands excited Bonaparte's anger to a violent degree; he would not even hear of granting them; and, on the 11th of May, Lord Whitworth left Paris, travelling however very slowly, as negotiations were still pending, although, ten days after, war was declared on both sides. The war began with injuries done, on both sides, to those who were, in defiance of all right and justice, shut in between them; because both parties were equally consistent, equally unconcerned about right or morality, and therefore equally practical and egotistical.

The English practised their above-mentioned piratical custom, and not only captured the Dutch ships, but some two hundred French vessels, before these latter could have any idea that war was declared. Bonaparte made the Germans pay for the crimes of the English. About this time, too, Bonaparte began his enormous preparations for an invasion of England, which he continued, at an immense expense of time, trouble, and money, till September, 1805. All the French papers were filled with accounts of the ports on the Channel, which

were being fortified and cleared out, so as to be able to contain a number of transports; all the books which treat of this period are filled with well-sounding phrases on the inventive powers and activity of the idolized hero, in exercising soldiers and sailors, and in getting together ships of war in Brest, for the protection of the transport-ships. For our own part, we cannot believe that Bonaparte ever seriously intended to invade England; his preparations for it served, however, to keep the English in constant excitement. The English militia was being constantly exercised, and all trade and business was forced to give way to warlike exercises; the expenses were enormous, and all trade was at a stand. In all the ports, from Brest to Texel, ships of war were collected; all the towns situated on the larger rivers sent transports, as a sort of patriotic contribution, and Boulogne became one of the wonders of the world, by its fortifications, by the number of ships in its harbour, and by the embarkation of so many troops; the whole coast of the Channel was covered with camps.

B.—HUMILIATION OF GERMANY, PRUSSIA, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL.

Germany, in 1803, afforded a striking proof of the miserable condition of a nation when the people have no voice in its affairs, when it is betrayed and sold by its princes and ministers, sacrificed by its nobility to pride or mere gain, and deserted by its emperor. The German emperor was not ashamed to help to plunder certain members of the empire particularly recommended to his care, in order to be enabled to provide for his relation, the Duke of Modena, in Germany; Prussia had already deserted the empire in the course of the war. Baden, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg, accepted from France sovereign power over the free knights of the empire; and when these latter appealed to the emperor for protection against the soldiers of Baden, Bavaria, and Wirtemberg, he appeared, indeed, as if willing to assist them; but a single threat from Bonaparte kept him silent. Bonaparte, therefore, did not scruple, in 1803, to consider the still-existing German Empire as something like Turkey, and to make Prussia's neutrality, the honour of its king, and of the German nation, a mere by-word, by his invasion of Hanover! Hanover experienced at this period the disadvantages of a country being subject to a triple government: its king was a foreigner, whose un-German princes were in Hanover itself; it was governed by a German minister, who resided in London with the king; but it was also ruled by an oligarchy in Hanover, composed of members of the principal caste. If a continued striving after incomprehensible depths, hatred of simple common-sense, hypercriticism, and ultra-learnedness, had not rendered the Germans divided among themselves, and incapable of any commonplace instruction, they would undoubtedly have learned from the course of events in Hanover what are the inevitable results, to a country governed by officials, of

servility in men in office, of the spirit of caste among the high nobility, of the useless education of the learned, and of presumption and pride among people of rank. Hanover had been loudly and repeatedly threatened by Bonaparte for more than a year; he had stated openly in his newspapers that he would occupy Hanover, on the breaking out of the war with England; but in Hanover itself all was still. The old course of things went on as usual; the noble lords trusted in the cabinet-councillor, Rudlof; and this man, like others of his stamp, considered enthusiasm to be absurd, and patriotism dangerous. How could any one in Hanover think of anything new? How could they think of arming the people for the defence of their country? How could the titled oligarchs take counsel with the people? How could they condescend so far as to inform citizens and peasants of the dangers which threatened their country? All remained silent; the court, the nobility, and the higher officials, continued their old course, as usual. There was at this time in Hanover a court kept up at considerable expense, though there was no king; the nobility had an academy, the princes kept several hundred hunters; there was a ministry, too, which had much pride and splendour, but no real power; for all the power was in the hands of Von Lenthe, who resided in London with the king, and who sent orders to Hanover in his name. There was also in Hanover King George's son—the Duke of Cambridge (for of the Duke of Cumberland, it has always been, the less said the better); but he, as lieutenant-general, only held a subordinate station, the Count of Walmoden-Gimborn being commander-in-chief of the army. This count was no genius, but he possessed both military courage and experience; he was, however, not merely immediately dependent on the government, but also mediately on the princes; and he was never initiated into any of Rudlof's secrets. Besides all this, he was always careful, like others of the German nobles, not to give offence or to irritate Bonaparte; how could he then insist on energetic measures? The cabinet-councillor, Rudlof, to whom the ministers Arnswalde, Kielmansegge, and Von der Decken, left the whole of the details of government, was one of those never-forgetting, very learned, pedantic, practical jurists, of whom Germany has so much too many, owing to the great quantity of writing, the style of its universities, and its secret administration of justice. He enjoyed the revenues of the abbey of Bursfelde, and belonged to the numerous class of statesmen of Pütter's school, with whom Germany has at various times been blessed. This man of documents remained quietly travelling on in his jog-trot way, long after the French had collected a powerful army in Holland, close to the German boundary. He, as well as Count Walmoden, who commanded some 15,000 men, relied on Prussia, upon the written and sealed documents securing the rights of princes of the empire, and upon treaties to which no one at this time paid any regard: they thought of no harm. Lenthe, too, although, being in London, he ought to have been better in-

formed, and should have known of the threatened invasion, suspected nothing. George III. alone was anxious about Hanover, and at last he sent M. Von der Decken to Berlin, to seek the protection of the King of Prussia for a country contained within the line of neutrality which had always been drawn by him; but Frederick William III. was in bad hands, and sought, in his fear, to avoid doing anything which might be displeasing to the French. When Von der Decken's mission was found to be vain, and the war between England and France inevitable, Von Lenthe appeared desirous of acting in the name of the king. He wrote to the ministry in Hanover to desire Walmoden to organise an army. Then began, as is the custom in Germany, not a movement and active preparation, but a correspondence, and on this occasion rather a comical one. Walmoden asked, "*How he was to organise it?*" The ministry, or rather, which is the same thing, the pedantical bureaucrat Rudlof, answered, "*So as to avoid everything which might cause excitement.*" The consequence of this was, of course, that nothing was done, because, without some excitement, no measure worthy of being carried out, and worthy of the resolution of dying honourably, can be put in operation. At the very time, therefore, when the French army, which had been sent to Holland, was collected in Nimeguen, and when Mortier, formerly commandant of the Parisian territorial division, was appointed general of the army against Hanover, and Leopold Berthier, brother of César Berthier, named chief of the general's staff, and very shortly before the final review which was held by Mortier over his troops, on the 12th of May, Walmoden, who knew nothing of all this, announced, on the 9th of May, to the bureaucrat in Hanover, that he should require *three weeks* to organise his army.

At last, when Mortier had actually commenced his march, the oligarchs of Hanover appeared to wake up; but instead of endeavouring to arouse the flame of patriotism in the breasts of the people, they issued, on the 16th of May, a proclamation quite in keeping with the rest of their conduct. They made use, in this proclamation, of exactly the same sort of language which they would have used in summoning the peasants to a battue. The Hanoverians were commanded to arm themselves for the defence of their noble masters, *on pain of fine and imprisonment in case of refusal.* This proclamation was printed by Bonaparte's order in the *Moniteur*, and criticised with merciless ridicule; and at the same time, the *Moniteur* informed its readers, that the Dukes of Cumberland and Cambridge had hastily left the country, as soon as Hanover was actually threatened. The very noble lords, too, who, on the 16th, had commanded the peasants, under a penalty, to take the field for them, began to fear that they might themselves suffer in person or property for having shown themselves to be so bold. On the 21st, therefore, they issued a second proclamation, in which they stated that they had not intended the citizens and peasants to arm themselves, but merely to cause themselves to be enrolled, in case it might be necessary for them to

take up arms at some future period. All this could only have the effect of disheartening Walmoden, who was by no means wanting in military courage. He could not help perceiving, that the ruling caste, who willingly endangered life or health in obtaining some post of honour in some court assembly, had not the slightest idea of sacrificing even the smallest portion of their possessions for their fellow-citizens or for their country.

The Hanoverian general did not even know from what quarter the French intended to advance, till Mortier left Coevorden on the 28th. He then proceeded to occupy Bentheim, and drove the Hanoverians from Osnaburg. People, officers, and soldiers, were willing to save at least the honour of the nation, in a bloody battle for their country—for there could then be no chance of conquering; but the men in power—the high nobility, the officials, and the jurists—behaved on this occasion in Hanover just as they did all over Germany from 1794 to 1813. They were too anxious for their places, their property, and possessions, for any noble thought, any heroic resolution, to find a place in their souls, broken and bent down by long servility. Every sacrifice for ideal benefits was, in their opinion, enthusiastic; they, like Bonaparte, considered patriotism merely an ideal good, and confined themselves to what was practically useful. The Hanoverian army and their general were willing to fight; they had even contended successfully on one occasion, when commissioners arrived from the titled government and the bureaucrats. These commissioners were the supreme judge, Von Bremer, and the finance commissioner, Brandis, who was honoured as the apostle of prosaic worldly prudence, by the professorial caste in Göttingen. These gentlemen supported the principle, worthy of a tradesman or of a finance-commissioner, that wherever nothing is to be gained, it is advisable to contrive to suffer the least possible loss. On the 2nd of June, they left Nienburg on the Weser, where the brave Hanoverian army was obliged, much against its will, to halt; and accompanied by Lieutenant-colonel Von Bock, proceeded to Suhlingen, to deliver up the army and the people into the hands of their enemies, without even permitting them to try the fortune of a battle, which, whatever might be the result, would at least have steeled the spirits of the Germans. It cannot even be said that they concluded a capitulation in Suhlingen, for it is an undoubted fact that they wrote down exactly whatever occurred to the French general, at the moment. These two German pedants apparently concluded a capitulation of seventeen articles at Suhlingen, on the 3rd of June; but a single article in it rendered all the rest null and void. The whole country, as far as the Elbe, was to be given up to the French; and the Hanoverian army was to encamp beyond the Elbe, in Lauenburg, until English vessels should arrive to convey the troops to England. But the whole capitulation depended on Bonaparte's ratification of it; and this was the point which rendered the whole thing a mere farce. It was also clearly shown how useless was the wisdom of Messrs. Bremer and

Brandis, who allowed the granting of the conditions given to them to depend on Bonaparte's consent, and yet promised, on their own part, immediately to disarm the country and the army. Bonaparte made his ratification of the treaty depend on a condition which the English, who had nothing in common with the Hanoverians, except the king and the princes, could not possibly comply with, and which, in fact, had been already rejected by them in the seven years' war. Bonaparte required that the Hanoverian army should be disbanded, as if it had been an English one; the English considered this ridiculous—and justly; and Mortier then demanded an unconditional submission.

At this period of universal danger, the practical wisdom of the learned professors in Göttingen was shown in their providing for their own safety, while their country became a prey to the French. Bonaparte's advisers, and he himself, eagerly caught at the opportunity of purchasing the reputation of protecting those literary men who did homage to the French academy, and who considered it the summit of fame to be correspondents of these vain forty, by his favourable treatment of the University of Göttingen. It was announced, that as Heyne and Martens were correspondents of the French academy, Bonaparte would feel pleasure in treating favourably an institution so closely connected with his own learned body. The best account of the manner in which the whole of the Hanoverian world of officials, courtiers, and lackeys, rivalled Göttingen in cringing and humiliating themselves, is that given by Mangourit, whom Bonaparte had despatched to Hanover as a sort of spy or collector of information.* All the haughty nobles of Hanover cringed to this Jacobin, who had been deposed from being criminal judge (lieutenant criminel) in 1782, and was afterwards sent as secretary of legation to Naples, but was not received there, from his well-known worthless character. He afterwards appeared to rather better advantage in Switzerland, and was at the time of this mission one of Fouché's instruments.

If the wise men of the cabinet, who were accustomed to keep everything a secret, had communicated to Count Walmoden, as general of the army, the whole of the capitulation of Suhlingen, and more especially that portion of it which rendered it entirely dependent on Bonaparte's consent, he would certainly never have surrendered his country and its army to the French, with their hands tied; but for fear that he might not place himself in the power of the enemy quickly enough, they only informed him of those points which had special reference to the army. He sur-

* He afterwards wrote a thick book, full of absurdities, giving an account of his mission to Hanover, in which all manner of heterogeneous materials were mixed up together; the most important part of it is to be found in the German abstract of it: "Der Hannöversche Staat in allen seinen Beziehungen: geschildert in den Jahren 1803 à 1804. Nach dem Französischen des Mangourit." Hamburg, vis Adolf Schmidt, 1805. 8vo.

rendered Hameln to the French, in obedience to the orders which he received, and delivered up to them his artillery, pontoons, and horses. The Hanoverians encamped in Lauenburg; and Walmoden was very much astonished at hearing, soon afterwards, of the article respecting the ratification: he wisely avoided showing himself to the army in Lauenburg, now seriously angry at this conduct on the part of their rulers, until he had at last resolved to venture everything at their head.

Bonaparte had refused his consent to the capitulation of Suhlingen, and sent orders to Mortier to cross the Elbe, in order to compel the Hanoverians to unconditional submission. It was on the 29th of June that Mortier arrived at the Elbe; the Hanoverian army was resolved to show the world what armed despair was capable of doing, to rescue the honour of a nation; but neither the Hanoverian officials nor the feudal Parliament had any conception of such conduct. The officials, on the contrary, afforded every assistance to the enemy, in order that no one might think of finding safety in resistance or with the army, and assisted the French in plundering the country. Everything was made easy for the French, who, if they had been compelled to resort to violent measures, to rob, burn—and murder—would inevitably have roused the whole population against themselves. Every civil officer remained at his post, and served, as usual, against the people. A commission of five was appointed, to govern in the name of the French; and one of the members of this commission was the same supreme judge, Von Bremer, who had concluded the capitulation with so much diplomatic talent. By means of this commission, the country was ruled as easily as if it had been a French province. The feudal Parliament at length appeared on the stage, to persuade the army to give up their absurd notions of sacrificing themselves in defence of the national honour. Officers and soldiers had announced their intention of resisting the passage of the French over the Elbe; all preparations had been made for this resistance; when, on the 28th of June, commissioners arrived from the feudal Parliament.

M. von Lenthe and Major-General von Wangenheim had undertaken to throw cold water upon the fire of national enthusiasm. They declared to the army, in so many words, that if they persisted in resisting, *and thus brought misery upon their country*, they had nothing to expect from the Parliament; that if, on the contrary, they would allow themselves to be disgraced, so that the French might be enabled to permit every one to continue in the enjoyment of his property and his comforts, on the sole condition of becoming their very humble servant, the Parliament *would provide for their maintenance*. The conduct of these men, belonging as they did to the body of knights of the empire, was the more disgraceful on this occasion, as they sought, by a secret dissemination of this message, to create dissension between the meanner portion of the army and the more noble and patriotic

portion of it. They had first summoned Walmoden, in the name of the Parliament, to surrender himself and his army to the French. He had, however, assembled the generals, and, with their consent, very shortly refused to obey this order: hence their wish of sowing dissension in the army. The French had made all their preparations for crossing the Elbe—they had collected vessels and erected batteries; they hesitated, however, when they saw that the Hanoverians intended to resist. Von Lenthe and Von Wangenheim endeavoured to induce their brave countrymen to submit to the French. This was, however, by no means so easy a task as they had supposed; and the two gentlemen were not a little perplexed, when two proposals which they had the audacity to make were unconditionally rejected by Walmoden, because his Hanoverians refused to surrender their arms and horses to the French. The deputies of the Parliament, therefore, made a third proposal; they professed themselves willing, in the name of the Parliament, to take the disgrace upon themselves. They would receive the arms from the army, and themselves surrender them and the horses to the French. Even this third proposal would have been rejected by Walmoden, but the deputies had, unfortunately, been successful in exciting fears for their subsistence in two regiments of cavalry. When these two regiments, therefore, refused to serve, Count Walmoden had, at last, an interview with the French general, on board a ship in the Elbe, at Artlenburg. A new capitulation was concluded there, on the 5th of July, by which it was agreed that the Hanoverian army should be disbanded, and its arms and horses given up; not by the soldiers themselves, but by the deputies of the Parliament, who were to receive them from the soldiers.* The Hanoverians thus merited, twice over, all the miseries they afterwards suffered, in consequence of this behaviour on the part of their government and their nobility. Any one who had any idea of honour would have seen at once, as was amply proved by the result, that it would have been infinitely better for them to have staked everything on an honourable battle, than to have meanly submitted to never-ending and disgraceful insults. How bitterly did the worldly souls, who cared only for money and comfort, lament the insolence and oppression of the French officials! How did the haughtiest of the nobility cringe and bend before the foreigners! How eager were the nobility and the officials, as instruments of the French, to throw the burden of the supply of horses, and of the eighteen millions of francs which were to be paid between June

* According to this third capitulation of Walmoden, the army delivered up their arms, horses, &c., to the deputies of the parliament; the inferior officers and soldiers were allowed to return home, on leave; and officers without private property were provided for by the state. The reader who wishes to see the whole meanness of the History of a man like Thiers, and of his sophistries, has only to read his account of these transactions, in the 4th part of his soulless composition, vol. iv., p. 300, *et seq.* As to the plunder itself, the French received on the spot 500 cannons, 400,000 lbs. of powder, 3,000,000 cartouches, 4000 horses, and 40,000 muskets.

and December, 1803, from their own shoulders on those of the wretched citizens and peasants! How did the Göttingen professors boast that their celebrity had freed them from the burdens which oppressed all their poorer countrymen!

Prussia, in the mean time, had fallen as low as Hanover; because the weak king allowed himself to be led by such men as Haugwitz, Lucchesini, the two Lombards, Beyme, and others; and these were men of the same stamp as the Hanoverian officials and knights. The King of Prussia was undoubtedly often deceived by this party of the times of the Countess Lichtenau; its chiefs were often agreed with Talleyrand, long before the king at all suspected it; and several steps which they advised the king to take—as, for example, the sending of Lombard to Brussels—were merely taken, in order to conceal the fact that they had already pledged themselves as to what the king should do. Bonaparte had previously despatched to Berlin his cold, solemn, and silent Duroc, who quite suited the King of Prussia—who was, in fact, very fond of him—in order to secure the king entirely in his net, and to separate him from all the other powers, by inducing him to allow himself to be used as a tool of the French, against the other members of the empire; but this appeared to the king too great a venture. The intriguing party at his court had not the courage of bold criminals; they wished to serve both the French and their enemies, and were, of course, esteemed and respected by neither.

As soon as the French took possession of Hanover, the English blockaded the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. The King of Prussia offered, if they would open the navigation of these rivers, to cause Hanover to be occupied by his troops; and, in due course, to evacuate it again. England, however, could not agree to this; for the simple reason, that it had nothing in common with Hanover, except that its constitutional king was also a member of the German Empire, in which capacity it was the duty of the emperor and of the King of Prussia to protect him. And, in fact, a sort of farce, which appeared to have this object, was played by Prussia, immediately after the occupation of Hanover by Bonaparte. Haugwitz wished to make it appear that his sovereign, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, did not suffer Bonaparte to penetrate so far into Germany, that, at a day's notice he could occupy Denmark, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg, without at least some remonstrance. The whole affair was, most probably, previously arranged between Lucchesini, Haugwitz, Bonaparte, and Talleyrand; and the king was afterwards persuaded that it was necessary, to discover Bonaparte's intentions with respect to Hanover; and that no one was so fit for this as the cabinet-councillor Lombard, an associate and companion of the trio.

Bonaparte happened to be on a journey in Belgium when Lombard undertook the mission. He met him in Brussels, and was received very graciously, although the object of the mission was, professedly, the evacuation of Hanover. This was in July, 1803.

Bignon, and the Belgian author who has employed the documents collected by Hardenberg, afterwards concealed during the occupation of Berlin, and then enlarged by whole volumes of remarks not at all to be depended on, in composing his "Memoirs of a Statesman," assert, that Bonaparte offered at that time to cede Hanover to the King of Prussia if he would conclude an alliance with him; but we now know, from perfectly good authority, that this was not the fact.* Bonaparte entirely captivated Lombard, by the amiability and condescension so peculiarly his own; he quite enchanted the cabinet-councillor; he overwhelmed him with fine phrases; he even expressed some idea that Hanover might become Prussian: and the vain and credulous ambassador convinced his sentimental king of the excellent intentions of the First Consul. The king was affected; he took it all to be as it was stated, and finally sent an autograph letter to Paris, with the following moving proposals:—"Prussia and Russia undertake to be security, that during the war with England, France shall be attacked by no continental power. They expect, on the other hand, that the First Consul will engage no further to molest neutral states; that he will diminish to 20,000 men his army in Hanover, which has been unaccountably increased; and that he will make no preparations for a descent on England along the rivers Elbe and Weser; and will, in no respect, disturb or hinder the trade and navigation of these rivers. The king expects, also, that the district of Ritzebüttel, belonging to Hamburg, shall be evacuated, and the Hanse Towns no further interfered with." All this was written without any reference to Russia, and was, consequently, of no value at all: and Russia, moreover, felt itself aggrieved, because it was at this very time engaged in plans in direct opposition to the proposals made by the King of Prussia. The object of these plans was to drive the French, by force, out of Hanover. When, in consequence of this, the Russian cabinet announced to the Prussian its intention of concluding an alliance with Austria and the northern powers against France, the miserable Prussian cabinet, with its perpetually vacillating and hesitating policy, was so terrified, that the king was induced to authorise a step which rendered Prussia not only odious to the First Consul, but what was worse, contemptible also.

It is clear, from La Forest's despatches, that Haugwitz and his

* We mean Lefebvre, and quote his observations here, as his book may not yet be in the hands of our readers. He says, vol. ii., pp. 336, 337: "Bignon affirme, que le Premier Consul proposa formellement à M. Lombard la cession du Hannovre et l'alliance. Ni dans la correspondance de M. de la Forest, ni dans les dépêches de M. de Talleyrand, nous n'avons trouvé un mot, un seul mot, d'où l'on pût inférer qu'en Juillet, 1803, Bonaparte ait proposé la cession du Hannovre. Si une telle offre eût été faite, le cabinet de Berlin l'eût prise en grave considération; elle eût été mise en cours régulier de négociations, même en admettant que le roi l'eût de suite rejettée comme trop hardie et de nature à le brouiller avec les Anglais; il en eût été question, ne fût ce qu'indirectement, entre M. de Haugwitz et M. de la Forest. Nous sommes donc autorisés à croire, que M. Bignon a été induit en erreur. . . . Il n'est point impossible, que dans un entretien avec M. Lombard le Premier Consul ait jeté en avant l'idée d'une incorporation de l'électorat au territoire Prussien; peut être a-t-il voulu sonder," etc.

colleagues, in their fear of finding themselves awkwardly situated between the French and the Russians, and of being at last obliged to resort to arms, hastily offered to conclude the alliance with France which Bonaparte wished: but almost immediately afterwards, hearing that Austria refused to join Russia against France, and that Russia threatened hostile movements against them, in case of their forming an alliance with France, they as hastily retracted their previous offer. In October, 1803, a draught of the conditions of a treaty between France and Prussia was handed to the French ambassador in Berlin (La Forest); and in the middle of November, an entirely different plan of the intended treaty was sent to Lucchesini, and communicated by him to the French cabinet. In this second scheme, the evacuation of Hanover was demanded, under entirely different conditions from those formerly proposed. It was no wonder, therefore, that this whole negotiation concerning Hanover, which had lasted nine months, came to a ridiculous termination in December, 1803. An agreement was concluded, by right of which Bonaparte was enabled to tyrannise over the whole of Northern Germany, as he had previously done, and the cabinet of Berlin was satisfied, as usual, with unmeaning phrases. Bonaparte promised, that, *with regard to Hanover, Prussia should be consulted in reference to all negotiations as to the fate of that country.*

From this period, Prussia entirely sank in public opinion; and the more so, as even Denmark, when the Hanse Towns were oppressed and laid under contribution by Bonaparte, and Mecklenburg was disquieted by his manœuvres, proved, by an energetic demonstration, that if Holstein should be attacked, it would not surrender itself into Bonaparte's hands as the Hanoverian government had done. Troops were collected, and the head-quarters fixed at Rendsburg. Bonaparte employed his usual plan of virulence and abuse in all sorts of papers, against the boldness of this attempt to resist his extortion; and he even compelled the Danes to break up their head-quarters in the month of September. But their honour was rescued, and their principal object gained; for Holstein was not touched. The Hanse Towns had suffered very much before this, and their sufferings still continued. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the good understanding between Russia and France to continue to subsist. The French army, which was kept up and paid entirely at the expense of the Hanoverians, had been increased to 30,000 men. Generals and officers were sent out expressly to enrich themselves by extortion practised on the inhabitants; and the army, at the same time, threatened the allies of Russia. On the other hand, Bonaparte threatened the republic of the Seven Islands, which was under the protection of Russia, from the side of Italy; and treated Spain and Portugal as conquered provinces.

Since the recommencement of the war with England, Bonaparte had again occupied Ancona, Brindisi, and Otranto; he was there almost in contact with the Seven Islands; and was enabled, in

concert with the Turks, to annoy the Russians. He moreover maintained absolute rule over all the country (and its inhabitants), from the Valais, in Switzerland, to the Straits of Messina. It was for this purpose that Bonaparte occupied the Valais with a military force; and he treated his *protégé*, the young King of Etruria, much as the English are in the habit of treating the Indian rajahs. He caused batteries to be erected all along the coast of Etruria, as Tuscany was at that time called, without having given any intimation of his intentions to the government of that country; and did not even condescend to return any answer to the complaints made to him on the part of the king. When he caused Elba to be occupied, giving as his reason that he could not allow Porto-Longone to remain any longer in the power of the King of Etruria, he sent a very cool message to the king, intimating that he was no longer to consider this place as forming part of his dominions.

All this ought to have afforded a pretext to the all-powerful Spanish minister (Don Godoy) for disengaging himself from France; and, more especially, he should have disengaged Spain from the obligation imposed upon it by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, in August, 1796, of furnishing troops and vessels to the French, for the approaching war with England. And, in fact, it appeared for some time as if a war would break out between France and Spain. The French collected an army at Bayonne, under the pretext of passing through Spain and Portugal. The Spaniards caused their army to advance to the Pyrenees; and a royal decree was published, ordering an additional levy of 10,000 men. Bonaparte accused Godoy of keeping up too intimate relations with England; and, in point of fact, an English ambassador continually resided at Madrid. On the other hand, the French threatened the Spaniards with war, unless they either took part in the war with England, or paid them six millions of francs a month towards the expenses. The French ambassador in Madrid was Beurnonville. He continued to threaten; Godoy was terrified; and Bonaparte, who entertained a most thorough contempt for the Prince of the Peace, already regarded Spain as his prey. Godoy caused negotiations to be commenced in Paris, because Beurnonville was too violent. Beurnonville threatened that he would leave Madrid, which would be the signal for a war. Godoy relied upon his intrigues in Paris, and upon Azara. The ambassador at length repeated his threatening alternative, that Spain should either pay a monthly contribution, or should take part in the war. He even threatened to leave Madrid on the 5th of September, unless his demands were immediately complied with. He did not, however, fulfil his threat, although he only received an evasive answer.

War was not declared, but the whole storm burst on the head of the unworthy favourite, who was not merely to be dismissed and removed from his office, but to be entirely removed from the king and queen, over whom his influence was unbounded. For this pur-

pose, the First Consul wrote a remarkable letter to Charles IV., in which he informed him of the whole disgrace of his house, and at the same time demanded, in an imperious and threatening tone, the dismissal of the Prince of the Peace. We give this letter, so important as displaying Bonaparte's character and the manner in which he treated Spain, *literatim et verbatim*, in the note;* although Godoy managed, by a very remarkable trick, to prevent the king from even opening the letter, much less reading it. A secretary of legation was sent direct from Paris to Madrid with this letter, and the king was informed that the letter which was to be presented to him concerned the quarrel with Bonaparte. The secretary of legation hastened first, however, to Godoy, who humiliated himself excessively, granted everything that was required, but left the drawing up of the new treaty to Azara, the Spanish minister in Paris, and Talleyrand. When the ambassador afterwards presented the letter to Charles IV., he considered that it had been written in anger, and that as everything was now arranged, it was unnecessary to read it, as it could only prolong the contest, and give rise to unpleasant feelings.

Spain had, previously to this, sacrificed to its allies its fleets, its armies, its treasures, its commerce, and its colonies. The treaty which the miserable favourite caused to be concluded on the 10th of October, at Paris, by Azara and Talleyrand, in order to screen himself, was equally disgraceful to France and to Spain; because the former abused its superior power, in the most mean and dishonourable manner. Spain was to pay six millions monthly, retaining, however, two millions as payment for the reception of French ships in their ports, and for the provisions and pay necessary for their crews. According

* The letter is dated October 19, 1803. "Dans les circonstances aussi pressantes où se trouve l'Europe, je crois avoir à remplir un dernier devoir auprès de V. M., en la priant d'ouvrir les yeux sur le gouffre ouvert par l'Angleterre sous le trône que la famille de V. M. occupe depuis cent ans. En effet, que V. M. me permette à le dire, l'Europe entière est affligée autant qu'indignée de l'espèce de détrônement dans lequel le Prince de la Paix se plut à le représenter à tous les gouvernements. Lui seul gouverne la marine; il gouverne la cour; il a ses gardes; il a un rom royal, il est le véritable Roi d'Espagne. Ses favoris sont dans toutes les places; tout le pouvoir de l'état est dans les mains de ses créatures; et je prévois, que si je suis obligé de soutenir une véritable guerre contre ce nouveau roi, j'aurai la douleur de la faire en même temps contre un prince, qui par ses qualités personnelles eût fait le bonheur de ses sujets, s'il eût voulu regner lui-même. Je ne doute pas, que par suite de la même politique, on ne conseille pas à V. M. de réunir des troupes pour s'opposer au corps d'armée que je suis obligé d'envoyer dans les ports d'Espagne, afin de mettre mes escadres à l'abri des forces de leurs ennemis et de la perfidie du Prince de la Paix. Le résultat de ces rassemblements sera la guerre entre les deux états, et je ne veux pas la faire à V. M. Lorsque le Prince de la Paix verra la monarchie en danger, il se retirera en Angleterre avec ses immenses trésors, et V. M. aura fait le malheur de ses peuples, de sa couronne, et de sa race, par un excès de bonté pour un favori avide, sans talents comme sans honneurs. Que V. M. remonte sur son trône, qu'elle éloigne d'elle un homme qui s'est par degrés emparé de tout le pouvoir, et qui a conservé dans son rang les basses passions de son caractère et ne s'est jamais élevé à aucun sentiment qui pût l'attacher à la gloire de son maître, et n'a été gouverné que par le soif de l'or. Je crois qu'on aura caché tellement la vérité à V. M., que la lettre que je lui écris lui sera pour ainsi dire toute nouvelle; je n'éprouve pas moins de peine à lui dire la vérité."

to the 7th article of this treaty, Spain engaged itself to oblige Portugal also to pay a million monthly to France. This method of raising money was in itself mean and disgraceful, and better suited to the piratical states of Africa, than to the most powerful states in Europe. It was, besides, to be foreseen that the English would perceive that all this was done merely to conceal the assistance which Spain was rendering to France against them. The English considered this treaty as a union of Spain with France, against England, and put an end to the neutrality of Spain, which was at any rate disadvantageous to them, by capturing four Spanish frigates, laden with the treasures of India, even before the formal declaration of war.

§ III.

R U S S I A.

It does not appear, as Bonaparte continually asserted, that English intrigues had anything to do in promoting the rupture between France and Russia in 1803. The Russians were too good politicians not to perceive that Bonaparte had only made use of them to obtain the requisite power in Germany, and that he had afterwards followed out his own plans, without any regard to what he had promised them. This will be at once seen from a concise enumeration of the treaties, respecting the violation of which the Emperor Alexander complained in 1803. When Murawieff, from Hamburg, communicated to the Emperor Paul the proposals of Bonaparte respecting a reconciliation, there were two points in particular which induced the emperor to despatch Kalitcheff to Paris to negotiate a treaty. These points were: firstly, that peace should be granted to the King of Naples, and that there should be an independent sovereignty guaranteed to him; secondly, Piedmont should be restored to the King of Sardinia. We have seen how ill this promise was kept by the truce of Foligno and by the treaty of Florence; or rather how the emperor was deceived. Piedmont was indeed not definitely united to France, but every year some new step was taken which proved that it was never to be restored to its former master. That Bonaparte never intended to fulfil the articles respecting Naples and Sardinia was so clear, even before Paul's death, that Kalitcheff handed in a very peremptory note, on the 18th of February, 1801, which put an end, for the time, to all thoughts of a treaty. In this note he demanded peremptorily, that the five articles, *the concession to which*, as he expressed himself, *had induced his emperor to concede other points to the cabinet of the Tuilleries*, should be immediately fulfilled. These articles the reader will find in the note.* The negotiations were not renewed till

* The five articles were:—1. The Kings of Naples and Sardinia shall be again put in possession of their states, and suffered to remain so. 2. The integrity and independence of these two states shall be maintained. 3. The pope shall be main-

Arcadi Ivanrowitch Markoff took Kalitcheff's place as minister in Paris. This man, who had been formerly employed for a considerable time in the foreign office, under Bedsborosko, was empty and vain, proud or cringing, as it happened; he was intellectual in the conversations of the *salons*, and yet had formerly been called, in the royalist society of Paris, *the insipid Markoff*. The affairs of Germany, as we have before remarked, afforded him an opportunity of bringing about a closer connexion between France and Russia. At this period he concluded, at the same time, a public treaty, and another, kept more secret even than secret treaties usually are, but which was known to the English not very long after.

We give in a note the eleven articles of this secret treaty, concluded the 11th of October, 1801: * the fact of their being known to the English government brought Talleyrand, who had an enormous income, and yet was always in difficulties, under suspicion of having sold the secret to them; whilst he endeavoured to lay the blame on two subordinate officers. The English undoubtedly spent 60,000*l.* in learning what this treaty was which was so carefully concealed from them, and received a copy of it out of the secret archives of the republic. Fouché and his police asserted definitively that Talleyrand received the money: he, however, allowed two of his clerks (*commis*) to suffer for him. They were dismissed and banished; but it surprised every one, that Talleyrand almost immediately afterwards made use of one of them in some other business. Bonaparte could not, and would not, fulfil the terms of the treaty. Markoff set spies to watch his proceedings, placed himself in close connexion with the royalists, who were then engaged in conspiracies, and bribed and corrupted Bonaparte's own people. Bonaparte was therefore enraged at the conduct of the Russian, who, immediately after the Bourbons had rejected the offers of the First Consul made at the instigation of the Emperor Alexander, secretly acted in their favour against Bonaparte.

The Neapolitan ambassador at the court of Petersburg (the Duca

tained in his position as a temporal prince. 4. The Grand Duke of Tuscany shall receive indemnification in Italy, not in Germany. 5. Russia participates in all conferences as to indemnification, founded on the peace of Luneville.

* 1. Russia and France will apply their utmost efforts to arrange that the indemnifications in Germany shall be so divided, that Austria and Prussia shall neutralise one another. 2. Both powers will unite in settling, in common, the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. 3. Russia will procure from the Ottoman Porte a ratification of the treaty concluded by its minister with France on the 9th of October. 4. The independence of Naples shall be secured. 5. The French troops shall evacuate the Neapolitan territory. 6. Russia and France will come to a friendly understanding respecting the indemnification to be made to the King of Sardinia. 7. The Duke of Wirtemberg shall receive some share of the plunder of Germany. 8. The Electorate of Bavaria, and the territory of the Margrave of Baden, shall also be increased. 9. The independence of the republic of the Seven Islands shall be secured. 10. All French prisoners in Russia and Turkey shall be set at liberty. 11. Russia and France will unite in securing peace and the balance of power, and in protecting the freedom of the seas, and will commence negotiations for these purposes.

di Serra Capriola) had prevailed upon the Emperor Alexander to advise the First Consul to advance money for the support of the banished princes. Bonaparte eagerly grasped at this proposal; he was very willing to secure a comfortable existence to the princes, if they would give up all ideas of restoration to power. This furnished the princes with a new opportunity of considering Bonaparte's conduct as an acknowledgment of their rights, and of trumpeting forth their magnanimous refusal to sell their honour for money. The Russian emperor, therefore, supported the Bourbons with money, and Markoff assumed the extraordinary position of a minister intriguing from, and in Paris, in favour of the Bourbons. The levity of Markoff, and the seriousness of the First Consul, rendered them at any rate ill-suited to each other, particularly if Markoff really was the author of the bitter epigram on the First Consul which was attributed to him.* The Emperor, however, allowed Markoff to remain in Paris; and Bonaparte endured him for some time, while he sought all manner of excuses, by way of pacifying the Emperor for the non-fulfilment of his promise respecting Piedmont. First, he appointed, instead of it, as compensation to the King of Sardinia, Parma and Placencia; then the Stato dei Presidii, which he had taken from the King of Naples; then the town and territory of Siena; and finally, in 1803, the republic of Lucca: but he was in earnest in none of all these offers. The quarrel respecting the promised but not yet determined compensation to the King of Sardinia was still going on, when Bonaparte, on the recommencement of the war with England, caused the seaport towns in Naples to be occupied by his troops, thus violating the principal article of the above-mentioned secret treaty. The occupation of Hanover afforded another ground of complaint, inasmuch as Mecklenburg and Oldenburg were endangered, the Hanse Towns thrown open to the French, and therefore the commerce of Russia interfered with. Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were protected by Russia, on account of their connexion with the imperial family. When England refused to allow Hanover to be occupied by the Prussians, and the blockade to be removed from the German harbours, the quarrel between France and Russia became more violent, particularly as the Russians first refused to mediate for the restoration of Malta, and afterwards offered their mediation under very restricted conditions.

As early as 1803, the relations between the two powers were of such a nature, that the Russian chancellor, Woronzoff, said plainly, in a note, of the 18th of July, "that if the war were to be prolonged between France and England, Russia would be compelled finally to take part in it." Before this declaration on the part of Russia had been thus made, Bonaparte had a scene with Markoff, which alone might very well have caused a rupture, inasmuch as the First Consul entirely abandoned himself to that military violence, which had already frequently carried him beyond the limits of decency. Bonap-

* Namely, that Bonaparte was "Tout le jacobinisme renfermé dans un seul homme, et armé de tous les instruments révolutionnaires."

parte warmly addressed the Russian ambassador, in a public audience, so rudely and violently, that even Bignon, who is disposed to worship Bonaparte as a demi-god, is obliged to confess that his hero entirely lost his dignity, and forgot his position.* If the emperor afterwards overlooked this insult, he probably considered that Markoff had not behaved very prudently during his stay in Paris. He, and even his secretary of legation, Baykoff, were in the habit of speaking in private society with an imprudence and a boldness which could not fail to irritate the First Consul, and the more so, as this was just at the time of the above-mentioned conspiracies. Besides this, Markoff had chosen for his mistress a lady who had been an *émigrée*, and who now continued to intrigue in Paris. She was persecuted by Bonaparte's police, under the pretext of her being one of the emigrants yet on the list of suspected persons; but in reality, because she would not lend herself to act as a spy on Markoff's actions. Besides all this, Markoff's private secretary was the Genevese, Christin, who was known as one of the agents of the former minister, Calonne, and made very suspicious journeys from time to time. A serious quarrel took place, on the subject of this man, in August, 1803, between the emperor and the First Consul, after the latter had written an autograph letter direct to the emperor, on the 26th or 29th of July, requiring Markoff's recal. As to Christin, Bonaparte was informed by his police, that he was a very active agent in the royalist manœuvres, commenced partly in Germany and partly in Switzerland, and supported by English money; he treated him, therefore, as if he had had no connexion with Russia. Christin was arrested in Switzerland, without any regard to the protection of Russia, or to his situation as secretary to the Russian ambassador, brought to Paris, and lodged in the Temple. In a similar manner, the Chevalier Vernegas, who belonged to the Russian embassy in Rome, was arrested by the French, in violation of the law of nations, and brought to Paris; and he was not released in consequence of the representations of the Russian ambassador, but at the special request of the pope.

Christin's arrest caused a new outbreak of Bonaparte's violence at an audience, and of such a nature as to render it impossible for Markoff to remain in Paris, even though his cabinet might not find it advisable as yet to break off all relations with France. Bonaparte,

* Bignon is diplomatist enough to be able to discover several excuses for the unsuitable language applied by Bonaparte to the English ambassador. Every impartial mind, however, on reading these excuses, will perceive that they suppose, by their mere use, a very great perplexity, and a want of means of escape. On the occasion of the scene with Markoff, however, he does not venture to excuse his hero, but merely endeavours to lessen his fault. Vol iii., p. 218: "Aussi le Premier Consul gardait-il trop peu de mesure avec cet ambassadeur. Le 6 Juin, dans un cercle des Tuilleries, il laissa échapper quelques paroles dont M. de Markoff aurait eu justement à se plaindre, si, par une demi-heure de conversation gracieuse, il n'avait cherché à les lui faire oublier." That is to say, there is no harm in giving a man a box on the ear, if you only pat his head gently afterwards, by way of soothing him.

instead of paying any attention to Markoff's repeated representations on the subject of the arrest of his secretary, forgot himself so far as to insult Markoff himself personally; and towards the conclusion of his invective, actually to defy the Russian government. In the audience of the 21st of September, Bonaparte went up to Markoff quickly, and said to him, after blaming him openly before the whole assembly, "that it was exceedingly extraordinary for a Russian ambassador to entertain among his dependents a Swiss, whose business appeared to be simply aiding in all sorts of conspiracies." After a stream of similar violent expressions, he concluded with the insulting words, "We are not yet so far sunk (*tellement à la quenouille*) as to look on quietly at such conduct; on the contrary, for the future, I shall cause all persons to be arrested, who may act against the interests of France." After this scene, the ambassador entirely broke off all intercourse with the court of the Tuileries. His emperor, however, helped himself out of the difficulty with that readiness of invention for which Bonaparte called him "as treacherous as a Greek." He recalled Markoff, and gratified Bonaparte in this respect; but, on the other hand, sent Markoff a special order, as a sign of his continued favour. Markoff wore this on the occasion of his farewell visit at the Tuileries, and affected to assure every one, that he considered his recal in the light of a favour.

When Markoff left in November, he left his secretary of legation, d'Oubril, as acting ambassador in his place. Every one, however, foresaw a breach at no very distant period; and Russia had already, in the autumn of 1803, when nothing was to be done with Prussia, entered into a closer connexion with England. Negotiations were also commenced with Austria, and a union with Sweden and Denmark, for the purpose of liberating Hanover, was spoken of. This was the state of affairs at the commencement of 1804: the murder of the Duc d'Enghien brought matters to a crisis. The mother of the Russian emperor had been all along hostile to everything proceeding from Bonaparte; and the mild and gentle spirit of the emperor, like that of all persons of good feeling in Europe, was deeply wounded by the fate of the duke. From the beginning of 1804, he had no further political reasons for keeping up a friendly relation with France; he therefore gave himself entirely up to his natural feelings, on hearing of the catastrophe at Vincennes. At the very next audience the court appeared in mourning, and the emperor himself received General Hedouville, to his very great surprise, in mourning. Thiers confesses that Hedouville was surprised; but he is never at a loss for phrases, and contrives to free the general from his embarrassment, and to make him play a dignified part at the audience. The emperor, however, went still further: he was the only one among the sovereigns of his time (with the exception of the King of Sweden, who acted in an absurd and ridiculous manner on the occasion) who publicly blamed this violation of the territory, and of the most sacred rights of the German Empire. The emperor

made use of the pretext, that he had become, by his share in the new division of Germany, and in the distribution of the secularized spiritual and of the suppressed temporal states, a guarantee for the independence of the German princes. None of the German princes, not even the emperor or the Elector of Baden, who was most particularly concerned, uttered any remonstrance in the Diet at Ratisbon: the Emperor Alexander alone handed in a note, calling upon the Diet to require satisfaction for the violation of the territorial rights of Baden. King Gustavus IV. of Sweden, in his quality as a guarantee of the Westphalian peace, also summoned the German Empire to vengeance. But he did this in such an extraordinary and extravagant manner, that it was too plainly seen that his understanding was not quite right.

The Emperor Alexander was not satisfied, however, with urging on the lazy, slow, and timid Diet; he caused a note to be handed in to the cabinet of the Tuileries, by his minister d'Oubril, relative to the occurrence in Ettenheim. The note which had been sent to the Diet was very properly and well answered, because Bonaparte left the answer to Talleyrand and his diplomatists; but it was quite otherwise with d'Oubril's note, because Bonaparte himself dictated the substance and the manner of the answer. The French diplomatists, or rather Talleyrand, first of all caused it to be very clearly explained at the Diet, that the Russian emperor could have nothing to say in this matter, which solely concerned Germany, so long as the empire and the princes themselves did not complain. They then observed, that, as far as his guarantee was concerned, he could not be required to exercise his power under this pretext, until he was summoned to do so by one of the parties concerned.

We see from a note, addressed by Haugwitz to the French ambassador, that he made a merit of the silence of his king on the subject of the affair of Ettenheim, and considered this as a favour done to Bonaparte; and the other princes acted in a similar manner. The Emperor of Germany concealed himself, as usual, behind his diplomatists. When the minister Champagny spoke, for the first time, on the subject to Cobenzl, the latter answered him, *that he understood there were such things as political necessities.* When the note of the Emperor of Russia was handed in to the Diet, it was thought advisable to please the Emperor Alexander; the German emperor therefore recommended the Diet to take the Russian note into consideration; but he consoled the French, at the same time, by telling them, that he would contrive to put off the discussion for two months or so, in which time the whole matter would be forgotten.

Thiers says, that Talleyrand and Von Dalberg, who was at this time the ambassador for Baden in Paris, were such good friends, that the ambassador prevailed upon his government to state to the Diet, that they were perfectly satisfied respecting the occurrence. This declaration, on the part of Baden, was first communicated to the

French government, in order to be sure of the approbation of the First Consul.

In the answer which was returned to d'Oubril's note, the personal influence and peculiar violence of the First Consul are but too clearly to be recognised. In this document, which was published and intended for the emperor, bearing date the 20th of April, the son, who was very sensitive in such matters, was very rudely put in mind of the murder of his father; and the English were made to bear the blame of this murder, without any reason or proof whatever. Hedouville was then recalled from Petersburg, and d'Oubril answered the insulting note by another, in which harsh language was as harshly returned. This note was to give the final conditions, on which the friendship between Russia and France could continue to subsist. These conditions, as set forth in the note of the 24th of July, are: that Russia should have a voice in arranging the affairs of Italy; that the promise of compensation to the King of Sardinia, so often made by France, should be at last fulfilled; that the French troops should be withdrawn from the north of Germany, and the neutrality of the smaller states respected for the future. We give the conclusion in the original note, because in it the reference to the Emperor Paul's murder is very summarily disposed of.*

The answer to this last declaration of Russia proves very clearly that it proceeded immediately from the Emperor Napoleon. Much quite foreign to the subject is mixed up with it; the accusations are answered by others; the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and the Russian court-mourning, are referred to; and it concludes, as usual, with violent expressions, which can only be construed into a challenge. From this time all direct communication ceased between the courts. Rayneval, whom Hedouville had left as his chargé d'affaires, was also recalled, and d'Oubril left Paris in August. The relation between the courts was now such, that, on the one hand, all sorts of diplomatic tricks were put in practice to keep up the appearance of friendship, and to deceive the French, until the coalition, which was then in progress, should be completely arranged; and, on the other hand, it was expedient to know whether Rayneval was beyond the boundary of Russia before d'Oubril had quitted France. D'Oubril, therefore, remained in Mayence till the 11th of October.

* "A peine croira-t-on que, pour soutenir un principe erroné, le cabinet de S. Cloud ait pu s'écarter de ce que les égards et les convenances requièrent, au point de choisir, parmi les exemples à citer, celui qui était le moins fait à l'être, et de rappeler dans une pièce officielle la mort d'un père à la sensibilité de son auguste fils, en tâchant contre toute vérité et croyance de charger d'une accusation atroce un gouvernement, que celui de France ne se fait pas scrupule de calomnier sans cesse, parcequ'il se trouve en guerre avec lui."

§ IV.

RELATION OF NAPOLEON'S EMPIRE TO OTHER POWERS.

A.—WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

THE war between France and England brought about a new coalition in 1805, the preparations for which had been made in 1804. It also, however, caused the threatening preparations for an invasion of England, which, in reference to that country itself, were entirely useless, but which served, from the commencement of 1805, that is, from the time when Napoleon began to foresee a new alliance between Russia, Austria, and England, to mask the Emperor's enormous preparations for a continental war. We leave to others the discussion of the question as to whether Napoleon was really serious in intending an invasion of England; but it is quite clear to us, that as soon as he was aware of the projected new coalition, he merely made use of his preparations against England, to unite his army secretly, and to exercise them carefully, in order at a future period to be able to surprise his nearest enemy, whose carelessness he well knew. This we shall be able to prove. We remark here, in reference to the war between England and France, that both nations unceasingly reproached each other in the most violent terms; and that both were equally wrong. Both nations acted upon similar principles; they showed the same terrible consistency; they both earned the esteem of the political world, which they sought, by their contempt of all moral principles; inasmuch as in active life the stronger alone can retain its advantages, whilst morality alone can never make itself feared. The French complained of the occupation of Cape Town, and of the capture of the several hundred vessels which the English had taken before the declaration of war. The English, on the other hand, complained of the violations of the rights of nations shown by Napoleon, who caused every Englishman he could find to be seized and conveyed prisoner to Verdun, and remain there until the war should be ended.

When Napoleon began to cause his new basin to be dug at Boulogne, commenced enormous and expensive works, collected together thousands of transport-ships, ordered all French, Spanish, and Dutch ships of war to be in readiness to convey his troops, and exercised the troops themselves, daily, in embarking and disembarking with the utmost expedition, the English began to believe that he was serious in his project of attempting an invasion. He gained, therefore, by his preparations, exactly at the time when England was engaged with the coalition in 1805, at least one great object, which was easier accomplished than the conquest of England: he had all his forces on the west coast ready for action at a moment's notice; they

could march to any point at once; and even Marmont's army, which was stationed in Holland, was equally ready for marching or action, because the same exercises were gone through at Texel as at Boulogne. The English had at this time raised the whole of their militia—the whole population of the country was in active service; but they did not act merely on the defensive. They blockaded the German rivers; and occupied, in the summer of 1803, the islands of St. Lucia and Tobago; in September, Demerara, Berbice, and Esse-
quibo; and in December, Rochambeau, with the remainder of the French troops in St. Domingo, fell into their hands.

The English also attempted to destroy the vessels and stores collected in Boulogne, and other harbours on the western coast, and spent much trouble and money for this purpose; but they only afforded a triumph to their enemies. At first, indeed, they were tolerably successful. In September, 1803, Admiral Saumarez appeared before Granville, and did a great deal of damage; he even attacked Dieppe, with a similar result; Havre-de-Grace, Boulogne, Calais, Ostend, &c., were kept constantly blockaded; but the arrangements of the French were so excellent, the means of defence—particularly in Boulogne—so good, that the English were always obliged to retire with loss, that even their boldest and most skilful naval hero, Nelson, earned only a considerable loss and some disgrace, and that the destructive invention of the catamarans ended ridiculously.

As to the fleets of France, even Thibaudeau believes (for Thiers is only an authority in the French Chamber of Deputies) that Napoleon was then in a condition to carry out great and fortunate undertakings by sea, from his cabinet in Paris. We do not believe this, however, although it is not to be denied that, to the misfortune of the French and Spanish sailors, he was occupied day and night in making enormous plans, and in issuing orders to his fleets.* He united the whole of the Spanish fleet with that of France; and, on the 12th of January, 1805, concluded a treaty at Aranjuez, by virtue of which, this unfortunate country, already quite drained by the sums which it had been obliged to pay to France, was required to keep in readiness, so as to be prepared for action at a minute's notice, thirty ships of war, and five thousand soldiers. He calculated (and this calculation is particularly important, in connexion with the blindness of the Austrians, who commenced hostilities against such an army as this without waiting till the two Russian armies should join them) that he had 193,000 men stationed on the coast, ready for his inva-

* Thibaudeau expresses himself, in the 9th chapter of his "Histoire de l'Empire," quite amazed at Napoleon's activity and knowledge in naval affairs, and adds that he has treated the subject of Napoleon's preparations at such length, in order to convince "les plus incrédules" that this plan of invasion was not a mere "épouvantail." We still continue of our own opinion, however. Dumas, in his "Précis des Événements Militaires," expresses himself to the same effect as Thibaudeau, and informs us that the Emperor, surrounded day and night with plans and maps, did nothing but make out instructions for his admirals, and send them orders respecting their fleets.

sion : sixty-nine ships of the line were appointed to act as a convoy to the fleet of transports, consisting of as many as two thousand vessels of different sizes.

The English oligarchy, which has always possessed the most correct tact for perceiving what is fitting to increase their power and wealth, saw very clearly that it was necessary to oppose an English dictatorship to that of France, and the iron strictness of British toryism to the inspiring policy of the *revolutionaries*; that Addington and his colleagues, therefore, were no match for Napoleon and his new Empire; and that Pitt, and his hatred of the French, must be called in to their assistance. This would have taken place sooner, had not the king been obliged to withdraw for a time from business, by an attack of illness, which lasted from Christmas, 1803, to March, 1804. As soon as he recovered, he perceived the unpleasant necessity for submitting once more to the yoke of the ambitious Pitt, who was no less obstinate than he was himself. Towards the end of April, 1804, Lord Hawkesbury declared that he had advised his majesty to form a new ministry, which might adopt more energetic measures against so formidable an enemy; and, on the 9th of May, the king committed the formation of the new ministry to Pitt, but with the express conditions that Fox should not be a member of it, and that no measure for Catholic emancipation should be introduced. By these conditions, Grenville was prevented from resuming his place in the ministry; because he thought that the danger now threatening England was so great, that every division of parties should be done away with, and whigs and tories should unite in the administration. He wished, therefore, that Fox, as head of the whigs, should receive a place in the administration; and when this was prevented, refused to act with the new ministry. He also considered the king's refusal to grant to Catholics the rights due to them as British subjects, in opposition to the demands of the times and of circumstances.* Lord Hawkesbury, and at a later period Addington (Lord Sidmouth) also, joined the new ministry; but unfortunately, one of its very first steps was to cause the debts of the king to be paid by the nation for the seventh time since his accession.

The Spaniards, although they had long kept up a secret correspondence with England, were then plundered in the midst of peace, exactly as the Dutch had previously been. Admiral Moore

* He said, in his letter, "An opportunity now offers, such as this country has seldom seen, for giving to its government, in a moment of peculiar difficulty, the full benefit of the services of all those, who, by the public voice and sentiment, are judged most capable of contributing to its prosperity and safety. The wishes of the public on this subject are completely in union with its interests; and the advantages which, not this country alone, but all Europe, and the whole civilised world, might derive from the establishment of such an administration, at such a crisis, would probably have exceeded the most sanguine expectations. But when, in the first instance, all trial for it is precluded, and when this denial is made the condition of all subsequent arrangements, we cannot but feel that there are no motives, of whatever description which could justify our taking an active part in the establishment of a system so adverse to our deliberate and declared opinion."

was despatched with a ship of the line and three frigates, to capture the Spanish flotilla, which was bringing a large quantity of the precious metals from the Plata to Cadiz. Four Spanish vessels, of which the *Mercedes* was the largest, after the admiral's own, were stopped by him, and on their refusal to surrender, were fired into. The *Mercedes* blew up almost immediately, and only a few of her numerous crew being rescued by the English, the rest met their death in the waves. A large portion of the treasure sank with this ship; the other vessels were captured by the English.

As Napoleon plainly foresaw that the continental powers would shortly unite against his increasing and repeated usurpations, he considered it advisable, after having accepted the imperial dignity, to take a new step, which his sophists might make out to be a new proof of his wish for peace, and thus throw the whole blame of the continuance of the war on the English. With this intention, he wrote, immediately after his coronation as Emperor, an autograph letter to the King of England, with an offer of peace, dated the 4th of January, 1805, as he had formerly done on being chosen First Consul. As, however, he had done the same thing before, and was aware that any direct communication to the sovereign on business of state was contrary to the fundamental principles of the British constitution, the whole thing was merely a farce, which ended as the former one had ended in 1800. At that time, Grenville answered it rudely; on this occasion, Lord Mulgrave, who filled his place, answered with rather more politeness. He wrote, as minister of foreign affairs, to the French minister, Talleyrand, and politely refused the offer, giving him at the same time very clearly to understand, that a coalition was in progress.*

B.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD COALITION.

In this new coalition, which, in order to draw down upon the continental powers the danger which threatened England, was managed by Pitt with his usual skill, and at the expense of an enormous sum of money. Gustavus II., of Sweden, who had been since 1803 the object of the most bitter and satirical raillery to all the French papers, formed one of the members. He had sold, or, as it was called for the sake of form, mortgaged, Wismar to Mecklenburg; and had spent the money in a foolish tour through Germany, in the course of which he brought the families of Baden and Bavaria into no slight perplexity by his extraordinary conduct; and in particular, had rendered himself an object of general ridicule, by his excessive anger at the lighted pipe of a custom-house-officer in the French service, on the Rhine-bridge at Mannheim. He was after-

* The following sentence concludes his note: "His majesty feels it impossible for him to answer more particularly to the overture made to him, till he has had time to communicate with the powers on the continent, with whom he is engaged in confidential connexions and relations, and particularly with the Emperor of Russia."

wards the only one among the princes of the empire, who in the year 1804 called upon the diet to protect, with the whole force of the empire, the knights of the empire and the emperor, who at that time appeared to support them, against Bavaria and Wirtemberg and their protector, Napoleon. He was, moreover, the only one who, in May, 1804, complained of the violation of the territorial rights of the empire, on the occasion of the seizure of the *Duc d' Enghien*. Napoleon revenged himself for the personal dislike which the King of Sweden entertained towards him, and which he frequently expressed in a very childish way, by a very insulting article which appeared in the *Moniteur*, in the month of August. In this article, the king was ridiculed, and treated like a school-boy; the Swedish nation, on the other hand, was flattered, and pretty plainly given to understand that it was quite time for it to get rid of its king.

When this article arrived at Stockholm, the king caused the French ambassador to be ordered to quit the kingdom; and on this occasion, spoke of the man who had ruled France absolutely for the last five years, as *Mr. Bonaparte*. He also quarrelled with the German emperor, for wishing to make Austria a hereditary empire. Immediately after this, he sent back to the King of Prussia his order of the Black Eagle, because it had also been sent to Napoleon. On all sides, however, he was met with ridicule; but with all this, he obtained a marked triumph over Prussia, which was sinking deeper and deeper every day, on the occasion of his entering into closer connexion with England, in October, 1804. In a letter which he wrote to the King of Prussia, upon the subject of admitting English and Russian troops, in a certain case, into Pomerania, he asked the King of Prussia, "*How Prussia intended to act, on the supposition of a closer connexion between Sweden and England?*" To this letter a tolerably haughty and conceited answer was returned, and the conclusion ran thus: "*That Prussia would never suffer Sweden to make hostile preparations in Pomerania, nor the French in Hanover to be threatened by any troops in Pomerania.*" It was shown, however, as early as January, 1805, that Prussia had neither the courage nor the power to enforce these high-flown words against Sweden. In December, 1804, Sweden concluded a treaty with England, by which, in consideration of a subsidy of 80,000*l.*, Stralsund was given up to the English, as a dépôt for their goods, an arsenal, and a fortress for their troops. Upon this, the King of Prussia renewed his threats, and declared, that if this treaty were executed, he would occupy Swedish-Pomerania. Immediately afterwards (on the 14th of January, 1805), Sweden concluded a treaty with Russia, and promised to receive Russian troops into Pomerania; and when Russia, upon this, published a very decided manifesto, Prussia was immediately reduced to silence. This, of course, injured the character of Prussia throughout all Europe; and so much the more, as, although it had at first taken very high ground, and had even returned no answer to the King of Sweden, it was now

obliged to humiliate itself before Russia, and to retract the greater portion of the haughty answer which it had afterwards condescended to return to Sweden. Long negotiations next followed, respecting the sum of money which England was to pay for 20,000 Swedish troops, who were to be sent into Pomerania, in English service, by the King of Sweden; and after much had been demanded, and less offered, everything was at length satisfactorily arranged, and Sweden joined in the alliance of Russia and England.

Napoleon proved more strongly than ever, in the years 1804-5, how much he, and the collected talent of regenerated France, were superior to the old and antiquated talent of aristocratic and monarchical Europe. The ministers of the continental powers, who had gained over to their side the well-meaning Emperor of Russia, made enormous plans ; they shared their booty before they had gained it ; they restored the ancient aristocratic-monarchical system in Europe before they had the power to do so ; their diplomatists travelled and intrigued ; their generals, distinguished on parade and in the war-office alone, made all sorts of plans on paper, in conjunction with Pitt, Cobenzl, and Collenbach :—Napoleon let them write, and laughed at their plans and documents. He alone drew up, in a few days, a plan in opposition to theirs ; drew together, in the north and west, a vast number of troops, quite ready for action ; and afterwards, calculated the days of their arrival, and all the necessary steps, with so much exactness, that he overtook his slower opponents, and destroyed at one blow what they had been preparing during a year and a half. On this occasion, Pitt showed himself as much superior to all other statesmen in the cabinet, as Napoleon was to all other generals in the field.

Pitt immediately perceived the absurdity of the plans which Novosilzoff brought to London, whilst Rasumowski was engaged in negotiating in Vienna ; he pretended, however, that it was his intention to agree to them. Thiers treats of these dreams of the Russian emperor, which were discussed with Pitt, in the commencement of his 5th part, to an extent which is extremely tedious. M. Von Hormayr, however, in the second part of his memoirs, has given some short, but, to one acquainted with the subject, very useful documents, which we must refrain from noticing here. From Thiers' account, it is clear that Pitt listened to everything with great patience, and appeared to approve of it ; but finally brought back the whole matter, as far as he was disposed to interfere in it, to those points which appeared to him, in reference to England, to be worth the money which she was about to spend on the coalition. The assistance of Austria was reckoned upon as certain, towards the end of 1804 : this is clearly proved by the treaty concluded between England, Russia, and Sweden, in April, 1805, which depended on negotiations carried on in 1804. In this treaty, not only are 300,000 Austrians reckoned upon to make up the 500,000 men who could be brought into the field against France, but three articles, which

were never made public, contain a plan which was revived in 1814-15. Holland, namely, was to be united with Belgium; Nice, Savoy, and Genoa, with Piedmont; and Lombardy and Venice, with the Austrian states.

Prussia, too, appeared, towards the end of 1804, as if about to awake from its long slumber; but the cunning politicians in Berlin, who possessed neither German nor Prussian patriotism, took advantage of the timidity of the king, to lull it to sleep again. The nobility was roused; the Baron von Stein did everything that a well-regulated German mind like his could do; even the queen was moved, little as she had till then interfered with politics. Haugwitz was obliged to retire for a short time, and Hardenberg took his place, by the express permission of Napoleon, although he had been formerly dismissed at the instance of the French Emperor. Haugwitz retired to his estates in Silesia; but the numerous partisans of the system which he and his party advocated, soon brought him back in triumph.

The patience of the King of Prussia was certainly very severely tried about this time. Towards the end of October, as we have already mentioned, the English courier, Wagstaff, vanished, without any traces of the means of his death, whilst passing through Mecklenburg, which was at the time under the special protection of Prussia; but there was no doubt that he had been attacked and murdered by some of the French then quartered in Hanover. About the same time, as we have also previously mentioned, Rumbold, the English ambassador to the circle of Lower Saxony, of which the King of Prussia was director, was carried off from his estate on the Hanseatic territory, and brought to Paris, where he was threatened with death. The King of Prussia was seriously angry at this, and declared, in a council specially summoned for the purpose, that he was resolved, at last, to assert his right as king; and every one believed that he was gained for the cause of Germany. He remained, however, weak, as he always had been. The matter was arranged, as was then the fashion in Prussia, by talk and writing, not by any energetic act. The king was induced to send a mild and friendly autograph letter to Napoleon on the subject; and the French ambassador, who was a party to the intrigue, wrote to his government that it was necessary to yield this point to the king, unless they wished him to break through the nets which the French and their coadjutors had woven round him. The Emperor then, though very unwillingly, wrote a civil and friendly letter, sent Rumbold safe to England, and declared publicly, that he had yielded solely on account of the King of Prussia. Napoleon, however, never forgot the disappointment which his compulsory concession had caused him in this affair.

After this short excitement on the part of the king, things went on again in their old way. Napoleon and the allied powers endeavoured, in their turn, to gain over Prussia; the king's politics vacillated

constantly, as they had formerly done; Haugwitz was allowed to return to Berlin, and the king consulted him at one time, and Hardenberg at another. The king then pretended a wish to act the mediator, and inclined his ear at one time to the Austrian ambassador (Metternich), at another to the French. Austria, as usual, was very slow in its preparations; whilst Napoleon was prepared to strike at any moment. Even in July, the Austrians endeavoured to conceal or to excuse, under various pretexts, their enormous preparations, and marchings and counter-marchings, on the Italian border, although Napoleon, by his conduct, had almost challenged them to a war.

C.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY—INSULT OFFERED TO AUSTRIA.

The change in the constitution of France, in 1804, made a corresponding change in that of Italy necessary. The title of President, under which Napoleon had till then ruled this republic, was to be exchanged for a loftier one; and Napoleon made use of the ceremony of his coronation at Paris to introduce this change. On this occasion, he sent for the Duke of Melzi Erile, who, in his name, had kept up a princely court at Milan, though without any very remarkable splendour or luxury, some councillors of state, some members of the legislative bodies, and some members of the highest tribunals—in short, what we should call an assembly of the notables*—to Paris. Mareschalchi, the resident minister in Paris, was the Emperor's instrument in this assembly; he, along with Cambacérès and Talleyrand, prepared a constitution, which was to be afterwards considered and made public as the work of the above-mentioned so-called *consulta*. The *consulta*, although they had received no sort of powers from the people relative to changing the constitution, continued to sit for this purpose in the Tuileries till March, 1805, and particularly fixed all those points which had reference to the introduction of purely monarchical unity, and to the personal relations of the Emperor and his family to the nominal republic of Italy.

It is commonly asserted, that a difference of opinion at this time took place between Napoleon and his brother Joseph, who was afterwards sent to Boulogne as governor; because the former offered the latter the kingdom of Italy, but on such conditions that he would only have been the instrument of French tyranny, and that he felt himself obliged to refuse it. We pass over the various anecdotes having reference to this subject, as also the numerous speeches and individual occurrences which have been handed down to us, in reference to the changes made in the Italian constitution by the

* The persons who came were the vice-president Melzi; the councillors of state, Mareschalei, Caprara, Paradisi, Fenaroli, Costabili, Luosi, Guicciardi; of the deputies and members of the tribunals, Guastavillani, Lambertenghi, Carlotti, Dambouschi, Rangone, Galeppi, Litta, Fe, Allessandri, Ladembeni, Appiani, Busti, Negri, Sopransi, Baldighi.

consulta of Paris; only mentioning the principal points of the new order of things, published by Melzi as the result of the discussions of the consulta. "The republic of Italy," it said, "shall be changed into a monarchy, and the Emperor Napoleon proclaimed King of Italy. The crown of Italy, however, shall only remain united with that of France during the life of Napoleon; after his death, France and Italy shall be ruled by separate monarchs. As long, however, as the French retain the harbours and fortresses in Naples, the Russians Corfu, and the English Malta, it is indispensably necessary that France and Italy should be united under one monarch. Napoleon shall be invited to proceed to Milan, there to be crowned, and to settle the new kingdom of Italy." On the day after the publication of these resolutions of the consulta, Napoleon made his appearance in the senate, announced his acceptance of the offer of the Italians, and his intention of proceeding to Milan as he had been requested. Talleyrand afterwards proved, in a well-set speech, that everything must necessarily have been settled as it had been settled.

Melzi was next obliged to descend one step, very much to his dissatisfaction, and Eugène Beauharnais was raised to his place. The national pride of the Italians, which had been flattered by Melzi's occupation of the second place in their state, was now wounded by a Frenchman's being preferred to this position. Eugène Beauharnais, upon whom Napoleon had bestowed the imperial dignity of chancellor of state, at the same time that he had named his brother-in-law, Murat, admiral of the Empire, was sent to Milan as viceroy, after Napoleon's coronation; and Melzi was obliged to be satisfied with a dignity in the Italian Empire. He was, namely, made chancellor of state for the kingdom of Italy. Eugène Beauharnais was at this time a French prince; he preceded the Emperor in arriving at Milan; and even before the arrival of the latter, had taken up his quarters in the palace. As the prince was young, and entirely without experience, Napoleon had not sent him there to govern, but merely to represent; and, therefore, a Frenchman of known talent was sent with him to assist him. This again was disagreeable to the Italians; and this is the less to be wondered at, as a similar proceeding, two years later, even irritated us much-enduring Germans. Méjean was the person chosen to conduct all business at Milan, though under an unobtrusive title. He was a clever and honest man, but at the same time a thorough Frenchman, who could not at all conceive that an Italian might know better what was suitable for his country than a Frenchman; he could not imagine anything superior to France, and everything French, as it had been since the revolution. He surrounded himself exclusively with Frenchmen, the most of whom were badly chosen, and none of whom knew anything of the state of affairs in Italy. The constitution was, therefore, a mere shadow; and when Eugène once ventured to delay some order of Napoleon's, out of respect for the Italian constitution, the latter

blamed him in no very gentle terms; particularly expressing his surprise that “he should have allowed himself to be influenced by the representations of a collection of blackguards (*polissons*).” It was therefore of very little advantage to the Italians that the Italian ministry resident in Milan was well chosen; for everything proceeded directly from Napoleon. Professor Aldini resided in Paris, and transmitted to the Italian authorities the orders of the Emperor, which were always positive, and very decided. We mention all this, as we happen to be on this subject. It properly belongs to the period after the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, which was connected with Napoleon’s coronation with the iron crown of Lombardy, with which also the German emperors in the middle ages used to be crowned. Napoleon appointed the 26th of May for his coronation, and set out for Italy towards the end of April.

The pope, who had been residing in Paris since December, set off on his return shortly before the Emperor, and they met on their journey. Pius VII. was, however, very ill satisfied; because Napoleon had made use of him for his own purposes, but had plainly given him to understand, that he had no intention of lending his support to a system of priestcraft. Concerning Avignon, Venaissin, and the legations, respecting which the pope handed in a long representation, Napoleon could not and would not decide; so that this matter was soon settled. The next question was respecting the rights of the Gallican church, and Louis XIV.’s edict on the subject, published in the year 1682. Louis XIV. had given the pope a written promise that he would never cause this edict to be put in force, being specially urged to do so by Madame de Maintenon and his confessor. The pope showed Napoleon this promise, which he afterward called an old rag (*chiffon usé*), if we may trust the accounts of those who profess to have written down his words in St. Helena, requested a similar promise from him, and promised, in return, not to show this to any one, as he had also done with regard to the former promise; but Napoleon, not having before his eyes the same dread of eternal punishment which had influenced Louis XIV., entirely refused. The pope having afterwards acknowledged that some of the bishops who had been invested by himself, and had afterwards become constitutional, had been at a later period further required to explain their principles as to church government, and some prefects having allowed themselves to be employed for this purpose, Napoleon gave the ultramontane adherents of the pope a rather severe lesson in the *Moniteur*. “The bishops,” said this article, “are invested by the Holy See, and the Holy See will certainly only invest such persons as live in the unity of its faith. All the French bishops, however, have received investiture. Whoever pretends to assert, therefore, that there are any among these bishops who hold principles opposed to those of the Holy See, is guilty of a disgraceful calumny against such bishops.” In the same number of the *Moniteur*, those prefects are severely blamed who had

caused the retractions secretly obtained by some of the ultramontane party to be printed. The Romans, however, were cunning enough, if the authority of the pope lost something on the one hand by the pride and jealousy of a military court whilst the pope was in Paris, to give it on the other hand a new support, by a brilliant exercise of the supremacy. Two Frenchmen, Belloy and Cambacérès, were made cardinals or ultramontane princes of the church, in the grand hall of the archbishopric, and with all the Roman ceremonies. The primacy of the German church was bestowed on Carl von Dalberg, the only remaining German spiritual elector, although he was known to be one of the *illuminati*; the primacy being transferred, by papal authority, from Mayence, which had formerly enjoyed this dignity, to Ratisbon.

The journey of the Emperor, the empress, and the whole of the court, was by way of Mount Cenis; and because it passed through provinces where republicanism was more deeply rooted than in the north of France, the new Emperor himself everywhere preached the doctrines of absolute monarchy, with military harshness in his expressions. He used language as coarse and violent with respect to what he called Jacobinism, and threatened the Jacobins as seriously as if he himself had been a member of one of the oldest ruling houses in Europe. He remained for some time in Stupinigi, one of the prettiest and most agreeable country residences in Europe, and then in Turin; thence he went to Alessandria, in order to celebrate a great solemnity on the battle-field of Marengo, which certainly gave greater splendour to the succeeding solemnity of the coronation at Milan, but which at the same time could not but have the effect of grievously insulting the pride of Austria, which was even then collecting its troops along the border, under the pretext of a cordon for keeping off the fever. The ceremony upon the battle-field of Marengo—the representation of the battle, the celebration of the victory—was insulting to Austria; and more particularly did it appear unworthy of a great man like Napoleon, to attribute especial importance to the momentary enthusiasm of the Italians, which this spectacle evidently excited; inasmuch as he very well knew, and even often said, that such enthusiasm was worth nothing. We give, in the note a description of the ceremony on the field of Marengo, in Botta's words,* as such description is not our business, and is en-

* Botta, lib. xxii., vol. v., pp. 282, 283. "Stavano i soldati chierati, molti memori delle portate fatiche in questi stessi Marenghiane campi: Francesi, Italiani, Mamalucchi, si fanti che cavalli: s'accostavano le guardie nazionali, tutte in abito ed in bellissimo ordine disposte; magnifica comparsa poi facevano le guardie d'onore Milanesi venute a Marengo per onoranza del nuovo signore. Stavano appresso gli ufficiati di corte, i ciamberlani, le dame, i paggi, e molti generali in abite richissime. Splendeva il sole a ciel sereno; i raggi ripercossi e rimandati in mille differenti guise de tanti ori, argenti e ferri forbiti, facevano una vista mirabile. Una moltitudine innumerevole di popolo era concorso. L'Alessandria pianura risuonava di grida festive, di nitriti guerrieri, di musica incitatrice. Napoleone glorioso venuto al trono, postovi l'imperatrice a sedere, descendeva del imperiale cocchio e montato a cavallo s'aggirava per le file degli ordinati soldati. Le gride, applansi, i suoni

tirely unnecessary to the purpose which we have proposed to ourselves in this history of the eighteenth century. We must not omit to notice, that Botta is not merely unjust in his description of Napoleon's robe of ceremony, but his description itself is incorrect; and we have therefore left out that portion of the account. It appears to us, that the review, and the representation of the battle, would have been much more worthy of a great man, whose object ought to have been, and could have been, the regeneration of Europe, without the throne, the theatrical pomp, and the crowd of courtiers and chamberlains.

As soon as the Emperor arrived, the customs of the Byzantine court were revived in Milan, as they had been in France. Grand dignitaries were named, and rules laid down for the regulation of the court and the palace. Melzi became grand-chancellor; the Archbishop of Ravenna, grand-almoner; Litta, grand-chamberlain; Caprara, master of the horse. The Lombards were also compelled to a concordat with the pope, which Melzi had up to this time been able to avoid. Before this was recognised as a concordat for the kingdom, several changes were made in it, which very much displeased the cardinals; the pope then applied to Napoleon for redress, but he insisted upon the concordat as it stood. When, therefore, Napoleon wished to bestow Italian bishoprics on the cardinals, they had an excuse for refusing to accept them.

On the occasion of the coronation in Milan, ambassadors were present, to congratulate Napoleon, from all the princes who feared him, or who hoped for his favour; and their presence rendered the ceremony of the 26th of May more imposing. Among those who thus did homage to him, was also the King of Prussia—not indeed in person, but by his representative. This was the more remarkable to all those who were anxious at the always-increasing pretensions of the French, as even then Austria was beginning openly to express its discontent. The King of Prussia, however, not only sent the Marchese Lucchesini to congratulate Napoleon, but he also sent to the Emperor himself the broad ribbon and star of the orders of the Black and Red Eagle; and afterwards also stars, and broad and narrow ribbons, to be distributed among the great people of Napoleon's Empire. Napoleon immediately interpreted this officious civility, on the part of the Prussian politicians, in the manner most favourable to his own plans. He appeared, a very few days afterwards, with the insignia of these orders; in order to prove, as it were, that from that time forth, he belonged to the family of kings, who ruled according to the old system, held courts, and adorned themselves with ribbons. We do not venture to decide whether an exactly opposite course would not have suited much better with the sans-culottism of his expressions,

d'ogni sorta più forti et piu spessi sorgevano e assordavano l'aria. Terminate la rassegna e la mostra, ivi a sedersi sul imperiale seggio ancor egli, essendo in lui conversi gli occhi della moltitudine. Tutti imperatore e vincitore di Marengo con altissima voce salutandolo."

in reference to any prince who displeased him, and with his revolutionary proceedings against every one, except the Frenchmen of his own immediate circle; as we have the most numerous and the loudest voices against us on this point. Prussia had now sunk deep indeed, under the conduct of Haugwitz; for what could be more humiliating than the appearance of the cringing marchese, as representative of Prussia, among the ambassadors of the humble vassels of Napoleon? Bavaria had sent Cetto; Beust appeared as the representative of the electoral chancellor of the empire; Baden, and the other states of Germany which had anything to hope from France, did not fail to follow Prussia's example. Tuscany, Spain, and Lucca, took this opportunity of recommending themselves to the favourable notice of the Emperor, and Genoa even sent its doge, its archbishop, and eight senators.

We pass over the ceremony of the coronation of the 26th, and everything connected with it, great as was the pomp, the rejoicing, and the expense. The nomination of the prince, who had been long before appointed viceroy, to this post, immediately followed the coronation; the constitution, as settled in Paris by the consulta, was introduced, the several tribunals established, the legislative body opened, and the order of the Iron Crown founded. The French *code-civil* was introduced, the courts of law arranged as in France; the trial by jury alone was not introduced into Italy, because Napoleon, himself an Italian, asserted publicly, that he was too well acquainted with the Italian character, to have that confidence in the people, or in their oath, necessarily supposed in trial by jury.

A marked contrast, however, was not wanting to all these ceremonies of former times, to the show of Byzantine formality, and to the everywhere-visible endeavours to observe, in every respect, the old customs, habits, formulas, and forms of etiquette; and this was, that at the first solemn audience at Milan, all the common forms and requirements of civility, even in common life, were egregiously violated by the Emperor, in reference to the Neapolitan ambassador, exactly as he had done in Paris with regard to Lord Whitworth and to Markoff, and in the present case even without any apparent cause whatever. The Queen of Naples had long hesitated whether she should send an ambassador to Milan, to congratulate the Emperor, like the other clients of France; she had at length resolved to do so, and had chosen a man of unblemished reputation, and of moderate views, Prince Cardito—a man in every respect distinguished. The prince arrived in Milan a few days after the coronation, and was presented to the Emperor at an audience, which, either accidentally or intentionally, was a very brilliant one. But what was the astonishment of the grand dignitaries, the courtiers, and the strangers present, when the Prince Cardito, after having presented his congratulations, was addressed in a most extraordinary style, and in a very unusual tone! The Emperor uttered the most bitter reproaches against Queen Caroline; he accused her of nourishing bitter hatred against

France; he spoke with the utmost violence of her intrigues, and her continual endeavours to set Italy in a blaze, and to excite all the northern powers to war. His violence increased as he went on, as was usual with him on such occasions: he enumerated, in one outburst, all the cruelties which she had perpetrated in Naples, in 1799; compared her with the daughter of Jezebel; and finally said, that she, as a new Athaliah, should meet the same fate as her predecessor. The assembly was struck dumb with astonishment; but Napoleon understood well the management of servile souls; his tone suddenly changed, and his amiable manners soon brought back to those who surrounded him their former confidence and serenity.

Lefebvre, whose father, Edouard Lefebvre, was first secretary of legation, and, in the absence of the ambassador, chargé d'affaires, at the court of Naples, is the first author who furnishes us with the real reasons for this extraordinary scene. The Neapolitan historian (Coletta) says, that Napoleon had discovered, by means of intercepted letters, some new intrigue of the queen with the English. This may be true; but Lefebvre's account of the matter better explains Napoleon's disgraceful exhibition of temper. The Marquis de Gallo, at that time Neapolitan ambassador in Paris, had, apparently of his own accord, but more probably in consequence of some understanding with members of Napoleon's family, hinted to his court the possibility of a matrimonial alliance between Prince Eugène Beauharnais and the Princess Amelia, the present Queen of France. On receiving this hint, the Queen of Naples spoke on the subject to Lefebvre; and he, although, having no instructions from his government, he could not speak officially on the subject, yet, privately, strongly advised the queen to the match. Napoleon's rage, therefore, is more easily explained, when we know that Lefebvre was obliged finally to write to his court that the queen had considered the matter for some time, and had then said, that she had no objection to the person of young Beauharnais; but that he was, as yet, a young man, with no position in the world, &c., &c.

Napoleon's conduct towards Genoa, or as it was then called, the Ligurian republic, and at a later period, towards Lucca and Tuscany, then called Etruria, was quite inexcusable. We are astonished, when we see the French constantly expressing such virtuous indignation at the partition of Poland, that none of them at all blame the annihilation of the free cities of the German Empire, or the annexation of the Italian republics; but find these proceedings perfectly right and proper. Napoleon's creatures came to an understanding with the Genoese deputation to Milan: the members of this deputation were persuaded that circumstances rendered it necessary for the Emperor to annex the city and territory to France, notwithstanding his often-repeated promise of respecting the independence of Genoa; and, finally, that the senate would do well to request him so to do. The senate, in order to avoid worse, took a part in this farce, and determined to request the annexation of Genoa to France. All this

was the work of a few days. On the 4th of June, the doge appeared again in Milan, at the head of a deputation of the senate and people of Genoa, and requested the Emperor to unite Genoa, as the first theatre of his victories, the first step of the throne upon which he was then seated, with his Empire, and number the Genoese among his subjects. It appears to us, at least, that it would have been much more creditable to the Emperor, if he had at once annexed Genoa to his Empire, without all the wretched farce of deputations to Milan and requests of the senate, particularly as he did not even fulfil the conditions on which the city had been delivered up to him. In that case, indeed, he could not have answered the protests of the other European powers against his occupation of Genoa, by saying that he had only granted their own request. It was, at any rate, a benefit to the people that he chose as his representative such an intelligent, moderate, and well-meaning man as the Chancellor Lebrun. He himself arrived in the town on the 11th of June, on which occasion there was of course no want of the grossest flattery and of bombastic speeches of all sorts, and all the necessary preparations were made for a definite union with France. The reason which the French urged, and which the Genoese senate had given, for sacrificing their liberty, was a curious one enough. It was the same which the allied powers employed for bestowing Genoa on the King of Sardinia, who really obtained it after the fall of Napoleon. The Genoese were ordered to say, *We are the naval power of Piedmont, and must therefore be united with Piedmont.* The republic was not, however, completely united to France till October. Napoleon wished to show his contempt and defiance of the coalition, which had just then been arranged, and of which, as we see from his violent language respecting Queen Caroline, he was well aware; and to prove to them, that he would advance in his usurpations exactly in proportion as they endeavoured to stop him. He showed himself hostile to the old state of things everywhere; forming, however, at the same time, the new state of things, which he constructed entirely of the moulderling remains of the old. Instead of respecting merely desert and fitness, he thought only of exalting his own family, and, instead of intelligent and deserving men, he placed at the head of several states, women and boys, who were no better than the degenerate offspring of the former ruling families, corrupted by court education. There were times when he himself fully perceived the folly of making princes of ignorant and unruly boys, like his brother Jerome. He proved this publicly, too, when he gave him a severe reproof for having presumed to name merely a captain of a ship; and his admirers, therefore, lay great stress on this fact. But he, nevertheless, made him a prince, destined him for a sovereign, and, on entirely untenable grounds, caused his marriage with Miss Patterson, who was not even allowed to land with her husband, to be pronounced null. Eugène Beauharnais, too, had neither merit nor experience, when he was made viceroy; Murat had at least military talent; the Emperor's

sisters, to please whom the Italian states were confiscated in the midst of peace, and in violation of all justice, were not celebrated, even among the French, for the excellence of their moral character. Pauline and Elisa particularly displeased their brother, who could not easily overlook any levity, by their behaviour, although he continued to gratify their wishes at the public expense. Pauline, the beautiful widow of General Leclerc, who had fallen in St. Domingo, was first introduced into an ancient family, as it is called. She married Prince Borghese, who had been long in alliance with the French; and on the 24th of March, 1805, he became a French citizen, was then made a French prince, and grand-cross of the legion of honour. This pair received territory and subjects at a later period. Elisa was made a princess in Italy. Her brother had first presented her with the small district of Piombino, contained in Etruria, as if it had been his private property; but when she made a *mésalliance*, he provided further for her. She married an officer, one Baciocchi, a Corsican, whose origin was at least very doubtful. Her brother made him a prince and a senator; and out of complaisance for his wife, the eldest sister of the Emperor, a similar manœuvre was performed with regard to Lucca, as had been already so successfully executed respecting Genoa. This republic (Lucca) was in the hands of a few patrician families, who, as soon as they received a hint that the Emperor wished for their city, willingly assisted him to obtain his wish without exciting any disturbance. They requested him to erect their city into a principality for his sister; and he, in return, allowed them to frame a constitution, securing to the former aristocracy considerable civic advantages. This constitution was submitted to the people, to be confirmed, as was the custom at the time, and the people, as usual, immediately confirmed it. On the 23rd of June, the aristocrats of Lucca requested the confirmation of the Emperor, which they received on the following day.

The families belonging to the old nobility remained, therefore, in possession of various privileges over their fellow-citizens; but Felix Baciocchi and his wife, and all whom they favoured, were raised high above the patricians, whose families dated from before the Crusades. Prince Felix of Lucca and Piombino was indeed merely a subordinate person; but his wife Elisa played the principal part, and was compared by the Italians to Catharine II. of Russia, both in regard to her manner of life and her moral character, and to the favour with which she treated poets, flattering rhetoricians, and sophists. She is, for instance, much praised by the French, for whom the authors whom she protected have much more value than for us, because she favoured the poet, Laharpe, and the Chevalier Bouflers, the great pet of the court of Berlin, and particularly of the higher nobility; further, because she materially assisted in spreading the fame of Chateaubriand, who was at that time engaged in introducing the florid style, and the new-fangled Christian-Catholic doctrines, as well as the taste for horrors, into novel literature. She also treated with

special favour the court sophist and academic phrase-maker, Fontanes, for various more or less suspicious reasons.

Napoleon's conduct towards the Italian states, as well as towards Holland, in 1805, proved clearly that he was, above everything, anxious to secure for his family a splendid and princely existence at the expense of these weaker states. In point of fact, he first gave Guastalla, and then Tuscany, to Prince Borghese, after having allowed Murat to act as sovereign in Tuscany, the Roman States, and Naples, during a considerable portion of 1805. Even at the time of the Italian coronation, Murat was in fact ruler in Etruria, where the widow of King Louis, who should have reigned in the name of her son, then a minor, was entirely without influence. Now, when neither Austria nor Spain, nor any other power, was for the future to be spared, Parma and Placencia were definitively and entirely united to France.

It is true that Holland was not, in the first few months of the year 1805, given over to a viceroy chosen from Napoleon's family, like Milan; or to a sister, like Lucca; nor was it placed under the power of his brother-in-law, whose gasconading disposition often made him ridiculous, like Etruria; but it was placed under such a government, as was evidently intended to prepare it for the reception of some Napoleonite. Napoleon explained to the Dutch ambassador in Paris, the worthy Schimmelpennink, that it would be necessary for him to do away with all remains of the provincial and federal government, in order to place Holland in the situation to occupy a place in the French system of states; but he also added, that for this purpose a monarchical government must be introduced. Schimmelpennink, who possessed great influence in his own country as well as in Paris, was to assist him in this matter; the Emperor even offered to confer upon him the sovereign power in the state. Schimmelpennink had no wish to play the prince for a short time; he had even the courage to undertake the defence of the republic against the Emperor, and to endeavour to obtain that it should be allowed to subsist; but Napoleon's system was laid down—Italy and Holland must be sacrificed. The manner in which the intended destruction of this oppressed, exhausted state, deprived of every means of defence, and which had been promised protection, was announced, was quite unworthy of the Emperor. His minister was desired, towards the conclusion of 1804, to utter all sorts of reproaches against the Dutch, their constitution, and government; and these expressions, printed in the papers, as was then the fashion, formed a manifesto, which announced the approaching subjection of the country.

In Holland, as must be always the case where the government is weak, the people were divided into several parties, which contended bitterly against each other on every possible occasion. On a hint from Napoleon to the French ambassadors with their secretaries, the generals, agents, and other creatures of the French, fanned the flame,

and assisted in increasing this party feeling, so as to clog and even stop the course of the government and of the administration. This gave Napoleon the desired pretext for demanding positively that the government should be converted into a monarchy, and that all republican forms should be entirely done away. The Dutch ambassador long refused to serve as the instrument for the destruction of the last remains of freedom in his country, and to be the means of delivering it over to the military caprice of the French; but when Napoleon finally threatened to annex the country to France, he undertook to induce the Dutch to consent to a monarchical form of government. With his assistance, a sketch of the new constitution had been made in Paris; and with this Schimmelpennink returned to Holland, and had influence enough to induce his countrymen to receive it, as a whole, on the 15th of March; he was, however, commissioned to negotiate respecting some single points which they wished to be changed, and for this purpose returned to Paris immediately afterwards. He in vain endeavoured to be allowed to retain at least a portion of the federal constitution, in order not to be obliged to force upon his countrymen a total change of customs, habits, and traditions. He wished, in order to spare the feelings of the republicans, to accept the first place in the state only under the title of *President*; but Napoleon declared that this reminded him of the North American republic, and would have nothing to do with it. Schimmelpennink sought, therefore, and found another means of escape.

The conduct of the Dutch government was indeed intrusted to him alone, with an unlimited extension of the executive power; but he was allowed to associate with himself a council of state, of from five to nine members, as a counselling body; and he was, further, permitted to retain the sovereign power for only five years, and under the ancient and modest title of Pensionary of the Council. According to this new constitution, which, however, lasted but a very short time, the laws were to be drawn up by the pensionary, with the assistance of the council of state, and presented for acceptance or refusal to the legislative council, which had itself no power to propose any law. The legislative council, too, lost all its influence, by the number of its members being reduced from thirty-five (which had been left at the last alteration in the constitution) to nineteen.

The new constitution was, for the sake of form, presented to the Dutch people for their acceptance; this, however, like many other things in our times, upon which great stress is laid, was merely a farce. All those who did not vote at all, were considered to be in favour of the question; and thus there was a large majority on this side. In this manner, therefore, a purely monarchical form of government was introduced, which was to serve as a preparation for what Napoleon further intended. On the 14th of May, the new legislative council, now diminished by the half, which bore the title of "their high-mightinesses," held its first solemn sitting. At this

period also, in which everything was everywhere destroyed, which was connected with the *ideology* of the better times of the National Assembly (as Napoleon himself expressed that particular portion of the revolutionary principles which he most detested), the French senate published a decree, on the 9th of September, abolishing the astronomical republican calendar, and re-establishing the Christian or Gregorian one.

§ V.

THIRD WAR OF THE COALITION.

A.—TILL THE CAPTURE OF ULM.

WHEN Pitt and his plutocrats were endeavouring to turn the attack of Napoleon, which threatened themselves, against the nations of the continent, they knew very well that Austria had neither any man of talent in its cabinet, nor any general of even moderate ability, nor any regularity in its financial affairs; but they acted on the principle that all this was the Austrians' business—not theirs. How little indeed Pitt and Lord Mulgrave cared what became of the unfortunate Austrians, is plainly to be seen from the fact, that we now possess documentary evidence to prove that they would again have placed Thugut at the helm of state, if this originator of all mischief had not had popular feeling so much and so decidedly against him. On the other hand, English influence alone placed their old friend, and the companion of the Duke of York, the unfortunate Mack, at the head of the Austrian army, to the final destruction of that country.

Austria had been playing a double game since 1804; it had openly professed friendship for the new Emperor, and had yet intrigued against France, in London, Petersburg, and Berlin. This double game was continued, even when the plan of the campaign was being discussed in Vienna, in 1805. The marchings and counter-marchings of the troops were ridiculously excused by fear of the yellow fever, which rendered a *cordon* necessary along the Italian border. All subjects of contention appeared to be removed; for, in 1803, the business respecting the compensation to be given to the Duke of Tuscany had been settled by the mediation of Russia; and on this everything which had been done in Italy was tacitly recognised by Austria—among other things, the incorporation of Parma, Placencia, and Piedmont, with France. The complaints respecting the arrest of the Duc d'Enghien had been cleverly stopped by Austria; and the trick by which this was accomplished had been puffed as a piece of great merit at Paris. At a later period, the diplomatists of Vienna had been quite as obliging as those of Berlin, in recognising Bonaparte's new title; and it had even been proposed to send a member of the highest Viennese aristocracy, either Ginzen-

dorf, or Esterhazy, as an extraordinary ambassador, to congratulate the new Emperor. Even in respect to the Kingdom of Italy, the Emperor Francis wrote a letter recognising this step, although it had been long previously agreed between him and the Emperor of Russia, that an army of half a million of men should be sent into the field against the French.

On the 8th of November (or, according to the Russian calendar, the 26th of October), 1804, a treaty had been signed by Tatitcheff and Czartorinski, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, and by Count Stadion on the part of Austria, which was not dated, kept secret, and called a defensive treaty, but which evidently partook of the nature of an offensive treaty, inasmuch as it provided that limits should be set to the further usurpations of France. Mention was only made, therefore, of 350,000 men, which Russia and Austria were to furnish; England not being mentioned at all, lest, by mentioning it, the treaty might have a too openly hostile appearance in reference to France. This must be mentioned here, in justice to Napoleon and the French; because their usurpations during this time, when they were treated as friends by Austria, whilst they were secretly betrayed by her, were nothing else than open reprisals for the secret intrigues which were being carried on in Vienna, in favour of England, by Madame Rasumowski and Woronzoff, long before the Emperor Francis had at all made up his mind how to act.

We find a tolerable account of the state of things in Austria, at a time when it was intending to enter the lists with the colossal power of Napoleon, his undoubted genius, and a dozen generals, who have only to be named to be commended for their military talents, in the Russian correspondence, which has lately been printed by Baron von Hormayr.* We quote this passage, not because we attach any importance to the letters in which it occurs (for they contain in general only diplomatic reports), but because the description is of itself true, and corresponds with what we know from other sources. We therefore occasionally vary an expression used in the original, and sometimes insert a phrase borrowed from other letters. "Truly," says this account, "one does not require to be long in Vienna, to discover that the Austrian state is becoming quite worn out, internally. The head of the state is counted for nothing—the ministers are without any talents whatsoever—the army has no confidence in its generals and officers, and consequently none in itself. The higher nobility are entirely without education, without any noble impulses, or any moral force; there is an absolute want of men of head. The terror of Bonaparte is great; and yet Austria stands quite alone, in consequence of its egotistical policy, which never sacrifices any advantage, for the benefit of others, and appears about to vanish entirely from the class of powers of the first rank. The Archduke Charles is the only man who possesses the con-

* *Lebensbilder aus dem Befreiungskriege (Anecdotes of the Continental War).*
Third part, additions and corrections. Jena 1844.

fidence of the public; he, however, is deficient in energy; whilst his constitution and weak health do not permit him to act with vigour or perseverance. He is, besides, accused of suffering himself to be surrounded by contemptible people, and of not keeping a strict eye over those who are only anxious to enrich themselves at his and the public's expense. He, therefore, as it is said, lends his name to the most contemptible acts of meanness and chicanery. And even if he had not these faults, it would be impossible to reckon upon him, in consequence of the bad state of his health." Whilst the Austrians and Russians held conferences, and caused great armies to be raised, and marched hither and thither—at least, upon paper—Napoleon, after his return from Italy, apparently directed all his threatening preparations against England alone; although he had collected no inconsiderable number of troops, under Marshal Jourdan, in Italy, to act against what was called the *cordon* of the Austrians, on the northern frontier of that country. The preparations for the invasion, to which we are here again obliged to recur, were resumed with great zeal and activity. Immediately after the Emperor's return to Paris, above a hundred millions of francs were expended upon them; and all historians, among whom is to be included one of Napoleon's most respected councillors of state,* concur in alleging with confidence, that in July, 1805, the idea of an invasion was entertained with perfect seriousness; we do not, therefore, venture to contradict their testimony, but must openly confess that we cannot possibly believe the fact. It appears to us, that the armaments by sea, and the noise which was made about the fleets, were increased precisely in the same proportion as progress was made in the negotiations of the powers which afterwards formed an alliance against France, and of which Bonaparte was fully informed. The event will show, that at the very time in which nearly 200,000 men were kept ready on the west coast of France, so as to be able to march to the Rhine on the very first hint, the German vassals of France, by hints, and without any special treaties, had been brought to that condition in which they really were when the war suddenly broke out. Some doubts concerning this point might be entertained with regard to Württemberg: in the case of Bavaria, it was perfectly well known; but she was obliged to conceal her views, in order not to be exposed to the first attack of the Austrians. Affairs in general had taken such a form, since the peace of Luneville, that Württemberg, Bavaria, and

* Thibaudeau, in whom we place the greatest confidence, becomes completely angry when any one insinuates even a doubt that Bonaparte, at a moment when he knew that armies of half-a-million of men were likely to be employed against him, could have intended to have employed the armies and fleets of France in such a dangerous undertaking. In the ninth chapter of the first part of his *Histoire de l'Empire*, he is quite inexhaustible in his descriptions of, and eulogies upon, Napoleon's activity in the concerns of the navy. For a full account, we refer our readers, therefore, to the work above quoted, to Thiers, and others, because it relates especially to Bonaparte and to France. Thibaudeau adds, that he has gone so fully into this subject, in order to convince even the most incredulous that the proposed invasion was no mere popinjay.

Baden, must stand or fall with Napoleon. The electoral arch-chancellor was also amongst the number of those who had already come to an understanding with Napoleon, during his coronation in Milan. In fact, any one who compares Bonaparte's measures, and the manner in which they were prepared and urged on, with the intrigues diplomacy, consultations, and devices, of his opponents, must be convinced that the third war would terminate still more disgracefully for the coalition than the two former ones had done. To give some idea of the manner in which the coalition was formed, a very summary account of the course of the negotiations will suffice. For this purpose, we shall first state, very briefly, everything which was done on the part of the allies, from October, 1804, till October, 1805; and then subjoin the course which Napoleon, in the spirit of that new age of rapid movement which he wished to found, pursued, in opposition to the traditional tediousness of the old speaking and writing age, which was still in existence in Vienna.

We have already referred to what Thiers has, with elaborate detail, stated in the fifth part of his History, as to the manner in which the easily-excited imagination of the Emperor of Russia was first worked upon, by immense schemes of a new division and a re-organisation of a great portion of Europe; of his having sent Novosilzoff to London, where Pitt afterwards saw through the cloud which was spread around his dreams, and, in the subsequent negotiations, brought everything back to a practical and obvious plan of partition. As early as 1804, Austria had moreover sent Count Stadion from Berlin to Petersburg; and in his stead, sent to Berlin Count Metternich, the most refined of the Austrian diplomatists, and who at the same time possessed in the highest degree all those external accomplishments which befitted a courtier: the object of his mission was to prevail upon the King of Prussia to join the new coalition. As early as October, Count Stadion had not only concluded the above-mentioned apparently defensive, but eventually offensive, treaty with Russia, but from the very beginning his deficiency in military knowledge had been supplied by General von Stutterheim, who accompanied him, in order to devise and agree upon the plans of the campaign, in conjunction with Russia.

The Archduke Charles, who, about this period was for a short time president of the court-council of war, proved, all to no purpose, that it was impossible for Austria to carry on a war; because she had neither money, troops, nor generals: Russian influence and English money, however, proved much more powerful than he. He was able to delay, but found it impossible to prevent, the formation of an alliance with England against France. From the commencement of the year 1805, Austria proceeded to make such preparations, and to collect such a number of forces on the frontiers of Italy and Bavaria, and in the Tyrol, as led Bonaparte to make importunate applications for explanation, and to be guilty of the most insolent usurpations in Italy. In the summer of 1805, Austria caused Prony, a French

engineer and *inspecteur des ponts et chaussées*, and an Italian general, to be arrested in Venice; and Napoleon made reprisals. Even previous to this event, he had acted with great harshness towards the Austrian *chargé d'affaires* in Genoa, who had been desirous of having an article inserted in the newspapers, respecting the union of Genoa with France: he caused it to be intimated to him, that he might have what he pleased inserted in the newspapers in Austria, but not in Italy.

Russian and English agents and emissaries were at that time in constant movement; and as the plan agreed upon between Russia and England, not only destined for Austria two armies, which were to be ready to march one after the other, but also determined that the French were to be attacked in Hanover, from Swedish Pomerania,—the interest and co-operation of the King of Sweden was to be first gained. We have already stated, that King Gustavus IX., in return for subsidies, not only promised to receive a division of English and Russians into Pomerania, and agreed to furnish besides 20,000 Swedes, but at the same time, with a total want of tact, gave mortal offence to the King of Prussia, whom on every account it was so desirable to gain over and conciliate.

The Prussian policy, which would unquestionably have been better had not the patriots and Hardenberg given rise to as great scandal by their immoralities as their opponents,* became more and more contemptible; so that the Russians even resolved on sending the second of their armies, with a threatening aspect, to the Prussian frontiers, and on marching through the Prussian territory without further question. This had a very opposite effect from what was expected upon the weak king, who was extremely jealous of all his sovereign rights and privileges. He became violently angry, and sent off a corps of his army; but he very soon after came to a friendly understanding with the Russians. The change from vehement indignation to warm friendship, in his relations to France, had been just as sudden. On the occasion of the carrying off of Rumbold, in 1804, the king appeared resolved to employ bold and worthy language; but fear of giving offence to the Emperor of the French was immediately afterwards revived in his mind by Zastrow, Haugwitz, and their companions. Towards the middle of the year 1805, he allowed himself to entertain the idea of becoming a mediator, without being able to give any weight to his mediation. The coalition was resolved on; everything was arranged; the Russians were about to commence their march; the Austrians were assembled; and Count Winzigerode had gone to Vienna (June, 1805),

* This had been already observed by the Russian, who states to Count Munster so much both of what is true and false, when Hardenberg had not as yet the conduct of affairs in Berlin. He writes: “Le représentant de votre souverain est un homme dénué de tous moyens, et il y a tout lieu de croire, que la cour de Londres est mal informée. *Hardenberg pourrait le suppléer, il est vrai. Je crois qu'il connaît l'état des choses, mais il est trop bon vivant pour prendre les choses à cœur et sortir de la sphère de sa mission.*” See Hormayr, *Lebensbilder*, etc., vol. ii., p. 178.

to hold conferences on the plans of the war, the minutes of which have been recently published by Hormayr,* with Mack, Schwarzenberg, and Collenbach, when a desire was felt to use the King of Prussia, whom it had hitherto proved impossible to draw into the alliance, in order, under the pretence of a reconciliation with England, to be mediated by Russia, to deceive Napoleon respecting the coalition. The same Novosilzoff, who had been employed in Petersburg and in London on the affairs of the war, the commencement of which was now to be delayed, was sent to Berlin, in order to obtain from the French Emperor, by the instrumentality of Prussia, the passports necessary to enable him to proceed to Paris. For this purpose, the Emperor of Russia wrote to the King of Prussia, on the 12th of April, 1805, a letter, which was admirably adapted to work upon the character of Frederick William III.—“I have resolved,” he writes, “to send Novosilzoff, my minister of justice, with unlimited powers, because France has made proposals of peace to England, and the latter has requested my mediation to bring about a general peace. Novosilzoff is to proceed without any public character, and to appear in Paris as a mere traveller; on this ground, therefore, I have to beg your majesty to obtain for him the necessary passports from the French cabinet.” We shall present our readers with the remark made by a French diplomatist, on the part which the King of Prussia was made to play in this affair;† but add, that Napoleon, although he at first appeared disposed to entertain the question, almost immediately saw through the deceit which was attempted. He was then in Milan; and on the 11th of May, answered the king, that he put no faith in the matter, but that he would, nevertheless, give the necessary orders for the passports to be prepared. General von Zastrow, who had the greatest fear of the French, who, even after the battle of Jena, did everything in his power to obstruct every energetic measure, and who, when formerly at the head of the war-department, had carefully sought to maintain the old and tedious usages and customs of the service, was at that time sent to Petersburg, and he at length opened the king’s eyes to the real state of affairs. Czartorinski, the minister for foreign affairs, tried to frighten him; the emperor himself informed him that the consent of Austria had been gained in favour of the war; nothing whatever resulted from Novosilzoff’s mission. He arrived in Berlin at a

* We refer to the document in the third part of the *Lebensbilder*, p. 192, No. 35, which is there entitled: “*Stärke der Österreichischen Kriegsmacht, wie selbe den Verträgen von 1804 u. 1805. Grunde gelegt und dem Obristen Grafen Winzingerode von Wien mitgegeben wurde zu.*”

† Lefebvre, vol. ii., p. 65: “*Cette demande (of the emperor to the king) était le piège le plus dangereux que l’astucieux empereur put tendre à son royal et candid ami. Frédéric Guillaume s’y laissa prendre; il ajouta une foi entière aux protestations du Czar; il crut sincèrement que la mission dont était chargé M. de Novosilzoff était toute de conciliation et de paix; et il voulait exprimer lui-même à l’Empereur Napoleon la satisfaction qu’il en ressentait. Il lui écrivit à cet effet. Il ne soupçonnait pas, qu’en prenant ainsi sous son patronage le négociateur russe et ses propositions, il se faisait le complice involontaire de nos ennemis.*”

moment when the king was absent; the business concerning the passports was therefore to be arranged with Laforest, the French ambassador. This was done by a letter written on the 5th of June, by Talleyrand to Laforest, in Berlin, according to the terms of which he was commissioned to intimate to Novosilzoff, that nothing could be really entered upon. This is intimated in the language of Talleyrand, in which he alleges, in the most courtly and periphrastic phraseology, that England was merely desirous of mixing up Russia in the affair as a mediating power, because she was anxious to turn a naval into a continental war. He then concludes the letter with those Napoleonic words—"That as soon as M. de Novosilzoff spoke one threatening word, or made any reference to certain hypothetical treaties which were concluded with England, he would be listened to no longer, but France would immediately have recourse to the sword."

How miserable all this petty cunning was, may be gathered from the fact, that the consent of the Emperor Francis to the war had been already gained in January, and that the English memorial or note, which was published on the 19th of January, and is to be found in Schöll (vol. vii., p. 358), contained the whole plan of the coalition. General Pelet, a well-informed, but somewhat too national and Napoleonic man, alleges, what we are not prepared to maintain, to the same extent as he, that at that time Naples also, as well as Spain and Portugal, were, in secret, parties to the alliance of the powers who were desirous of breaking up and partitioning the Empire of Napoleon, as was done in 1814.* The Archduke Charles, as president of the council of war, was strongly opposed to Austria's entering into the coalition; but when, in the agreement of the other powers, on the 11th of April, the Austrian force was mentioned along with those of the other allied powers, it could no longer be doubted that the emperor had been gained for the alliance; in consequence of this conviction, the Archduke Charles resigned his office of president of the council, on the 11th of May, 1805. The English again suc-

* Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809 en Allemagne, avec les opérations particulières des corps d'Italie, de Pologne, de Saxe, de Naples, et de Walcheren, par le Général Pelet.—D'après son journal fort détaillé de la campagne d'Allemagne, des reconnaissances et des divers travaux; la correspondance de Napoleon avec le Major-Général, les Maréchaux, les Commandants-en-chef, &c.; iv. vols., 8vo., Paris, 1824. Vol i., p. 9:—"En 1804, l'Angleterre, menacée sur son territoire où Napoleon allait chercher la paix, avait armé l'Europe entière contre la France. La note du 19 Janvier, 1805, et les articles secrets du traité de concert du 11 April, servirent de base à la ligue des puissances. Les projets contre la dynastie impériale étaient encore enveloppés de mystère, mais on a su depuis ce que les cabinets entendaient par bouleversements et usurpations. On s'expliquait plus ouvertement sur le démembrement de la Belgique; sur sa réunion avec la Hollande, vendue à la maison d'Orange, les places de la Meuse, avec des garnisons Russes et Autrichiennes, devant servir de barrière contre nous; sur la restitution de Nice et de la Savoie au Piémont." He then adds something which is at least very doubtful, and concludes: "Les plans de campagne furent discutés, et tous sont inconnus maintenant. Naples, Rome, et le Portugal, se déclaraient pour la coalition; l'Espagne s'y préparait sourdement, pendant même que ses escadres combattaient avec nous.

ceeded in having the unfortunate Mack appointed to a chief command; and the aristocracy of Austria were satisfied, because he was contented to bow down before them, and humbly to endure their pretensions and disobedience. Mack was undoubtedly an excellent man in the war-office: he was honest, as is proved by the poverty in which he lived from 1806 to 1814, and was, moreover, a great favourite with the soldiers; he was, however, wholly deficient in the qualities of a commander in the field—in quick perception, ready determination, and undaunted courage in dangerous situations; whilst his whole soul was at the feet of the proud nobility. He therefore submitted to have a young archduke placed over him, who followed his own views, or the interested advice of those by whom he was surrounded; he enjoyed no real distinction in the army, and every one of the high-born generals and colonels, with whom the army swarmed, thought himself superior to the man without birth or family. Unfortunately, too, the main army on the Inn, which was to be joined by the first Russian army, was to open the campaign; and this force was under the command of the young Archduke Ferdinand, assisted by General Mack. Austria was desirous of taking Bavaria by surprise, and thus making itself master of the Bavarian army; for so little was known of Bonaparte's preparations, that it was thought possible to overreach him. Bonaparte, however, knew well, that the first Russian army, under Kutusoff, which was to form a junction with Mack, had not advanced further than the frontiers of Moravia; whilst the second, under Buxhövden, was still far distant; he therefore allured the Austrians to an attack upon Bavaria, whilst he made everything ready on his western coasts, and therefore at a great distance, as well as in Holland and Hanover, to fall upon them like a thunderbolt, when he was supposed to be far off. With this view, he had already made all the necessary arrangements with his German vassals.

On this occasion, it is impossible to accuse those German princes whose provinces lay on the Rhine, or those who, like Bavaria, knew what they had to expect from Austria, with any want of German patriotism; for the Austrian preparations, generals, finances, and aims, were of such a description as to furnish no ground to hope for safety from that quarter. On the other hand, Prussia and Electoral Hesse were to blame for the fall of the German Empire; for if, instead of negotiating, they had appeared in the field, and shown themselves in earnest in the defence and support of the integrity of Germany, they might have set bounds to both parties, and have, according to circumstances, either protected or overawed those princes who attached themselves to France: standing alone, these must have fallen, without any advantage accruing therefrom to the Germans. The Emperor of the French, first of all, threw out a general promise, of a very alluring nature, to those German princes who were already French—a promise which could not fail to lead them to hope for an extension of their respective territories; and then

he negotiated with them individually. This general promise was, that he had no intention of aiming at any conquests on the German side of the Rhine. Austria had joined the coalition as early as June; and most probably, too, Napoleon had long come to a perfect understanding with the princes whose troops afterwards joined those of France: these princes, however, assumed, more or less, an air of independence—Nassau and Baden the least, Wirtemberg and Bavaria the most. The Elector Frederick of Wirtemberg, despot and cruel tyrant as he was, maintained his dignity, and enjoyed the respect of Napoleon. He afterwards, for appearance' sake, allowed matters to proceed so far, as to have the French cannon pointed against the gates of his capital; all this, however, was merely a mask. In Bavaria, Montgelas and Maximilian Joseph pushed the matter still further. They entered into negotiations with the invading Austrians, availing themselves of the slackness with which they threatened to enter the territory; for instead of making a rapid movement, and at once overrunning the country, they sent Prince Schwarzenberg to Munich, and opened negotiations; so that their army reached Munich two days too late. Had Napoleon wished to overrun Bavaria, and incorporate the Bavarian troops with his, as the Austrians did, he would have broken into the country with all his force, instead of losing time in tedious diplomacy. It is clear, from the orders of the day which Berthier issued to Marmont and Bernadotte, when the Austrians were making preparations to fall upon Bavaria, that Darmstadt and Nassau had long before promised their accession. Baden played the most melancholy part. It had thrown itself completely into the hands of Napoleon, and yet was afraid to acknowledge the fact; Berthier, therefore, in writing to Marmont, and desiring him to proceed up the Rhine from Holland, gives him especial directions to hasten to the assistance of Baden, should it be threatened before the grand French army should reach the Rhine. The Emperor of the French was fully informed of every plan, of every step, and of every consultation, of the Austrians, by means of his friends in Munich; whilst no one knew anything of his designs, till he suddenly issued his general orders to his army.

The Queen of Naples found herself, in relation to the French, in a situation precisely similar to that of Bavaria, with respect to Austria; except that the queen was driven on by an irresistible passion, which was quite foreign to the nature of the mean-spirited German princes. In the preceding year, she had employed Roger Damas in preparing armaments, and in disciplining the troops—circumstances which were regarded as so suspicious by the Emperor of the French, that he compelled her, by threats, to remove the general from Naples, and to send him to Sicily. From that time, she had taken part in all the negotiations in reference to the coalition; and it was generally expected, that she would recal the general from Sicily, and place him at the head of an army. It was arranged in Vienna, that, as soon as the war was commenced by the allies, the queen was to cause her

Neapolitan army to unite with the Russians, who were to be conveyed in English ships from Corfu to Naples. Napoleon knew all this; and we see, therefore, from the orders issued to his army, that, from the first, he was resolved to drive the queen out of Italy before the war, and to put an end to her kingdom; as he really did when the war was ended—the queen having furnished him with the desired pretence, by being guilty of a faithless breach of the agreement about to be mentioned.

In the orders to which reference has just been made, General Gouvion St. Cyr, who commanded the French troops occupying the Neapolitan fortresses, was most strictly enjoined, on the first movement of the Neapolitans which came to his knowledge, to fall upon their troops and their capital, to have recourse to fire and sword with an unsparing hand, and to put an end to the rule of the Bourbons. Napoleon was at that time only half informed of the engagement into which the Queen of Naples had entered in July, to unite her army with the 14,000 Russians and the 6,000 English who were to be landed on the coasts of Naples. That such, however, was really the case, is obvious, from the minutes of the conference of the 16th of July, 1805, which have been published by the Austrians. The Russian general, Lascy, was in Naples as early as June, to settle and determine upon the most suitable place for debarkation. At the decisive movement, Lefebvre, the head *chargé d'affaires*, perceived that it would be for the interest of both parties to avert this misfortune from Naples; he made proposals, and he persuaded the queen. Napoleon, too, bethought himself, disapproved of the conduct of his ambassador, who would not listen to a word respecting conciliation, and commissioned Talleyrand to offer favourable terms. Talleyrand immediately sent for the Marquis of Gallo, who still remained as ambassador in Paris, and laid before him a treaty ready drawn up, which he was to sign if he wished peace to continue. He signed it on the 21st of September. By this treaty, the Emperor promised to withdraw all his troops from the Neapolitan territory; and the King of Naples promised to remain neutral, to oppose the debarkation of any of the parties to the war, and not to give the command of his troops to any foreign general. By a secret article, the king bound himself never to acknowledge the supremacy of England in Malta, and to dismiss Acton altogether from his service. The queen ratified this treaty with a heavy heart, on the 19th of October; and St. Cyr immediately departed with his troops for Upper Italy. The queen herself afterwards released the Emperor of the French from all his obligations, by violating the treaty as soon as the Russians and the English showed themselves on the coast.

The Elector of Hesse was closely allied with Russia; and, like Frederick William III., used all possible means to gain something, without hazarding anything. His mean and calculating mind never entertained a thought of country, humanity, or of sacrifices

for duty and right. At a time, therefore, when the whole fate of Germany, and afterwards that of Prussia, was at stake, his admirable army neither co-operated with the Emperor in 1805, nor with Russia in the following year, because no subsidies were forthcoming. As to Russia, at the very moment when the Russians were on their march, when the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack were about to invade Bavaria, in order to take possession of the country, and to incorporate the Bavarian army with the Austrian, Frederick William III. was induced, by Zastrow, Haugwitz, Lombard, and others, to have recourse to some opposition, which made him an object of contempt to the energetic and consistent Emperor of the French. Affrighted by the threats of the Russians, the Prussians did not at first venture to protect the French in Hanover against an attack of the Swedes, Russians, and English; and yet, immediately afterwards, entered into arrangements with France, to prolong the possession of Hanover; but then, again, became alarmed at the boldness which they had shown, and resumed what they had given.

As regards the first point, we have already observed, that Swedish-Pomerania was appointed as an assembling-place for the English, Swedish, and Russian troops, which were to attack the French in Hanover; although we see, from a letter of Czartorinski, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, that he strongly insisted on the Russians being landed on the Elbe or the Weser; because, if disembarked at Stralsund, they might be placed in difficulties in case of retreat. An army of at least 50,000 men in Pomerania and Hanover might have been very dangerous to Prussia; Hardenberg nevertheless declared that Prussia would remain perfectly quiet, and not do anything to obstruct the march to Hanover, provided the allies touched no other territory but the Hanoverian. Immediately afterwards, the king was led into a negotiation with France, which was to lead to an agreement, whereby Prussia was to be bound to keep off the allies from Hanover by force of arms.

Napoleon, to whom it was at that time of great importance to secure the King of Prussia as an ally, not only offered to place Hanover in his hands, as a pledge during the war, as the king had demanded, but to cede it to him as a possession, provided he would agree to an alliance. This was, indeed, a subject of grave consideration, for a king of the old system, like Frederick William, to change completely from the old to the new, and, isolated as he would be, to place himself in the same relation to Napoleon as the Elector of Bavaria, who, although he too was afterwards called a king, was none the less a vassal of Bonaparte, and did him homage with all his people. The king, however, at first seemed to take a different view; he entered into the matter, and Napoleon, in all haste, sent the king's old acquaintance, the Grand-Marshal Duroc, to Berlin, where he arrived on the 1st of September, the very day on which Bonaparte's grand army broke up its quarters at Boulogne, in order to march to the Rhine. The instructions, both verbal and written,

given by the Emperor to Duroc, and which are now printed and in the hands of the public, closely resemble all those given and written on such occasions; but we find it impossible to believe that Bonaparte was really serious in the assurances of his desire to make Prussia great and mighty, as a bulwark against the power and incursions of Russia. The king, however, no sooner bethought himself, and became fully aware that no great gain was to be acquired in the world, without great danger, than he yielded to his fears, and drew back. In fact, had the king concluded the alliance, an active participation in the war would have become almost unavoidable. And yet, at that time, the Prussian army was scattered hither and thither, over the whole monarchy; there was nowhere anything like a complete division together; those absent on leave were not called in. The fortresses had been so neglected, and were so badly provided with materials—without adequate garrisons and able chiefs, or even secondary commanders—that it would have been incredible that these things should not have come to light, at the end of the following year, to the astonishment of the whole world, and even of the French themselves. There is no doubt, too, that when the king finally declined Duroc's proposal, he was influenced by the counsel and desire of the German patriots, who were continually increasing, both in Berlin and at the court, as well as in the whole of Germany.

Even the Frenchman to whose reports, deposited in the French archives of the foreign department, we attach the greatest credit, because he was neither an absolute Bonapartist, like Bignon, nor a rhetorician or sophist, but, with all his prejudices in favour of everything French, writes as a calm and intelligent man, admits that Metternich, who was then ambassador in Berlin, Stein, and all those who, unlike Zastrow and the miserable triumvirate, had any shadow of patriotism left, importuned the king to decline the alliance. This really took place; but the king, instead of assembling an army, as he should have done, in Anspach and Bayrenth, in the neighbourhood of the scene of war, in order to protect his neutrality, collected one in Poland; because the Russians, who were not serious, had appeared on the frontiers, and seemed as if, without further ceremony or permission, they would march across the Prussian territory. This was, however, not to be wondered at; for Haugwitz was again busy in Berlin, and in the very moment in which the war broke out, was destined to proceed to Vienna, to maintain the peace by words.

The King of Prussia at that time vacillated in such a way, hither and thither, that neither friend nor enemy entertained the least respect for, or could place the slightest confidence in him. He saw that Napoleon's army must necessarily push forward into Bavaria, through Franconia; and yet he satisfied himself with the Emperor's mere assurance that he would not violate his territory; and in reference to Hanover, he exhibited an incomprehensible degree of cowardliness and fear. He first asked to have Hanover put into his

hands as a pledge, which Napoleon refused; then Napoleon offered it him in full possession: he stretched out his hand to seize the prize, and then drew it back with fright. Napoleon afterwards offered him, what he had previously desired, that Hanover should be ceded to him during the continuance of hostilities; and he rejected the offer, in order not to come to open hostilities with the English, Russians, and Swedes, who were threatening to march into that country from Pomerania and the Weser.

The invasion of Bavaria by the Austrians, and their rapid march to Munich, to shut up the elector and his army, and to compel them to form a junction with themselves, hastened the breaking out of the war, and led the Austrian army, under the Archduke Ferdinand and General Mack, to their destruction at Ulm; whereas, had they not hoped to have taken the Bavarians by surprise, they ought to have remained on the Inn, and awaited the arrival of the first Russian army under Kutusoff. The Elector of Bavaria and his minister admirably availed themselves of the illusion of the Austrians, who only threatened and suffered Schwarzenberg to threaten in Munich. They deceived the Austrians, kept them off, and suddenly saved themselves and their army, by marching through the Prussian territory into Würzburg, as soon as they saw that the Austrians were really in earnest. When Napoleon, at a later period, violated the neutrality of the Prussian territory, he appealed for his justification to the case of the Bavarians and of the Austrian division, which was sent after them to bring them back, and which, on that occasion, marched through the Prussian territory without permission asked or obtained. As we learn from the letters of Otto, the French ambassador, who always accompanied the elector, the part which Maximilian Joseph played at that time was by no means to his honour, whether we consider his correspondence, or his promises and protestations to the Emperor of Germany, who was still his emperor, or the anxiety and fear which he exhibited, and which he either affected or really felt, when he sought for support and consolation from Otto. The whole comedy which he played in Bavaria, before he saved himself and his army by marching into Würzburg, is the more surprising, as his alliance with France had been concluded in Munich as early as the 24th of August, and therefore long before the Austrians threatened Bavaria; and the treaty concluded in Würzburg, pretendedly in consequence of the threats of Austria, was nothing more than a confirmation and extension of that already agreed upon in Munich.*

* Von Hormayr, indeed, is silent concerning the private understanding which preceded the negotiations with Otto, the French ambassador, in Munich, and the ostensible treaty afterwards, first signed with France in Franconia. He therefore justifies the political conduct of Bavaria, which, moreover, we also, in *the then circumstances*, cannot disapprove: in his *Lebensbilder u. s. w.* (1 vol., p. 163), he observes, the pretensions and claims which were put forward in the beginning of September, 1805, by the Austrians advancing into Bavaria under the Archduke Ferdinand and General Mack, were an insult to the national feeling and to their

The Archduke John was at that time already in the Tyrol; the Archduke Charles, who was to command the army destined for Italy, was opposed by an army greater in force, under General Massena, who had succeeded Jourdan in the chief command of the army in Italy, even before he was obliged to send thirty battalions to Austria; the Archduke Ferdinand, assisted by General Mack, placed all his reliance upon the Russians. One of the Russian armies, under Kutusoff, had, it is true, already reached the banks of the Danube; but the other, under Buxhövden, was still far from the frontiers of Moravia. Under these circumstance, the Archduke Charles disapproved of the whole plan of the campaign, and especially of the advance of the army, under the Archduke Ferdinand and General Mack, to Ulm. Judges of military affairs allege, which we mention in passing, that Mack's position in Ulm, with 60,000 men, was by no means bad in itself; but that he should have been, at the same time, able to reckon upon a sure communication with the Tyrol; and that a strong Prussian army ought to have been stationed in Anspach, to prevent, by force of arms, if necessary, both Bavarians and French from violating the territory. Neither of these was the case. Napoleon availed himself of the delusion of the Austrians, to throw himself, with an immense superiority of force, on the unhappy Mack—to annihilate the army under his command—and then, by forced marches, to proceed against Kutusoff, in order to destroy his army also, before he could be joined by Buxhövden on the Danube.

Napoleon had long taken all the necessary measures, in order to be able to send a force to Bavaria, superior to that of the Russians, even when they had formed a junction with the Austrians. This took place, at the very time in which the English, to say nothing of Mack and men like him, believed him to be wholly occupied with naval armaments and the invasion of England. Marmont, who commanded the army in Holland, and Bernadotte, who was at the head of the French force in Hanover, had long before been secretly and most minutely informed, by written instructions from Berthier, of the manner in which they were to direct their march to Franconia. The intimate friendship between Prussia and the Elector of Hesse, left no room to doubt, that a prince like the elector would suffer a foreign army, marching against his emperor, to pass through his territory. For appearance' sake, Bernadotte was afterwards obliged to pretend that his army had been recalled to France, and was to be replaced by that under Marmont. This pretence could not possibly have deceived the elector; but, as a pretext, it answered the purpose intended. Bernadotte had received orders to leave a few thousand men only in Hameln, as a garrison. When he should have reached Franconia, he was to unite the Bavarian troops with those under his command,

military honour. To incorporate the Bavarians by battalions, was a thing which never occurred to Napoleon, even at the summit of his dominion. Bavaria was therefore compelled to turn to the quarter from whence it had most to FEAR, but also most to HOPE.

and then to wait till Marmont, with the army of Holland, which was to be supplied with means of transport, and other necessaries, by Nassau Weilburg (at that time Usingen), and to be joined by the troops of Baden and Darmstadt,—should be as far advanced as himself. Bernadotte, Marmont, and Gouvion St. Cyr, as the commanders of the most remote divisions of the army, had received their orders as early as the 23rd of August. Those issued to General St. Cyr directed the annihilation of Naples as a kingdom; but were afterwards moderated, when the queen promised to keep herself quiet, and Napoleon found it advisable to send the troops, under St. Cyr, as quickly as possible to Northern Italy. The quiet and thoroughly well-considered arrangement by Napoleon of a campaign, which was suddenly to overwhelm and annihilate the power of Austria, continues to excite the wonder and admiration of the world, and to give the most astonishing impression of the greatness of his military genius; even although Daru's account of the manner in which the plan of the campaign was suddenly drawn up, and dictated to him at a sitting, be regarded either as apocryphal, or this dictation be looked upon as one of those means of which Napoleon was not ashamed occasionally to avail himself, when he meant to dazzle the world. The French historians—even Matthew Dumas (in his “*Précis des Événements Militaires*”)—express a steadfast belief in the correctness of Daru's assurances, which have again recently been put into circulation by Dupin, in his book on the naval power of England; for which reason we will subjoin them in a note.* Thibaudeau alone has had intelligence enough to express some doubts. Supposing, however, that the plan then dictated to Daru, in four or five successive hours, was not, as Daru would wish us to believe, the inspiration of the moment, but the result of long and deliberate forethought and

* We give the passage without abridgment, because its substance is so dramatic as to do honour to the best romance; and this it is which induces us to present an embellishment (not an *invention*). Charles Dupin, “*De la Force Navale de l'Angleterre*,” vol. vi., p. 264, writes as follows:—“En 1805, M. Daru était à Boulogne, remplissant les fonctions d'intendant-général de l'armée. Un matin, Napoleon le fait appeler dans son cabinet. Daru le trouve transporté de colère, parcourant à grands pas ses appartements, et ne rompant un morne silence que par des exclamations brusques et courtes . . . Quelle marine! . . . Quel amiral! . . . Quels sacrifices perdus! . . . Men espoir est perdu. . . . Ce Villeneuve, au lieu d'être dans la Manche, il vient d'entrer au Fensol. C'en est fait, il y sera bloqué. Daru, restez-vous-là . . . écoutez et écrivez . . . ” We do not think it necessary to proceed further with an account of the Emperor's indignation at the failure of his views respecting the fleet. Daru then continues: “Alors, dans l'emportement d'une fureur qui ne permet pas aux autres hommes de conserver leur jugement, il avait pris une des dispositions les plus hardies, et tracé l'un des plans de campagne les plus admirables, qu'aucun conquérant ait pu concevoir à loisir et de sang froid. Sans hésiter, sans s'arrêter, il dicta le plan de la campagne d'Austerlitz. Le départ de tous les corps d'armées, depuis le Hanovre et la Hollande jusqu'aux confins de l'ouest et du sud de la France; l'ordre des marches, leur durée; les lieux de convergence et de réunion des colonnes; les surprises et les attaques de vive force; les mouvements divers de l'ennemi; tout fut prévu, la victoire assurée dans toutes les hypothèses. Telles étaient la justesse et la vaste prévoyance de ce plan, que, sur une ligne de départ de 200 lieues, des lignes d'opération de 300 lieues de longueur furent suivies d'après les indications primitives, jour par jour, et lieue par lieue, jusqu'à Munich.”

calculation, the head by which it was devised will only be the more worthy of our admiration, and excite the greater astonishment. It was not merely a plan projected, but the means were at the moment fully pointed out by which the plan was to be executed. According to the Emperor's command, Daru was to assume the appearance of being obliged to proceed to Ostend; instead of which, however, he was to go to Paris, and there enter into full particulars and arrangements with Déjean, the minister of war, for preparing all the necessary orders. He himself was forbidden by Napoleon to employ any other hand than his own, in writing whatever was necessary for regulating the commissariat, the lines of march, &c.; and to have the drafts afterwards signed by the Emperor. Seven divisions, under the Emperor in person, were to march to Bavaria; and an eighth, under Massena, to be sent to oppose the Archduke Charles, on the Adige. The Bavarians, under Wrede, were to form a junction with Bernadotte, who was sent from Hanover to Franconia. The Darmstadt troops, and the small force which Baden was able to afford, were to join Marmont, as soon as he arrived in these duchies with the army of Holland. The corps to be marched to the Rhine was placed under the command of Murat, till the Emperor himself should arrive. The Elector of Baden had long before concluded a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the French; but this was kept so profoundly secret, that even Murat was only informed of it at the last moment. As soon as the Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, or rather under General Mack, crossed the Inn, on the 9th of September, afterwards occupied Munich, and drove the Elector of Bavaria from his country, Napoleon was furnished with an excuse for throwing the blame of the war from himself, and giving it, in the eyes of the French, the character and appearance of a defensive war. It was proclaimed, that he was hastening to the aid and protection of an ally and friend, when he ordered the *corps d'armée* at Brest to proceed to the Rhine, and there, under Bernadotte and Marmont, to march to the Danube. From the direction of the march pursued by both these generals, it was moreover obvious from the very first, that the neutrality of the Prussian territory was to be violated.

The army, which proceeded by forced marches from the western coast to the Rhine, consisted of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions, which had composed the camp at Boulogne; of the seventh, which, at a later period, Augereau led directly from Brest, to the Voralberg; and of the guards, and the reserve. The four corps from Boulogne reached the Rhine on the 25th of September, and on the same day passed the river on the whole line from Mannheim to Strasburg. Bernadotte and Marmont, reinforced by the troops of Darmstadt and Baden, had collected a combined force of 62,000 men in Franconia; and, as early as the 28th of September, Bernadotte received orders to push forward, without regard to the neutrality of Prussia, on the Emperor's solemn assurance, through

the territory of Anspach, by Eichstadt to Ingolstadt and Munich, in order to cut off Mack completely from the Inn. The contemptible opinion which Napoleon at that time entertained respecting the policy of Prussia, and the certainty which he felt that the king would not venture to take any decisive step, appear fully from the fact, that he might, if he had so pleased, have avoided the mortal offence given to the king, who had been shamefully deceived by him, without producing any important delay in his measures, or essentially altering his plans. Had he ordered Bernadotte, for example, to march through Nuremberg, the latter would have reached his object, without touching the Prussian territory, at most a day or a day and a half later than through Anspach. We make this remark, because we cannot concede to the blind worshippers of the Emperor that in this case his conduct was regulated by good policy, although it is true that he accidentally attained his object when opposed by such an irresolute prince as Frederick William III., the miserable people under whose guidance he was, and a general like Mack.

The allegation, too, of the French, that the allies had a superior force in the field, is obviously false. They might, indeed, appear stronger upon paper, and they might have been so in the field, had they been united; but they never were so, in the case of any single battle.* The French army in Bavaria, at the beginning of October, was 220,000 strong, if we take into account the troops of the German allied princes, which were afterwards joined by the troops of Wirtemberg. The Elector of Wirtemberg, who was a great admirer of Bonaparte, and, it was said, a thoroughly practical man, who was never led astray by any feeling or idea, had long before entered into an alliance with Bonaparte, with which no one was acquainted, as it appears from the documents in the archives of the office of foreign affairs in Paris. At first, however, he played the neutral. Fearing to offend his near relation, the Emperor of Russia, he pushed his refusal to allow the French to march to or through his capital, so far, that Ney, who, as is well known, was harsh, and who was not in the secret, caused his cannon to be pointed against Stuttgart on the 3rd

* The French, like children, believe the merit of a general to be the greater, the smaller the army is with which he gains a victory. This is only true when he is taken by surprise, or is not in a condition to bring a large force into the field; on the other hand, it was one of Bonaparte's great merits that he always knew how to bring a superior force upon the ground, and therefore to gain a speedy victory at a small loss. We are led to make this observation, because even a writer like Matthew Dumas, in his "Précis des Evénemens Militaires," vol. xiii., pp. 136-138, gives an extraordinary account of the number of the troops. He reckons Kutusoff's army, which was still on the eastern frontier of Austria, as if it had been on the western; he reckons Buxhovden's army, to which afterwards the Emperor Alexander came, as if it had been already in Austria; he reckons the Russian army in the Ionian Islands, and that under Tolstoy, in Pomerania, together with the Austrians, who were in Ulm, in the Tyrol, on the Adige, and scattered through the interior—and from the whole he only brings out 360,000 men. Compare this with what is said in the text, of the number which under Napoleon marched against Mack's 80,000, and reckon, besides, the cohorts of militia and the corps de reserve, and it will be seen, that the French were far superior to the allies in numbers.

of October. Immediately afterwards, when fortune declared in favour of the French, the elector threw off the mask, espoused their cause, and promised them ten thousand men.

Napoleon himself had settled his arrival on the Rhine for the 4th of October; but before he left Paris he adopted measures, which proved, it is true, that by a combination of all the forces of the French nation he was far superior to the coalition, but which at the same time showed that he considered himself justified in sacrificing the liberties and social existence of the nation to his and their military vanity and ambition. From that time, every one must mournfully acknowledge, that he started from the principle of leaving to his successor an empire resembling the Roman Empire, which Cæsar left to Augustus. With this view, he at that time suffered his creatures, who constituted the majority of the senate, to usurp the rights of the national representation. The senate, by a decree which it was not justified in passing, even according to the last ultra-monarchical constitution, ventured not only to call into active service 80,000 conscripts, who were not liable to serve till the year 1806, but issued directions that all those who had been liable to serve from 1801-1805 inclusive, and who had not been called out, should immediately join the army. To all those who do not know that there is no more miserable slave to the priests than the man who has formerly ridiculed religion, and no more contemptible creatures of any government, than those who formerly swaggered about liberty, we recommend the perusal of the speeches which on this occasion were delivered in the senate, by those who gained their notoriety and promotion through the revolution.* The whole nation was drawn away from its domestic and social affairs, in order to be ready, in case of need, to fight for Napoleon's conquests, then the only object and aim.

True, indeed, that, according to the words of the decree, the national guard were only to be called upon to perform the necessary service in the interior; but it is obvious, from the organisation to which it was subjected, that a portion of it was to be immediately converted into a moveable force, and the remainder to be regarded as an army of reserve. The whole male population of the kingdom, from twenty to sixty years of age, were divided into cohorts, which again were divided into regiments, whilst the cohorts themselves constituted parts of legions. Each cohort consisted of ten companies. Twelve departments, extending from the Pas-de-Calais to the Lake of Geneva, were immediately placed under arms. These departments were divided into four *arrondissements*, and at the head of each was placed an able general, whose business it was to take care that none

* The Roman Senate never more scandalously flattered Cæsar, Augustus, or Tiberius, than those men of the revolution flattered the Emperor. When the senate, on the 23rd of September, usurped the rights of the legislature, not then assembled, it declared that it fully agreed with the proposition announced in pompous phraseology by St. Jean d'Angely and Ségur, that the French people has transferred to Napoleon the right *de vouloir pour lui*.

but the best men of the levies were incorporated in the three *corps de réserve*. The generals thus employed were Rampon, Lefebvre, Kellermann, and D'Aboville. Brune was placed at the head of the three *corps de réserve*, which were to be encamped between the Somme and the Schelde, and as far as the Rhine; his head-quarters were fixed at Boulogne. Lefebvre commanded in Mayence; and Kellermann, who drew his people from the former Franche-Comté and Alsace, had his head-quarters in Strasburg. In addition to these camps, there was a flying camp at Alessandria, grenadiers were collected in Rennes, and a camp was also established in La Vendée.

All the preparations for overwhelming the incautious and self-confident Austrians, by means of a series of masterly movements and an unexampled body of troops, had been completed as early as the 23rd of September; on the 26th Napoleon arrived in Strasburg; and from the 4th till the 6th of October, 180,000 men crossed the Danube at different places. Every one was astonished that Mack remained in Ulm, and did not either march with his whole force through the Prussian territory to Bohemia or to the Inn, to form a junction with Kutusoff, or finally endeavour to draw near to the Archduke John, who was in the Tyrol. Each of these schemes was indeed dangerous, but at that moment still possible, and in every case less dangerous than remaining to be shut up in Ulm. The investment of the city began as soon as Bernadotte had made himself master of the towns of Ingolstadt and Munich, and had completely cut off Mack's army from all communication with the Austrians, which Meerfeld afterwards found it impossible to re-establish. Whilst Bernadotte advanced towards the Isar, Marmont crossed the Danube at Neuburg. After the Archduke Charles had been obliged to weaken the Italian army, by sending thirty battalions to Bavaria, neither Kienmayer nor Meerfeld were able to maintain themselves on the west of the Isar; Soult, Ney, Lannes, and Murat, crossed the river at Dillingen and Donauworth, and shut up Mack's army in a still narrower circle. Mack was by no means aware of the threatening danger; he did not at first even know whether he had to do with the whole power of the enemy, or only with a part, otherwise he would have availed himself of the only open way of retreat towards the south, and have retired towards the Tyrol; in a few days afterwards this mode of escape was wholly barred.

Those who are acquainted with the incomprehensible confusion, ignorance, carelessness, and mad self-confidence, which at that time exposed the Austrians, their emperor, and his ministers, to general derision, will be not at all surprised at the pitiful conduct which was displayed by Mack, and almost all the officers of rank, on the approach of the French. We shall refer to a few examples, which are as good as a thousand. The Emperor Francis set out from Vienna, and joined his army in Bavaria, as if he could give his troops courage

and strength; he, however, quickly returned to his capital, on becoming aware, during his sojourn in Landsberg, that the want of ardour and discipline was so great as to make it impossible for him to restore them. His minister suffered himself to be deceived by Maximilian Joseph and Montgelas; his army attempted in vain to detain the Bavarians, who were marching to Franconia; and yet Buol Schauenstein remained so completely blind to the real state of affairs, as to write from Wurzburg that he was in hopes of being able, through Montgelas, to prevail upon the Bavarians to make common cause with the Austrians. His eyes were not opened till Bernadotte's arrival. At the end of September, Lord Paget, relying on what was said by the Austrians in Vienna, informed the English government that Mack, who was protected by England, entertained the best hopes of success; when at that very time Mack did not know where Bonaparte himself really was, or against what point he was likely to direct his main attack. Even on the 7th of October, and therefore at the very latest moment when it was still in his power to march to the Tyrol, Mack never suspected that Bonaparte himself was with the army. When the whole of the French force was advancing upon Ulm, he thought he had to do with only two of its divisions, and therefore fought battles which he ought to have carefully avoided. He, however, perceived soon enough, that nothing remained for him but to retire, with his whole army, into Ulm, where no preparations had been made for the sustenance of such a multitude of men, even for a few weeks.

We must here briefly notice some of the engagements fought in the neighbourhood of Ulm, partly because the most exaggerated accounts of them were often given in Bonaparte's bulletins, and partly because they served to gain an abiding reputation for some of the French generals, there brought into comparison with those of Austria. We refer to them, however, especially, because the issue of all those battles was of such a kind as completely to destroy the confidence of the brave Austrian soldiers driven into Ulm, and of their able officers of middle rank, in the aristocratic generals by whom they were commanded. As to the first point, no one will dispute the fact that the French were everywhere victorious; but the mere boasting of their bulletins cannot be allowed to find a place in the pages of a German historian. It is true that Murat, on the 8th of October, at Wertingen, scattered twelve battalions and some squadrons of Austrians, under General Auffenberg, who proposed to withstand his vehement attack; but this was not done in the manner in which it has been stated in the French accounts, but after a vigorous contest, in which the Austrians were overwhelmed by numbers. Again, on the 9th of October, Ney, without much trouble, undoubtedly drove 10,000 Austrians from their position at Günzburg; but he became aware at Albeck, that he must not act in the field, as was written in the bulletins.

After the victory at Günzburg, Ney received orders to proceed directly against Ulm; and he was insolent and contemptuous enough

to despatch Dupont with a single division for this purpose. True it is, that Dupont compelled the Austrians to retreat in the battle of Albeck, which was magniloquently trumpeted forth in all the newspapers, because the chief command of the Austrians was universally in incapable hands; but the victory was very dearly purchased. Berthier's letter to Ney, in which he reproached him for disobedience and rashness, proves that Napoleon knew right well, that what he caused to be blazoned forth as a deed of marvellous bravery and a splendid victory, had been an act of great imprudence, which was attended by injury, and might have had more serious consequences.* As early as the 12th of October, when Soult attacked Memmingen, the want of courage on the part of the Austrian leaders had become so great, and their sense of honour so small, that they immediately made a cowardly surrender to the enemy of a place which, although not very strong, they should have defended with desperation, at a moment when everything depended on the gain of a few days.† After these battles, the city of Ulm was invested on all sides, on the 13th of October, by the French divisions under Murat, Marmont, Ney, and Lannes; and poor Mack, upon whom all the high and noble generals always looked with contempt, was incapable of a heroic resolution which might have rescued the honour of the army, although with the sacrifice of some thousands. Had he, however, even possessed this capability, he could have accomplished nothing among those aristocratic and useless generals, who saw, from these numerous capitulations, that one capitulation would immediately restore them to the scene of their luxuries and pleasures in Vienna.

Mack should not, as the French themselves admit, have sacrificed thousands, and allowed 24,000 of his troops, for the most part cavalry, to have been sent to Bohemia, on the 14th of October, merely to save the archduke; because the force was too small to march through the body of the enemy; but he should have taken the way which the archduke took, with the whole of his forces;

* In Berthier's letter to Ney, concerning the battle of Albeck, he reproaches him with having caused the loss of two regiments of dragoons, which were cut to pieces, and also with the loss of baggage and artillery. He says: "Vous n'avez pas eu ordre d'attaquer Ulm, et ce n'était pas avec une seule division que vous deviez faire cette tentative. Les événements déconcertent les plans les mieux combinés; il faut éviter tout ce qui relève le moral d'une armée qui n'en a plus." The French, and even Lefebvre, allege, that the 20,000 Austrians at Albeck should have made a sally; it is obvious, however, from the above letter, that Ney wished to force the position.

† A French writer briefly and admirably describes the miserable condition of all the arrangements adopted by the Austrians, when he says: "La place de Memmingen donna le signal de ces nombreuses capitulations, qui étonnèrent l'Europe et les vainqueurs eux-mêmes. Le General Sebastiani s'étoit posté contre cette place le 11 Octobre. Le 12 le Maréchal Soult y étoit arrivé avec ses trois divisions. Le lendemain la place capitulait après un investissement de vingt-quatre heures. Sa garnison, formée de neuf bataillons d'infanterie, dont deux de grenadiers, restait prisonniers de guerre. Les officiers étaient renvoyés sous parole de ne servir qu'après leur échange."

for even if he had been defeated, he would have made an honourable resistance. A retreat could only have been effected by cutting their way through the ranks, and marching over the bodies of the enemy. For that purpose, the archduke was too weak; whilst the whole army would have been superior to the French divisions, which had been brought together with great haste. The archduke, in his attempt to open up a way for himself through Franconia to Bohemia, divided his force into three divisions, with one of which he hastened forward; the miserable Werneck followed, with the two others—a general who, during the whole course of the war of the revolution, never ceased to bring contempt and disgrace upon the Austrians, and yet was always again employed. It is to be observed, with respect to the possibility of the retreat of the whole army, that Werneck obtained a considerable start of the French, but was overtaken by Murat on the 17th, whose division, however, would not have been fit to cope with Mack's whole force. Any other general except Werneck would at least have tried the fortune of a battle; he, however, without hesitation, signed a capitulation, at Trochelfingen, which has scarcely ever had a parallel. He not only signed a capitulation for the divisions under his command, attached to which there were eight other generals, but even promised to deliver up as prisoners of war all those who were in advance of him. The archduke, who was with the first of the retreating army, did not, it is true, turn back; but of the 24,000 men with whom he left Ulm on the 14th of October, only a few thousands reached Bohemia. On the day on which the archduke saved himself by his escape from Ulm, General Laudon, one of the most estimable and skilful of the Austrian commanders, fought an unsuccessful battle with Marshal Ney, at the bridge of Elchingen. This engagement was so decisive for the conquest of Ulm, that Napoleon, at a later period, conferred on the marshal the title of Duke of Elchingen. In consequence of this victory, the heights around Ulm were easily won; although, under the then existing circumstances, the Austrians should have rather suffered themselves to be cut to pieces on the Frauenberg and Michelsberg, than have surrendered these two heights, the occupation of which by the enemy rendered the defence of Ulm utterly impossible.

Napoleon knew that Kienmayer had been reinforced by thirty battalions, under Meersfeld, which had been sent by the Archduke Charles; that Kutusoff was hastening to their relief; and that it was not possible to attack the Archduke John in the Tyrol till Ulm was taken. For these reasons, and being sensible that a few weeks' delay might prove very injurious to his prospects and aims, he founded his plan of making himself master of the city, without loss of time or men, on his knowledge of Mack's character. He sent into the city Colonel Philip de Sécur, a man who had much more affinity to the Lichtensteins, and other princes in the army, than Mack had to his noble colleagues. The Frenchman, with his polite boasting and threatening speeches, understood admirably how

to work upon the mind of such a man as Mack, who, although he was honourable, brave, and even able in his particular department, betrayed on every occasion the mind of a subordinate—a spirit which had formerly recommended him to Lascy, and since that time had led to his advancement in Austria, and favour with the English and Neapolitans. He was ready to capitulate, and sent Lichtenstein to Napoleon's camp. Lichtenstein was also the man, who, after the battle of Austerlitz, helped to allure the Emperor Francis into the snares of Napoleon; and, according to the French account, was for that reason earnestly recommended by Napoleon to the Emperor Francis, as the only man on whom he ought to place any reliance. He was therefore admirably chosen for the conduct of this negotiation. Napoleon had recourse to all his powers of amiability and persuasion to convince the prince that he was desirous of a speedy capitulation, merely in order to save the Austrian army, of which he said all sorts of polite things, from the melancholy fate which awaited it; and that he was ready to offer favourable conditions. We can scarcely believe, that, as Bignon says, he tried to terrify the prince—whom, moreover, he must have known better than we—and through him, Mack and the army, into submission, by intimations of what had befallen the Arnauts and Mamelukes, who were cut down and shot in Jaffa.

Mack could not bring himself immediately to resolve on accepting the conditions of capitulation, although there were no supplies in the city, and he knew not how to deliver himself from his situation; on the next morning, therefore, Napoleon had recourse to serious and threatening preparations. On this occasion, it is certain that poor Mack was in fact alarmed by the impending dangers, as it made obvious to him how easy it would be from the heights completely to annihilate the army, and the city with its inhabitants, by artillery. This was Mack's honest conviction, and he acted accordingly; for we are convinced that there is not the shadow of reason to impute either treason or corruption to him. He then concluded a capitulation which filled all Europe with amazement. We, who lived in the centre of Germany, were wholly unable at that time to comprehend those events; as we continually hoped what we so earnestly wished, and therefore placed our reliance upon the Austrians, because we looked to them for our deliverance from French arbitrary dominion. From the 14th to the 20th one Austrian division after another capitulated, without even making an attempt at a struggle. We intentionally avoid dwelling on the mere military events of the war, but we must on this occasion bestow a little more attention on the subject of Mack's capitulation. We must first of all observe, that the fate of the whole Austrian monarchy was at stake. A few days' delay would not have been purchased too dearly by the sacrifice of some thousands of troops and a single city. And even although no one could reasonably have expected a desperate resistance from Mack, yet no one believed that he could agree to

Bonaparte's march against Kutusoff several days earlier than was fixed upon in the conditions of the capitulation.

When, however, we read with attention the account of his mission given by Colonel Philip de Ségur, we readily comprehend how it was possible for Mack to be frightened into submission, and even to be persuaded by the French to the commission of such a folly. This report is to be found in the memoirs which go under the name of Rapp's. Here will be found a complete view of the whole character and conduct of petty minds, of their insolence in success, and their cowardly timidity in misfortune. Mack, Prince Lichtenstein, and all the other noble aristocrats, never seemed to have had any doubts as to whether there should be a capitulation or not; but Mack contended earnestly, that eight days, instead of five, as Napoleon desired, should be allowed him, in order that he might wait and see whether the Russians would come to his relief.

The French general at length consented, on the 17th, to a term of six days; whereupon Mack, Lichtenstein, Guilay, and Klenau agreed to the capitulation. Lichtenstein was afterwards sent to the French camp, to arrange the particulars of the surrender of the city and army into the hands of the French, on the 25th. Ney, who had German blood in his veins, but also German rudeness of character, treated poor Mack with great contempt, of which the latter bitterly complained; to judge, however, from Ségur's report and Rapp's account, Ney was not wrong in his conduct.

We learn from Ségur's report, that Napoleon himself would not believe that there were 21,000 Austrians in Ulm, because Mack's conduct was so cowardly; and yet it afterwards turned out that there were no less than 33,000.

Ségur further reports, that Mack had stated to him and the other French officers, that he could shew them written proof, that not he, but the Archduke Ferdinand, was to blame for the separation of the army, by which he had been reduced to his desperate situation. There can be no doubt, from all that he said and did, that he was afterwards bowed down under the weight of his misfortunes. He proved himself to be especially little-minded, when Napoleon caused him to come to Elchingen, in order to persuade him to evacuate Ulm some days earlier than was agreed upon by the terms of the capitulation. The language which, according to Rapp, he used to the Emperor's adjutants, in the antechamber at Elchingen, betrays a little mind, which, from a total want of that consciousness of personal dignity that belongs to every noble mind, is full of anxiety respecting the opinions of others.* Mack's cowardice, even after the

* Mémoirs de Rapp, p. 37. "J'étais à Elchingen avec les Généraux Mouton et Bertrand, lorsqu'il vint rendre ses hommages à Napoléon. 'Je me flatte, messieurs,' nous dit il, en traversant le salon de l'aide-de-camp de service, 'que vous ne cesserez pas de me regarder comme un brave homme, quoique j'ai été obligé de capituler avec des forces aussi considérables. Il était difficile de résister aux manœuvres de votre Empereur; ses combinaisons m'ont perdu!' How mean-spirited!!!

capitulation, not only encouraged Napoleon to venture to persuade him to relinquish an advantage which had been conceded to him, but led him even to refuse compliance with a condition to which he had previously given Prince Lichtenstein reason to believe he would consent. In the terms of the capitulation of the 17th, it was agreed, that unless Mack were relieved before the 25th, the city, artillery, munitions of war, and army, were to be surrendered to the French; and the officers allowed to return to their homes upon parole. Prince Lichtenstein had sought to obtain the dismissal of the soldiers also, and Napoleon appeared not disinclined to consent; when, however, he perceived with what sort of persons he had to do, he insisted, on the 17th, that the soldiers should remain as prisoners of war. On such occasions, which indeed are rare, it becomes evident how ruinous it is, when a government, for a number of generations, promotes merely men of mechanical activity and discipline, who adhere to hereditary usages, and possess the mere prosaic prudence of egotistical calculations, to the exclusion of all men of imagination and noble minds, strength of character, individuality, and genius. The whole of the Austrian officers were like Mack; for Major Locatelli shewed no hesitation in imitating the example set to him by Mack and others. On the 18th, at Bopfingen, he surrendered, without a struggle, the whole baggage of the army, a large park of artillery, and the troops attached to both.

It was wholly unpardonable in Mack to suffer Napoleon to anticipate the terms of the capitulation in Trochtelfingen, and to allow himself to be persuaded, on the 19th, to surrender the city to the French on the 20th; by which he made it possible for the main body of the French to appear on the Inn five days sooner than they could otherwise have done, and to attack the Archduke John, in the Tyrol, earlier than they could have anticipated. This the French themselves admit; and it was made one of the chief grounds of accusation against Mack, on his trial before a court-martial, in consequence of which he was deprived of all his honours, dignities, and privileges. It is singular enough, and quite characteristic of the Austrian aristocratic government, that Melas, who, after the battle of Marengo, against the advice of his officers, and with an army more numerous than that of his adversary, made a more shameful capitulation than Mack's, was on this occasion president of the court which condemned the latter for having surrendered to a force five times the amount of his own. Mack continued to live in miserable obscurity till the fall of Napoleon, and was not pardoned till 1815. Perhaps it then occurred to the minds of the government, who it was who had been president of the court by which he had been condemned; and at all events, it certainly was not his fault that the Austrian cabinet, the English, and the Russians, had placed his mediocrity in opposition to the greatest military genius of modern times.

The chief argument which Bonaparte employed to induce Mack to surrender Ulm as early as the 20th, was, that after the capitu-

tion in Trochtelfingen, it would be cruel and useless to expose the army and the citizens of Ulm to the sufferings of want and investment for a week longer. On the morning of the 20th, the French, therefore, exhibited the spectacle of a triumph, which had a more powerful influence on the subsequent undertakings during the war than any species of reward could have produced. Thirty-three thousand Austrians, among whom were eighteen generals, marched past Napoleon, laid down their arms before the conqueror, deposited forty stand of colours at his feet, and delivered up sixty pieces of artillery. If Napoleon addressed the generals in language of courtesy and kindness, as his generals report, it was honourable; but if he really used the words which we quote below from his journals,* it was neither honourable nor worthy of himself; and we cannot concur with some French writers, who are of the same opinion with us respecting the thing, in allowing them to be regarded as a mere *ruse de guerre*. He might, perhaps, be excused for having spoken them, but not for having allowed them to appear in print.

B.—TILL THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

It is singular enough, that at the very moment in which Napoleon reached the pinnacle of glory, in his wars upon the continent, and in his struggles with the continental powers, to whom his genius was superior both in the cabinet and in the field, all his efforts for naval improvement and his activity in naval warfare brought misfortune and disgrace both upon himself and upon France. As the French inform us with admiration and astonishment, he had, within nine months, succeeded in setting in motion the whole French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets; guided them, like divisions of his army, by orders immediately proceeding from himself; and pointed out to his admirals, as well as to his marshals, where they were to be at specified times, how they were to deceive the English fleet, by which theirs were watched, and during their absence to unite the whole naval force in the harbour of Brest. He was even, at first, as fortunate on an element where everything depends on the wind, the weather, and long experience in naval service, as upon land.

Admiral Missessi sailed from Rochefort at the end of February, 1805, and without being overtaken by the English, reached the West Indies in safety, supplied Martinique with stores, liberated St. Domingo, which was closely blockaded by the negroes, plundered the English islands of St. Christopher, Dominica, and Montserrat, and made many rich captures. We particularly mention the expedition of this fleet, which returned happily to Rochefort on the 20th

* “ Je donne un conseil à mon frère l’Empereur d’Allemagne, qu’il se hâte de faire la paix; c’est le moment de se rappeler que tous les empires ont un terme. L’idée, que la fin de la dynastie de la maison de Lorraine serait arrivée, doit l’effrayer. Je ne veux rien sur le continent; ce sont des vaisseaux, des colonies, du commerce, que je veux, et cela vous est avantageux comme à nous.”

of May, because it was the only one in the course of a twenty years' war which terminated successfully. The Toulon fleet, also, which was to form a junction with the Spaniards in the harbour of Cadiz, succeeded in reaching the latter port; and the combined fleet was afterwards fortunate enough, when it put to sea again in May, to escape Nelson's attention and to lead him astray. He sought for it in vain in the Mediterranean, because it had sailed to the West Indies; and he fell in with it no more, even when he had followed it thither. On its return, this fleet fell in, off Cape Finisterre, with Admiral Calder, who captured two Spanish ships of the line, but did not venture to force the combined fleets to a general action. Both Admirals Villeneuve and Calder were, on this occasion, vehemently blamed by their respective governments. Calder demanded a court-martial, and was admonished for his conduct; whilst Villeneuve drew down upon himself the violent indignation of the Emperor, because, instead of sailing for Brest, he had run into Ferrol. The Emperor having already blamed Villeneuve, at the time of the Egyptian expedition, for being the cause of the loss of the fleet at Aboukir, we may reasonably be surprised that he again employed him: this fact is usually explained by his being supposed to have been a favourite of Decrés, the minister of marine, who continually brought him forward. Whilst in Ferrol, he received the most positive orders to bring the combined fleet to Brest, whilst Nelson was in the West Indies; but here again he dared not obey his orders. He had learned that Nelson was returned from the West Indies, and was cruising off the Straits of Gibralter. He was therefore afraid of being overtaken, if he should attempt to form a junction with, and bring away, the Spanish fleet, which had sailed to Cadiz. During the month of August, Nelson went for a short time to Spithead, and Villeneuve hastened to avail himself of the opportunity to set sail for Cadiz; but, as soon as Nelson again appeared, lay delaying in the harbour of that place. Napoleon received the news of this hesitation and fear, during the time of his sojourn in Boulogne; and this led to the violent passion in which Daru found him, when he was sent for in order to write down the plan of the campaign against Mack, which the Emperor dictated to him. Napoleon had now lost all patience with Villeneuve, and appointed Admiral Rossily to undertake the command. Villeneuve was not disposed to await the event of his being superseded; and therefore sailed, in an unlucky hour, from Cadiz; for an unavoidable engagement with Nelson was to be foreseen. The English were lying off Cadiz, with twenty-seven ships of the line. Villeneuve thought they had only twenty-one; whilst he and the Spanish admiral, Gravina, had thirty-three under their command; and when Nelson left the port open, to allure the enemy to sea, the French admiral imagined that he felt himself too weak to maintain the blockade which he had hitherto enforced. Villeneuve disregarded the advice of Gravina, the Spanish admiral, who recommended him not to put

to sea. On the 19th of October he sailed with his thirty-three ships, and as early as the 21st fell in with the enemy's fleet, off Cape Trafalgar. On this occasion, the same admiral, for the second time, sacrificed the whole naval power of France, and delivered thousands of Frenchmen into the hands of their enemies; many millions, which in recent times had been spent upon the navy, were all thrown away, and became the booty of the English—the continued objects of Napoleon's hatred and abuse. On this occasion the English took nearly as many prisoners as Napoleon did in Ulm or Vienna, a greater number of heavy guns, and a larger quantity of stores, than he found in either of these places; they gained, in fact, a complete victory, after a warm engagement which lasted for five hours. By this victory at Trafalgar, they got possession of nineteen ships of the line, belonging to the combined fleet; four others which escaped were afterwards taken, before they could run into Ferrol; and of the whole fleet, four ships only escaped from the hands of the enemy. Nelson was killed, and Villeneuve taken prisoner.

By the booty which they acquired, and the certainty of an unlimited dominion over the trade of the whole world, the English obtained an abundant compensation for the millions of subsidies spent upon the cabinets of the continental powers, in prevailing upon and enabling them to lavish the lives of their people in continental wars. They were not only victorious, but succeeded in completely turning away public observation from the power of the egotistical aristocracy of England, which was increased to an incredible extent. In this third coalition-war, England also drew the grand prize in the great lottery of fate; whilst, as usual, all the blanks fell to the poor Germans. Napoleon now became much stronger, and more dreadful to his neighbours; an end was put to all his vain naval schemes, and expenditure upon his fleets and invasion; and he was constrained for the future to confine himself to his own proper element—war by land. He found it much easier to deal with the Kutusoffs, Collorados, Cobenzls, Lichtensteins, and Macks, with Haugwitz, Rüchel, Möllendorf, and Brunswick, than with the Pitts, Cannings, and Nelsons. Immediately, therefore, after the taking of Ulm, he hastened to meet the Russians on the Inn, after having dispatched Ney with his division against the Archduke John in the Tyrol, without paying any attention to the storm which since the 14th of October had broken loose against him in Berlin.

On the day just referred to, the King of Prussia received intelligence of the violation of his territory in Franconia, and of the violent and brutal behaviour of the French in Anspach. The resentment of the king, thus offended on his most sensible side, was unbounded, and there was a general expectation of an immediate breach with France. The Emperor of the French, however, was too well acquainted with the character of the King of Prussia, to suppose him capable of adopting any quick resolution; he knew that he would first apply to and consult the *médiocre* councillors by

whom he was surrounded; and that Laforest and Duroc, who was still in Berlin, had among these councillors very many friends. In Berlin, the popular voice was undoubtedly in favour of the patriotic party, who were desirous of rousing the spirit of their country in favour of national deliverance from the supremacy of the French. In Berlin, as well as in Central Germany, which was overrun with Frenchmen, every one felt and perceived that Germany was threatened with the fate of Italy and Holland. Unhappily, however, the patriotic party everywhere exhibited much more warmth of feeling, than seriousness of purpose or energy of action. This was especially true, in Berlin, as regarded Prince Louis Ferdinand, and the wild and dissolute companions who assembled around him. Such an insolent and presumptuous band was well calculated to provoke and annoy the king, but by no means to win his favour.

The literati and talkers of the day were not much better, as was clearly proved in the case of Johannes von Müller. On the other hand, Baron von Stein, who, as minister of excise, customs, and manufactories, had been in Berlin since 1804, was even at that time an object of fear to the French, in consequence of his conduct, character, nationality, and uprightness. He was, however, less consulted by the king in political affairs than others; and it was not till a later period that the queen was impelled, by her warmth of feelings, to sympathise in the anti-Gallic efforts of the Germans. Hardenberg, it is true, was not well-disposed towards the French; but his dissolute mode of life occupied him quite as much as his politics. The people who surrounded the king, and understood how to guide him, were either men attached to the usages of the olden times, or favourable to delay, hesitation, and yielding. Among the high military officers, perhaps Hohenlohe, Blucher, and Rüchel, may be regarded as having been disposed for war, although not for the best reasons. Kalkrenth, too, was favourable to a union with Russia; not, indeed, from patriotism, but from an inclination towards the Russians. The Duke of Brunswick was, as is well known, too great a courtier not to give his advice in accordance with the king's wishes. He was, indeed, full of anxiety and fear respecting Napoleon's designs upon Germany; but he found it impossible to lay aside his prejudices against Austria, nourished in the seven years' war, and greatly increased by the war of the revolution. The aged General von Zastrow, the very soul of old Prussian nationality, under whom the army had become degenerate by mere mechanical exercise, and the fortresses had fallen into decay through useless governors and commandants, had great influence with the king, as he was at the same time a general and a minister of state. He was regarded as a Nestor in wisdom, and honoured by the king with an attachment peculiar to himself. Zastrow was decidedly in favour of the policy of Haugwitz, Lombard, Beyme, and their colleagues; and the first-named minister, unfortunately for Prussia, had shortly

before returned from his estates in Silesia to Berlin, where, at that time, sometimes he and sometimes Hardenberg was consulted.

Among the king's adjutants, Kökeritz, his friend and inseparable companion, was in favour of France; Massenbach was an enthusiast for Napoleon; Kleist and Pfuhl had but little influence, and were regarded as neutral. From the 15th till the 26th of October, great uncertainty prevailed as to the king's determination; Laforest and Duroc durst not appear in his presence, and it was even believed, that intimation had been given them to leave Berlin altogether; the diplomatic councillors, however, miserable as they were, had still a preponderating influence. Haugwitz was sent off quickly to Vienna, as the bearer of some proposals for reconciliation, to which neither the Emperor Alexander nor the Emperor Francis would lend an ear, and returned to Berlin without having accomplished anything. The news of Mack's defeat, which had in the meantime been received, and the not very consolatory information which Haugwitz brought back from Vienna, threw the king back into his old system of vacillation. He immediately opened negotiations anew with both sides, and made his system and the policy of his cabinet contemptible to both. The key to the interpretation of this conduct will be given by a brief notice of the course of unfriendly action pursued by Prussia towards France, after the violation of the Prussian territory; though, at the same time, it did not possess the courage to give any real force to this hostile, though perfectly empty demonstration.

The king, as we have already observed, being full of indignation, instead of ordering an army of 100,000 men against the Russians, for purposing to march across his territory without consulting him, declared to the Emperor of the French, on the 14th of October, that he would no longer guarantee the neutrality of the North of Germany, and that he felt himself obliged to take measures for the protection of his subjects (that is, in other words, *AGAINST* France); Prussian troops were also to advance into Hanover.* This last was not, indeed, a hostile step, inasmuch as the French (except those who lay in Hameln) had evacuated the electorate. The king, moreover, sent General Kalkreuth to Pulawy, to the Emperor Alexander, to declare to the emperor, in his name, that there would no longer be any opposition made to the march of the Russians through Silesia and Lauenburg. These and other steps led the world to expect an energetic declaration against France; and every one was astonished at the note which was sent to the French

* This declaration was made on the 26th of October, and had the effect of putting Napoleon into a furious rage. He immediately issued orders to General Barbou, who commanded in Hameln, to resist the Prussians by force if they should attempt to interfere with him. As early as the 24th, he had written to Laforest, who had informed him of what was resolved on in Berlin: "Je ne pense pas que les Prussiens aient l'audace de se porter en Hanovre, pour y arracher mes aigles; cela ne pourrait se faire qu'avec du sang. Les drapeaux français n'ont jamais souffert d'affront; je ne tiens pas au Hanovre, mais je tiens plus à l'honneur qu'à la vie."

ambassador concerning the violation of the Prussian territory, because it was calculated to offend the Emperor, and yet contained only a matter of dispute which could lead to no useful result. It was very well known that Hardenberg signed this note against his own judgment, and that had he been allowed to follow his own opinions, it would have been drawn up in a very different strain. In this note, after the usual general asseverations and phrases respecting the politics of Prussia, a very useless disputation is raised. The French had attempted to vindicate the violation of the territory of Anspach, by alleging that the Elector of Bavaria, on his retreat to Wurzburg, had proceeded through the district of Passau, and that the Austrian division which pursued the Bavarian army had in like manner paid no respect to Prussian neutrality. A most absurd and useless controversy was raised, and proofs given to show that the cases were wholly dissimilar. The diplomatic verbiage of the note concludes with a threatening intimation of the adoption of measures of revenge, which, as it led to no immediate hostilities, merely served to give the Emperor mortal offence.*

The measures intimated in the note were, like the note itself, smoke without fire. If, by any chance, the king took a single step towards the coalition, he became alarmed, and took two or three backwards. Even the renewal of the sentimental friendship formerly concluded in Tilsit, between the Emperor Alexander and Frederick William, led to no decisive step on the part of Prussia. With respect to the breach which had for some months threatened this friendship, the Emperor Alexander behaved in his usual good-humoured and visionary manner. He no sooner learned that the King of Prussia felt himself offended by the disrespect shown him, and by the march of the Russian army to the frontiers of Silesia, and that an army was stationed on the frontiers of Poland, than he wrote a very friendly letter to the king from Brzsk. In this, he recalls every threatening expression which he had used, and assures the king of his continued friendship and esteem; he excuses every step and every word which could possibly have been misunderstood, and commissions the young Prince Dolgorucki, who was to be the bearer of the letter, to propose to the king a personal interview. The king received the letter in a most friendly spirit; but declined the offer of an interview, in order not to give offence to the French, who had not then violated the neutrality of his territory. When, however, he received intelligence of what had taken place in Anspach, he altered his behaviour. He not only sent Count Kalkrenth to Pulawy, but gave express permission for 30,000 Russians from Warsaw to march through Silesia, and for 8,000 Russians and 12,000 Swedes to pass through Lauen-

* Hardenberg's note to Duroc and Laforest concludes with the following words: "Entravé de toutes parts dans ses généreuses intentions, le roi doit avant tout veiller à la sûreté de ses peuples, et, sans garantie comme sans autre obligation, il se voit contraint à faire prendre à ses armées des positions devenues indispensables pour la défense de l'état."

burg into Hanover. The Emperor Alexander was no sooner informed of the alteration which had taken place in the mind of the King of Prussia, than he left Pulawy, and hastened to Berlin, where he arrived, wholly unexpected, on the 25th of October. In order to reconcile all contradictions, and to illustrate the complete want of energy in the policy of Prussia, Haugwitz was obliged, at that very time, to come back from Vienna, and Möllendorf as well as the Duke of Brunswick, for the king's satisfaction and pleasure, to support his subtlety in always devising new delays. Haugwitz was to be sent to the French head-quarters, and then to require from the Emperor concessions which Prussia would, if necessary, compel him to grant, by means of an armed union with Austria and Russia. From the interview of the Emperor of Russia with the King of Prussia, during the sojourn of the former in Berlin, and from the sentimental night-scene between the emperor, the king, and the queen, in Potsdam, there was every reason to look for a very different conclusion from the king, than merely that Haugwitz should make a new journey, and weave a new intrigue.

The Emperor Alexander was received with surprising enthusiasm by the king and queen in Berlin; and he himself displayed all the light of that true inspiration which, as well as his mild and friendly disposition, advantageously distinguished him from all the rulers of Russia. The Queen of Prussia, who won all hearts, as much by her gentle goodness as by her great personal beauty, showed, for the first time, on this occasion an eager desire to liberate her husband from the commonplace course of Zastrow, and from the wiles of Lombard and Beyme, and to inspire him with true patriotism. From that time forward, she laboured, with all the warmth and earnestness of a woman, to inspire her husband with a feeling of enthusiasm for the honour of German princes, who were at that time exposed to the sneers and contempt of every French sergeant; and for her conduct on this occasion, she was abused in Napoleon's journals in the tone and taste of the guard-room. The king appeared to have formed a close friendship with the emperor; and both went together to Potsdam, where they could enjoy their friendly intercourse with greater freedom than in Berlin.

Whilst they were in Potsdam, the news of Mack's defeat was received; and the Archduke Anthony came to make urgent representations to the King of Prussia, to induce him, if possible, to adopt some decisive measures. The king excused himself, by saying that his army was not together. Orders, indeed, were issued, that seven *corps d'armée* should be got on foot; but this step also, as well as the others, could serve no other purpose than to irritate the French, and confirm the Emperor in his determination to be revenged upon Prussia. Those who knew anything of the Elector of Hesse, the Duke of Brunswick, and the generals of what was called the army of reserve, know that they were so partial to the old system of strategy, and to the modes in fashion in the seven years' war, with its queues,

spatterdashes, and canes, that, like the Austrians, they would always come either too late or too early. It was not to be expected, either from Zastrow or the Duke of Brunswick, that they would counsel the king to the adoption of any hasty resolution; and in the following year, the elector, out of policy, left Prussia in the lurch, at the very moment in which his brave Hessians might have reduced the enemy, marching through Franconia, to great difficulties.

The Elector of Hesse, it was said on paper, was to bring together 20,000 men in Westphalia, the Prince of Hohenlohe 60,000 in Franconia, and the Duke of Brunswick 50,000 in Silesia. Of these armies there was at least some trace; but the reserves, which were to march forth under Rüchel, Mollendorf, and Prince Eugene of Württemberg, were not yet in existence. It appeared at that time as if Hardenberg had a decidedly preponderating influence; and this led the people of Berlin to make a useless demonstration, which gave new offence to the haughty French and their Emperor. Some absolute bands of those patriots, who were attached to Prince Louis Ferdinand, prevailed upon the true patriots, who saw that the court was far behind the people, to join them in a noisy popular congratulation by night to Hardenberg, because he was the opponent of the French, and wished for war; whilst they broke Haugwitz's windows, because he was a friend of the French, and counselled peace. Duroc had, nevertheless, taken a very friendly leave of Berlin on the 3rd of October, and was very politely dismissed by the king, because it was still believed that the message, which Haugwitz was to convey, would produce a great effect upon and alarm the Emperor. The contents of this message, never executed, were agreed upon in Potsdam, by the king, the Emperor Alexander, and the Archduke Anthony.

On the 3rd of November, the King of Prussia was at length brought to sign an agreement, whereby he bound himself to undertake an armed mediation between the powers engaged in the war, and to announce this determination to the Emperor of the French, by Count Haugwitz. The count was to submit to the Emperor those points which, according to the king's judgment, must be conceded to the allies, and to declare, that if these concessions were not made before the 15th of December, the king would feel himself bound to unite his whole force with the armies of the coalition. Talleyrand and the whole French cabinet were in a condition to lay before the Emperor such proofs of Prussia's eagerness to co-operate with France for the territorial enlargement and increase of the power of both, drawn from the secret history of the two cabinets since the peace of Bâsle, that Napoleon was necessarily filled with unmeasured indignation at this new-born patriotism in Berlin, and this anxiety for the just balance of power in Europe. In December, 1805, he therefore took up that feeling of hatred towards Prussia, of which, from 1806, he gave so many and such unquestionable proofs. Two circumstances, very unimportant in themselves, which occurred towards the close of 1805, greatly contributed to this result.

The agreement of the 3rd of November, by virtue of which limits were to be placed to the designs and aims of the Emperor of the French, should, on account of Napoleon's character, have been kept a profound secret. The cabinet of Vienna, however, caused it to be published in its official journals, as the formal accession of Prussia to the coalition, in order to give new courage and resolution to the depressed and despairing minds of the people. Napoleon was therefore mortally offended; the French triumvirate in the Prussian cabinet was dreadfully alarmed, because it was not serious in its threats, and availed itself of the opportunity to make the king, for whose pleasure everything had been done, an object of suspicion and contempt to his new friends. Lombard raised his voice against the intelligence given in the Austrian journals, with as much arrogance as if he were the king himself; he protested and raved. Who, therefore, could any longer place the slightest confidence in Prussia? In the position in which Prussia was then placed, and thought to maintain, as well as by the manner in which Haugwitz conducted himself on his mission, the visionary and poetical character of the Emperor of Russia gave rise to a second highly injurious piece of imprudence. The emperor, the king, and the queen, accompanied by the whole mass of their not precisely sentimental suites, on the night before the emperor's departure, between the 3rd and 4th of November, betook themselves by torchlight to the garrison-church of Potsdam, to the tomb of Frederick the Second. The emperor and the king threw themselves down before it; the emperor kissed the tomb, gave his hand to the king over the sepulchre, and they pledged themselves to eternal friendship; the emperor, the king, and the queen, then tenderly embraced each other. German readers, who are now constantly reading and hearing, even in the tamest journals, of many days of honour—of wreaths, chaplets, memorials—and of the most affecting entertainments, *fêtes*, processions, and demonstrations of honour and regard, will readily be able to form an idea of the manner in which this scene was profited by, by loyal sentimental writers of the Kotzebue school, in order to rouse and inspire the Prussians; but, at the same time, of the biting, satirical sarcasm with which this outpouring of feelings, which belong only to the most intimate relations, and this close union of Prussia with the belligerent powers, was overwhelmed by the witty French.

The choice of Haugwitz as the person who was to convey the message of the 3rd of November to the Emperor of the French, was in like manner an evil omen of the result. He suffered himself to be detained, under all sorts of excuses, from executing his mission, and afterwards abused the king for being desirous of giving to his mission a different import from what it really had, for which reason he was contemned by Napoleon himself. It has never yet been really known what those demands precisely were, agreed upon between the King of Prussia, the Emperor Alexander, and the Archduke Anthony, with which Haugwitz was to combine the continuance of

peace between Prussia and France. From his position and connections, Schöll should have been able to have received, and also have given, the best information; but what he does give is undoubtedly incomplete, and yet, as far as it goes, correct. The condition of things at the peace of Luneville was to be restored; the kingdom of Italy to be separated from France; and Switzerland and Holland to be relieved from their dependence on France. We now know, however, from the correspondence of Laforest, the French ambassador in Berlin, deposited in the archives of the department of foreign affairs in France, that Hardenberg, in a personal conversation with him, spoke words of the same import as what others have concluded from expressions which casually fell from Haugwitz. According to those expressions, after the Prussian fashion, no precise demands were prescribed, but everything left ambiguous, and the composition left to the discretion of the intriguing Haugwitz. The same was precisely [the case with Hanover, which the king, according to the terms of the treaty of the 3rd of November, was to occupy, in order afterwards to restore it to the King of England. As early as the 26th of October, Prussian troops advanced from Hildesheim, into Hanover. The only consequence of this movement, however, was, that a high aristocratic government, under the presidency of Count Munster, was established; the country oppressed by civil and military exactions; and a greater degree of hostility shown towards the Hanoverians than towards the French. The latter were not only allowed to remain undisturbed by any hostile measures in Hameln, but really provided for at the expense of the electorate, which was also obliged to furnish subsistence to the Prussians. Under such circumstances, who could either feel any respect for, or place any confidence in, Prussia? The allies, therefore, and by deeds too, showed as much contempt for Prussia as did the French. The Russians, under Ostermann, who were disembarked as early as the 8th of October, crossed the Elbe at Lauenburg, on the 10th of November; and the Swedes followed, on the 12th. Unfortunately, however, Gustavus IV. also arrived, who, even at that time, exhibited manifest proofs of derangement. He took possession of Lüneburg, caused the tolls upon the Elbe to be raised, and collected them for his own use. The allies lay in presence of the Prussians, neither in a state of peace nor hostility, till an English army was brought over, at the end of November, and Tolstoy, on the 1st of December, took up a position with 2000 Russians before Hameln; immediately afterwards, however, the battle of Austerlitz changed the whole condition of affairs.

In the meantime, Napoleon, undeterred by the threats and preparations of Prussia, continued his march towards Vienna, whither also the army of Italy, under St. Cyr, was ordered to direct its course. The Archduke Charles having sent away thirty battalions from the army under his command, to reinforce Kienmayer on the Inn, Masséna became as strong as the archduke to whom he was opposed;

and he therefore was making arrangements for an attack, at the very time in which the archduke received orders to hasten to the relief of the imperial city, then seriously threatened. The archduke was lying at Caldiero, between Verona and Vicenza, when Masséna attempted to drive him from his position by force, which led to a battle. This bloody engagement continued for three days, and terminated without any decisive advantage; although the French, as usual, boasted of having obtained a decisive victory. From the various reports given, it appears to us that the French lost the greater number of men; and the so-called memorials of St. Helena confess that Masséna was defeated. The archduke remained in his position till he proved that he was not compelled to leave it, and then gained six or eight marches upon Masséna, when he broke up on the 1st of November. He marched with the greater speed, because he still hoped to be able to form a junction with Kutusoff's army, either through Neustadt or St. Polten. The Archduke John, also, was fortunate enough to be able to escape into Styria, with the remains of one of those divisions which were to have defended the Tyrol. Of the two other divisions, the one under Jellachich was obliged to capitulate to Augereau at Feldkirch; and the other, under Prince Rohan, attempted in vain to reach Venice, and was obliged to lay down its arms at Castel-Franco. In the meantime, Masséna rapidly followed the Archduke Charles, the rear of whose army suffered considerably; and the whole would have been exposed to imminent danger, had not the marshal made a sudden halt in Carinthia. The Queen of Naples, led astray by her passions, had ventured, to her own destruction, to break the truce concluded with Napoleon on the 21st of September, and thus to furnish him with the long-desired pretence for subduing Naples. As the queen had united her troops with the Russians, who were landed by the English, Masséna was necessarily obliged to remain in the neighbourhood of the danger impending in that quarter. Augereau, with the 16,000 men who composed the *corps d'armée* of Brest, had long before crossed the Rhine, come to the support of Ney in the Tyrol, and taken Feldkirch.

Neither Meerfeld's nor Kienmayer's army, nor that of Kutusoff, could venture, with any hope of success, to detain Bonaparte on his advance; they were therefore obliged to retreat fighting, till they should have formed a junction with the second Russian army under Buxhövden, in Moravia, to which the Emperor Alexander had gone from Berlin. During the whole retreat of the two armies from Passau to Krems, the French only once experienced that matters in the field were not exactly as they were related in their bulletins, and that the language which their 15th bulletin ascribed to the Russians was scandalously false. The imprudence of Mortier, who had crossed to the left bank of the Danube at Linz, gave occasion to the engagements at Stein and Dirnstein, to which we refer, and in which the French lost more men than they ever acknowledged. Mortier's army of 30,000 men consisted of three divisions, under

Generals Gazan, Dupont, and Dumonceau. This army had positive orders to keep always near to the main body, which was pursuing its march along the right bank, and never to advance beyond it. Kutusoff had long retreated on the right bank; but on the 9th of November, he crossed to the left at Grein, and lay in the neighbourhood of Krems, when Mortier's troops advanced. The French divisions maintained the distance of a whole day's march one division from another, because they thought they were following a fleeing army; but between Dirnstein and Stein, they fell in with the whole Russian army, 20,000 strong, at a place where the French were obliged to pass through a frightful ravine. On the 11th of November, Mortier ventured to make an attack with Gazan's division alone; but between Dirnstein and Loiben (twenty hours from Vienna), he got into a narrow way, enclosed on both sides by a line of lofty walls, and there suffered a dreadful loss. When the French, about noon, at length supposed themselves to have gained some advantage, the Russians received reinforcements, outflanked the French, cut them off, and would have annihilated the whole division, had not Dupont's division come up at the decisive moment. The latter division had also suffered severely on the same day. Whilst Kutusoff was sharply engaged with Mortier, whose numbers were being rapidly diminished, and his cannon taken, the Austrian general, Schimdt, attacked Dupont at Stein, where the contest was as murderous as at Dirnstein, till Schmidt fell, and the French forced their way. Mortier's corps was afterwards transferred, for a time, to the right bank; he himself was removed from the army, his corps newly organised and united with Bernadotte's army.*

On the 11th, the same day on which the French suffered so great a loss at Dirnstein, on the left bank of the Rhine, Murat, with the van of the army, reached Hütteldorf on the right bank, in the neighbourhood of Vienna. There he received a deputation, which humbly laid at his feet the keys of the capital; because, in Austria, as well as afterwards in Prussia, the officials so acted as that every-

* When we now coolly read the shameless falsehoods and boasting of the French bulletins, we cannot avoid honestly lamenting the condition of a nation which was so organised as to have need of such means to urge its people to great deeds; and still more do we pity a great man, who had recourse to such means in the way of which the bulletins are an example. It is, however, more melancholy still to see that almost all histories are composed in the same strain. The French historians repeat *all these LIES* and all this rhodomontade, and are furious if one refuses to believe every letter. They do not feel, those otherwise clever writers, that they bring discredit upon themselves, and upon the really GREAT DEEDS of their hero, by those shameless falsehoods, and by their stilted rhetoric. This is particularly the case in the account of the battle of Dirnstein, as is also true of the previous insignificant engagement at Amstetten. In the latter case, they report themselves to have taken prisoners 1800 Russians (how stupid!); whilst at Dirnstein, Gazan, with 5000 men, is said to have totally defeated Kutusoff and Miloradowitsch. Even Thibaudieu, on this occasion, adopts the official reports, according to which the Russians are said to have lost from 10,000 to 12,000 men killed, and 2500 prisoners. We may just observe, for such readers as take interest in such things, that Posselt, in his "European Annals" for 1806, part 2., p. 182, has collected all the various reports of the engagements on the 11th.

thing might remain in order. In Germany in general, but especially in Austria, it is well known that the *bureaucracy* of the officials is so well organised, and so completely separated from all idea of the people in the country, and every man so completely dependent on his next immediate superior, and on him alone, whoever he may be, that the whole machine goes regularly on, whether those who conduct it and command its movements be called Daru and Clarke, or any others. This facilitated matters very much to the French, to whom the German servility was very acceptable. It saved them the trouble of extortion and oppression; and, to our indignation, we heard them continually rejoicing, with how much satisfaction they sojourned in Germany as conquerors, and how very different it was from Spain and Russia. We shall, therefore, also see, that Murat had no sooner advanced into Vienna, and Napoleon's head-quarters been established in Schonbrunn, than the capital was as quietly governed by Daru and Clarke, as Paris could be governed by the Emperor from St. Cloud.

In the meantime, Kutusoff had marched from Krems to Znaym; and Murat would easily be able to anticipate him, and cut him off from Buxhövden, if he could succeed in passing over the bridge of the Spitz in Vienna. Care, indeed, had been taken to have this bridge in a condition to be blown up immediately on the advance of the French; but the execution of the project was entrusted to a second Mack, of whom, unfortunately, there were a great many amongst the Austrian generals. When the French marched into Vienna, on the right bank, the Prince of Auersberg was stationed on the left bank with about 14,000 men—the cannon was planted—and artillerymen stood ready, with burning torches, immediately to set fire to the bridge, which had been strewed and filled with all sorts of explosive materials; and the prince alone was to blame for the non-execution of the plan. We feel the more bound to make this remark, as all the French who were present, and who have since given an account of the matter, have so described it as to attribute the whole merit to the generals, and to throw the whole of the blame on the subordinate Austrian officers, who strictly fulfilled their duty. Auersberg, namely, issued orders to the officer who was in command of the battery which was to blow up the bridge, already completely charged in every part with explosive materials, not to set fire to the bridge till he should see the French troops fully upon it; and, till that time, to suffer persons sent for the purpose of parley freely to pass over. Auersberg gave these orders to Kienmayer, and the latter again to Colonel Geringen, who communicated them to the officer at the battery, upon whom, and upon his colonel, Auersberg afterwards tried to throw the blame. Thus, Bertrand and Lanusse, being taken for officers sent to hold a parley, were first allowed to go upon the bridge; whilst Murat himself, Lannes, and Belliard, surrounded by their staff, followed. All these officers assured the commanding-officer on the Austrian side of the river, that

peace with Austria was as good as signed, that they were about peacefully to enter Vienna, and that nothing was now waited for but the withdrawal of the Russians. To confirm their assurances, they pointed to a retired Austrian general (Trenk), whom they had brought with them in full uniform; and by means of their suite, caused the cannon to be reversed. At the same moment, the officer perceived the French troops entering upon the bridge, suspected treachery, caused the cannon, which had been turned away, to be again pointed at the bridge, and an artilleryman was just about to fire the explosive trains, when Lannes gave him a thrust. This, however, would have been of no use, as the French reports would have us believe; Lannes, Lanusse, Belliard, Murat, and Bertrand, would have been taken prisoners, and 1800 Frenchmen, who were on the bridge, blown into the air, had not the evil fates of Austria at that moment brought the stupid fool who had the chief command to the spot. Murat immediately turned to him and showed him the letter, which he said he had received from his Emperor, concerning the peace, whilst the other officers surrounded and persuaded him; he suffered himself to be convinced, and treated them as friends. He himself led the advancing French battalions over the bridge, and even caused the Austrian troops to be drawn up on parade before them. The latter were thereupon surrounded and made prisoners. The prince was allowed to escape; but, by command of the emperor, he was immediately seized, put in irons, and conveyed to Königsgrätz. Such is the account which was at the time faithfully given to the writer himself, by an inhabitant of Vienna, and agrees with that given in a small work entitled "The French in Vienna, by an Eye-Witness" (*Die Franzosen in Wien, von einem Augenzeuge*), and which has never been contradicted. The account given by the French we subjoin in a note.* The prince was tried by a court-martial in Königsgrätz, and, according to the old proverb, that "crows never pick out crows' eyes," he was acquitted; the imperial council of war, however, sentenced him to be deprived of all his honours and dignities, and to imprisonment in a government fortress.

* We expressly select the following account, as one couched in terms of moderation; and from the conclusion it will be seen, that the writer would have arrived at the same result as ourselves, had he not been afraid of provoking the wasp's nest of his countrymen: "Bertrand et Lanusse (says he) arrivèrent les premiers au pont, à la tête du 10ième des Hussards, et demandèrent à parler au général; on les laissa passer, mais seuls, sur la rive gauche. La colonne vient ensuite, fit halte. Lannes et Murat mirent pied à terre. Un petit détachement se posta sur le pont et s'y établit. Belliard avança comme en promenant, les mains derrière le dos; Lannes le joignit. Ils gagnèrent ainsi du chemin; le commandant du poste fit quelques difficultés, on le calma en lui parlant de l'armistice. Cependant il perdit patience lorsque le détachement français se fut avancé jusqu'aux trois quarts du pont, et voulut commander sa troupe. Lannes et Belliard s'emparèrent de sa personne, et crièrent plus fort que lui. On parla, on raisonna, on discuta. Pendant ce tems-là, les Français allongèrent le pas, débouchèrent du pont, et s'en rendirent maîtres. Auersberg en fut pour la honte. *Nul militaire autrichien n'était plus propre à donner dans une ruse de guerre. Le découragement, la mollesse, la sottise concouraient à l'envie pour aplanir tous les obstacles qui pouvaient retarder la marche des Français.*"

The possession of the bridge rendered it easy for the French troops to pass the river, to reach Znaym sooner than Kutusoff, and thus to prevent his junction with Buxhövden. Murat, Soult, and Lannes, marched directly to Znaym; whilst Bernadotte, who had again crossed the Danube at Stein, and taken command of Mortier's division, nearly destroyed at Krems, was to annoy and harrass the Russians on their rear. The Emperor of the French himself at first remained behind in Schönbrunn, and exacted considerable contributions as a conqueror. We shall not here spend time in enumerating the sums which were thus raised in Austria, or the mass of stores of all kinds, of cannon, powder, muskets, and balls, which were found in the arsenals and carried away from Vienna; for all these details may be found much more minutely given in other works, than it would be compatible with our object to do. Even in Vienna, Bonaparte attached great importance to his newspaper-war, and was not ashamed to have recourse to the arts invented in the time of the revolution and the reign of terror, as well as admirably profited by in our own days, which employ well-paid sophists to create, if possible, and wherever possible, a public opinion. It forms a necessary part of such a process, to persecute and terrify all those who venture to deny that public opinion is something very different from what the government allege it to be.

As regards the first point, in the 21st bulletin we find the following language: "It is said in Vienna, and in all the Austrian provinces, that the government is worthless, and that there are too many political evils to remedy, to justify the people in adding to their misfortunes the evils of war. On the contrary, the people in Hungary, as well as in Austria, are persuaded that the Emperor Napoleon is desirous of peace—that he is the friend of all nations, as well as of all great ideas." In the *Moniteur*, article followed article, upon the prevailing discontent among the people of Vienna. In one of the numbers of this journal it is said: "the indifference of the inhabitants of Vienna to a change is obvious, and so general amongst the higher and more enlightened classes, that there can be no doubt that neither the Archduke Charles nor the Palatine of Hungary would meet with any difficulty, should they resolve to mount the throne." This absurd method of attempting to create a public opinion, or of circulating falsehoods, and making them prevail over true public opinion, appeared to the Emperor so necessary, and indeed essential, to the stability of a government and administration depending on deception and falsehood that he had scarcely appointed General Clarke governor of Vienna, when he caused Berthier to write to him, to lose no time in endeavouring to obtain a number of persons of influence in Vienna, who should write in the newspapers and periodical journals, in the tone in which he wished the people to think. This plan did not, however, prove so successful in Vienna, as it did the following year in Berlin, where at that time Hurter's countryman, Johannes von Müller, shone amongst the stylish acad-

micians. He first belonged to the Tritons and Bacchantes of Prince Louis Ferdinand, and lustily blew the trumpet of a crusade against Napoleon, in whose praise he afterwards, when Prussia fell, wrote eulogies which might rival those of Fontanes. He even suffered himself to submit to play a pitiful and contemptible part under King Jerome, and among his French followers in Cassel.

Since Mack's defeat, the Emperor Francis had made several attempts, and taken great pains, to obtain a separate peace (to which we shall hereafter return), and was continually in as great fear of his allies as of his enemy. His generals were despised by the Russians, and hated them in return; whilst Lichtenstein, and other friends of France, worked upon his mind. He therefore was, as it were, continually conspiring against the Russians and their interests. This was known to all the generals, who, consequently, expected that peace would be every moment concluded, and that they would be thus relieved from the presence of the Russians. These facts alone can afford any explanation of the most unjustifiable conduct of General von Nostitz, concerning which we are disposed to place great confidence in the Russian account, especially as it completely agrees in essentials with that given, not, indeed, in the French bulletins, but by two truthful French writers. Kutusoff, on his march to Znaym, was overtaken by the van of the French, under Belliard, near Hollabrun; and everything depended on detaining him so long as might enable Kutusoff to gain time for getting in advance. For this purpose, Bagration, with about 6000 men, took up a position in the rear of the main body. Nostitz served under Bagration, and had some thousand Austrians and a number of Russians under his immediate command. He occupied the village of Schöngablen, in the rear of the Russians, and in the very centre of their line of march. Belliard ought to have attacked him first; but as his corps was not superior in number to that of Bagration, he had again recourse to the expedient which he had already tried, with such signal success, at the bridge of Vienna. He entered into a parley; declared that peace with Austria was already concluded, or as good as concluded; assured them that hostilities henceforth affected the Russians alone; and by such means induced Nostitz to be guilty of a piece of treachery unparalleled in war. Nostitz, with his Austrians, forsook the Russians, even those whom he had under his own command—who of themselves were then, indeed, unable to maintain the village of Schöngablen, which was taken possession of without a shot; and Bagration and Kutusoff appeared lost, because Murat's whole army was advancing upon them.

On this occasion, we must again remind our readers, who have been accustomed to all the French falsehoods and boastings which have become current in books, that declamations and bold falsehoods always find more credit than modest truth. There is only *a single* French writer of our own times who says openly that Nostitz was deceived; whilst the bulletin and other writers are shameless enough

to pretend that the French had suffered themselves to be deceived; and, from magnanimity, allowed Nostitz to march through their ranks; because, as is well known, they are the most noble-minded people in the world.* This is, however, trifling, compared with what is stated in the same bulletin—that Milhaud, in the insignificant engagement at Volkersdorf, on the Brünn road (Nov. 14th), where, it is true, the Russians were obliged to leave forty pieces of cannon, had taken 191 pieces; or with what is reported of Lannes—that when he took a well-provided magazine of military dresses, he got possession of an amount sufficient completely to clothe the whole army. When, however, we read the 23rd bulletin, concerning the booty which was gained in Vienna, where it is said—“ We have found munition enough for *four* campaigns, and if we lost the whole of our artillery, could replace it fourfold,” we conclude that we are reading, not the reports of the Emperor Napoleon, but some of the fictions of the celebrated Baron Müinchhausen.

In the meantime the Russians at Hollabrunn extricated themselves from their difficulty, because they were not so stupidly foolish as the Austrians, but understood how to deceive the Gascons by whom they were pursued, as Belliard had deceived the Austrians. For this purpose, they availed themselves of the presence in Kutusoff's camp of Count von Winzingerode, the adjutant-general of the Emperor of Russia, who had been employed in all the last diplomatic military negotiations in Berlin. Murat having sent his adjutant to call upon Kutusoff, whose line of march had come into the power of the enemy, in consequence of Nostitz's treachery in capitulating, he assumed the appearance of being desirous to negotiate, and Winzingerode betook himself to the French camp. Belliard and Murat, without taking the trouble to examine the count and Kutusoff's powers to conclude a treaty which should be generally binding, came to an agreement with Winzingerode, by virtue of which all the Russians, within a certain number of days, were to evacuate every part of the Austrian territory. This capitulation was to be sent to the Emperor Napoleon, at Schönbrunn, for confirmation; and to this condition there was necessarily attached another, for the sake of which Kutusoff had commenced the whole affair. There was to be a suspension of hostilities till the arrival of Napoleon's answer; and it was agreed, that in the meantime both parties should remain in their then positions. Bagration, with his 7000 or 8000 Russians, complied with this condition, and remained in their position at Hollabrunn, because they could be observed by the French; but Kutusoff, with all the rest of the army, which lay at a greater distance, quietly continued his route to Žnaym; and this, with a full view of the danger of Bagration being afterwards overwhelmed by a superior force. On being made acquainted with the state of affairs, Napoleon became enraged at the capitulation, because

* “A cette extrême facilité,” says the 24th bulletin, “on reconnaît le caractère du Français, qui, brave dans la mêlée, est d'une générosité souvent irréfléchie.”

he immediately perceived how grievously his brother-in-law had suffered himself to be deceived; and ordered an immediate attack. This was indeed made; but eighteen hours had been irreparably lost, and Kutusoff gained two marches on Murat; the whole French army, above 30,000 strong, therefore fell upon Bagration.

It was shown, on this occasion, what Mack might have done, had he marched out of Ulm; and the faults inherent in the Austrian generals, and a miserable bureaucratic government, aristocratical to the core, and by no means monarchical, were fully developed. Bagration, who had still with him the Austrian regiment of hussars of the Crown-Prince of Homburg, commanded by Baron von Mohr, offered a vigorous resistance to the whole French army with his 7000 or 8000 men. The Russian bombs set fire to the village in which was stationed the corps which was to fall upon Bagration's flank; the consequence was, that this corps was thrown into confusion, and the Russians opened up a way for themselves at the point of the bayonet. The Russian general, it is true, was obliged to leave his cannon in the hands of his enemy, and lost the half of his force; it must, however, always be regarded as one of the most glorious deeds of the whole campaign, that, after three days' continued fighting, he succeeded in joining the main body under Kutusoff, at his head-quarters at Wischau, between Brünn and Olmütz, and, to the astonishment of all, with one half of his little army. Even the French admit, that the Russians behaved nobly; that they themselves lost a great number of men, and that, among others, Oudinot was severely wounded.

On the same day on which Bagration arrived in Wischau, a junction had been formed by Buxhövdens army, with which the Emperor Alexander was present, with the troops under Kutusoff, who thenceforward assumed the chief command of the whole. On this occasion the two emperors sojourned for a time in a castle which had formerly been fitted up with great taste and at a vast expense by Prince Kaunitz. Napoleon himself came to Brünn, and collected his whole army around him, because he knew well that nothing but a decisive engagement could bring him safely out of the situation in which he then was, and which was the more dangerous the more splendid and victorious it outwardly appeared to be.

It is beyond a doubt, that the precipitation and haughtiness of the Russians, who were eager for a decisive engagement, combined with the miserable policy of the Prussian cabinet and the cowardice of the king, as well as the fears and irresolution of the poor Emperor Francis, and the want of spirit among his advisers, contributed more to the success of Napoleon's plans respecting Prussia, Germany, and Italy, than his victories in the field. Napoleon's plan, which he afterwards carried out, was the establishment of a French Empire on the continent, such as the English have in India. A glance at the situation of affairs at the time of the battle of Austerlitz will show at once how easily he might have been stopped in his career. We see,

first, that although Prussia trembled for fear, it was, nevertheless, compelled to declare itself, even if no battle was fought. As we must hereafter return to Haugwitz's mission, we shall here only remark, that although Napoleon detained him, sometimes under one excuse and sometimes under another, and sometimes referred him to Talleyrand, a declaration must at last be made, which, had it been made before the battle, would necessarily have brought Prussia into the field. It was this which made the Emperor, after the victory, so ready to make concessions to the Emperor Francis, and turned the whole of his indignation upon Prussia. In the field, indeed, the French were everywhere victorious; with the exception of Hungary, Bohemia, and Upper Silesia, they had overrun and plundered almost the whole Austrian dominions; but the moment there was any cessation or delay, they were immediately exposed to difficulties from the very extent of the conquered territory. The Archduke Charles had continued his retreat, although General Hillinger, who was to cover it, had at the very beginning capitulated, with 5000 men; he afterwards formed a junction with the Archduke John, who had fortunately escaped from the Tyrol, and with the corps of General Hiller. As Massena made a halt in Carinthia, the Archduke Charles's army suffered comparatively little, and reached the Drave as early as the 30th of November. He then dispatched Field-Marshal Chasteler against Marmont, who was in Styria, and pushed so rapidly forward with his main body towards Vienna, that his advanced guards touched Windpassing, about twenty-seven miles from the capital, on the 7th of December. Had the combined army of Austrians and Russians marched from Moravia to Hungary, in a very short time 40,000 Hungarian levies might have been brought into the field.

The Archduke Ferdinand had again raised his small force saved from Ulm to 20,000 men; and when Bernadotte was obliged to follow the main body of the French army, he threw himself upon the Bavarians under Wrede, who, as early as the 5th of December, were driven out of Stöken, Wolnau, Pfauendorf (near Iglau), and driven as far as Budweis.

In the north of Germany, too, as well as in the south of Italy, considerable preparations were made against the French, which were all rendered of no effect, not so much by the victory of Austerlitz, however splendid that victory was, as by the cowardly behaviour of the Emperor Francis and his cabinet after the battle. As early as the 19th of November, seven battalions of the Hanoverian legion and two English brigades had been landed by the English at Stade; and on the 5th of December the cavalry of the Hanoverian legion, embarked at Deal, were brought to the Weser and the Elbe. It was calculated that 10,000 troops in English pay were already in Hanover, and that 12,000 more British would be sent over from Deal. Since the 1st of December, 2000 Russians had been lying before Hameln, who were afterwards joined by the Hanoverians;

there was, however, no other result but an insignificant engagement, which took place on the 8th before Hameln; for, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in Moravia, Napoleon had gained absolute dominion from the Straits of Messina to the Northern Ocean.

The Emperor Napoleon feared nothing more than that the Russians should march either to Hungary or to Upper Silesia, and avoid a decisive engagement; he therefore took means to ascertain the characters and views of the personal attendants and advisers of the Emperor Alexander; and when he had learned that young men of foolhardy dispositions had the preponderance in his councils, he formed his plans accordingly. He first advanced from Brünn to Wischau, and afterwards retired again into the neighbourhood of Brünn, as if afraid to venture upon an attack. The Emperor of Germany, as well as the Emperor Napoleon, appeared seriously desirous of a peace; but the former was obliged to propose conditions which the latter could not possibly accept; and Napoleon wished first completely to set the Emperor Francis free from the Russians, his allies, and from Prussia, before he came to an agreement with him. As Count Stadion, who came to the head-quarters of the French on the 27th of November, with Giulay, as ambassadors to treat for peace, was a sworn enemy of Napoleon, and remained so till 1813, and had, moreover, been very instrumental in founding the whole coalition, and in maturing their plans, his appearance on this occasion was of itself no good omen for the favourable issue of the mission. The proposals made as the basis of a peace were the same as had been made for the event of a victory on the part of the allies—the French were to evacuate Germany and Italy. When Napoleon sent Savary (afterwards Duke of Rovigo) the head of his *gendarmerie* police, under pretence of complimenting the Emperor Alexander, it was indisputably a great part of this envoy's object, as appears from the 30th bulletin, to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the prevailing opinions and the leading characters, during the three days of his sojourn in the emperor's camp. Savary was moreover very well received, and sent away with every courtly attention by Alexander; but it was intimated, that it was intended to make common cause with Prussia, and that it was expected, that Novosilzoff, whom the Emperor Alexander wished to send to Napoleon, would meet Haugwitz in Brünn. The hint was sufficient to induce Savary to decline the company of Novosilzoff.

When Savary informed the Emperor of the illusion of the Russian generals, and of their belief—that fears were entertained of the Russians, and that on this account embassies were sent to seek for peace—Napoleon very cunningly took care to strengthen the fools in their folly. Savary was once more obliged to go to the enemy's camp, and on this occasion to propose an interview between Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia. The interview was declined; but Prince Dolgorucki was sent to propose conditions to Napoleon. The

latter did not allow him to come into his camp, but received him at the outposts. If it be true, that the prince on this occasion behaved most rudely, and that he made the same demands of which Napoleon complains so bitterly in the 30th and 31st bulletins, the Russians were certainly seized with a delusion which must necessarily draw them on to their destruction; but we must add, that we do not place unhesitating confidence in anything which proceeded immediately from Napoleon, or in words which are put into his mouth.* In the same bulletin in which abuse is heaped upon the Russians, the English again play a part along with them—the English, who were always a thorn in Napoleon's eye.

If it be asked, why the Russians, with whom there were only some 20,000 Austrians, did not wait for the third army, under Benningsen, or reduce Bonaparte to the greatest perplexity, by taking up a strong position in Hungary or Upper Silesia, or remaining quietly upon the heights of Pratzen, the reply is, that the whole system of supplies was bad, and that want had reached so great a pitch, that it would have been impossible for them to have remained. Certain it is, that they suffered themselves to be drawn down from the heights, and away from Austerlitz, nearer Brünn, where the talents of their generals were unable to devise the plan of a battle, which Napoleon could not immediately oversee; it would have been otherwise in the mountains. The French allege, that Napoleon had long before fixed upon the very place in which the Russians offered him battle at Austerlitz, on the second of December, as his battle-field, and laid all his plans accordingly. The possession of the heights of Pratzen was regarded, by those skilled in strategy, as the key of this battle-field. The Russians were in full possession of these heights, with all their force, on the 1st of December; on the 2nd they descended from them, when Bonaparte drew back one of the wings of his army. He had long calculated on gaining the victory by the possession of these heights, and thus rendering the retreat of the Russians impossible. He did not, therefore, fail, in the very opening of the battle, to seize upon them. A column of the third Russian army, under Benningsen, commanded by Michelson, just arrived at the decisive moment when Napoleon had also called to his aid Bernadotte's corps, and when the Bavarians were on their march from Budweis to Moravia; but none of their leaders could lay any claim to the reputation of a commander of genius. Napoleon's proclamation to his army shows his full confidence in his own

* France was not only to renounce Italy, but also to give up Belgium—as was said in the bulletins. The French diplomatist, however, from whom we borrow this, himself confesses that he could not believe this, and that it was probably only one of the many sentences of the famous bulletins, calculated for the people and the army. The answer put into the mouth of Napoleon may have been different in words, but in reality was exactly as it has been printed : “ Si c'est-là ce que vous avez à me dire, allez rapporter à l'Empereur Alexandre que je ne croyais pas à ces dispositions lorsque je demandais à le voir, je ne lui aurais montré que mon armée, et je m'en serais rapporté à son équité pour les conditions; il le veut, nous nous battons; je m'en lave les mains.”

superiority, as well as in that of his generals and soldiers; and this confidence was fully realised on the bloody field of Austerlitz, on the 2nd of December. It is undoubtedly true that the Russians were defeated; but it is as undoubtedly true, that had it not been for the cowardice of the Emperor of Germany, and for the counsels of Lichtenstein and his associates, who wished for the defeat of the Russians, and to promote the advantage of their emperor at the expense of his honour and the Austrian name, the exaggerated advantages of the victory, which the French so admirably understood how to magnify, and which no one on the continent at that time dared to doubt, would not have produced the effects which they did in reality produce. It was not the victory itself, but its immediate consequences, which made the German princes the humble vassals of France, gave Italy into the hands of Napoleon, raised his brothers and his brother-in-law to the rank of kings, and his generals, diplomats, and sophists, to that of princes.

As regards the immediate result of the battle, the Russians lost the greater part of their artillery and their army; but this loss has been so grossly exaggerated by the French, that we do not venture either to give the number of the fallen, or of those who escaped. Many, in other respects trustworthy French writers, give 54,000 as the number of the slain; and Matthew Dumas, who does not belong to the boasters, states, that of 80,000 Russians, 40,000 fell in the battle. It is obvious, however, that these mere military official boastings are not entitled to much credit, as the Russian accounts as absurdly diminish the amount of the loss, as those of the French extravagantly exaggerate it. Kutusoff, in his account, says that he lost 12,000, and the French 18,000 men. The French reports may be partly refuted by a comparison of one with another, as will appear from a single example (*ex uno discit omnes*): Buxhövdén was hard pressed beside a frozen lake; some battalions retreated upon the ice, which the French broke with their artillery; so that many Russians perished, and their cannon sunk into the water. The first French accounts, in order to make up the sum of 50,000 Russians fallen, will have 20,000 to have been drowned in the lake. In a second report, however, this 20,000 is reduced to 4000, and the Russians do not admit that almost any of their men were lost in the lake. This is, no doubt, as incorrect as the French accounts, although we should be disposed still very much further to reduce the amount of their second report. We may, with the less hesitation, leave the investigation respecting the real state of affairs, or the defeat of the Russians, at one o'clock on the 2nd of December, to military writers; because, there is no doubt that the Emperor Francis regarded his own situation, and that of the Russians, precisely in the same light as it was regarded by Napoleon, and expressed in his bulletins, and that, therefore, his conduct on the night after the battle was that of a man who thought all hopes were for ever lost.

THIRD DIVISION.

FIRST CHAPTER. TILL THE PEACE OF TILSIT.

§ I.

IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

A.—CONSEQUENCES TO AUSTRIA, HOLLAND, AND GERMANY, TILL THE END OF JUNE, 1806.

AFTER the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon found in Francis the Second a ruler who, from his weakness and his completely Italian character, proved as useful a tool for the promotion of his views, as he had found in the King of Sardinia, after the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo, in 1796—1797; with this difference, that the emperor's understanding was still less vigorous than that of the king. This was evident, when Lichtenstein, after the battle, as we shall hereafter state, conducted the poor terrified Francis to a personal interview with the superior genius, who immediately brought him into subservience; and, as a favour, granted a cessation of hostilities, which placed the Emperor of Germany, with his hands bound, in the power of the conqueror. The first condition of the truce was, that the Russians should wholly withdraw. This was the more advantageous, as, after the battle, the difficulty of supplies ceased, which was alleged as an excuse for not having taken up a strong position in Hungary or Upper Silesia, instead of risking a battle. The remains of the army would have been easily provided for. The French, indeed, allege, that the Russian army was completely surrounded, and the emperor as good as made prisoner; having owed his escape to favour, and to a pass from Napoleon, presented by General Davoust. However ungrounded this may be, all the French writers insist earnestly upon its truth (Lefebvre excepted); and the intelligent Thibaudeau is even amongst the number of those who reproach the Emperor of Russia with the greatest ingratitude. The whole of the silly story of Napoleon's magnanimity towards the

Emperor Alexander, rests upon this—that when Savary was sent to the poor Emperor Francis, in order to obtain the concurrence of the Emperor of Russia in the agreement into which the former had entered, the latter made no difficulty about acquiescing, from compassion, and in a spirit of kindness complied with the wishes of his ally. Savary's visit furnished an opportunity to the 30th bulletin, and to all Frenchmen, to invent a dialogue between Savary and the Emperor of Russia, in which the latter is made to strew incense upon the Emperor of the French, and to say things which sound marvellously strange in his mouth. The Russians, on the contrary, say that Savary had no conversation whatever with the emperor; he may, indeed, have seen him, but the dialogue is wholly apocryphal. It will appear hereafter, that the emperor had completely withdrawn from the reach of the pursuing French, before Savary was sent; and it will, at the same time, be obvious, that the Emperor Francis resigned all hope a great deal too soon.

We have already stated, that the difficulty of providing supplies was very great before the battle; this, however, might easily have been provided against beforehand, in such countries as Hungary and Moravia, by the adoption of energetic measures. Kutusoff's army was not so weak after the engagement as the French allege, and by a union with the force under Benningsen, would have been again as strong as before. The Archduke Charles was altogether unconquered, and threatened Napoleon in the rear; for, at the very moment in which he received intelligence of the suspension of hostilities, he was about to set out for Vienna. Had Haugwitz not been compelled by the truce to hold very different language, he would have been obliged to fulfil the embassy entrusted to him, and agreed upon by the King of Prussia and the Archduke Anthony, on the 3rd of November. We believe ourselves, therefore, to be fully justified in saying, that the whole calamitous consequences resulted from the degree of confusion and disorder which prevailed in the administration of the whole of the military and civil affairs of Austria—a degree which almost exceeded all belief. This still further appears from the fact, that immediately after the peace of Presburg the emperor was obliged to appoint his brother, the Archduke Charles, generalissimo. The archduke caused great reforms to be made, not only in the whole war department, but in all the other branches of administration. Upon the whole, the situation of things, on the 3rd of December, was by no means so desperate as Lichtenstein made the emperor believe. The Emperor Alexander lent his name to a *ruse de guerre*,* not in order to save his army, which was not cut off

* Davout suffered the Russians to continue their march unmolested, on the receipt of an autograph note from the Emperor of Russia to the following effect: "J'autorise le Général de Meerfeldt à faire connaître au Général Français que les deux Empereurs d'Allemagne et de France sont en conférence, qu'il y a un armistice dans cette partie, et qu'il est en conséquence inutile de sacrifier plus de braves gens."

from retreat, but was in full march through Urschitz, Czeitsch, and Göding, along the March, which river it afterwards crossed, but in order to avoid a battle, which Davoust would have begun, and which, under existing circumstances, would certainly not have been without danger. The army had not lost *all* its artillery, although it had been obliged to relinquish 200 pieces; and the rear was commanded by Bagration, who was a no less able general than Davoust. Besides the Archduke Charles, who threatened Vienna, and Benningsen, who was advancing, the Archduke Ferdinand was in close pursuit of the Bavarians retreating from Bohemia towards Moravia; and Prussia, to its misfortune, had at length also put its army in motion. The Emperor Francis preferred humbly begging for the favour of Napoleon.*

In the night between the 2nd and 3rd, the same Prince Lichtenstein, who had arranged Mack's capitulation, and whom Bonaparte recommended in his bulletin as the man, whom the emperor should have placed at the head of affairs in preference to all others, was sent by the Emperor Francis to Napoleon, in order to ask for a personal interview. He wandered long around the space, where the French army lay scattered after the battle, till he found the Emperor, who showed himself ready to receive the Emperor Francis on the 4th. This meeting was intentionally appointed, not in Briunn, where Bonaparte's head-quarters were, but in very bad quarters at Saruschitz, where were the advanced posts of the army. This furnished an opportunity for bringing forward, in the journals and histories, Napoleon and his French, in contrast with the Emperor Francis and the generals who accompanied him, and for giving a dramatic character to the reception and conversation. The French have, in fact, after their fashion, decked out the interview with anecdotes; they have, on this occasion, even given the Emperor Francis the reputation of talents; and all this has become history, like Plutarch's anecdotes; but it does not lie at all in our way.

The Emperor Francis asked for a suspension of hostilities, during which negotiations were to be carried on with a view to a peace; Napoleon granted the request, on condition of the Russians evacuating Hungary and Moravia within fourteen days, and Galicia within four weeks. We find it difficult to believe, that Napoleon said and did on this occasion what we find written in bulletins and books, because we regard it as less worthy of his character and talents than the French appear to do.† By virtue of the terms of the truce, the

* The French, and particularly Thibaudeau, reason against what has been alleged in the text, as if it had ever occurred to any one to *say certainly* that the allies would have conquered; that is not the question; the question is about *venturing*. How was it after the battle of Borodino? How was it in Prussia in 1813? And in Spain in 1808?

† We cannot introduce such things into the text, but subjoin in a note, what all the French writers relate concerning this interview. Napoleon is reported to have said to the Emperor Francis: “L'armée russe cernée, pas un homme ne peut échapper; mais je désire faire une chose agréable à l'Empereur Alexander; je lais-

French army was to continue, till the ratification of a peace, in possession of the whole circle of Iglau, Znaym, and Brünn, together with a part of the circle of Olmutz, in Moravia; and, further, of the right bank of the March, till its influx into the Danube, Presburg included. Upper and Lower Austria, the Tyrol, Venice, Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, Görz, and Istria, remained occupied; and, in Bohemia, not only the circle of Tabor, but the district lying eastward of the road from Tabor to Linz. From this third of the Austrian monarchy 100,000,000 of francs were demanded for the pay and rewards of Napoleon's army; and, notwithstanding the magnitude of this demand, oppressions of other descriptions were by no means diminished. For this reason the Emperor Francis willingly assented to whatever conditions were imposed, merely in order to be quit of the French, and to have his empire relieved from their oppressive occupation. The Emperor Alexander gave his assent merely because his ally wished it; and Savary's mission proved successful in obtaining the concurrence of both emperors. This conduct on the part of Alexander was both admirable and noble; but the French, from Savary's mission, have contrived to invent the whole of the romance of the deliverance and escape of the Russians, and an absurd dialogue between Savary and the emperor. The truce agreed to on the 4th by Prince Lichtenstein, on the part of the Austrians, was not confirmed till the 6th, after Savary's return with the express assent of the Emperor of Russia; and, on the 6th, Talleyrand, Stadion, and Giulay, met at Nikolsburg, to agree upon the terms of the peace, which both parties were desirous of concluding as quickly as possible. This was very easily accomplished, for Napoleon laid down his terms; and the Emperor Francis, being deprived of all means of resistance, was feign to agree, consoling himself with Napoleon's promise, that in two months after the ratification the whole of his states would be evacuated by the French.

The negotiations commenced in Nikolsburg, by Stadion and Giulay, who were only employed on account of the military arrangements, were afterwards continued in Brünn, where Prince Johann von Lichtenstein took Stadion's place. The French had no confidence in the latter, and Napoleon even felt himself personally offended when he was appointed to the charge of the foreign department, on the removal of Louis Cobenzl. From Brünn, the plenipotentiaries afterwards went to Presburg, because this city lay at about

serai passer l'armée russe, j'arrêterai la marche de mes colonnes, pourvu que l'armée russe retourne en Russie, qu'elle évacue l'Allemagne, la Pologne autrichienne et russe, et que V. M. promette de ne plus me faire la guerre." "Cette promesse je vous la donne," répondit l'Empereur d'Autriche; "quant à l'Empereur Alexandre, son intention est de retourner en Russie avec son armée." This is differently told even in its accessory circumstances, and the people who present such things as history add, that when the Emperor Francis left him, Napoleon said to his generals: "Cet homme me fait faire une faute; j'aurais pu suivre ma victoire et prendre toute l'armée russe et autrichienne; mais quelques larmes de moins seront versées." What rhodomontade and affected sentimentality!

an equal distance from Hollitsch, where the Emperor Francis was sojourning, and from Schönbrunn, at which place Bonaparte had established his head-quarters. The peace was signed as early as the 26th of December, and was ratified immediately afterwards by both the contracting powers, because Napoleon was anxious to make a threatening movement against Prussia and the Emperor Francis, eager again to get possession of his states. We subjoin, in a note,* the chief articles of the peace of Presburg, the most oppressive of which was not, as it might appear, the sacrifice by Austria of 1000 square miles of territory and 3,000,000 of subjects, but the complete recognition and submission to all Napoleon's usurpations and extortions, and to all the measures adopted in favour of his family, his generals, and creatures of every description. From this time forward the Emperor of the French began to exercise the greatest degree of overbearing haughtiness and contempt for public opinion; he had found the princes of Europe and their ministers such a miserable set, that he began also to feel contempt for the people. All the French writers speak of his system, of his plan of a Carolingian Empire, and of a hundred other things, which all look very well upon paper, but of which we have seen nothing in reality. We saw only continual

* Austria agreed that France should retain, in full right and sovereignty, all the duchies, principalities, and territories on the further side of the Alps, which before this treaty had been incorporated with the French Empire, or were governed by French laws and administration. The Emperor of Austria recognised Napoleon's right to dispose of Lucca and Piombino. He renounced that part of the republic of Venice which was ceded to him by the treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville. This portion was to be incorporated with the kingdom of Italy. He recognised Napoleon as King of Italy, and promised, that if in future the crown of France and Italy should be separated, he would acknowledge as King of Italy whomsoever Napoleon should appoint to that dignity. The Electors of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, who had adopted the title of kings without retiring from the German confederation, were acknowledged as kings. Bavaria obtained from the Emperor the margraviate of Burgau, the principality of Eichstadt, that part of Passau belonging to the electorate of Salzburg, the county of the Tyrol, together with Trent and Brixen, the Voralberg lordships, the county of Hohenems and Königsegg, Rothenfels, the lordships of Tettnang and Argen, and the town of Lindau. Wirtemberg obtained the towns of Ehingen, Munderlingen, Riedlingen, Mengen, and Sulga, on the Danube, the upper and lower counties of Hohenberg, the landgraviate of Nellenburg, the district of Altorf, with the exception of the town of Constance; a part of the Breisgau, and the towns of Villingen and Brentingen. Baden obtained the Breisgau, Ortenau, and Constance, with the commendature of Meinau. Salzburg and Berchtesgaden were incorporated as duchies with Austria. The Emperor of the French bound himself to procure Würzburg from the King of Bavaria for the Archduke Ferdinand, who had hitherto been in possession of Salzburg; and the transference of the electoral dignity to Würzburg. All the rights, estates, and possessions of the German order were to be hereditary in a prince of the house of Austria, whom the Emperor of Austria should appoint. Napoleon also was to take care that the Archduke Ferdinand should receive compensation in Germany for the loss of the Breisgau. Bavaria was to be allowed to keep possession of the city and territory of Augsburg, and Wirtemberg of the county of Bondorf, without any claims being made on the part of Austria. The Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Elector of Baden, were to enjoy their old and new possessions in full sovereignty, as the Emperor of Austria or the King of Prussia did theirs; and the Emperor Francis, as head of the empire, was neither in his office as head of the confederation, nor as a member of the same, to raise any obstructions to whatever arrangements these princes might have adopted, or should hereafter adopt.

changes of possessions, of rulers, and of institutions, and suffered at the same time from the united evils of a despotism and a republic. There was nothing to be seen or heard of but the arbitrary conduct of a man who built up to-day and pulled down to-morrow, in order to build up something new on the day following. Every change in the state of affairs, every new act of pitifulness on the part of the old governments, led to some new plans on his part, as may be seen in the steps which he took against Portugal and Spain. Kingdoms and principalities sprang up and disappeared like card-houses; kings and princes changed their territories as officers changed their regiments. Holland was incorporated with France as soon as the new king ventured to show a sense of his duties towards others as well as towards his brother. All the arrangements and institutions were admirable, for Napoleon exercised dominion over the whole intelligence of the old and new period of France, and, with that tact which was peculiar to him, sought to make the best of all they contained; but what did he arrange, what did he select from these numerous materials as serving his aims? One while a republican, and another a completely Byzantine law; as will appear from the numerous laws borrowed from the decess of the National Assemblies, and from the principalities, baronies, fiefs, and taxes, which were at the same time created, even in the year 1806, against the existing laws, and in favour of the Bonaparte family or other Frenchmen with whom Germany and Italy were burdened. How does his irresistible zeal for right and justice, and for a new system of legislation and administration, in the spirit, and agreeable to the demands of, the age, correspond with the violation of all natural and positive laws, which he frequently both did and permitted? What a glaring contrast do these regulations for the maintenance of order and quiet, so highly praised by the French, form with the cruel plunder and extortions carried on in the countries of friends, in the midst of peace? How do the gold lace with which the new court and the new high nobility were often most farcically adorned, and the costly bombast of the official rhetoricians, contrast with the cynical tone of the bulletins and the *Moniteur!* The intention was, if possible, again to restore princes to honour and esteem, and yet the newspapers were suffered to indulge in the grossest calumnies and abuse, such as would disgrace a common guard-room, against ancient houses and reigning dignitaries! The miserable old courts, and the poor souls who belonged to them, in Germany and Italy, but especially in Spain and Portugal, would have served the object of a universal monarchy, if Napoleon entertained such a project, far better than the new dynasties and the incorporations which circumstances led him to prefer.

We make these general remarks in this place, because henceforward we shall be chiefly occupied with the relation of the heroic deeds and conquests of Bonaparte and his army, with the servility and weakness of the old generation of the aristocracy on the con-

tinent, and with the mad infatuation which happily hurried on the foolishly-honoured idol of the French and the people themselves from one deed of violence to another. We shall, however, afterwards show in what manner noble patriots roused the spirit of the better part of the old German knighthood and the sleepy German people, how a real national struggle was begun, how for once a patriotic inspiration prevailed over the indolence of the bureaucracy, and a new day dawned, amidst universal rejoicing. With this, we shall be happily allowed to draw our work to a close, and our goal will have been reached; for it would be a mournful task, at our advanced age, still to be obliged to relate, how hell again opened, and hypocrites and knaves laboured to bring back the former night, and how the struggle has been continually carried on, sometimes with and sometimes without success, against the alliance of the emissaries of darkness. The peace of Presburg gave a very considerable impulse to the fulfilment of Napoleon's idea for the erection of a dominion founded upon conquest like the ancient Roman Empire, or like the Russian or Anglo-Indian of our own times. Before, however, we proceed to give proofs of this, we must premise some hints on the state of Austria immediately after the peace of Presburg, and then show how Holland and the greater part of the German Empire, even before the dissolution of the Diet in Ratisbon, were either immediately subject to foreigners, or governed by princes who were obliged to form alliances with the Bonaparte family.

As regards Austria, it became evident, immediately after the peace, when an attempt was made to reform some of the crying evils of the government and administration, how miserable the condition of the emperor was, and how completely the whole constitution had become obsolete and decrepit. A great number of the official persons in the war department and in the administration were either dismissed on account of their conduct during the war, or were made responsible for their misdeeds; all branches of the administration, and especially the war department, underwent a complete change, for which purpose the Archduke Charles was entrusted with unlimited powers. Among the higher classes, who had forgotten their duty in the last war, or shown the most remarkable incapacity, General Mack and the Princes of Auersberg and Auffenberg were the most notorious. These were forthwith placed under close arrest in the fortress of Josephstadt, till they could be tried by a court-martial. In the mean while, Napoleon, after his withdrawal from Austria, continued to overreach and harass the emperor in every way, till at length, by the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, already hinted at in the peace of Presburg, he compelled him to dissolve the empire and to renounce the imperial dignity. From the very first, the Emperor of the French, cherishing the views which he did towards Prussia, saw with anxiety and regret the Archduke Charles placed as generalissimo at the head of the war department, and the department itself thoroughly reformed. He

found himself also deceived with respect to the conduct of the department of foreign affairs. Louis von Cobenzl was removed on his application, but Count Stadion was appointed in his stead. In consequence of this appointment he wrote a letter, on the 19th of February, to General Andréossy, who was named on his part to act with Prince Lichtenstein, to see to the fulfilment of all the articles of the treaty of peace. He desired him to say to the prince, that this nomination was calculated to make him (Napoleon) very distrustful for the future. And that he really was so, he gave many proofs, in the letters which he wrote during the same week of February on the subject of the troops, which the Emperor Francis, with Talleyrand's verbal consent, lent to the Archduke Ferdinand, when the latter took possession of Würzburg, ceded to him by virtue of the treaty of Presburg. Napoleon wrote four times that he would not suffer any Austrian troops to be employed beyond the limits of Austria; that the archduke was to recruit troops in Westphalia, and the Austrians forthwith to retire from Würzburg. Another cause of dispute arose from the demand made by Napoleon to be allowed to march the troops which he wished to send from the territory of Venice to Istria and Dalmatia through some part of the Austrian Empire. The road led through the barony of Monfalcone, and Napoleon appealed to the fact, that Austria had never refused this privilege to the republic of Venice. There was another point, however, still more important, of which Napoleon availed himself—to make Braunau, which he was to evacuate in three months, a bulwark between Bavaria and Austria.

Napoleon had sent General Molitor to Dalmatia, to take possession of the country and the fortresses which were to be delivered up to him by Ghisilieri, the Austrian commissioner. As, however, the Russians were at the same time shipped across from Naples to Dalmatia, Molitor accused Ghisilieri of having sold the artillery, in order that the French might be unable to defend the fortresses against the Russians. General Brady afterwards gave up Cattaro, Budua, and Castelnuovo to the Russians before the French arrived. Napoleon took advantage of this to refuse to fulfil his promise, of withdrawing his armies across the Rhine, before the 1st of April, and to keep possession of the fortress of Braunau.

He called upon Austria to see that the Russians evacuated Cattaro, but the latter were in no hurry to gratify the Emperor Francis in this respect; Braunau, therefore, not only remained in the hands of the French, but its works were considerably strengthened, and Austria continued to be threatened from that quarter. It was, however, a great gain to Austria that Count Metternich Winneburg was sent as ambassador to Paris instead of the miserable Philip Cobenzl, who had so scandalously suffered himself to be deceived in 1805, and had lulled the emperor into a ruinous security respecting the views, plans, and preparations of the French, till it was too late. The importance to which Count Metternich rose in public affairs, was afterwards

very salutary for Austria, for to him indisputably belongs the glory, if it be a glory, of being in some measure a match for Talleyrand.

Before we pass on to speak of the steps which were taken, even before the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, to accustom the Germans by degrees to the French yoke, and to hand them over to rulers who were either Frenchmen, or sprung from French blood, we must mention, that the federative republic of the Netherlands fell contemporaneously with the German Empire. We make this remark expressly, because it will hereafter appear, that the attempt to rob the nations, of their nationality, and to enforce French usages and laws, first upon the servile and sleepy Germans, betrayed and sold by their princes and their official aristocracy; next, upon the demoralised and indolent Italians; and lastly, upon the Spaniards and Portuguese, from the year 1806 onward, roused the people in all quarters to make patriotic efforts for their deliverance. In the next volume we shall point out how the German nation became alive, and was roused to a sense of its condition, as early as 1806; and how all the means which Napoleon employed—his cruel and tyrannical police, and his legal murders—such as that perpetrated upon Palm, the bookseller—to rule or suppress public opinion, contributed admirably to keep up the excitement, and so to harden the people by oppression, that they afterwards broke loose with irresistible force, and despised every danger.

Holland had been long preserved from a variety of evils by Schimmelpennink—a man who was worthy of the best times—whose patriotism, self-sacrifices, and freedom from the general vanity and haughtiness of statesmen, made him very different from those with whom Napoleon had usually to do. Till the autumn of 1805 the government of Holland was completely national, and no one suspected that the Emperor of the French would, within a year, overthrow a constitution which had been first established by himself in 1804, through the instrumentality of Schimmelpennink; and yet he contemplated this proceeding immediately after the battle of Austerlitz. From what follows, it will be seen that the idea of occupying the throne with his own family, from that moment forward frustrated the best views of the Emperor, inasmuch as he only wished for mere tools, in order to use all nations for the exclusive benefit of the French, for which purpose the old cringing and bowing counts would have proved undoubtedly more serviceable than the members of his own family, all of whom looked upon themselves as Napoleons. We are very fully informed respecting the elevation of Napoleon's somewhat singular brother Louis to the throne of Holland, by the documents which have been printed.* We see from these papers that the pensionary of the council first did everything in his power to preserve his country from the dominion

* Herr N. G. von Kampen has caused these to be printed, from the originals communicated to him by Schimmelpennink, as appendices to the 4th vol. of his “*Geschiednis der Fransche Heerschappy in Europa.*”

of France, and, when this was no longer possible, tried to lessen the disgrace by leading the Dutch, of their own accord, to choose a foreign master, and voluntarily to sacrifice their freedom and independence, so honourably and gloriously maintained in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first against Spain and afterwards against France. Inasmuch as the Emperor always preferred cunning to force, when any piece of injustice was to be practised, and as in his conduct towards Holland he meant to have recourse to the same means which he had employed in the annihilation of the republics of Lucca and Genoa, Talleyrand wrote to the pensionary, as early as 1806, that the Emperor deemed it necessary to make a complete change in the constitution established in the year 1804. The pensionary was required, by letter, to send Admiral Verhuel, who was at the same time both in the Dutch and French service, to Paris in order to enter into the necessary arrangements by verbal conferences.* The admiral remained six weeks in Paris, from which he took his departure on the 15th of February, and declared, on his return in April, that the Emperor required, unconditionally, that the Dutch should ask for and accept his brother Louis as their king.

Verhuel, who for very good reasons had been required to be sent by the Dutch as their ambassador to Paris, although at that time Brantser, who filled that office, was present in the French capital, was of opinion, that there was nothing else to do than to recommend the most distinguished men of his nation to allow themselves to be made use of in this intolerable trick, whereby *all the French, without exception*, even now try to give to their plans of robbery the appearance of right.† Schimmelpennink entertained a very different opinion. He remained firmly opposed to the proposition of soliciting Louis Bonaparte to become King of Holland, even when Verhuel declared that Napoleon was resolved, if the Dutch refused compliance, to unite Holland with France. The pensionary summoned a large assembly in the palace at the Hague, consisting of

* Talleyrand wrote to the pensionary as follows: "The time has now arrived to complete the system of the internal and external policy of Holland, and to secure its independence (how cunning!) by a close and inseparable connexion with France. The coalition is desirous of restoring the house of Orange; means therefore must be taken to annihilate all the hopes of the friends of this house, by giving to the country a permanent constitution, which must be settled before a peace with England, in order not to disturb such a peace, which the Emperor wishes to be of long duration. The Emperor is anxious to negotiate confidentially on this subject with the pensionary of the council, and would be best pleased to see Admiral Verhuel."

† This is carried so far, that a man naturally so calm, intelligent, and classically educated as General Pelet, says in the "Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809," vol. i., p. 15: "L'Autriche avait été laissée trop forte au traité de Presbourg; où Napoleon a sacrifié trop aux protestations et aux vertus de l'Empereur François." This same General Pelet, in 1834, sat beside the author at table, in the house of his relation, Count Pelet (de la Lozère), and tried quietly to demonstrate to him, in all seriousness, that it was highly unjust that the left bank of the Rhine should have been again restored to Germany.

persons whom he called Dutch notables, members of the legislature, and of the council of state, and the ministers of the various departments, and encouraged them to offer a vigorous resistance, not to the thing itself, but to the supposition that they themselves were to solicit a foreigner for their king. The assembly resolved to send a deputation to Paris for the purpose of making representations. The members of this deputation consisted of Admiral Verhuel, Gogel, the minister of finance, Six, councillor of state, and Herr von Styrum, as one of the legislative body. When the arrival in Paris of the deputation, who were to be joined by Brantsen, and had received precise orders from the assembly in the Hague, was announced by Verhuel, the answer he received from Talleyrand was, that the Emperor would not receive them at all till they had acknowledged his brother as king. This intelligence having been communicated to the pensionary, he again summoned the notables to meet, and there resolved, on the 3rd of May, to empower the deputation to come to an agreement respecting a new constitution. To this agreement was given the form of a treaty between the plenipotentiaries of Holland and the Emperor, although, in fact, the conditions were prescribed in France, and only some very small changes admitted. Among the reasons premised as the grounds of this change, the first was, that in consideration of the general spirit and tendencies of European organisation, a hereditary sovereignty must necessarily be established in Holland. There are many reasons which would justify us in passing over this new constitution without any mention, and especially, because it was never regarded for a moment when its provisions interfered in any respect with the will or views of Napoleon. One thing alone deserves to be mentioned, that concessions were made to the Dutch which were by no means granted to the Germans and Italians, who looked upon servility and cringing as an honour. Amongst these concessions, we may mention the express determination that natives of Holland alone were to be admitted to any offices in the state; and the Dutch language was to be acknowledged and employed in all public affairs, and their national debt fully recognised. As, however, some of the high offices at court must necessarily be filled by foreigners, this difficulty was got over by the fact of the army belonging to the French; and the royal house was completely bound to France, by making the dignity of constable hereditary in the king's family, and by the Emperor's earnest recommendation to the king *never* to become a Dutchman. ("Ne cessez pas," said he, "d'être Français.") When the treaty was signed, and Louis recognised by the deputation as king, Napoleon required that the signatures of the deputation should be regarded as a ratification by the government. This they however refused to concede, and the treaty was therefore sent to the States General. Schimmelpennink did everything in his power to prevent the ratification; but when it was at least found better to yield to the force of circumstances, he honourably retired from his

office without giving his personal assent. King Louis arrived in Holland in June, 1806; Schimmelpennink was to be most honourably rewarded; but he declined all honours and presents, and retired to his estate. The blame of his having long since been obliged to give up public business, in consequence of complete blindness, has been ascribed to a French oculist, whom he had employed to please the Emperor.

A member of the Bonaparte family was also forced upon the Germans; but the Germans were never consulted upon the subject, as the Dutch had been; because, for centuries, they had been accustomed to cabinet decrees disposing of their lives, properties, and rights, without asking them any questions. We shall hereafter give an account of the manner in which Prussia, by virtue of treaties signed in Paris on the 15th of February and the 5th of March, ceded the duchies of Cleves and Wesel to Napoleon, after Bavaria had ceded that of Berg, and of the bestowal of these German principalities by Napoleon on his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat. By such means he got over the fulfilment of his promise that he would make no conquests on the right bank of the Rhine, and at the same time fully attained his object, for the new German grand-duke was to retain and bequeath as hereditary in his family the dignity of a grand-admiral of France, and, therefore, body and soul to belong to the French Empire. The decree of the 15th of March, by which Napoleon presented to his brother-in-law the territories ceded by Prussia and Bavaria, was announced from Cologne on the 21st of March, 1806; and as early as the 25th the Grand-duke Joachim made his public entry into Düsseldorf, with all that pomp, of which he was so ardent an admirer. Napoleon lent him a body of French troops. He himself, however, very soon afterwards withdrew again; but immediately caused a completely new state of things to be established in his territories, and practised all kinds of chicanery upon the King of Prussia, especially in reference to the abbeys of Essen and Werden. The Germans were benefited in so far by the new order of things, as they were relieved from the operation of the Roman and the so-called German law and cabinet justice, as well as from their feudal burdens, not by dissolution, but by measures of radical reform. Nor did the new French ruler abuse his sovereignty, as did the two new German kings. He did not abolish the estates of the country, but still allowed them to exist.

As to the two new Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Elector of Baden, it was already intimated, in the peace of Presburg, if not expressed in distinct language, that they were to become vassals of a new Gallo-German Empire; and two of them were obliged immediately to incorporate themselves with the Emperor's family; the third found it necessary, at a later period, to give his noble daughter in marriage to the thoroughly uneducated and extravagant Jerome Bonaparte. The approaching dissolution of the German

Empire, and the establishment of a Gallo-German union of the relations and vassals of Napoleon lay in the seventh article of the treaty of Presburg. By the sovereignty of the three princes therein determined, the old empire was, in fact, virtually dissolved, because its constitution and rights were incompatible with this sovereignty; whilst the fact of these princes remaining members of a German confederation gave indication of a new empire to be established under the protectorate of Napoleon. The marriage of the Princess Augusta Amalia of Bavaria with Napoleon's stepson, Eugène Beauharnais, whom he afterwards adopted, was celebrated in Munich immediately after the conclusion of the peace, on the 13th and 14th of January. This ceremony was performed in the presence of the Emperor and Empress, with all that splendour, luxury, and extravagance, which formed a part of Napoleon's policy. In order to abolish every recollection of simplicity and independence of republican usages and manner; in order that he might be surrounded with a court like Charlemagne or the Abassides, he demanded from his generals, and from all whom he favoured, the maintenance of a high degree of state, and a lavish expenditure. On the 7th of April following was celebrated the marriage of the Elector of Baden with Stephanie Beauharnais, the niece of the Empress, whom Bonaparte had adopted, as well as his wife's children by her former marriage. How deeply humbled on this occasion was the pride of the ancient houses of Wittelsbach and Zähringen!—in no respect through the marriage, for fools alone could regard that as a humiliation, but through the manner in which the Crown Prince of Bavaria and the Elector of Baden were to be initiated into the French principles of government, and by the language and form in which their appearance in the council of state was announced in the French journals. In the time of the republic, such a circumstance would have been undeserving of notice; but during the period of the Empire, when Bonaparte was anxious to renew all the ancient honours and privileges of nobility, it was revolting to the German mind publicly to place the descendants of races of heroes, honoured for many centuries in Germany, below his own ephemeral creatures, the men of the reign of terror. Under the pretence of being desirous of instructing them in the art of government (such, at least, is the reason given by Napoleon, in his letter written in August to the sister of the crown prince in Italy), he caused the crown prince, as well as the elector, to be present for a considerable time at the meetings of his council of state. This might have been very well, but he caused it to be announced in his journals, that, on these occasions the one sat *below* his *arch-chancellor*, and the other *below* his *arch-treasurer*. This was in the highest degree offensive. Both Cambacérès and Lebrun were men who had sprung from, and owed their elevation to, the revolution; both were indebted for their places to their servile submission to Napoleon; and although

Lebrun might be regarded as an estimable man, yet Cambacérès, notwithstanding his immense legal learning and sophistry, was entitled to no such commendation.

Moreover, in Baden at least, no abuse was made of the sovereignty which had been obtained—everything possible was done to lighten the burdens of the country, which, in consequence of its forming merely a narrow strip along the Rhine, suffered less than others from the quartering and passage of troops. The Knights of the Empire, the German order and those of St. John, who were delivered up to the power of the three vassals, suffered, it is true, also in Baden; but still they were far from being so brutally treated as in Wirtemberg. Their discontent and powerful influence afterwards contributed more than anything else to the liberation of Germany from the French, by whom they had been sacrificed. The old elector allowed the University of Freiburg still to remain, and however burdensome two universities were to his small country, he did his best, for the pleasure of the people of the palatinate, to restore Heidelberg to its former splendour, which it had completely lost in the 18th century. The French code was introduced, and the whole institutions of the state changed; the people, however, who were appointed to conduct the government, had no experience in public affairs, and one patent of organisation (as it was called) followed another, so that there was often the greatest uncertainty as to what was the really existing condition of things. In the mean time, however, the influence of the middle ranks increased, and the old elector, notwithstanding his numerous weaknesses, was respected throughout the whole of Europe.

In Bavaria, indeed, Maximilian Joseph, Montgelas, and their favourites, lived quite according to the most arbitrary discretion; of tyranny, however, there was really no reason to complain, for the king was good-natured and kind, and very far removed from that oriental mode of thinking and acting, which was characteristic of his neighbour, the King of Wirtemberg. The condition of the finances was truly miserable, and grew worse from year to year; but still light for a short time beamed on the darkness of Bavaria, for their financial embarrassments compelled the government to secularise all the rich ecclesiastical foundations, and under Charles Theodore a regular military government succeeded to the rule of ecclesiastics; experience, however, has since proved, that the souls of the Bavarians could just as little dispense with priests and monks as their bodies can relinquish the enjoyment of their celebrated beverage—beer. In the mean time, however, many improvements were really introduced. The misery of the country was, moreover, unspeakably great precisely at the period which immediately preceded the formation of the confederation of the Rhine, in consequence of the marches and quartering of the French army, which was scattered about in South Germany, and remained there, under the pretence of the disputes concerning Cattaro, but in reality to threaten Prussia.

The general need was so great, that corn was obliged to be sent to an agricultural country like Bavaria, and that Napoleon distributed something more than a million of francs among the suffering Swabians and Bavarians.

The King of Wirtemberg, one of the worst despots, in a country whose dukes, with very few, and therefore the more honourable, exceptions, have been notorious as oppressors of their subjects, immediately used his sovereign power for the destruction of his people. He abolished the estates, who were very burdensome to him, and yet far from being models for imitation; he rioted in luxury, hunted, and, in the midst of the greatest suffering and misery, employed himself in creating menageries and other costly vanities, which were solely for his own pleasure. Maximilian Joseph, too, abolished the estates; but they had, in fact, long before ceased to exist in reality; whereas, the Wirtemberg estates, on the other hand, had a real existence along with the prince, with a number of officers and attendants, and these were at least pensioned off by King Frederick when he began, immediately on the commencement of the year 1806, to treat the whole of his people as a mere appendage to his court. In order that he might be able to appear in the midst of a formal court, he blessed the small territory of Wirtemberg with a high and lower class of nobility, hitherto unknown. He raised a number of the servants of the state, and other favoured persons, to the simple rank of nobles, and made them barons, or even counts. He published an ordinance, in which the whole list of royal and princely titles of his house was minutely prescribed; and created magnificent ministers, with departments, for a country always easily governed hitherto by a chancellor and councillors, because these new creations sounded well: the whole hierarchy of officials was strictly regulated. The papers concerning these institutions are so drawn up, that every step and duty of the officers of government of the people are minutely prescribed, and the joyous, light-hearted Allemanians were constrained and drilled in all their movements in life like a regiment of soldiers. The King of Wirtemberg, moreover, was the only one among all the German princes who made any attempt to maintain his dignity, even against Napoleon and his generals, although with small success, because every officer considered it a point of honour to insult the vassals of his Emperor. We shall quote a single example, because it will be seen in what spirit the French met the German princes, even before the war with Prussia, and how Napoleon himself treated these new kings.

In order to guard against a conflict between two princes of the then still existing empire, Marshal Bernadotte took possession of Anspach with French troops, in the name of the King of Bavaria; the King of Prussia had been obliged to cede this territory, and thus the burdens of Bavaria were somewhat lightened. In order still more to ease the people, Davoust and Ney removed a portion of their troops into the territories of Wirtemberg and Baden, because these

had suffered comparatively less than Bavaria. The 30,000 Austrian prisoners were still also detained in Swabia, because Napoleon would not dismiss them till the settlement of the dispute concerning Cattaro. In April, the King of Wirtemberg complained bitterly to Davoust, and Davoust consulted Berthier on the subject, whose head-quarters were still in Munich. Berthier replied, "The country of Wirtemberg ought not to be spared more than the territory of other princes. The king owes the Emperor Napoleon too much, not to feel rejoiced at finding an opportunity of giving him some proof of his thankfulness." From that time the French commissioners, contractors, and other subordinates, pursued so oppressive a course of conduct, that the king at last wrote to Davoust that he would have recourse to force, and drive away the French agents by his own troops. Davoust and Berthier were greatly offended; and the latter not only issued orders to disarm every Wirtemberg soldier who should attempt to arrest a Frenchman, but he also wrote to Napoleon, and demanded satisfaction to be taken upon King Frederick for not having respected the wishes of the Emperor, to whom he owed everything. In a letter, afterwards printed, Napoleon fully approved of Berthier's conduct.* Another German vassal and idoliser of Napoleon—the arch-chancellor and primate of the old empire, filled with fear and dread the minds of all those Germans who had any feeling for the maintenance of their language and nationality, and knew nothing whatever of the approaching confederation of the Rhine, when he not only proposed to make one of the members of the Bonaparte family a German prince, but to place him at the head of the whole Catholic clergy of Germany. Carl von Dalberg, who shortly before the last war had addressed a singular half-poetical, half-prosaic letter to the German nation, with a view to rouse their patriotism, suddenly declared his intention of adopting Cardinal Fesch, the uncle of Napoleon, as his coadjutor—that is, in other words, he desired to make him not only primate of the German clergy, but to bestow upon him the principalities of Ratisbon and Aschaffenburg. On this occasion, the German emperor, whom the primate was still at least bound to acknowledge, was never consulted: his protestations and appeals against such a step were wholly in vain, and the nomination of Cardinal Fesch to the dignity of coadjutor was announced to the Diet in Ratisbon on the 27th of May. There did not exist a full chapter, but those ecclesiastics who called themselves the chapter were the ready tools of French intrigues, and on the 29th of May gave in their consent and offered their congratulations in an humble and grateful letter. That no doubt might be entertained, that the whole plan was concocted by the Arch-chancellor of France, and formed a part of the general scheme of bringing the whole people of Europe

* The Emperor writes: "Qu'il était satisfait de la fermeté qu'il avoit montrée dans cette circonstance, qu'en effet le Roi de Wurtemberg lui devait assez pour qu'il s'acquittât par quelques sacrifices, et qu'il ne devait pas être plus ménagé que les autres souverains."

under subjection to French princes, this letter was inserted in the *Moniteur*.

Darmstadt, which had done, and continued to do, everything in its power to give satisfaction to France, and the city of Frankfort, which gave such splendid and costly entertainments to the French generals and officers, and showed itself always ready to do what was demanded, were also obliged to feel the consequences of the battle of Austerlitz. They became conscious that they were merely tools in Napoleon's hands, and that both emperor and empire had lost all their importance, even before any declaration to that effect was issued. In order to please the Emperor of the French, Darmstadt had raised an army of 10,000 men, and was obliged to send this ill-paid and ill-fed force to assist the French in their operations against the Emperor of Germany; and yet, notwithstanding this, Augereau, with his division, took up his quarters in the territory of Darmstadt as early as January, and expressly declared, that both soldiers and officers, without regard to the peace or their alliance, must be supported at the expense of the country. Augereau's division, indeed, marched to Frankfort, but Lefebvre, with his, came in their stead. A contribution of no less than four millions of francs was laid upon the city of Frankfort, under the absurd pretence that the traders of Frankfort were in close connexion with England, and formed the channel for the distribution and sale of English merchandise in and through Germany.

B.—CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ TO PRUSSIA, TILL JULY, 1806.

Every one saw, what even the French writers of our own days, who do not regard it as an act of patriotism to write in the old tone, readily admit, that after the agreement of the 3rd of November, and the threatening measures adopted as its result, the King of Prussia had no other resource than to comply with the wish of the Emperor of Russia, and to send his Silesian army, which was ready for the field, to Bohemia against Baraguay d'Hilliers. Those, too, who knew Napoleon best, were persuaded that he would never rest till he had trodden down and humiliated Prussia; if, however, the Prussians had appeared in Bohemia, the Russians would not have been in such a hurry with the battle of Austerlitz. We have already mentioned that the opponents of Hardenberg and the patriotic party had succeeded in bringing the king, who to the end loved the middle path, and favoured a timid policy, to such a point, that he not only selected Haugwitz for his mission to the French headquarters, but gave him the most indefinite instructions instead of those definite demands, which by virtue of the agreement of the 3rd of November, he was bound to have preferred. The French ambassador in Berlin fully informed his master of these things, and added, as we now learn from published extracts from

his letters, that the old field-marshall, who should have been the very one to have counselled action, had given his advice in favour of treating and writing. We subjoin this passage of the letter, because it furnishes us with the reason why Napoleon from that time cherished the idea of being able to do what he pleased with Prussia.* No one, moreover, suspected, what probably Haugwitz and his party knew perfectly well, that the whole military department of the state was in an incomprehensibly bad condition: this first became obvious at the end of 1806. It was believed that even the garrison of Berlin and the hospital department had received marching orders, that magazines were everywhere collected, the fortresses in good condition, and everything ready for war. Lord Harrowby had come to Berlin and made the most splendid offers; but it was impossible to prevail upon the king to take a bold step, at the very moment in which he might have had the aid of the Russian army retiring from Austria, of the combined Russian, English, and Swedish army in Hanover, and of large subsidies from England; Haugwitz was again obliged to help him out. Haugwitz's design was to betray every one without loss to himself, as we shall presently prove, because, in a conversation with Gentz, at a later period, he made a merit of his disloyalty. He did not suspect that the French saw through him, and that they, as well as the Russians, the English, and the German people, felt towards him the deepest contempt. His selfish cunning completely ruined Prussia at a time when there were still hopes of deliverance.

Haugwitz did not hurry himself in the execution of a commission in which everything depended upon promptitude. He suffered himself to be kept back by Bernadotte, to whom Napoleon had given instructions to that effect, from continuing his journey to Brünn, under the pretence that the head-quarters were about to be changed to Iglau; and in this way he was detained by all sorts of arts and delays, and did not arrive in Brünn till the 28th of November. Both the emperors heard of his arrival; and when Savary came to the Emperor Alexander, before the battle of Austerlitz, the latter wished to send his minister Novosilzoff with Savary to Brünn, in order to unite with Haugwitz in making proposals for a peace: Napoleon, however, frustrated this design. Savary forbade Novosilzoff's mission, and Napoleon did not receive Haugwitz till after the victory of Austerlitz, on the 7th of December. Haugwitz then made no mention of the real objects of his mission; he only congratulated the Emperor on his victory, and made a general offer of Prussian mediation. In order to delay matters till the mediation

* Laforest writes, that Möllendorf had said: "Puisque le Comte Haugwitz était allé soumettre à l'Empereur Napoléon les bases de la pacification, l'équité demandait d'attendre ses premières lettres. D'ailleurs les armées prussiennes n'avaient point achevé leurs mouvements de concentration; il y aurait de la témérité à se prononcer immédiatement; il importait absolument de gagner plusieurs semaines."

should fall away of itself, Napoleon offered to accept it, on conditions which Haugwitz was first obliged to communicate to his court; whilst, however, the answer was coming, Napoleon had time to complete his arrangements with Austria. The conditions were so drawn up, that the Emperor of the French gained time in the north without sacrificing anything whatever in the south. He demanded from Prussia that she should prevent the English or Russians from undertaking anything against Holland from the Prussian side, and that a large space around the fortress should be evacuated for the benefit of the French garrison in Hameln, in order to enable the troops to get supplies. Before, however, Major Pfuhl arrived with an answer from Berlin, Haugwitz suffered himself to be so harassed, that Prussia was exposed to contempt in the eyes of the whole world.*

The news of the victory of Austerlitz, as Napoleon learned from Laforest's letters, had the effect of again throwing the Prussian court completely into the power of the French party; and not only Lombard, but even the Duke of Brunswick, took all imaginable pains to persuade the French ambassador that there never had been any serious intention of forming an alliance with other powers with a view to counteract the French love of conquest. The king was very far from prescribing a becoming earnestness to his minister in his negotiations with Napoleon, for this could only have been observed had he accepted the means offered to him by England and Russia, in order to be able to begin a struggle with better hopes of success than he was in a condition afterwards to do in September. Lord Harrowby had come to Berlin to offer considerable subsidies, the Emperor of Russia had sent Prince Dolgorucki, who was afterwards followed by the Grand-Duke Constantine, to place the Russian army in Silesia and that in Mecklenburg at the disposal of the king. As to Lombard's conversation with Laforest, we give his words below. They themselves give the best evidence of the tone of that unprincipled set to which he belonged, and of the miserable way in which they obstructed all useful and honourable measures.†

* Here again we must express our regret that Napoleon always prefers boasting to truth. His version is, that he would not listen to Haugwitz, but immediately referred him to Talleyrand. We do not see why the account given in the text is not as honourable to him as the other; nor do we see why Hardenberg, from whose note to Lord Harrowby we have taken the passage, should have given a false account of the matter.

† Laforest states that Lombard had declared to him, in the name of the king, "que sans doute il aurait pu se trouver accidentellement dans le cas d'épouser la cause de l'Autriche, s'il avait été possible que l'Empereur Napoléon eût conjuré la perte de cette couronne; mais la pensée du roi s'était toujours refusée à admettre une telle supposition. La convention, que l'Empereur Alexandre lui avait arrachée avait pu être l'ouvrage d'une machination irrésistible, mais la pensée sécrète ressortait du contraste qui s'était fait remarquer entre les ordres officiels et la lenteur calculée des préparatifs. Il y avait eu plan sur plan, mouvement sur mouvement; en résultat, on n'avait cherché qu'à gagner du temps, sans faire sortir un seul bataillon des frontières. On devait au roi la justice de penser qu'il n'eût pas agi ainsi, s'il avait eu l'intention de faire la guerre à la France. On en savait assez à

The Duke of Brunswick held similar language, but did not go so far as to allege that Prussia would only have felt itself impelled to action had there been a manifest intention *wholly* to annihilate Austria. He said that Prussia had only felt desirous of lending assistance to Austria, in case the latter state should be called upon to make sacrifices calculated to endanger its future safety; that the king, however, was of opinion that the emperor might cede his Swabian possessions without danger, and must also acknowledge the present state of things in Italy, which was the same as it had been before the war. That fears were indeed entertained that France might also demand a part of the Tyrol, or of the Venetian provinces, but, added the duke, and truly not much to his honour, even this would furnish no reason for Prussia to fulfil, if it were still called upon to do so, the promise which she had previously made to the Emperors of Germany and Russia.

Before anything was known of Haugwitz's second audience, Hardenberg offered to the Russian and English ministers to grant an asylum to the English and Russian troops on Prussian territory, should Hanover be again taken possession of by the French. Whilst negotiations were going on for the evacuation of Hanover, in order to make way for the French, Napoleon had extorted from Haugwitz, by threats, his agreement to an alliance, offensive and defensive, between Prussia and France. As soon as the cowardice and apprehensions of the Prussians were made known to Napoleon by Laforest's letters, and his negotiations with Austria had proceeded to a certain extent, he received the Prussian minister on his second audience, on the 13th of December, in Schönbrunn, in a spirit very different from that in which he had received him on his first, at Saruschitz.

On the 13th, Napoleon addressed to Haugwitz the vehement language which will be found in Thibaudeau;* we very much doubt, however, of the truth of his having given the blunt answer, which is recorded in all books, to Haugwitz, in reply to his congratulations on the victory of Austerlitz, or of his having been unwise enough to have alleged that he knew that this compliment had previously been intended to have a very different direction. Napoleon was by far too much accustomed first to draw into his snares those whom he wished to destroy, to insult his creature the Prussian minister, and to alarm the king, as early as the 7th, when the negotiations with Austria were only just commenced. This is corroborated by the 34th bulletin, whose date is precisely of the same day as that on which Haugwitz's audience, just referred to, took place. In this bulletin, in which Napoleon's

Berlin pour avoir compris, qu'après le passage du Rhin il y avait des jointures, par où il eût été facile de porter des coups funestes à l'armée française. Si on ne l'avait pas fait, c'était donc, que le roi ne l'avait pas voulu."

* "Le Consulat et l'Empire," par A. O. Thibaudeau. Paris, Reneuard, 1831. Empire, vol. ii., p. 54.

hand is easily recognised, he mentions the names of all those upon whom he can reckon in reference to the weak king. He there praises the right-mindedness and great wisdom of the king, the great political ability of Haugwitz, of the Duke of Brunswick, of Möllendorf, Knobelsdorf, and Lombard, councillors of state, who all understood admirably how to defeat and counteract the intrigues of England. To these diplomatic sentences he does not, indeed, fail to subjoin a military phrase, after his own peculiar fashion: “Even although the Prussians should have declared themselves,” says the bulletin, “no other effect would be produced by the avowal of 150,000 additional enemies, than a temporary prolongation of the war; happily, however, all intrigues were frustrated by the great wisdom of the King of Prussia.” Napoleon’s conduct towards Prussia was the same as it had always been towards states whose overthrow he had sworn—he first drew it towards himself, in order to isolate it, and then by degrees brought forward his own peculiar views. In pursuing his object, such men as Haugwitz, Lombard, Lucchesini, Beyme, and Zastrow, were most suitable tools, because they, and especially the first three, thought themselves quite matches for Talleyrand at intrigue.

At his first audience, on the 7th of December, Haugwitz was consoled; at the second, on the 13th, in Schönbrunn, he was bullied, but in such a manner, that his politics were praised, whilst those of his opponents were virulently abused. The Emperor commenced with politeness and in a complimentary strain, which was manifestly intended for Haugwitz and his party, and then proceeded, in the tone so well known in his bulletins, to speak of the part which Prussia had played in recent events. The whole of his outbreaks were rude and offensive, although it is impossible to deny that all his reproaches were true. Napoleon concluded his vehement language by words which no one but Haugwitz would have patiently submitted to hear, and made proposals, or rather issued commands, in a manner precisely similar to that in which the English Governor-General of India recently treated the conquered Sikhs. Napoleon said in express terms to the representative of the King of Prussia, “I could, if I had pleased, have taken signal vengeance upon Prussia for the many acts of treachery which she has done towards me,—I could have taken possession of Silesia—restored Poland—and inflicted a blow upon Prussia from which she never would have recovered. I prefer, however, to forget the past, and to act magnanimously. I am ready to overlook these things, on condition that Prussia forthwith forms an indissoluble alliance with France, and, as a pledge of this alliance, makes an exchange with me for Hanover.” We leave it to our readers to find in Lefebvre, whose account is founded upon documents, the details of the miserable acts by which Napoleon urged on Haugwitz (as he did the Count St. Julian in 1800) to a step of which no one ever dreamt in Berlin, and for which he had no powers. According to his well-known fashion,

Napoleon one while flattered the minister whom he deeply despised, and sometimes ventured boldly to say that Prussia had only now to choose between an alliance and war. Talleyrand, together with all the marshals, afterwards frightened the miserable intriguer with the representation that the French were about immediately to advance into Silesia, then destitute of troops. Within two days he yielded, without taking much time for reflection—or without even negotiating. This appears from his signing, on the 15th of December, after a single day and two nights, not a treaty agreed upon as it were between him and Talleyrand, but one laid before him by Duroc, marshal of the palace, as an unchangeable law.

By virtue of this treaty, which Haugwitz signed at the very moment when his king and master had, on account of the pledge required at the first audience for the mediation of Prussia, made very different arrangements with England and Russia, France made over its right to Hanover, which was no right, to Prussia; whilst in return Prussia left Anspach and Bayreuth to Bavaria, which in its turn ceded the duchy of Berg to France. In addition to this, Prussia relinquished Neufchatel and the duchy of Cleves, together with the fortress of Wesel, to the Emperor of the French. We have already observed that Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat, obtained the provinces ceded by Prussia on the Lower Rhine, under the title of the Grand Duchy of Berg. Berthier was created Prince of Neufchatel—the son of a keeper of the palace of Versailles was made chief of the haughtiest aristocracy—emulating in their pretensions the pride of the patricians of Berne or Lucca. Prussia, it was said, gained thereby 600,000 souls, because the provinces ceded by it contained only 400,000, whilst Hanover counted a million of inhabitants. The continued possession of Hanover, however, was in no respects guaranteed; for a peace must at last be made with England, and England could not conclude a peace without the restoration of the electorate to her royal family. Haugwitz having signed the treaty, Laforest, the French ambassador, was obliged to declare in Berlin that Prussia could only be put in *actual* possession of Hanover when all the enemies of the French—the English, Russians, and Swedes—had left Northern Germany, and commenced their return to their respective countries. The treaty of the 15th of December has never, as far as we know, been printed in any collection of treaties, but it probably also contains the consent of Prussia to recognise, if not the dissolution of the empire, yet the other sacrifices imposed upon the Emperor of Austria by the peace of Presburg, concluded ten days afterwards.

In this way Haugwitz was used not only to deprive Prussia of principalities which were among the hereditary possessions of the house of Hohenzollern, but to compel Austria to accept unconditionally whatever was prescribed by Napoleon. The conditions of the peace of Presburg were not set forth by Talleyrand till after the conclusion of the treaty with Prussia, in which those conditions

were already recognised by Haugwitz: they had been verbally communicated by Napoleon to the Emperor of Germany at Saruschitz. Haugwitz, on his journey back to Berlin, met Major Pfuhl, who was the bearer of fresh instructions for his guidance in reference to Napoleon's proposals of the 7th of December. He took the major back with him, because, after the treaty which he had signed, and the conclusion of the peace of Presburg, the question of mediation was of course at an end.

Haugwitz himself felt the full force of what he had done; he saw beforehand that Hardenberg would never consent to the loss of the principalities in Franconia, which he still assiduously watched over from Berlin; he therefore neither despatched courier nor letter to give intelligence of the treaty which had been concluded on the 15th of December. The king was not informed of the fact till the 25th of the same month, and then by Haugwitz in person. He was astounded when he read the treaty, not because he at once became fully aware of all its consequences, but because, without wishing or willing it, he found himself all at once removed from his old vacillating middle position, and compelled to a determinate end. At the time of Haugwitz's return, Lord Harrowby and Jackson, as representatives of the English government, were in Berlin, and engaged in urging the weak-minded king to follow the counsels of the patriotic and bolder members of his council; but although the English ministers were assisted strenuously by the Swedish minister, by Prince Dolgorucki, and by the Grand-Duke Constantine, who had also come to Berlin, the king could only be persuaded to adopt a new half measure.

With respect to the facts of this case, though not to his opinions, we think that every reliance may be placed upon the letters of the French ambassador Laforest, because they entirely concur with all that we know of the history of the Prussian court and cabinet. Instead of ratifying the treaty unconditionally, if there was really a determination to maintain peace at all cost, or of rejecting it absolutely if there was an intention of forming an alliance with England, Sweden, and Russia, bidding defiance to the threats of Napoleon, and, if necessary, taking the field, it was resolved to ratify the treaty, with a reserve. This reservation was to consist in taking possession of Hanover only for a time, because Hardenberg placed in the clearest light the haste and indiscretion of which Haugwitz had been guilty in ceding provinces against the possession of which there was neither claim nor objection to be raised, in exchange for a country which could never be either justly or securely held without the consent of its rightful hereditary sovereigns. The king himself had at that time so little suspicion of the approaching dissolution of the German Empire, that he was desirous of the subsequent introduction of an article in the treaty of the 15th of December, to the effect that the electoral dignity of Hanover should be transferred to Brunswick Wolfenbuttel. The king then, with the above-mentioned reserva-

tion, ratified the treaty—that is, he added to the ratification, by way of explanation, the points agreed upon as necessary in the assembly of his council. The French ambassador was at first unwilling to receive it in this form, and when he did accept it, declared that he did so only on condition that if the Emperor was not satisfied with a ratification accompanied by such reserves, it should be considered as null.

This alarmed the king anew, and it was resolved to send Haugwitz himself to Paris with a letter from the king, in which he recommends his representative, although the latter concluded this scandalous treaty, and therefore could not be much inclined to press for essential alterations in its terms, as a man possessing his whole confidence.* Without waiting for the result, Prussia immediately acted thereon, as if there could be no doubt that Napoleon would unhesitatingly accept the reservations appended to the treaty of alliance offensive and defensive. The king caused to be communicated to the English, and to Count Munster, who was at the head of affairs in Hanover, what was also expressed by Count Schulerberg-Kehnert in the patent whereby possession was to be taken, "That Hanover was to be taken under Prussian protection and administration only till the conclusion of a general peace." The Prussian divisions were now disbanded, as if everything was over, and removed to their old permanent quarters, whilst those of France still remained together in a threatening attitude on the Maine and in South Germany. Sweden, England, and Russia, were called upon by Prussia to withdraw their troops from Hanover and Lauenburg. When Haugwitz arrived in Paris, Napoleon was already informed that England and Russia were indignant at the occupation of Hanover by Prussian troops, and that it had disbanded its armies from an ill-timed principle of economy. He knew, besides, perfectly well with whom he had to do, and how he might deal with Haugwitz. He therefore played the bully, as he was accustomed to do with people such as Haugwitz, the Prince of the Peace, and those of their stamp. He used severe language, and threatened the downfall of Prussia. A few days, however, after this first stormy audience, Talleyrand announced to the count, that as the treaty of the 15th of December had not been ratified within the specified term, the Emperor would consider it as not concluded, and caused another to be submitted to him.

This treaty, or, more properly speaking, law, which Haugwitz was required to sign unconditionally, was afterwards laid before

* "M. mon frère, le Comte de Haugwitz, aura l'honneur de remettre à V. M. cette lettre, et d'acquitter envers elle la dette de confiance que m'imposent nos nouveaux rapports. Qui, mieux que lui, peut mettre la dernière main à ce qui fut son ouvrage ? Honoré de vos bontés à Vienne, j'espère qu'il aura le bonheur de l'être à Paris. Il sera interprète des derniers veux qui me restent à faire depuis que nos intérêts sont les mêmes. Il connaît ma manière de voir sur tous les objets que nous engagements laissent en suspens. Je prie V. M. de l'écouter avec confiance, ne doutant pas que sa mission ne resserre les liens qui nous unissent."

him by Duroc. Its conditions speak the feelings and contempt of Napoleon for Prussia in such unmistakeable language, that every one who had observed his mode of conduct, from that time despaired of Prussia, and consequently of Germany. The territory of 20,000 souls, with which Prussia was to be compensated for Anspach, by virtue of the treaty of the 15th December, was no longer mentioned; on the other hand, demands were made in this treaty which were not contained in the former one. Prussia was now required to assume a decidedly hostile attitude towards England, and to shut the Weser, the Elbe, and the Ems, against all English trade. This requirement was not made in a courtly or friendly tone, but Count Haugwitz was obliged to submit to receive it, accompanied by threats against non-compliance. He was told, that if he refused to subscribe this new treaty, the French troops would be immediately put in motion against Prussia. The count made no hesitation of signing this most shameful treaty on the 15th of February, 1806, and sent his worthy compeer, the Marquis Lucchesini, to work out its ratification in Berlin. This ratification eventually took place; but Napoleon did not wait till it was done. As early as the 21st of February Bernadotte took possession of Anspach for Bavaria; Oudinot, of Neufchatel for Berthier; and Murat, Wesel and Cleves for himself. On this occasion the king did what was extremely offensive to the French, and even to the Germans, by taking a journey to Stettin, on the 3rd of March, expressly for the purpose of doing honour to the Russians, by reviewing them on their return to their country; and yet, on the 9th of March, he ratified the treaty forced upon his minister, Haugwitz, and which bound him to adopt hostile measures against England and Russia. It was difficult to know what to conclude from the fact of Prussia's having on the one hand closed her ports against England, and having, on the evacuation of Hameln by the French, taken military possession of Hanover; and, on the other, endeavouring to retain the friendship of Russia, and being treated with favour by the English, even after the 28th. On the assumption of a hostile attitude by Prussia against England, the latter appeared disposed to have recourse to reprisals, for they caused the Prussian rivers and coasts to be blockaded, and laid an embargo upon all Prussian ships in their harbours; contrary, however, to the usual practice of the English, they delayed its execution for fourteen days, so that in the mean time all the Prussian ships reached safe quarters.

General Count Schulenberg-Kehnert, who shortly before had declared that he took possession of Hanover only till the conclusion of a general peace, issued a new proclamation on the 1st of April, in which he formally, and for ever, took possession of Hanover in the name of his king, because the King of Prussia had received the country in exchange from the French, to whom it belonged by right of conquest. On this, neither the Hanoverian nor the English government could any longer remain silent. The declaration of

both governments placed the miserable and cowardly policy of Prussia in such a light as to destroy all possible confidence of the smaller powers in its king and cabinet. Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and their comrades, consoled the King of Prussia for the Gallo-German union which Napoleon was about to establish in the south and west of Germany, under the name of the confederation of the Rhine, with an idea, thrown out by the French, but never executed, of a Prussian protectorate to be established in North Germany. The dear-bought possession of Hanover became very uncertain as early as April and May, 1806, when Napoleon commenced negotiations with Fox. Pitt died on the 23rd of January, 1806, and George III. found no one who was able to keep together a ministry except Pitt's former colleague, Grenville. Grenville, who had undertaken the formation of a new ministry, had previously refused to resume his former place under Pitt, because the king, in order to exclude his mortal enemy, Fox, from office, would not give his assent to a union of the Whigs and Tories, on which Grenville insisted. The king was now, however, obliged to yield to circumstances: after a period of twenty years he was obliged to admit into his councils the man who had so abused and annoyed him in the North American war, for Grenville insisted that Fox must become a member of the administration. For the last session of Parliament, Fox, as well as Grenville, as members of the opposition, had deeply offended the fanatical and Anglican king, by bringing forward the question of Catholic emancipation, to which the king was bitterly opposed. Fox was known as a friend to the principles of the revolution; he and his friends were also spoken of with praise in Bonaparte's journals, though they bitterly abused the English and Pitt. As early, therefore, as the end of March, a correspondence was commenced between Fox and Talleyrand. This correspondence originated, it is true, in an occurrence merely accidental, and had no political object; but it served to open up the way for the commencement of negotiations concerning a peace.

Napoleon's purpose, of driving Prussia from its position as one of the great powers of Europe, disposed him, in May, more than ever to draw England to himself, and to come to a complete breach with Prussia: Talleyrand, therefore, was all concession towards Fox, and showed himself ready, at all events, to negotiate with Russia also. Among the English who had been detained in Verdun during the war by Napoleon, was Lord Yarmouth: by Napoleon's desire he returned to London, there received instructions, came again to Paris, and found means to remove the difficulty which arose respecting the participation of Russia in the negotiations. There came at length to be merely the question concerning Hanover and Sicily to arrange, in order afterwards to be able to enter upon the terms of a treaty. On the 13th of June Lord Yarmouth announced to the English secretary of state—"That Talleyrand had stated to him, that, since such extreme stress was laid by England on the question of Hanover, no difficulty would be raised on that point." This declaration was as

much as to say, that in case of resistance, Prussia could and would be obliged to relinquish Hanover; and the declaration was accidentally made almost at the same time as England (June 11th) had at last unwillingly felt herself constrained to issue a vehement declaration of war against Prussia.

About the middle of June, the period at which we shall again take up the thread of the history, the situation of Russia was in the highest degree critical. It had quite unconditionally fallen into the hands of the French, because, since the conclusion of the treaty of the 15th of February, the whole direction of affairs had been under the guidance of Haugwitz, Lombard, and their associates. The country had sunk so deep, that even the King of Sweden, notwithstanding his insanity, was allowed with impunity to bid defiance to the Prussian power. As to the direction of Russian affairs, Napoleon, after the conclusion of the treaty, forced his creature Haugwitz upon the King of Prussia, in the same manner as he had before extorted the signature of the treaty from Haugwitz. The kind of politics, however, which this dishonest minister pursued, may be best learned from an account, which Gentz has left behind him, of a conversation which he had with him on the 5th of October, 1806, in the camp at Weimar. He there said, without any feeling of hesitation or shame, that he and his party had been falsely accused of favouring Napoleon and his plans, whereas their object had been above all things to deceive all the other powers, and France especially; and that, by the force of circumstances, this line of conduct had become their duty. That they had been long convinced that *Napoleon* and *peace* were contradictory terms, and therefore had wished for merely the shadow of a peace. It was a man, who after this fashion scoffed at honesty, fidelity, and his pledged word and honour, who obtained the whole direction of the political affairs of Prussia, when Napoleon, according to his usage, attacked Hardenberg, and the king proved weak and cowardly enough to submit to his demands.

As early as his 34th bulletin, Napoleon, speaking with the highest commendation of Haugwitz, says of Hardenberg (the minister of Prussia), that it was impossible to speak of him with the same respect or good feeling as of Haugwitz—for that *Hardenberg, being born in Hanover, was not inaccessible to the golden rain.* Orders were afterwards sent to the French minister in Berlin, desiring him to have no communications with Hardenberg whatever, to make none to him, and to receive none from him.

The king, however, still retained him in the ministry, and the attacks in the *Moniteur* were continued. Hardenberg replied to the latest of these attacks in the *Court Journal* of the 31st of March, and his reply was couched in so vehement a tone, that the Zastrows and Möllendorfs filled the king's mind with dread of the Emperor of the French; and, through his fear of war, he resolved to sacrifice his minister. On the 1st of April it was announced in the *Court Journal*, “That the minister Von Hardenberg had requested permis-

sion to withdraw from public affairs, and had in consequence received the king's assent. That Count Haugwitz was now the sole cabinet minister by whom the affairs of the state would in future be conducted." During the night which followed this announcement, the people broke Haugwitz's windows to show their hatred of him, as the head of the French party, to which the whole business of the state was now entrusted: Prince Louis Ferdinand was probably not wholly free from blame in this outrage. The dispute with Sweden was disgraceful to the King of Prussia, without being either honourable to Gustavus IV., or advantageous to his kingdom.

When, in virtue of the first agreement with France (of the 15th of December), Prussia took possession of Hanover, and measures were adopted for the withdrawal and embarkation of the Hanoverian and English troops, and the return of the Russians to their own country, Gustavus took the most singular steps. Von Bildt, the Swedish ambassador, was first obliged to announce to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon, on the 13th of January, 1806, "That in consequence of the numerous illegal acts which several of the estates committed against the constitution of the empire, and as usurpation exercised a decisive influence upon all its deliberations and conclusions, the King of Sweden would no longer take any part in its consultations." Previous to this the king had issued a proclamation from Lüneburg, announcing that he would yield to the Prussians (as the English, Prussians and Hanoverians had done), but would defend the territories of his ally against them. This offensive note was indeed sent back by the Diet, and the king found it advisable to allow his troops to retire beyond the Elbe, but he desired them to remain in the territory of Lauenburg. Prussia having taken definitive possession of Hanover on the 1st of April, the Swedes were required to evacuate Lauenburg. Count Lowenheim, however, declared on the 13th of April to the Prussian commander in Hanover and the Mark, that he had received orders to protect Lauenburg by force of arms, because the King of Sweden had guaranteed to the King of England the possession of the country north of the Elbe. This led to a war between Sweden and Prussia, which was in reality no war, but served to destroy Prussia completely in the public opinion. Sweden was suffered with impunity to insult Prussia, at the very same time that Napoleon threw all sorts of contempt upon it in his bulletins and in his journals, and Hardenberg was punished because he returned a sharp answer, and when Fox, in his speeches in Parliament and in the English declarations, placed the miserable and contemptible character of the Prussian policy in a clearer light, and with bitterer and keener language, than that employed by Napoleon himself.

The whole of this Swedish war was limited to a skirmish, because the Prussians did not wish to excite Russia, and at the same time had no desire to deal honestly with the French. Two thousand Prussians were sent across the Elbe, and would have had a serious

affair with 400 Swedes who were at Seefeld, but they had taken very good care not to cut them off, and to leave open for them a way to retreat, so that in fact they merely drove them out of Lauenburg. On this occasion Gustavus IV. showed far less hesitation in treating the Prussians with hostility, than Frederick William III. had shown with regard to the Swedes. He laid an embargo on all the Prussian ships in his harbours; and in a note which he caused to be delivered to the Diet in Ratisbon, on the 13th of May, he declared that Prussia had broken the peace of the country. He sent a part of his fleet to sea, and closely blockaded the Prussian harbours, especially those of Memel, Danzig, and Pillau. Prussia adopted no serious measures even after these open hostilities: she applied for the intervention and mediation of Russia, which, however, failed in consequence of the obstinacy of the unfortunate King of Sweden. From that time forward Sweden and Prussia remained in hostile array against each other on the frontiers of Pomerania. Although the blockade in the Baltic was raised at the request of Russia, Sweden and Prussia continued till after the battle of Jena in a relation which was very favourable to Napoleon's plans, for had they been on friendly terms, the remnant of the Prussian army defeated at Jena might have found an asylum and reinforcements in Pomerania. The unfortunate condition of King Gustavus, who was neither absolutely insane nor *compos mentis*, not only appeared in these transactions, but also in the tyrannical decrees which he issued out of hatred to Napoleon, and in his conduct in Pomerania. Whilst he declared himself against the dissolution of the German Empire, even at the very moment in which the Emperor of Germany had announced it, and laid down his dignity, he annihilated the constitution which he himself had guaranteed to Pomerania, and attempted to force upon the province the unconditional acceptance of Swedish laws and Swedish tribunals. But the more proofs of insanity were manifested by the King of Sweden, the more discreditable was it for Prussia to suffer herself for nine months to be treated by him with every sort of insult and contempt.

C.—CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ TO ITALY.

In Italy, after the battle of Austerlitz, the unnatural union of the legal tribunals, and other institutions of the revolution, with a military autocracy, and the usages of feudal times, were much more consequently carried out than in Germany. According to the new system, the seat of a European Empire was to be established in Paris, to which the whole continent was to be in subjection. No one was from thenceforward to reign and to be secure on his throne, unless he was some blood relation of Bonaparte, or some obedient vassal whom he had bound to himself by the ties of marriage, or at least by birth

a Frenchman. The kings of the new Empire, even although Napoleon's brothers,* continued to be his servants, and were required to attach greater importance to the maintenance and promotion of French interests and French views, than to the well-being of their subjects. Generals, officers, soldiers, diplomatists, and creatures of all kinds were to be fed upon the marrow of all countries, and their crimes to be regarded as the virtues of heroes. And when we now know this, who will blame the French for considering Napoleon as their deliverer, and for worshipping him as the idol of French interests and claims?

That this policy affected the spoiling of all Europe will hereafter appear most clearly from his conduct towards Spain and Portugal, but may be made obvious enough from a very brief notice of the arrangements which Napoleon made after the battle of Austerlitz, in Italy. We shall commence with Upper Italy, although the steps against the pope, and the establishment of a Bonapartist French Empire in Naples, together with what took place contemporaneously in Germany, exhibited more strikingly the arrogance of this military dominion. We have mentioned above the manner in which Napoleon provided for his brother-in-law, his uncle, and the chief of his staff in Germany and Switzerland; we must therefore first refer to that in which he provided princely titles and revenues for other Frenchmen. The Venetian provinces ceded by the Emperor of Austria to the French were incorporated with the kingdom of Italy as early as the 1st of May, 1806. The whole nature of the kingdom of Italy and its institutions are at once clear, from the fact that Eugène Beauharnais, a Frenchman, was appointed viceroy, and that even he did not govern the country, but Napoleon himself, from Paris, through the instrumentality of other Frenchmen whom we have already named. Dauchi, councillor of state, was sent to the Venetian provinces as general administrator of domains and finance, and everything was managed after the French fashion. The Code Napoleon, the French system of money, and the concordat with the pope, were all announced as fundamental laws. So far all sounded excellently, as these were both suitable and advantageous, but they were combined with other measures which were in the highest degree injurious. Dalmatia, Croatia, Istria, Friuli, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo, were raised to the rank of duchies, and declared to be grand fiefs of France. These duchies were afterwards shared amongst those who had been, and were, most active in the establishment and mainte-

* Even Maret (Duc de Bassano) admitted to the author of this history, that the Emperor had shown himself too weak in his leaning towards his family. How miserable is the language (even if employed) which Napoleon is said to have employed in St. Helena as a defence of his conduct; that he wished to rely for support upon his family—that is, upon a Louis, Joachim, Jerome, and Joseph, upon Borghese, Elisa, and Eugène Beauharnais, against the nations and their princes! The words are: “Je sentais mon isolement, je jetais de tous côtés des ancras de salut, au fond de la mer. Quels appuis plus naturels pour moi que mes proches?”

nance of the Napoleon Empire. The Emperor of the French was to confer the investiture of this fief upon the heirs according to primogeniture; and on the extinction of heirs male, the fief was to revert to the crown. The revenue of the nine dukes was to be formed of the fifteenth part of the revenues of the Venetian provinces and the rents of the national estates, valued at 30,000,000 of francs. In addition to this a yearly sum of 1,200,000 was allotted to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the army, and fixed as a permanent debt upon the country. The kingdom of Italy, moreover, was to furnish a monthly contribution of 2,500,000 francs for the pay of the French troops in Italy. The Emperor, having already provided for one of his sisters in Italy, made an arrangement, as early as the 30th of March, concerning Guastalla, in favour of the other; and gave her this petty state, as it is stated in the patent, in full sovereignty (*pour en jouir en toute propriété et souverainté*). Her husband, the Prince Borghese (who, in comparison with her, was a very secondary person) was to bear the title of Duke and Prince of Guastalla, and the principality was to descend to his heirs male, on whose extinction it, too, was to revert to the crown. Pauline and the Prince Borghese retained the title; the kingdom of Italy was obliged to purchase from them the territory of Guastalla, under condition that they, with the money paid for the duchy by the Italians, should purchase other estates, which were to be held on the same conditions as those determined upon for the duchy.

Elisa Baciochchi, too, was no longer contented with Lucca and Piombino after the victory of Austerlitz; she wished for an extension of territory, and her brother, whose readiness to comply with the desires of his family was his greatest weakness, gratified her wish. The duchies of Massa and Cararra, and the district of Garfagnana, as far as the sources of the Serchio, were torn away from the kingdom of Italy and united with the principality of Lucca. This principality, too, was raised to the dignity of a duchy, and made a great fief of the Empire. The fifteenth part of the revenue which the Prince of Lucca was to derive from the districts separated from the kingdom of Italy was to be regarded as the proper income of the fief. In this case, also, the Emperor reserved more than 4,000,000 of francs in domains which lay within the new duchy and principality of Lucca, and above 200,000 francs yearly from the exchequer, to be able to appropriate them in favour of the generals, officers, and soldiers of his army.

Caroline, Queen of Naples, by an act of imprudence which the conduct of the Emperor in some measure justified, placed at his disposal a whole kingdom, several principalities, and very considerable dotations for distribution among his brothers, generals, and minister of foreign affairs. We feel less disposed to dwell severely on the conduct pursued towards Naples, because the Neapolitans might console themselves for the sufferings of the present with the hope of better times than they had had under the Bourbons. Although the

King of Naples had previously signed the treaty of the 21st of September, 1805, by which he freed his country from the French, and renounced the coalition, yet the English and Russians, who had sailed from Malta and Corfu to join the Neapolitans in marching against the French, never doubted that the queen would immediately violate the treaty recently concluded with the French as soon as the English appeared on her coasts. They first made their appearance on the 20th of November, in the Bay of Naples, with about 19,000 men, among whom were 5000 English, at a time when the queen was already informed of Mack's defeat; she nevertheless never made the smallest preparation to oppose their landing. Colletta, the historian of Naples, is here very inexact, and in many circumstances obviously wrong; whereas the son of Lefebvre, the first secretary of the embassy, and at that time *chargé d'affaires* in Naples, has given a most interesting account, from his father's papers, of the conduct of the bold and masculine queen at the time of the landing of the allies. Of the 30,000 men which she had promised to the allies, there were not 12,000 collected. The people whom she forced into the ranks were of no use in the field, and the Russian general, Lascy, who was to command the united forces, although he did not make himself ridiculous, as Colletta alleges, yet proved no better as a general than Mack had done in 1798.

The queen felt this herself, and suffered her feelings to be clearly seen by the French *chargé d'affaires*, who enjoyed more of her confidence than Alquier, the ambassador; and yet she plunged headlong into a hopeless struggle. The conversation which she held with the French *chargé d'affaires* at the moment in which she was uniting her troops with the English and Russians, displays great talents and extraordinary diplomatic skill. She excuses herself by necessity—professes to have adopted all means to keep away the Russians—and at last intimates that she had only had the choice of surrendering Sicily to the Russians or Naples to the French.* The combined army was to march through the Papal States, and through Tuscany into Lombardy. Its strength was stated at 60,000 men, but there was really but little more than 30,000 regular troops, which Prince Eugène, with the national guards of Lombardy, the division of St. Cyr's troops, which had not joined the main army, and those which General Verdier brought out of Tuscany, could have easily detained had it been necessary. The victory of Austerlitz, however, made all efforts on the part of the French quite superfluous.

In the 37th bulletin, Napoleon declared that General Gouvion St.

* See Lefebvre, vol. ii., p. 267. The conclusion of the conversation runs as follows: M. de Tatischef (the Russian ambassador) avait osé demander que la Sicile fût occupée par les troupes prusses pendant toute la durée de la guerre. Poussée alors au désespoir, elle avait rompu les conférences et dit: Eh bien! que le destin s'accomplisse! C'en était fait maintenant; le government n'avait plus la liberté de ses actes; il était emporté par le torrent des événements dans une direction entièrement contraire à celle qu'il aurait voulu suivre.

Cyr was to proceed by rapid marches to Naples, and, as it is there expressed, “to punish the treachery of the Queen of Naples, and to drive from the throne that wicked woman, who, with the utmost disregard of all shame, has violated everything esteemed sacred among men.” On the day on which the treaty of Presburg was signed, the Emperor afterwards issued a proclamation to his army, which concluded with a phrase very frequent in his mouth from that time forward: “The Neapolitan dynasty has ceased to reign; its existence is inconsistent with the peace of Europe and the honour of my crown.” When this was published, Napoleon had already selected his brother Joseph as King of Naples; but, for appearance sake, he first named him as his representative in the army of 45,000 men, which was assembled on the frontiers of the States of the Church, but which was, properly speaking, commanded by Massena. In the mean time, the allied army had broken up, as the Emperor of Russia, at the same moment when he withdrew his troops from the Austrian states, also recalled his army from Italy. The English alone were too weak, and under the pretence of protecting, they took possession of, the island of Sicily. In this way the Queen of Naples lost all hope of any longer playing a political character, even in that part of her kingdom which the English had undertaken to defend by their fleet and their army. She tried in vain, first by humbling herself before Napoleon, who had heaped such shameful abuse upon her, to obtain a peace by entreaties, and then to inspire the bold mountaineers with fanaticism to make a desperate resistance. She was at that time very unfortunate in the choice of the man who was to conduct her case with Napoleon, for she sent the notorious Cardinal Ruffo. In addition to other very humiliating conditions, the cardinal was commissioned to propose the complete withdrawal of the king and queen from all concern with public affairs, and their resignation of the government to the crown prince. Ruffo waited in Switzerland to no purpose for passports to France; they had no wish to see him there at all. The cowardly king fled, as early as the 13th of January, to Sicily; the queen displayed more courage. She was anxious again to arm the Lazzaroni; and the crown prince, with some 18,000 men under Roger Damas and Field-Marshal Rosenheim, was to support the Calabrians; but neither the capital nor the Calabrians could offer any considerable resistance to such generals as Massena, Regnier, and Gouvion St. Cyr; Gaeta alone, in which the Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal commanded, held out, and was not reduced till July, after a long siege.

Massena himself directed his movements against Capua and Naples, and the queen followed her husband to Sicily as soon as he appeared before the gates of the capital, on the 14th of February. On the following day, Joseph Bonaparte, at first only as the representative of his brother, made his public entry into Naples. He established a new administration, although his patent of office was not yet prepared. He appointed ministerial offices, which he filled with Neapolitans,

with the exception of the war department, to which he appointed Miot, a French councillor of state; and the police, at the head of which he placed Salicetti, a former member of the convention. The educated portion of the Neapolitans exhibited rather pleasure than dissatisfaction at the change of government. Napoleon was pleased that everything went off so quietly, but suffered himself to be hurried away by his passions, to be guilty of a shameful insult to the Queen of Naples. It was arranged (for the passage to be quoted from the *Moniteur* proves the fact), that the news of the expulsion of the Queen of Naples was to be brought to the Emperor in the theatre, at the representation of "Athalia." Talma was then obliged to come forward, after the first act, and to announce the news to the public. The passage, however, from the *Moniteur* of the 25th of February, which we subjoin in a note, explained to the public the reason why the communication was made in this manner—in order to proclaim to the whole world what Napoleon himself had proclaimed to the Neapolitan ambassador, after his coronation in Milan.*

The resistance of the crown-prince and the Calabrians prevented the French from getting complete possession of the southern part of the kingdom for about four weeks; but the crown-prince no sooner took his departure for Sicily, on the 20th of March, than both the Calabrias were occupied by the French. In the meantime Joseph Bonaparte was elevated by his brother, by virtue of an imperial decree of the 1st of April, to the dignity of King of the two Sicilies, though he was really only in possession of one, and had no means whatever of obtaining the other; inasmuch as neither he nor his brother had any fleet at their command to oppose that of England. His rights to the throne of France were reserved to the new king; he and his country, however, were, like Holland and Berg, placed in complete dependence upon the Emperor; for, first of all, Naples was merely a great fief of France, hereditary in the male line; and then, the new royal dignity was inseparably connected with that of a grand elector of France; and therefore the king was simply the first subject of the Emperor. The new king received this decree in the course of a journey undertaken, on the 3rd of April, into Calabria, Apulia, and Basilicata, and at the moment when he was in Scigliano,

* "Le sceptre de plomb, ('Moniteur,' February 25th) de cette nouvelle Athalia vient d'être brisé sans retour. Le plus beau pays de la terre aura désormais un gouvernement ferme, mais libéral. L'Empereur rétablira le royaume de Naples pour un prince français; mais il le rétablira fondé sur les lois et l'intérêt des peuples, et sur le grand principe, que l'existence du trônes, l'éclat et la puissance dont sont environnés les souverains, la perpétuité du pouvoir, et l'hérédité, sont des institutions faites pour le service et l'organisation des peuples. L'Europe entière verra avec satisfaction expulsée du trône une reine, qui a tant abusé de la souveraine puissance, dont tous les pas ont été marqués par des révoltes, des parjures, et du sang. On la hait et on la méprise à Vienne autant qu'à Naples; mais déjà son mémoire est du ressort de l'histoire; car le nouveau royaume de Naples fait désormais partie des états fédératifs de l'Empire Français, et il faudra ébranler cet empire dans ses fondements avant qu'on puisse y toucher."

in the further Calabria. The imperial senate of France sent three of its members to congratulate the new king; and there was no lack of *fêtes*, speeches, and rejoicings, when he caused himself to be proclaimed as king; even the lazzaroni of the capital gave the most unequivocal testimonies of their joy. The accession of King Joseph, however, was not altogether undisturbed; for Massena was not only occupied with the siege of Gaeta, till a period beyond our present scope, but Sidney Smith, at the very time of the festivities, took possession of the island of Capri, and therefore in some measure commanded the whole coast.

Naples, too, was obliged to contribute its share to the maintenance of the splendour of the imperial court in Paris, and to cover the princely expenditure of its grandes, as well as to reward the officers and soldiers who founded and supported the new Empire. Continental disputes had been carried on between the pope and the Kings of Naples, respecting the principalities of Ponte Corvo and Benevento. Napoleon put an end to the strife, by presenting both to his friends. Ponte Corvo was bestowed upon Bernadotte and his heirs male, on the same conditions imposed in all other similar cases, since 1806; and Benevento fell to the share of Talleyrand. And this was not all; for in addition to these, six great fiefs were erected as duchies, with which Frenchmen were invested, after a similar fashion as in the case of those which had been established in the Venetian territories. The kingdom itself, moreover, was compelled to pay a yearly contribution of a million, as is expressed in the patent of the 30th of March, which was to be divided among the general officers and soldiers of the French army.

Because Napoleon himself, by virtue of the concordat, and in the concordat, had completely restored popery, and done all he could to make the hierarchy and the mere mechanism of divine worship an instrument of government, as it had been before, he had more difficulties in dealing with the pope, than with the secular, lamentable governments of the continent of Europe. This did not appear till a later period, when matters came to extremities, and the pope, completely deprived of all secular power, and reduced to his spiritual jurisdiction, turned against him that same power of public opinion, for the sake of which Napoleon had previously sought to win his favour. The pope became stronger through persecution; for Napoleon was obliged always apparently to recognise his spiritual supremacy, unless he was prepared to relinquish all the advantages to be derived from the concordat in France and Italy, Dalmatia and Istria. Matters did not proceed so far as this in the time whose history we relate in this volume; on the contrary, the pope, above all others, was obliged constantly to make sacrifices to the new Empire. As early as January, 1805, the pope and cardinals were much dissatisfied that the difficult and burthensome journey to Paris, for the purpose of anointing Napoleon, had brought with it not one of

those advantages for which they had hoped. The want of concord appeared even upon the journey, when Napoleon and the pope met by the way. The pope was afterwards obliged to take a part, indirectly, in Napoleon's war with the coalition, or at least to receive a French garrison into Ancona. He was anxious to remain neutral, and appealed to his spiritual office; and thereupon the French took forcible possession of Ancona and its fortress. This led to a violent dispute, in which Cardinal Fesch, who at that time managed the affairs of his nephew in Rome, was placed in great difficulties. From the 13th of November, 1805, Napoleon continued to carry on a very harassing correspondence with the pope; and from the letter addressed to him from Munich, of the date of the 7th of January, 1806, his holiness must have clearly seen, that the Emperor of the French wished to play Charles the Great, and to extend his feudal system over the states of the church also. In his first communications, he had not said that he regarded the pope as his vassal; but in a letter, dated the 29th of January, he expresses this plainly. In this autograph letter, he repeats the demand first made by Cardinal Fesch, in his name, that the pope should not suffer any Sardinians, English, or Russians, in the states of the church, and exclude all the ships of these nations from his harbours; other complaints of all kinds clearly showed that there was reason to anticipate further disputes. The Emperor brought vehement accusations against the pope, on account of the slowness of his measures respecting the new arrangements of the church in Germany, and especially in Württemberg; and at the same time, as if incidentally, threw out the idea which lay at the foundation of his system for the renovation of the Roman Empire. This idea he expressed by saying, that his holiness was indeed Sovereign of Rome, but that he himself was Roman Emperor.* The pope could not concede the claim, and Napoleon would have found difficulty in coming off victorious in a dispute for the right; he acted, however, as if the case was beyond a doubt.

From the time in which the pope sent him an answer in a vehement tone, the correspondence was left to the minister for foreign affairs, and the execution to his generals. The dispute, too, related to purely spiritual affairs; because the pope complained of the alterations made in the French concordat, by Melzi; of the introduction of this concordat into Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and all the provinces united with Italy by the peace of Presburg; but especially of the article of the *code civile*, respecting the dissolution of marriage. Cardinal Fesch was unable to set these points to rights by fair means, and therefore the violent Alquier was chosen to harass the pope. The cardinal ended his embassy by the announcement of the nomination of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples; and Alquier

* "Sa Sainteté était souverain de Rome, mais il en était lui l'empereur."

opened his by demanding the recognition of the new king. The pope, in his turn, required the new monarch to recognise the rights of the church over his kingdom, and to pay that homage which had been rendered to the holy see by all kings since King Charles the First of Anjou. Napoleon had calculated on this beforehand, because he sought a ground of quarrel. He not only would not listen to the so-called rights of investiture claimed by the pope, but declared to his holiness, at the end of May, that if he continued to refuse his recognition of the king, he would, it is true, recognise him as head of the church, but would not acknowledge him as a secular sovereign.* As a dispute with the pope was sought, and the latter was already engaged in one with Elisa Baciocchi, Napoleon took up the cause of his sister. The dispute with the Baciocchi family related to the presentation to the sees, and the introduction of the French concordat into their little state. Napoleon had recourse to action, when they did not yield in Rome. Military possession was taken of Pesaro, Sinigaglia, Fano, and Civita-Vecchia; the papal principality of Ponte Corvo was bestowed upon Marshal Bernadotte, and Benevento upon Talleyrand; and the pope was besides obliged to dismiss Cardinal Gonsalvi from the management of public affairs, because Napoleon regarded him as the cause of this obstinate resistance.

The Emperor of the French now at length became very sensible of the error he had committed, in restoring the popedom and the Catholic church upon the foundation of the Council of Trent, instead of returning to the constitution of the first four centuries; in having despised synods, and sacrificed the episcopal to the papal rights. He repented of this when too late—when a complete breach took place in 1808. The pope on this occasion was able to appeal to a right, which was not derived from antiquated parchments and seals, but from Napoleon's own concessions in 1802. Napoleon wished, in fact, to give in—he wished to give back the states of the church, but probably only because a war with Prussia was impending. In the beginning of July, he caused proposals to be made to the pope, through Alquier, to withdraw the French troops, if the pope would exclude the English from his harbours, and promise that, if at any time foreign troops, of any nation whatsoever, should appear on his coast, he would receive French troops into his fortresses. When the pope refused to comply with these terms, Napoleon gave orders to his generals to make themselves masters of the administration and government, in those towns which were in their possession, as well as in the districts attached to them, and to take the military and finance affairs into their own hands. As the pope continued to protest, and the Emperor was thinking of a new war, he once more had recourse

* “Il se verrait obligé à ne plus reconnaître au saint siège une souveraineté temporelle.”

to the method of friendly negotiation; and this time, through the mediation of Cardinal Caprara, who resided as legate at his court. Caprara, who was less priestly than any of his colleagues, thought himself obliged to advise the pope to accept the proposals; because Napoleon had seriously threatened to take possession of the states of the church, and not to restore them again. The proposals made by Caprara, at the end of July, were in reality the same as those made by Alquier at first.

The pope returned a negative autograph answer, on the 31st of August, to Caprara's communication, and to the various propositions made during the course of the month of August. We shall quote the words of his reply in a note;* because they led to an open breach, of whose consequences we shall subsequently give an account. It was not till February, 1808, that military possession was taken of Rome by General Miollis; because Napoleon hesitated to proceed to extremities during the war with Prussia, and to set limits to the pope even in the exercise of his spiritual functions. This, however, was to be done when Miollis advanced into Rome. He not only took possession of the Castle of St. Angelo, and treated the pope as a prisoner, but the six concessions which he was to extort from the pope were of such a kind as appeared to threaten the spiritual supremacy of the holy see, after it was deprived of all its temporal splendour and distinction. A patriarch was to be named for France; the French civil code—and therefore the decisions of civil judges in questions of divorce—to be everywhere introduced; the free exercise of religion to be granted even in the states of the church; a general reform to be effected in the management of the bishops' sees; all orders of monks to be everywhere abolished; and priests to be permitted to marry.

* The pope writes: "Qu'il ne pouvait rien changer à ses résolutions; qu'il ne désirait rien plus ardemment, que de voir placé par l'Empereur dans une position à pouvoir donner essor à toute sa tendresse pour lui. Le moyen d'y parvenir était de renoncer aux demandes qu'il avait faites, d'arranger les affaires spirituelles à la teneur des lois de l'église et du concordat, de rendre Ponte-Corvo et de réparer les dommages causés à l'état par la dépense des troupes. C'était comme son testament qu'il était prêt à sceller, s'il le fallait, de son sang."

§ II.

EUROPE TILL THE PEACE OF TILSIT.

A.—POLITICAL RELATIONS OF THE CONTINENTAL POWERS
TILL THE BATTLE OF JENA.

WE have stated, that even after the peace of Presburg, Austria still continued to be threatened by the French,—that the French army was scattered over south-western Germany,—and lastly, that from its positions on the Lahn and Maine, it assumed a threatening appearance towards Prussia. It was believed, as early as May, 1806, that Prussia could only be delivered from destruction by the conclusion of a peace between Russia and England, on the one part, and France on the other, which appeared by no means impossible under the Fox administration. Fox had never shared in Pitt and Canning's aversion to France and to the revolution; he never thought ill of Bonaparte, as his countrymen did; and had, in fact, opened negotiations: whilst the Emperor Alexander, for two reasons, appeared inclined to peace. First, the Emperor had views upon Moldavia and Wallachia; and, secondly, he was anxious to relieve the Emperor of Austria from the difficulty into which he had fallen, in consequence of the occupation by the Russians of the places in Dalmatia, which, according to the conditions of the peace of Presburg, were to be given up to the French. As long as the Russians kept possession of the fortress of Cattaro, and other places, Napoleon adhered to the Austrians, because it was convenient to him to have a pretence for leaving a portion of his army on the frontiers of Austria, and keeping constant possession of the small fortified town of Braunaau. This was, therefore, converted into an arsenal, and more strongly fortified. The Emperor Francis was at length placed in such difficulties as to be obliged to assume a hostile attitude towards the Russians, in order to shift off the blame from himself. He closed the ports of Fiume and Trieste against Admiral Siniavin, who was cruising with a Russian fleet in the Gulf of Venice, and finally gave orders to General Bellegarde to act as if he intended to drive the Russians by force out of Dalmatia.

Immediately on Pitt's death, which took place in January, 1806, Fox undertook the direction of foreign affairs, in a ministry very singularly composed of a mixture of different parties, and therefore very unstable. The ministry comprehended, not only the moderate friends of Pitt, but also such fierce French-haters as Windham and Thomas Grenville, who, indeed, was not, like the other Grenville, a member of the cabinet, but still held an important place in the administration, and had very considerable influence. However, in

March, 1806, this ministry appeared disposed to enter into the new proposals transmitted to Lord Yarmouth. Lord Yarmouth had been recalled; he was now sent a second time to Paris, and was there waiting for the arrival of the Russian plenipotentiary, in order to enter into negotiations in common. This joint negotiation was frustrated by a cabal in the Russian cabinet.

D'Oubril, who, before the war, and after Markof's recal, had for some time managed the interests of Russia in Paris, was again sent thither; but Czartorinski, Budberg's predecessor in the department of foreign affairs, had caused his instructions to be drawn up in such a manner, that d'Oubril thought himself so circumstanced as to justify him in concluding a peace without the co-operation of England. Entertaining these views, d'Oubril, on his way through Vienna, did not give such explanations of his plans to Sir Robert Adair, Fox's confidential friend and English ambassador to the court of Austria, as the latter expected. Sir Robert therefore thought himself justified in supposing that the French might succeed in completely withdrawing England from Russia; and, in fact, it soon became obvious that this design was entertained. We can now form a better judgment than at an earlier period, on what at that time actually took place; because we are no longer compelled to rely solely on the sophistical and diplomatic language of Bignon and Gentz, who always endeavour, not only to conceal the truth as much as possible, but when it is advantageous so to do, never hesitate to say boldly the reverse; but can now consult Sir Robert Adair's account, accompanied as it is by the original documents.

D'Oubril was probably still more fully informed in Vienna of the real state of affairs, and of the dangers which impended over Austria and Prussia, and was desirous of serving these powers by the early conclusion of peace. He thought, too, that even if Fox himself, was serious about a peace, many of the members of the English cabinet would be disposed to raise difficulties; he therefore opened negotiations for a separate peace between France and Russia, without the co-operation of Lord Yarmouth, whom he met in Paris, in July, 1806. The conduct of the Russian ambassador, in this matter, would be wholly inexplicable, were we not obliged to assume that d'Oubril had received verbal instructions from Czartorinski, such as would justify him in interpreting his ambiguously-written instructions as he did. In his absence, however, Budberg, who had entertained views very different from those of Czartorinski, became minister; and the latter, therefore, let d'Oubril fall to the ground. From Lord Yarmouth's printed dispatches and Sir Robert Adair's accounts, we learn that Lord Yarmouth took all possible pains to prevail upon the Russian ambassador to communicate to him the proposals made by the French, but that the latter not only declined, but even absolutely concluded a treaty, as early as the 20th of July, and therefore very precipitately, without consulting his own government in Petersburg. He went so far as to sign the treaty, without paying the least atten-

tion to Lord Yarmouth's earnest request that he would delay the signature for eight-and-forty hours, in order to enable him to submit the matter to the English ministry, and d'Oubril to consult the Russian ambassador in London. D'Oubril himself felt that he might have been precipitate; and therefore, instead of sending a courier, was himself the bearer of the treaty to Petersburg, in order, as he said, to offer his head in expiation of the error of his conduct. In order to save Austria and Prussia, d'Oubril had probably been precipitate in concluding the treaty; his object, however, had, in the meantime, been already attained, with regard to Austria, in another way, even before Budberg had induced the Emperor, in August, to refuse its ratification; his granting it would not have saved Prussia.

As regards Austria, Sir Robert Adair informs us, that Razumofski, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, was empowered as early as the beginning of August, to issue orders to the Russian commandant in Cattaro to give up that fortress to the French. He is in error, however, when he adds, that the recall of this order had arrived too late. Siniavin paid no attention to the order, and Cattaro was not at first evacuated; Braunau, therefore, still continued to be occupied by the French, although, in order to be able the more easily to humiliate Prussia, Austria was first treated with greater mildness. The negotiations with England were probably only so long protracted, in order as long as possible to delay a reconciliation between England and Prussia, which had been at enmity with each other since the occupation of Hanover by the latter. Lord Yarmouth had, it is true, broken off the negotiations and returned to England; Lord Lauderdale had, however, been afterwards sent to France, and both parties found their advantage in continuing to interchange diplomatic notes, till September, or till the moment at which Bonaparte took his departure from Paris, in order to commence the war with Prussia. Sir Robert Adair has given us a guiding-thread, which, however, we can only follow to a very short distance, through the web of very artful falsehoods with which Bignon, and other French writers, Thiers not excepted, have overlaid and entangled those diplomatic negotiations. From his account it will be seen how impudently they attempt to belie Fox; how audaciously and shamelessly Bignon appeals to documents, which, it is true, were printed in the *Moniteur*, in order afterwards to be used as proofs of a tissue of falsehoods, but which had not been previously sent to Lord Yarmouth, as is alleged in the *Moniteur*.*

At this time, even before Prussia was conquered, Napoleon's dominion over the whole of Germany, as far as it was not Prussian,

* We may altogether omit any examination of the French accounts, and especially of what Bignon has stated at great length respecting the negotiations in Paris, and the relation of Fox and Lord Yarmouth to Napoleon and Talleyrand; first, because we never enter upon diplomatic correspondence; and secondly, because Sir Robert Adair, in his published correspondence, has given us an even too copious refutation of Bignon, and justification of his friend, Fox.

was firmly established. The whole of the princes did voluntary homage, in order to be allowed to rule without any limitations, the most zealous friends of old abuses were everywhere the strongest supporters of a foreign absolute dominion, and the most abject flatterers of a man who always made might stand in the place of right; but even at that time the whole people murmured in secret, and we know well, from our own personal knowledge, that the habitual phlegm of the German character retained in these melancholy times

concealed elasticity. The French were scattered over the whole empire; they oppressed the German subjects, tyrannised over by their rulers; conducted themselves most brutally towards all who were engaged in any public office, and with the greatest insolence towards those princes and their courtiers who bowed with the most profound respect in the presence of every Frenchman. Napoleon, without more ado, made Wesel a fortress of the French Empire; his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, Grand-Duke of Berg; and without waiting for any judicial decision, or the issue of any negotiations with Prussia, by force of arms, and in the midst of peace, made himself master of the Abbeys of Essen, Verden, and Elten; whilst Blücher, who commanded in Westphalia, and would willingly have resisted force by force, was not allowed to stir. Blücher, Stein, and Hardenberg, gnashed their teeth; but Haugwitz, Zastrow, and others whom we shall hereafter have occasion to name, had the irresolute king completely in their power.

We must leave it to writers who treat of the special history of Germany and Prussia at that time, to give fuller particulars of the oppression exercised after the peace of Presburg, upon Austria and the whole of Germany, by the servants of the French Emperor, who was exalted to an idol by the materialists, and whose mind was continually full of astonishing and colossal projects; we can only advert in passing to what immediately bears upon *our object*. Davoust, Soult, and Berthier, men who owed their greatness, or, more properly speaking, their rank, to the reign of terror, pursued the same course of conduct towards the Germans in Swabia and Franconia, as they had previously done towards the French in the reign of terror. The arrest of Schröder, and of Palm, the bookseller of Nuremberg, because they were said to have given circulation to a pamphlet by Gentz and Arndts—"Spirit of the Times" (*Geist der Zeit*),—the persecution of other patriots, who, even at that early period, were secretly at work to give an impulse to the nation sold by its administrative officers—clearly prove, that the German vassal princes of Napoleon were not in a condition to afford any protection to their own subjects. The way in which the French, according to the principles of their nationality, measure the allowable and the non-allowable, in reference to themselves and other nations, by a very different standard, may be best learned from the remarks made on this occasion concerning Davoust's and Berthier's police, by the honest and intelligent Thibaudeau. He speaks of Schröder's pardon as an act of extra-

ordinary clemency on the part of the Emperor of the French. (He appears not even to have known that the Emperor yielded only to the earnest entreaties of the King of Bavaria.) He justifies the carrying away of Palm to Braunau, and the political murder there perpetrated on the 2nd of August, by command of a court-martial, in a manner wholly incomprehensible, in the case of a writer so thoroughly versed in matters of business and in the duties of courts of law and equity as he was. It is, he observes, absurd to call that wrong, to which seven French colonels had given, by their judgment, the stamp of right. The Germans, therefore, began to anticipate, as early as April, 1806, what would be the results of the dissolution of the German Empire, from which the princes and their ministers hoped for an enlargement of their territories and an increase of their unlimited power.*

No decided mention was, indeed, made of the dissolution of the German Empire in the treaty of Presburg, but it was sufficiently intimated; as early as the 12th of January, 1806, Bonaparte wrote from Munich to the French senate, as follows: "He reserves to himself the adoption of further measures, whereby the bonds should be more fully determined, by which, in future, all the federal (or, in other words) vassal states of the French Empire were to be united. All the various parties, though independent of each other, must be united by some common bond. What that bond was to be, it is needless to inquire; because the whole Empire was obviously held together by the will and genius of the Emperor, and not by any right or common agreement. In fact, Napoleon, on the 21st of April, issued an order, couched completely in the style of a mathematical problem, in which he instructed his minister, Talleyrand, to construct a scheme for the formation of a federative union among the provinces on and near the Rhine. This order is drawn up precisely after the fashion in which the Emperor used to issue directions to Berthier, under certain conditions and in a certain way to organize an army. It is very important, as evidence of the continual change in all the institutions of the Empire, that, as early as

* As Thibaudeau was one of the honestest men of the times of Napoleon, we shall here quote his words, in order to show what ideas of *right* all Frenchmen, *without exception*, entertained when the *grande nation*, or people such as Soult, Massena, and Davoust, are the subjects. He takes great care not to reveal the scandalous system of a renegade from the old *régime* such as Davoust was, and not to give us even an idea of the oppression exercised in Franconia, Swabia, Bavaria, and on the Rhine; but the revolting indifference with which he speaks of the conduct pursued towards Bavarian subjects in the time of peace, sufficiently proves the nature of men's thoughts and feelings in France: "Deux libraires, Schröder et Palm, furent condamnés à mort comme convaincus d'avoir tenté de soulever les habitans de la Souabe contre l'armée. Leur sentence fut publiée en Allemand. L'Empereur fit grâce à Schröder, le libraire Palm, de Nuremberg, fut seul exécuté. *Les Allemans et les ennemis de Napoléon ont fait de cet individu une victime innocente, un martyr. Le crime dont il était accusé était grave; à qui persuadera-t-on que sept colonels l'eussent condamné, s'ils n'eussent pas été convaincus de sa culpabilité?*" (Vol. ii., p. 403.) Could even Gourgaud, Las Cases, and Montholon, have more revoltingly defended the idol of the age?

this order, intimations were given of a possible incorporation of the Hanse Towns, which first took place at the end of 1810, and therefore at a time when the scarcely-formed Kingdom of Holland was already again dissolved.* The security, however, of this ephemeral kingdom was, according to the orders given to Talleyrand, to be a subject of particular attention on the formation of the confederation of the Rhine. In the work assigned to him—to construct a French and defenceless Germany (for Prussia was unable to afford protection)—Talleyrand possessed an admirable support and money-resources in the soliciting princes and nobles, in their diplomatists and lawyers, but especially in the vain and dazzled electoral arch-chancellor, who played a very important part in the formation of the confederation of the Rhine. When the views of two Frenchmen of the better sort have been seen from the passages which we are about to quote, no one will be surprised that Napoleon and most other Frenchmen, who were acquainted with those classes only whose modes of thinking have been indicated in these passages, laughed at German patriotism and our Teutonic boasting; we can, however, assure our readers that the mass of the people entertained very different views, and acted in a manner very different from the princes and their bestarved courtiers. Thibaudeau says: "He feels unable to determine which had thought and acted the most shamelessly and disgracefully in the period between May and July 1806, the old German aristocracy, or the French *parvenus*, who had become illustrious since 1799." He adds, "that in the compensations awarded in 1803 to those who had lost something or nothing," Germany was really set up by auction for the highest bidder; but that in the formation of the confederation of the Rhine, the conduct of both payers and receivers was still now revolting. "We (he, Thibaudeau, councillor of state, and a count of Napoleon's empire) are acquainted with all the people who shamefully abused the influence which they at that time possessed, and the confidence which Napoleon reposed in them. They took advantage of this opportunity to secure for themselves a splendid position, by accepting all manner of bribes. They got possession of immense wealth by downright robbery. But hence their memory has become eternally infamous." Another French

* Napoleon, in his *Correspondance inédite*, vol. vii., p. 5, writes to Talleyrand as follows: "Faire un nouvel état au nord de l'Allemagne, qui soit dans les intérêts de la France, qui garantisse la Holland et la Flandre contre la Prusse, et l'Europe contre la Russie. Le noyau serait le duché de Berg, le duché de Clèves, Hesse-Darmstadt, etc., etc. Chercher en outre, dans les autours, tout ce qui pourrait être incorporé pour former 1,000,000 or 1,200,000 âmes. Y joindre, si l'on veut, le Hanovre. Y joindre dans la perspective Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck. Donner la statistique de ce nouvel état. Cela fait, considérer l'Allemagne comme divisée en huit états, Bavière, Bade, Wirtemberg, et le nouvel état; ces quatre dans les intérêts de France. L'Autriche, la Prusse, la Saxe, Hesse-Cassel, dans les quatre autres. D'après cette division, supposez qu'on détruise la constitution germanique, et qu'on annule au profit des huit grands états les petites souverainetés, il faut faire un calcul statistique pour savoir, si les quatre états qui sont dans les intérêts de la France perdront ou gagneront plus à cette destruction que les quatre états qui n'y sont pas. Un rapport sur ses deux objets Dimanche matin. (The 2nd of April.)

writer speaks in still harsher language of these German princes, and diplomatists, and French sharpers. We shall give his own words in a note,* and introduce into the text the two anecdotes which he has recorded as examples of the boldness of the one party and the ductility of the other.

A hundred and twenty thousand Frederick d'ors was demanded from the Duke of Mecklenburg; he paid forty thousand, and gave two securities for the remainder. He afterwards repented of what he had done, and applied to the Emperor of Russia. The latter communicated the matter to the Emperor Napoleon, but begged that the person who had received the money should be allowed to keep it, and that the securities alone should be annulled. The citizens of Hamburg paid a very considerable sum in order to preserve their existence. When they were afterwards incorporated in the great Empire, they complained of having been cheated out of their money. Napoleon investigated the affair; the contrivers of the fraud were obliged to refund the money, but the people of Hamburg never received a farthing back—it went into the imperial coffers. When everything was fully arranged, the plenipotentiaries of those who had bought or begged their way into the confederation were sent for to Paris, and Count Beust, the representative of the Arch-Chancellor of Germany, was forced to play the melancholy part of signing what he had not seen. True it is, that the arch-chancellor and his people of business had drawn up the first sketch of the constitution of the confederation, but the French merely left as much of it as suited their purpose; the arch-chancellor, too, was named president of the assembly of the confederation, which, however, was never holden. In this completely French affair, the chief elector of the old empire was therefore obliged, as the saying is, to carry the letters, and act as the tool of Talleyrand. He was, indeed, allowed to make Count von der Leyen, his relation, a sovereign prince, whilst the Prince of Thurn and Taxis, the King of Prussia's brother-in-law, was treated in the most disgraceful manner. The arch-chancellor got for his

* "La Confédération du Rhin, c'est à dire, la refonte des divers états et principautés d'Allemagne, fut une mine d'or pour certains fonctionnaires de Napoléon; ils vendaient aux petits princes la conservation de leur existence territoriale; ils agrandissaient ou diminuaient leur petit territoire, selon que ces princes payaient ou ne payaient pas le prix que leur fut demandé sous peine de vie ou de mort; et il est tel fonctionnaire du Grand Empire qui aura retiré une somme de dix-huit millions de francs pour vente de sujets et cession de territoire aux membres du corps germanique, refondus en états de la confédération du Rhin!! On vit rarement plus de corruption et d'avidité; les pots de vin, les présents diplomatiques, se traitaient comme des affaires de bourse; tel fonctionnaire public exigeait qu'un petit prince d'Allemagne lui achetât à un prix exorbitant deux cent mille bouteilles de vin Champagne (qui lui appartenaient, disait-il), faute de quoi sa principauté serait fondue et donnée à un autre prince; tel autre fonctionnaire exigeait des cinq cent, des huit cent mille francs, en traites acceptées par les premières maisons de banque. On peut dire, que la souveraineté et même l'existence territoriale des petits princes était à l'encan."—In order to see how the souls sold to the Prince Primate and Napoleon spoke, wrote, and acted, read Bredow's Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century, pp. 399, &c. In order to see how the patriots thought, read Bredow's short notes to the text, particularly, p. 402, note m.

own share the title of Prince Primate, and the town of Frankfort; but he, too, found himself very much deceived, when Talleyrand came forth with the document itself.

The constitution of the confederation of the Rhine had been prepared in secret in Paris; and from the 7th till the 12th of July, whilst still in a somewhat incomplete state, it was laid before the ambassadors of the respective states of the confederation, but the particular points only which affected the state which they respectively represented were submitted to each; and then, on the 12th, Count Beust, as ambassador of the president to Talleyrand, was appointed to sign the whole document which he had never read. He did so sign it, and afterwards excused himself to his master, by declaring that he had subscribed the constitution, when he had only time allowed him to read three articles, because it was impossible to avoid compliance with the demand. All the other ambassadors were in like manner obliged to add their names without having ever read any part except that which referred to their own states respectively. The act itself was first made public on the 17th, and signed by Napoleon on the 19th at St. Cloud. The new French Germany, called the confederation of the Rhine, consisted at first of a small number of sovereign princes, but was from time to time enlarged, as every one who either wished to take part in the oppression of his country, or was willing to pay, was admitted as a member. The Prince Primate of Frankfort; the princes of Darmstadt and Baden, who were called grand dukes; those of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Cleves and Berg, Nassau-Usingen and Weilburg, who assumed the title of dukes; those of Hohenzollern, Hechingen and Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm and Salm-Kysburg, Isenburg, Bartenstein, Aremberg, Lichtenstein, and the Count or rather Prince von der Leyen, by Bonaparte's favour became sovereigns in their large or even in their very small territories; and whosoever either did not seek for or could not obtain this favour, and lay within the bounds of their respective territories, was made subject to their supremacy. In this way Frankfort fell to the Prince Primate; Nuremberg to Bavaria; the principality of Heitersheim, belonging to the order of St. John, to Baden; the burgraviate of Freidberg to Darmstadt; and the knights in Franconia, Swabia, and on the Rhine, were deprived of their independence.

We refrain from alluding to all the particular changes which were at that time made, in order especially to refer to the manner in which Prussia on this occasion was intentionally insulted. The king's brother-in-law, the Prince of Thurn and Taxis, was, as we have already observed, humiliated and robbed; the prince of Nassau, the king's near blood-relation, was treated precisely in the same manner with regard to his hereditary possessions in Germany, and his new principality of Fulda was threatened as early as September by the French pressing forward into the country. The possessions in Nassau, belonging to the branch of Orange, were given to Usingen and Weilburg; and Joachim of Berg obtained the feudal supremacy over

Siegen, Hadamar, and the lordships of Beilstein and Dillenburg. Napoleon himself was in reality the supreme ruler, under the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and it was therefore of no consequence whatever, whether the assembly of the states, spoken of in the articles of confederation, ever met or not; for from this assembly the sovereign princes would have had nothing to fear, although they did so, but have been allowed to domineer just so long as it pleased Napoleon. We do not think it necessary, therefore, to dwell upon agreements which were never brought into operation; and merely refer to such claims, connected with the new constitution of French Germany, as were actually made, in order to be able to use the powers of Germany for the benefit of France, and gently to prepare the way for its absolute subjection.

With this view Napoleon fixed the number of troops which every member of the confederation was to furnish for his wars; he himself promised 200,000 men in case it should be necessary for him to defend the confederation. He at first indeed required only 65,000 from his German vassals; but the regulation respecting the position of the troops was so cunningly drawn up, that instead of this number four times as many might be called for. After the formal publication of this confederation in Ratisbon, on the 1st of August, and the shameless renunciation of the ancient national union of the Germanic empire, and adhesion to a new alliance with the hereditary enemy of this empire, the Emperor Francis laid down his crown by a declaration to that effect, issued on the 6th of August. In this way Prussia was isolated, and its deliverance rested completely on the grace and favour of the Czar of the Sclavonians. In order to prevent a hasty application to the czar for his favour, Napoleon threw out a new bait for those miserable creatures to whom the king had left the direction of affairs. His object was to delay for some time the war with Prussia, now unavoidable, and leave the king with a feeling of security. The French ambassador in Berlin (Laforest) was verbally instructed (for he took good care not to make any written communication) to intimate, that there was still a place in the confederation for Prussia; he even hinted at the possibility of the imperial dignity. No attention was paid to the last point in Berlin; but Haugwitz seized so eagerly upon the thought of a northern confederation, that, by his haste in adopting the suggestion, he made the king ridiculous in the eyes of the French, whilst the joy which he expressed in reference to the proposal threw a melancholy light upon him in the eyes of the Germans.*

The ministry in Berlin reckoned, as too often happens there, with-

* The proof of this may be seen in Laforest's Correspondence, now, at least, partially published; on the subject of the hint verbally given by him, but never seriously intended, with respect to a northern confederation, he writes to his own government as follows: Haugwitz had said, that "le roi dans l'ivresse de sa joie, ne se regarde pas seulement comme l'allié de la France, mais comme l'ami personnel de l'Empereur Napoléon; c'est à ce titre qu'il consentira avec zèle à tout ce qui pourra consolider sa dynastie."

out their host; for no thought could be entertained of the co-operation of Sweden and Denmark; Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were held in check by their intimate relations with Russia, and negotiations were no sooner opened with Saxony and Hesse than every possible means were tried in Paris to prevent the diplomatists of those two houses, never even suspected for centuries, of a particle of patriotic enthusiasm, from entering into any union with Prussia. It was intimated to the elector of Hesse, who was always eager to reap, without taking the trouble of sowing, that he might possibly obtain Fulda, which, however, must first be again taken away from the house of Orange. The Hanse Towns were forbidden by Napoleon, in an authoritative tone, even to enter into negotiations respecting a union with Prussia. There was still time for Prussia to throw herself into the arms of the English, to place her fortresses in good condition, and to assemble an army behind the Elbe; especially as the English continued incessantly to urge Austria to a new coalition, because she could only save herself by a desperate resolution. Sir Robert Adair relates, that he was desirous of entering into some connexion with Prussia, as early as the time of his journey to Vienna from Brunswick. At that time, however, King George III. would not listen to such an idea; he afterwards thought better of it. Sir Robert Adair, therefore, wrote from Vienna to Count Hardenberg, who at that time lived on his estate, because he, as well as Count Stadion, were convinced, that nothing was to be done with Count Haugwitz, whose cowardly soul never could advise anything but what was cautious, timid, and cowardly. Talleyrand, on his side, merely continued the negotiation with Lord Lauderdale, because he was desirous of keeping alive the mistrust between England and Prussia. For this reason the French government was shameless enough to cause it to be stated in the *Moniteur*, on the 15th of August, that Mr. Fox's illness was the only reason why a peace with England had not been concluded.* Mr. Fox's most confidential friend, however, tells us the very reverse. The account circulated on the 7th of September, when Lord Lauderdale was in Paris, that the treaty was broken off in consequence of Mr. Fox's death, is proved to have been equally false. This, in fact, is contradicted by Talleyrand's continuing the negotiations after the death of the English minister, and by the fact, that even on the 25th of September, when the Emperor had set out to put himself at the head of his army against Prussia, and he accompanied him, he wrote, on his journey, to Lord Lauderdale, who had remained in Paris.

* The *Moniteur* of the 15th August contains the following: "Les négociations entamées depuis le mois de Mars étaient arrivées à leur maturité; la paix même, comme le bruit en avait couru, avait été au moment d'être signée. (Let our readers merely compare with this Sir Robert Adair's account, in order to learn how simple the public is, which regards these fables in the *Moniteur* as history, and Bignon, Thiers, and their fellow-writers.) Mais la maladie grave de Mr. Fox et son absence du conseil ont rendu tout incertain et ont replongé ces grands intérêts dans le dédale de la chicane diplomatique, des formules latines et des obstructions."

Prussia was first roused in terror by the publication of the constitution of the confederation of the Rhine, which appeared like a flash of lightning in a clear sky; and next, by the cabals whereby the French had prevented the formation of a Prusso-northern confederation; and last of all, but much too late, the Marchese Lucchesini gave the alarm, but, as usual, was taken in his own net. Lord Yarmouth had assumed the appearance of being a little intebriated, and had let out on the occasion some reference to the secret proposals made him by Talleyrand, on the subject of Hanover; he also gave the Italo-Prussian intimation of some of the secret articles of the treaty concluded with d'Oubril: what he said, was partly true and partly false. Lucchesini hastily committed to paper all that he had heard, and immediately sent it off to Berlin. In this dispatch, he expressed some doubts in reference to Hanover; but with regard to the treaty with Russia, he thought himself perfectly sure of his case. He wrote, that he had himself immediately gone to Talleyrand, informed him of all he had learned, and by the coolness of the answer he received was confirmed in the conviction that the whole was true. Lucchesini was surrounded by nothing but loose and venal people; Napoleon, therefore, was immediately made acquainted with the accounts which he had sent to Berlin, and the advice he had given to his king. He had advised him to set out immediately, to go himself to Petersburg, and prevail upon the emperor to refuse to ratify the treaty with France, which would be laid before him by d'Oubril. This took place at the beginning of August, and, therefore, at a time when Napoleon could not have known that the Emperor of Russia, without being urged thereto by Prussia, had refused to ratify the treaty; he therefore gave way to the greatest passion, and committed one of the grossest violations possible of the law of nations, by seizing on the original of the ambassador's dispatch, of which the duplicate only reached Berlin on the 7th of August. This dispatch so alarmed the King of Prussia, that, on the 10th of August, he issued orders to place his army in marching order. On this occasion, the same course as usual was pursued at the court of Prussia—abundance of consultations—hesitation—willing and wishing—a too tardy resolution, and then precipitate action.

Haugwitz, Zastrow, and their colleagues, kept the king in bondage, and represented to him, that all decisive preparations for war were dangerous, as they would infallibly provoke the French; and it never occurred to any of them to remove all the old generals and commandants of the seven years' war, before commencing a youthful struggle for life or death. Matters went on in the cabinet as they had always done. Kökeritz, the king's confidential friend, every morning opened all letters and other papers addressed to his majesty. He then divided them according to their contents among three cabinet councillors—those for war, home affairs, and political events. These secretaries of state made their reports; but among them were

still to be found Lombard and Beyme, whose influence was considerable, although their characters were suspicious. Kökeritz, like the king himself, was what is called a good sort of man, and, therefore, like the king also, rather averse to all genius, and easily frightened by men of decisive character; mediocrity was always preferred by him, and he was therefore surrounded by mediocre people. Kökeritz had, moreover, too much inclination to indulge in the pleasures of the table, and was much too fond of talking to be a great statesman; and how could a man thus devoted to pleasure ever introduce resolute and vigorous men to the king's notice? Among the generals of first rank, Rüchel and Blücher were determined enemies of the French; but the coarseness, insolence, and strictness of the former disqualified him wholly from giving life and vigour to the spirits of the people, whom it was now necessary to employ. He was merely acquainted with spatterdash service and mechanical drilling. Blücher (who commanded in Westphalia) was the only one among the generals engaged in the seven years' war, who was in a condition, notwithstanding his advanced age, to measure himself against Napoleon's generals, who had been promoted from the ranks.* Prince Louis Ferdinand was, indeed, also amongst the number of the generals; and like the dissolute and clever patriots of the guards, and such academicians as Johannies von Müller and others, made a great parade of his love for war, which made him a great favourite of the people, and an object of fear to the prudent diplomatists; his capacity, however, was by no means great, and his courage was more that of a bold hussar than of a general.

Negotiations, indeed, were entered upon with Saxony and Electoral-Hesse, with a view to a close alliance; but Saxony had suffered too much from Prussia in the eighteenth century, to unite with it in a struggle which demanded the sacrifice of everything; and the Elector of Hesse never thought of anything but how he might best increase his own private property, and always win without ever risking a loss. He first called in all the soldiers who were on furlough, organised a body of militia for the protection of his territory, and increased the number of small fortified places in the electorate. He sent his minister to Berlin; but in order to have two strings to his bow, at the very time when this minister was concluding a treaty with Prussia, he caused negotiations to be opened in Paris, respecting neutrality, and offered money. All men, and perhaps even the angels in heaven, rejoiced, when he lost money, land, and people, because he wished to fish on both banks.

On this occasion, the elector was caught in his own net; because

* The most distinguished generals of the Prussian army were no longer of an age for active service. Mollendorf, who afterwards accompanied the king to the camp as a Mentor, was eighty-two; the Duke of Brunswick, seventy-one; Kalkreuth, sixty-nine; Prince Hohenlohe, sixty; Count Kunheim, seventy-four; Prittitz, seventy-two; Arnim, sixty-six; Holzendorf, sixty-five; Schmettau, sixty-nine; Blücher, sixty-two; Wartensleben and Gravert, sixty; Rüchel, fifty-two.

he most foolishly thought himself more cunning than Fouché, Talleyrand, and their coadjutors. The neutrality which he sought was granted him, he resigned the office of a Prussian field-marshall, and allowed the French to pass through; but kept his army together, with the foolish notion that Napoleon would suffer them to remain in his rear, where they might at any moment fall upon his troops. The Elector of Saxony, who was thoroughly acquainted with the whole state of Prussian affairs, justly concluded, that were he to rely on Prussia, he never could save his country, betrayed as it was by fifteen princes, and forsaken by Hesse. For this reason he steadily opposed the pretensions of Prussia, so that the aid which he might have been able to give, was afterwards rendered, when no longer in season. At the last moment, when the Prussians were entering Saxony from Silesia, he gave a forced consent to the union of his army with that of Prussia; but even then, under very restrictive conditions.

The unfortunate King of Sweden, whose madness changed all his best designs into follies, assumed a hostile attitude towards Prussia,—on the one hand, refusing to acknowledge the dissolution of the German Empire, and on the other, building on this dissolution, he abolished both the civil and ecclesiastical constitution in his part of Pomerania, and introduced that of Sweden. Gustavus prided himself in the security of Russia's assistance, when he was desirous of rendering that assistance which he had promised, in return for English subsidies paid by King George III., to prevent the Prussians from forcibly taking possession of Hanover, and to hinder them even from occupying Lauenburg. He triumphed so far as to force the King of Prussia, in order to be able to make use of his services against France, to allow his troops to remain in the territory of Lauenburg. Prussia would, no doubt, have been able to come to a reconciliation with England as early as August, had not, as we have above observed, the English ministry believed, that as long as Haugwitz, Lombard, Beyme, and others, possessed a preponderating influence in Berlin, no confidence whatever could be placed in the Prussian cabinet. At length, Thornton, English consul in Hamburg, opened a communication, as early as September, with Baron Jacobi, who had been ambassador in London, and the baron was to travel to London; still, however, the English government had not sufficient confidence in the Prussian ministry, and Jacobi was obliged to put off his journey. On the 1st of October, when the Prussian head-quarters were in Naumburg, Jacobi at last received express commands to proceed from thence to London; but, on the 8th of October, Sir Robert Adair still persevered in insisting upon it as a condition, that the negotiations should not be carried on through Haugwitz, for fear of being betrayed, but indirectly through Hardenberg. To Hardenberg, therefore, Sir Robert had also indirectly written on the 18th of September, and through him opened negotiations in Berlin; to this communication Hardenberg

sent, indirectly, an answer. As Haugwitz, however, still retained his influence, the English had no confidence in the matter. It will be clear, from an expression of the light-minded minister himself, how correct Rühle von Lilienstein, whose report of an eye-witness we shall often quote, is, when he alleges that the first hope of any fortunate issue to the war into which Prussia had been forced, would be the dismissal of Haugwitz and the whole of his partisans. In a conversation with Prince Hohenlohe, who commanded the army in Silesia, Haugwitz alleged, and tried to prove by means of documents, that as early as the end of December, 1805, he had despaired of the possibility of maintaining peace, and yet he had continued to lead the king from one deception to another, till September, 1806! We, the public, who did not learn the real state of affairs until afterwards, however indignant we were at the systematic spoliation, the boasting pride, and the contemptuous and immoral measures of the French, nevertheless suspected, in the beginning of October, 1806, what Rühle von Lilienstein printed in his work in 1807.* And yet the aged, weak, and obstinate Duke of Brunswick, who in the last war had been universally acknowledged to be incapable of withstanding the new system of the French, and become an object of ridicule, was appointed commander-in-chief of the whole army; and Prince Louis Ferdinand, to whom no one who knew him would have given any command, or at most that of the reserve, was appointed commander of the first division, which, by his foolhardiness, he was quite certain to expose to the danger of being cut off from the rest of the forces!!

Lucchesini, in whom some faith may be placed in trifles, informs us, in his dull book on the Confederation of the Rhine, that the Duke of Brunswick, in a conversation which he had with him at headquarters, in Naumburg, on the 25th of September, had not the slightest suspicion that the French and their German allies would venture to attack the Prussians. The Prussian commander-in-chief was so utterly incapable of contending against the clever plans of the greatest military genius in existence, even with the ordinary and traditional skill of a general, that Prince von Hohenlohe did not, according to his account, even receive an answer to his request for a very moderate sum of money, to pay for information. The French, on the other hand, were thoroughly acquainted with everything which took place in the most private consultations of the cabinet, in

* Bericht eines Augenzeugen von Feldzuge des Fürsten von Hohenlohe in Herbste, 1806. Tübingen, Cotta, 1807, p. 9, we read as follows: "The removal of Beyme, Lombard, and Haugwitz, from the cabinet, and of the Duke of Brunswick from the head of the army, would of itself have given a greater preponderance to the cause of Prussia and Germany than whole armies and loads of money, if those men remained as they then were. The chief reasons why all confidence of a successful issue disappeared from the minds of the people and of the army, although it had taken possession of them for a moment, must be sought in the sending of Von Knobelsdorf to Paris, in the journey of Count Haugwitz to the head-quarters, and in the non-appearance of the expected, and justly expected, proclamation."

the army, and everywhere else, better than the king himself; because Haugwitz, Lombard, Lucchesini, and their coadjutors, were surrounded by people who laughed at such things as honour and patriotism. The movements of the Prussians proved that they were irresolute, and had no fixed plans; whilst the French, on the contrary, had a tremendous force in Franconia, threatened Münster from the Rhine, and the Dutch army was prepared to invade East Friesland and Oldenburg. Magdeburg was neglected by the Prussians, and the commandant, both from age and character, was wholly unequal to the circumstances; whilst Bonaparte, sure as he was of victory, issued orders to incorporate Wesel with the department of Roer, and to fortify it anew. Bernadotte with his army occupied Nuremberg, of which he had taken possession for Bavaria; and the Prussians no sooner advanced into Saxony, than he took possession of all the mountain-passes leading into that country. Würzburg, then governed by the Archduke Ferdinand of Tuscany, was treated by the French in the same manner as the Electorate of Saxony had been used by the Prussians—that is, it was compelled to take upon itself all the obligations of the vassal states of the confederation of the Rhine. Austria was not in a condition to interfere in favour of Ferdinand, because at that very time its position with regard to the French was very critical. The Russians still kept possession of Cattaro, because Admiral Siniavin had not carried out the orders of the Russian minister in Vienna, to evacuate the place. Napoleon, therefore, either did not place full confidence in the assurances given in Vienna, that in the new war Austria would remain neutral, or he acted as if this was his opinion, and surrounded Austria with fortifications and arms. Braunau remained in his possession and was more strongly fortified, the citadel of Passau and the fortress of Kufstein were placed in a condition of defence, and 20,000 Bavarians were assembled in the country lying north of Munich. Würzburg was therefore compelled to submit to the protection, or more properly speaking, to the dominion of the French, by a treaty concluded on the 25th of September; the Archduke Ferdinand joined the confederation of the Rhine, assumed the title of Grand-Duke, and as a compensation for the oppression suffered by his subjects, for the costs and loss of life in a war with which they had no connexion, he received the property of other persons as a present from Napoleon. The whole of the knights, small counts, and princes, hitherto holding immediately under the head of the empire, were made subjects of the new grand-duke, who at the same time took possession of all the estates belonging to the Knights of St. John.

The Prussians at length took up their position in Thuringia, the right wing under the command of Rüchel, who was to be joined by Blücher from Münster, the centre under the orders of the Duke of Brunswick, and the left of the Prince von Hohenlohe. So little, however, was the idea entertained of an early attack on the part of the French, that there was a continual boasting in the camp, that

their enemies would be very shy to attack the Prussians in their position on the Saale. On the 7th of September, Lucchesini had his last audience in Paris, and on that occasion received verbal commissions from Napoleon to the king. The haughtiness and insolence of this verbal message are passed over without notice by the French,* it would, however, be still more striking, had not the manner in which Napoleon expressed himself been so cunningly calculated to work upon the irresolute and timid mind of the King of Prussia, which shrank from any quick and energetic determination. Laforest, in a letter to Talleyrand for the diplomatic use of the Emperor, had previously given an excellent description of the king's character, in reference to the possibility of preventing him from adopting any energetic measures, by throwing out some well-baited allurement at the decisive moment.† As a proof how easy it would be to prevent the King of Prussia from taking any decisive step till he was in the power of the French, he states as a fact, that the king, at a great council, on the 24th, had been desirous of recalling everything which had been previously determined on, on the 11th, in reference to the war. This indeed did not take place, but Herr von Knobelsdorf, who always worked as zealously for a union with France, as Herr von Krusemark did for one with Russia, was sent to Paris instead of Lucchesini.

Lucchesini having given in his letters of recall on the 7th of September, notes were exchanged between Knobelsdorf and Talleyrand, in which it was obviously the object of the latter, who was a master in all kinds of dissimulation, to deceive the new Prussian ambassador, even when Napoleon had completely thrown off the mask to his predecessor. Napoleon at that time had already sent the declaration given in our note to the Prussian camp, and was about to put himself at the head of his army in order to attack the Prussians.‡

* In his history of the causes and effects of the confederation of the Rhine, Lucchesini, who knows well how to throw a mist around his descriptions, gives the following as the account of the affair. He states that this message from Bonaparte to the king was delivered by him in Naumburg, in the presence of the Duke of Brunswick, who did not profit in the least thereby. The message itself was to the effect, that since the breaking off of negotiations for peace with Russia had weakened the hope of maintaining peace on the continent, and the war at sea was carried on still more obstinately, he would take a lesson from the events of the past. That should he therefore be compelled to come to an engagement with the Prussian armies, for which he had the greatest respect, he would bring against them such a superior force as to make his victory certain, before a junction with the troops of the Emperor Alexander, and the aid of the bitterest enemies of France should render it more uncertain, more bloody, and perhaps even cause Austria to vacillate in a neutrality at present barely maintained.

† "C'est un trait caractéristique de Frédéric Guillaume," says he, "de ne se déterminer qu'au dernier moment pour les partis audacieux, et une fois qu'il les a pris de ne savoir s'y maintenir. Ce qu'une noble fierté, un élan de courage ou de colère lui a un moment inspiré, presque toujours la réflexion y fait renoncer."

‡ Here we think it right to appeal to the French, who admire Napoleon, and to whom the archives of the foreign-office are open. Lefebvre, in reference to Talleyrand's apparently very friendly proposals to Knobelsdorf, from the 12th till the 25th of September, observes: "Mais Napoléon lui tenait un langage pacifique lorsqu'il n'était plus tems, et qu'à Berlin la passion publique déborda. Désarmer

This contributed very much to prevent the desperate plan which presented the only prospect of a successful result from being carried into execution. This plan was very much approved of by Blücher, but was the less agreeable to the systematic pedantry of the Duke of Brunswick, as in this case it would have been necessary to assail a prince of the empire such as he himself was.

The plan proposed was to anticipate the French, to compel the co-operation of the Elector of Hesse, and in conjunction with the Hessian army, to fall upon the French on their march to Franconia. Those of us who in Frankfort saw the French for weeks together passing through, expected nothing else than what has just been stated, especially as the stout, valorous, and warlike Hessians stood ready for action in Hanau. The adoption of this resolution was also urged by the noble and patriotic queen, who on that account was loaded with ridicule and shamefully scoffed at, insulted in the columns of the *Moniteur* and in the bulletins, and is still, even now, occasionally treated with abuse by some of the numerous French writers who treat of that time. Rüchel also, with whom Scharnhorst then was, and who afterwards gained immortal honour by the services which he rendered to the new and truly national Prussian army, was favourable to the plan. Kalkreuth, Pfuel, and Blücher, all wished to anticipate the French; even Hohenlohe was desirous of breaking straight into Franconia with the Silesian army, and was supported in his views by Massenbach, who accompanied him; but the Duke of Brunswick, as commander-in-chief, caused him to be called back, and only gave him leave again to advance when he ought to have retired with the whole army behind the Elbe. As to the notes from Talleyrand to Knobelsdorf, the essential contents of which are to be found in Thibaudeau, who would have us believe that the whole was seriously meant; and in Lefebvre, who openly admits that the whole of this writing was only designed to throw the Prussians into a state of slumber. The imprudence of the Prussians was also exhibited by the manner in which they all at once passed from the absurd illusions of weakness to pride and haughtiness, which would have been unpardonable even had they had victory in their hands.*

après les fières provocations des salons, des casernes, après le désaveu de M. d'Oubril n'était plus possible. L'Empereur avait le secret de cette situation, et quand il insistait sur une chose qu'il savait inacceptable, il n'avait qu'un but, c'était de jeter de l'irrésolution dans l'esprit du roi, et de gagner le temps nécessaire pour concentrer ses forces sur les points décisifs."

* We know nothing more to the purpose, or historically better founded, than the language of Lefebvre, p. 343: "Jamais un gouvernement ne courut à sa perte avec plus d'emportement et d'imprévoyance; terrible exemple de la réaction téméraire que produit presque toujours dans les âmes timorées l'excès de l'injure trop longtemps supportée." How sudden the change was from fear to presumption may, perhaps, be best of all learned from the king's expression in a letter to General Ruschfeld, captain of his guards, on the 20th of September, when he took his departure from Berlin: **IF WITHOUT DRAWING OUR SWORDS WE CAN OBTAIN OUR OBJECT, VIZ., THE NECESSARY SECURITY FOR OUR OWN STATES, SO MUCH THE BETTER; AND LUCCHESINI (ITERUM CRISPINUS) STILL CONTINUES TO ALLEGE THAT ALL MAY BE BROUGHT TO A PEACEFUL CONCLUSION.**

On the 25th of September, and therefore immediately after Lucchesini had brought Napoleon's message, and the news of his departure to the army, to the Prussian camp, the king sent a letter, fabricated by Gentz and Lombard, the contents of which were essentially the same with the ridiculous and offensive manifesto subsequently quoted, to General von Knobelsdorf, to deliver to the Emperor, whom the Prussians had so long meanly flattered. This letter, sent by Knobelsdorf, from Mayence, to the Emperor, was received by him on the 7th of October, the day after his arrival in Bamberg, at the same time with a letter from Talleyrand, in which the latter announced the haughty demands which Knobelsdorf had directed to him. Knobelsdorf had declared that peace could only be maintained on three conditions, which he prescribed; and had even fixed a day for the return of an answer. The answer to his demands, it was said, must be sent in by the 8th of October. The prescribed conditions were : I. That all the states of Northern Germany should be suffered to enter into a reunion with Prussia; II. That the whole of the French troops should be removed from the right to the left bank of the Rhine; III. That Wesel should be again separated from France, and Essen, Verden, and Elten, restored to the King of Prussia. These haughty demands, and the offensive contents of the letter, twenty pages long, would of themselves have inevitably given occasion for war, had not orders to commence hostilities been already issued. These began on the 8th of October.

We neither dwell on Bonaparte's manifesto, on his letter to the senate, nor on his appeal to his soldiers; they were all composed in that boasting, abusive, and threatening tone, calculated to make an impression on the minds of military men, which worked miracles as long as the French were favoured by fortune, but became mere ridiculous rhodomontade as soon as they suffered a check or disaster. The Prussian manifesto was well, but not prudently written; for, besides being itself a most vehement accusation against Russia, which had not only tranquilly witnessed all the acts of injustice therein thrown in the teeth of the French, but had even shared with them in the plunder of Germany, contained wholly superfluous and unnecessarily offensive attacks upon an excitable and presumptuous enemy, who was superior to them in power. This manifesto excited surprise: Napoleon's appeal to his army surprised no one. His first bulletin, composed in a completely *sans-culottes* style, against the queen, who was generally beloved, awakened, it is true, the indignation of all our minds, but, in other respects, was written in his usual strain. Thibaudeau, who, in reference to this, remains true to the spirit of the revolution, in which he played a part, endeavours to excuse it; this, however, Lefebvre does not venture to do. In the Prussian manifesto, the reference to the murder of the Duc d'Enghien was particularly indiscreet, and represents Prussia itself in

a very unfavourable light. Prussia had, up to this time, not only remained silent respecting the violation of the German territory, and the execution of the duke, but had made a merit towards Napoleon of having suppressed the voices of others. We shall be best able to show how the whole contents of the document, and the wonderfully sudden outbreak of zeal and patriotism, must have surprised and offended France and her German allies, by the selection of a few passages from the manifesto itself. We select the passage in which an attack is made upon Bonaparte, without considering, that if the thing were really as represented, Prussia, which surrendered Hanover, was much more blameable than the First Consul, who took possession of it. "After the tottering possessors of power," says the manifesto, "who, since 1792, in quick succession, strove to maintain their existence by war, the commencement of a firmer government in France awakened hope in the friends of peace. Still the policy of France remained the same; insatiable ambition was its predominant character; both arms and treaties were to be made subservient to the same ends. In the midst of peace, French troops invaded Hanover, closed the ports of Germany against the English flag, and made themselves masters of Cuxhaven, in the territory of a free town. In the midst of peace, French troops violated the German territory in a still more offensive manner. The Germans did not avenge the death of the Duc d'Enghien, but the memory of this event is by no means extinguished." When this manifesto was issued from Erfurt, on the 7th of October, Napoleon had already issued his proclamation from Bamberg on the previous day, and, for six weeks past, with all the energy, insight, and experience, of which he was master, had regulated everything, and precisely fixed the movements of every division of his army, in almost every possible contingency; whilst the Prussians were marching hither and thither, without object or plan. In order to remain true to our plan, we must not suffer ourselves to enter upon military affairs; we shall merely premise some brief information to the account of the results, rather than description of the events of the war, and hereafter pass very rapidly over the decisive battles of Jena and Auerstadt. In the first place, we must observe, that whilst Napoleon alone was the soul of his army, the source of all commands, and knew the muster-roll of all the different descriptions of troops, regiments, and companies of an army which may be called unique in its organisation, courage, discipline, experience and skill of its leaders, the King of Prussia, with the Duke of Brunswick, Möllendorf, Hohenlohe, Kökeritz, Rüchel, Pfuel, Massenbach, Scharnhorst, and Major von Rauch, held a council in Erfurt, on the 5th and 6th of October, on what was best to be done. This council of war became the ridicule and contempt equally of friends and enemies, in consequence of the king having invited Count Haugwitz and the Marquis Lucchesini to be present at its deliberations, and thereby disclosing the whole of its resolutions immediately

to the enemy. At this meeting, Hohenlohe, whose proposal was the boldest, was outvoted. His advice was, that the army should, without further delay, march to the right through Hesse, and fall with the whole of the left wing upon Franconia. We conclude, that, in a military point of view, this would have been best, from the fact that Napoleon himself, and all the French military writers, allege the cause of the Russian disasters at Schleiz and Saalfeld to have been, that Tauenzien was obliged to remain in Hof, instead of combining all his forces in the strong town of Cronach, which commanded the passes of the mountains.

The blind Duke of Brunswick was too late in becoming convinced, that Lucchesini's assurance that Napoleon would not attack, but await the attack of the Prussians, was either the result of Italian lightmindedness or of treachery; and Lucchesini himself, in his prattle about the confederation of the Rhine, altogether denies that he ever gave such an assurance.

The measures adopted by the Prussians were wholly destitute of order; every one wished to command—none to obey; for the king and the duke, from defects of character, were one while meek, and at another obstinate. Hohenlohe was never more than half obedient; the Saxons were unwilling to be employed on the offensive, and the Elector of Hesse played a cowardly game. He purchased neutrality from the French, and was so destitute of shame, as to go himself to Naumburg on the 3rd of October, and announce this to the King of Prussia. At this moment it was too late to hem him in between Blücher and Rüchel, which might have been done earlier; the king, however, tried by friendly persuasion to induce him to remain true to the treaty into which his ambassador had already entered in Berlin. A whole day was spent in negotiations with him, but his only answer to any proposal was, that *he wished to remain quiet*. On the 4th he took his departure, an object of contempt, not only to every patriot, but also to the French themselves. We, who at that time in Frankfort built our hopes upon Prussia, and regarded the spirit of its manifesto as excellent, rejoiced when Nemesis overtook him, at no more distant date than nineteen days afterwards, and regretted nothing more, than the being restrained by a sense of duty from telling the French that his ill-gotten money was concealed in wine-casks, in Amschel Rothschild's cellar in Frankfort. Blücher had at that time appeared, with a division of his army, in the Hessian territory; but because the king was too weak, he withdrew, in order to form the advanced guard of the Duke of Brunswick, instead of pressing forward with 40,000 men in the rear of the French, as he wished to have done when reinforced by the Hessians.

B.—HISTORY OF THE WAR TILL JANUARY, 1807.

The Emperor of the French anticipated the Prussians, pushed forward from various points from Franconia into Saxony, and marching down the course of the Saale, attacked the advanced troops of the Prussian left wing. Rühle von Lilienstein has given us a melancholy but true description of the condition of the army under Hohenlohe, which was to oppose the French; this account, published in 1807, has never been contradicted. Those who have read his description of the anarchy, irresolution, and fear, which prevailed before the battle of Saalfeld, of the badness of the provisions, clothing, and arms, and of the disorder, confusion, and cowardice, which were manifested after the battle, will easily understand the contempt expressed for the Prussians by the Emperor, who had been spoken of so offensively in the manifesto.*

The French pushed forward by Hof and three other roads, with such a superiority of force against the Silesian and Saxon army under Prince Hohenlohe, that Tauenzien was compelled to withdraw from Hof in haste as early as the 8th of October, and suffered considerable loss at Schleiz on the 9th, because his superior officers, did not know how to prevent Bernadotte and Maison from forming a junction to destroy him.† On the 10th, the division under Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, which formed the advance-guard of the left wing, was routed at Saalfeld, the artillery, ammunition, and military chest, lost; because the prince, on account of his rank, did not think himself bound to obey orders, but gave way to the impulse of his mad courage. As early as the morning of the unfortunate 10th, the prince had received orders not to march out of Rudolstadt; these he did not observe; at Saalfeld, all the officers of experience entreated him not to begin a useless engagement, but he disregarded their advice. In the fight, he most foolishly showed none of the capacity of a general, but merely the courage of a duellist; he suffered himself to get into a personal encounter, and fell.‡ In this way his body became

* Rühle von Lilienstein observes, p. 30: "With proud calmness and indifference, we therefore allowed French officers, under various pretences and disguises, to stroll about through the whole of Saxony, and to go even as far as Dresden, and with perfect ease and convenience, to obtain the most exact information concerning all the military matters worth knowing. All proposals to obtain information for ourselves in a similar manner were regarded as unworthy and expensive trifling."

† We do not think it necessary to go into particulars, in order to show, what is already recorded in every work on the subject, how incomprehensibly badly everything was provided in all departments of the service; we shall merely quote the words in which Rühle von Lilienstein gives a summary of the whole, p. 92: "It may be affirmed," he says, "that during the last three or four years before the outbreak of hostilities, the foundation had been laid for the unfortunate issue of the whole campaign. In the same manner, the overruling destiny on the day of the battle must indisputably be deduced and explained from the events which, during the five days preceding the decisive battle, combined for the destruction of the armies."

‡ The manner in which the prince met with his death is variously related. The

a trophy; and the French, afterwards, on delivering it up, were able to play the part of magnanimous knights. The loss which the Prussians sustained by the fall of the prince was in reality very small; but the news of his death, of the rout of his corps, and the loss of the artillery, produced an electric effect, unmanned the Prussians, and strengthened the French in the feeling of their superiority. As early as the 12th, they had completely out-maneuvred the Prussians. Murat took Naumburg; Soult, Gera; Ney, Auma; Bernadotte, Zeiz; Davoust, Mittelpölnitz; Lannes forced Hohenlohe to leave Jena, and to take up a position at the Landgräfenberg, whither he immediately followed him; Augereau was in Kahla. The Prussians had magazines at Naumburg, which now served the French; on the 13th, they were unable to defend the bridge at Kösen, and in consequence, their retreat across the Elbe was cut off, and the hope of meeting with a Russian army on the other side of the Oder disappointed. Napoleon sought to profit by the terror which the advantages he had gained had spread abroad, in order completely to draw off Prussia from Russia. This was undoubtedly his object in sending M. de Montesquieu from Gera to the Prussian camp, as the bearer of three letters, calculating, as he did, upon the character of the king, and of the people by whom he was surrounded.

One of these letters was addressed to the Duke of Brunswick as commander-in-chief, and related to the wounded and prisoners; the second to Count Haugwitz, and the third to the king himself. The king, however, received this letter too late, on the battle-field of Jena. Prince Hohenlohe had detained the bearer of the letter, and caused it to be delivered only on the following morning. The letter to the king was couched in the language of condolence on the death of Prince Louis Ferdinand, which might almost have been regarded as irony; it further contained an offer of delivering up the body, with a view to interment in the royal sepulchre, and some sly and mild phrases addressed to the king, to make him waver in his resolutions. It requires all the ingenuity and impudence of French sophists, to persuade any one who has ever read its commencement, and is acquainted with the manner in which Napoleon treated all his vassals, and even his brothers, that it speaks the language of magnanimity, and does not rather indicate the design of misleading the king and Haugwitz into some new illusions.*

After the defeat at Saalfeld, the advice given by Massenbach to Prince Hohenlohe, who had no ideas of his own, was approved by all the intelligent men in the army. He recommended the prince

French naturally make it the most adventurous; but we have good reasons for not acquiescing in their statements. The best account will be found in Rühle von Lilienstein's book, so often quoted, pp. 242-251.

* It runs as follows: "Sire, votre majesté m'a donné rendez-vous le 8 en bon cavalier, je lui ai tenu parole; je suis au milieu de la Saxe. Qu'elle m'en croie, j'ai des forces telles que toutes ses forces ne peuvent longtemps balancer la victoire. Mais pourquoi répandre tant de sang? Dans quel but? Si V. M. m'eût demandé des choses possibles par sa note, je les lui eusse accordées," &c. &c.

immediately to cross the Saale, and to take up a position behind the Elbe, before it was too late. The Duke of Brunswick, however, was altogether incapable of coming to any rapid conclusion; he, therefore, delayed for three days, and only at last agreed to set out, when he learned that the French were marching upon Leipzig. It was then too late to follow the advice, and the unfortunate resolution was adopted of dividing the army into two parts. With the one half, the duke was to march through Naumburg and Auerstadt, to Freiburg; whilst the Prince of Hohenlohe, the Duke of Weimar, and Rüchel, were to remain with the other at Jena, in order to cover the retreat: the Saxon troops formed a part of this second division. Napoleon, on his part, was eager for a decisive battle; he had given orders to Lannes to take possession of the Landgräfenberg, and on the night between the 13th and 15th of October, all the necessary arrangements were made to annihilate the half of the army which had remained at Jena, by attacking him with his whole force. At the very time in which the battle of Jena was being fought, the main body of the Prussians, in their march to Naumburg, fell in with the third division of the French army under Davoust. The duty of keeping open the communications between Prince Hohenlohe and the Duke of Brunswick, had been assigned to Rüchel; he, however, came too late, and did not even set out from Weimar till Hohenlohe had been separated from the duke, beaten at Jena, and his army dispersed. Rüchel, it is true, collected the flying and advanced; he was, however, quite unequal to cope with the united divisions of Soult, Augereau, and Murat, by whom he was attacked and beaten. Rüchel himself was wounded, and the remainder of his forces, threatened on all sides, retired behind the Ilm. In this way, Napoleon's victory at Jena destroyed one half of the Prussian army, whilst Davoust gained a much more glorious victory over the other at Auerstadt. On the 14th, Napoleon's army was at least double that of the Prussians;* whilst Davoust had undoubtedly not more than half the numbers of the Duke of Brunswick, when he defeated him on the same day at Auerstadt. By that party among the French who seek on every occasion to depreciate Bernadotte, this is ascribed to the ill-will of that general, who, they say, should have hastened up with his division from Apolda, which he omitted to do. We cannot go into the investigation of such points; so much is certain, that the order issued to Davoust, to unite both divisions under his command, in case of need, was not communicated in sufficient time to Bernadotte. When, at length, he did advance through Domburg, Davoust had already gained the victory; Berna-

* The most recent writers, no longer favourers of Napoleon, allege that the Emperor had 80,000, and Hohenlohe 55,000 men. In the (documentary) history of the war, carried on by the Russians and Prussians against France in the years 1806-7, with 5 plans, Berlin, 1835, it is, however, said, p. 36, "That the marching condition of the combined Prussian and Saxon troops amounted to little more than 35,000 men, of which the division of Count Tauenzien contained 7900, and that of General Holzendorf 5900."

dotte's fresh troops completed the destruction of the whole Prussian main army, separated, beaten, and caught, in a most unexampled manner.*

Neither the king himself, the princes, nor the old generals, were at all deficient in bravery and physical courage; but they were deficient in moral courage, and in the knowledge of those changes in military movements, and in the command of large armies, which had become necessary in consequence of Napoleon's energy and tactics. Great personal bravery was exhibited by the king, both his brothers, and the three aged generals, the Duke of Brunswick, Count Schmettau, and Möllendorf, who were successively commanders-in-chief; the king was, with great difficulty, persuaded to retire from the contest; both the princes were slightly wounded, and the duke, Schmettau, and Möllendorf, so severely, that they afterwards died of their wounds. The Prince of Orange and Count von Wartensleben were also wounded. The number of prisoners is, indeed, very much overrated by the French, because they make the whole number of the Prussian army much larger than it really was; yet we are to this hour impressed with the recollection of the numerous and incessant trains of miserably-clothed and disarmed Prussians, whom we daily saw passing through Frankfort. The French, who escorted them, were furious, when they saw people streaming onward from all directions, and without distinction of rank, offering refreshment or support to their suffering countrymen. How they pushed the poor fellows with the but-ends of their guns! So much the less importance can be laid on the number of killed and prisoners, as it is certain that at least one-third of the whole army was either killed or taken in the two battles fought on the one day; that but a very small part of the other two-thirds was remaining at the end of the year 1806; and that all the artillery and stores on this side of the Oder had fallen into the hands of the enemy. No one understood better than Napoleon how to follow up on all sides the advantages which he had gained, whether in the cabinet or in the field, and quickly to turn them to account; and no people are quicker and more courageous in victory than the French. All this was particularly manifest in the results of the two victories gained on the 14th of October. Rüchel, with that part of the army under his command, which, from pride and self-conceit, he put late in motion, had marched to Erfurt, where the fortifications of the Peters-

* Notwithstanding all we have since read, we know nothing better to say than what has been said by Mathieu Dumas, "Précis des Événements Militaires," &c., vol. vi., p. 181: "Aucune des trois armées prussiennes n'était préparée à livrer bataille, ni celle du Prince Hohenlohe ni celle du Général Rüchel, qu'on avait laissées en observation, en défendant aux généraux en chef d'engager une action sérieuse; ni celle du roi, qui marchait sur Fribourg avec autant de sécurité que si l'ennemi eût été encore au-delà des montagnes; on n'avait pas donc calculé la possibilité d'une retraite précipitée, le généralissime n'avait fait, à cet égard, aucune disposition d'ensemble pour les trois corps d'armée, ou du moins pour les deux grandes masses, l'armée saxo-prussienne et l'armée du roi."

berg afforded protection for a time, and where they ought to have maintained themselves for some days; especially as stores of all kinds had been collected there, and the place was well defended with artillery. Unfortunately, however, great numbers of those who had escaped from the battles, had assembled there without order or discipline; and Möllendorf, who was mortally wounded, and the Prince of Orange, wounded also at the same time, had been brought thither. This decided the fate of Rüchel's division. At this moment, the delay of a single day was of immense importance, and yet Murat had scarcely made his appearance at Erfurt, on the 15th, fresh from the field of battle, when a capitulation was signed by Möllendorf, on the 16th. By virtue of this capitulation, the Prince of Orange, two lieutenant-generals, two major-generals, and 14,000 men, fell, as prisoners, into the hands of the French. Helwig, a lieutenant of hussars, contrived, indeed, to liberate 9000 of those prisoners on their way; but the signature of Möllendorf, who immediately afterwards died, still proved ruinous to the remainder of the army, commanded by the king himself. The king, as soon as he saw that all was lost, hastened by the shortest route to the Oder, leaving the command of the army in Sondershausen to Prince Hohenlohe, after whom Murat hastened immediately on the capitulation of Erfurt.

The Saxon governments had never been honest in their dealings with Prussia; and Napoleon's conduct towards the Saxons on the battle-field, which was trumpeted forth as magnanimity, was nothing more than the result of the pains taken by the Saxon diplomatists, and of the union which their government had continuously maintained with the French. This, too, it was which, both before and afterwards, caused their general, Von Zeschwitz, to raise so many objections to the Prussian measures, and to cause so many delays. Napoleon dismissed the Saxon soldiers and officers, without requiring any other conditions than a promise not to serve against him again. He addressed them in his hypocritical, boasting manner, and thereby quite delighted the good people, to whom his words were interpreted, by such an instance of goodness. He alleged, that he was not at war with Saxony, and sent Major Funk as a courier to Dresden, in order that he might separate Saxony quickly from Prussia, and be able to use it for his own purposes. Even before Funk came back, General von Zeschwitz sent Captain von Thielmann, who was very skilful, and not very scrupulous as to the means of making his fortune, with a commission to the Emperor, who granted him an audience in Merseburg on the 18th. Thielmann's vain soul was enchanted by the smooth words and gracious manners of the Emperor, just as Johannes von Müller afterwards was, in Berlin, by his conversation, which he caused to be printed, both in German and French, without ever for a moment suspecting that the man who spoke to him had calculated every word for its impression on him and his like. Thielmann even went so far as to speak of peace,

which he was not commissioned to do; so that even the Emperor expressed his astonishment at his boldness, but, nevertheless, did not hesitate to employ the captain as a tool, since he offered him his services. Thielmann was sent to the elector, and managed the cause of the French so skilfully among his practical Saxons of the old stamp, who possessed not a particle of enthusiasm, that the orders issued to the Saxon army were drawn up precisely as Napoleon wished. As the bearer of these orders, he returned to the camp at Barby, as early as the 21st, and contrived, thenceforward, to have himself regarded as the author of peace.*

In the letter of which Thielmann was the bearer to Dresden, the Emperor insisted that the Saxons should immediately withdraw from the Prussians, and without further efforts give up the cause of their ally as hopeless. In order, too, that the other princes of the Saxon house might do the same, Napoleon cunningly regarded the decision of the elector as applicable to the Duke of Weimar and the other dukes. The conclusion of the peace was afterwards delayed till December, and in the mean time, means were employed to exhaust and plunder the Saxons. In the practice of these extortions, by reason of the nature of German official life, Napoleon was able to allow everything to follow a systematic course, without exciting observation, to suffer everything to go on in the usual way, and to use the Germans against the Germans. The public officials, accustomed to serve those from whom they had their living, served the French, as they did in Hanover and other occupied countries, and afterwards also in Prussia; official life and tax-gathering remained precisely as it was, except that Frenchmen, or half-Frenchmen, were placed at the head of the extorting machine. Saxony was divided into four districts—Naumburg, Leipzig, Dresden, and Wittenberg; all were obliged to pay before they were let out of the talons. Leipzig was laid under special contribution, as a town and as a district, like Naumburg—it was compelled to pay 6,000,000 francs; and Wittenberg, though much smaller and poorer, was required to give the same amount. Weimar and Eisenach, notwithstanding all their dreadful sufferings from friends and foes, paid 300,000 dollars; Coburg, Meiningen, and Hildburghausen, were assessed; 130,000 were at first demanded from Gotha, but afterwards remitted. The treaty of peace between Saxony and France, which was signed on the 10th of September, conferred the title of king upon the elector, the only effect of which was an increase of useless expenditure. The new king, like the other German princes, became a French vassal by his incorporation in the confederation of the Rhine, in order that, through him, his subjects, with their blood and property, might be made available for the purposes of France. He was compelled to take part in the war against Prussia, which was, at that time, the only re-

* We here follow, as an authority, the account given by Count von Holzendorf, in the "Beiträgen zu der Biographie des Generals, Freiherrn von Thielmann, mit Actenstücken belegt." Leip. bi Von Vondk, p. 7.

presentative of his German fatherland, and at the very first to furnish 4000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, 300 artillerymen, and 12 guns, and to bind himself in future to send 20,000 men to the army of the confederation. The Saxon duchies were also incorporated in the confederation of the Rhine, and agreed to send 2800 into the field for the enemy of their country.

The King of Prussia, as above observed, had given the chief command of the army to Prince Hohenlohe, and desired him to assemble all the scattered troops in and around Magdeburg. The prince, however, since he had heard of Möllendorf's capitulation, on the 17th of October, appeared to have lost his understanding. He was absolutely terrified, when he was informed that Soult, with 40,000 men, had advanced as far as Kreussen, and that Blücher and Tauenzien had only escaped imprisonment by giving out that a truce had been concluded. There was still, indeed, a body of reserve at Halle, under Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg, which is usually stated to have been 14,000 strong; but Bernadotte was just about to attack them, and Murat, with his cavalry, was at the heels of the division under Kalkreuth. The prince, therefore, marched directly to Magdeburg, but soon heard of the complete defeat of the whole division entrusted to him. From the accounts given by an eye-witness, himself an officer of distinction,* we see how inconceivably bad the organisation of the connexion between the different divisions of the Prussian army was, how defective the news which reached the generals, and how slowly the regiments, appointed for a purpose, assembled. The troops which were to be commanded by Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg, were not assembled when he reached Halle on the 14th of October, and he himself was in uncertainty as to the issue of the decisive battle of Jena, at eight o'clock in the evening of the 15th. As soon as this bad news reached him, he sent a messenger for orders, when no orders were to be had, instead of himself adopting a speedy determination. The prince supposed that the Duke of Brunswick, who was mortally wounded (and who neither knew nor could know the state of affairs), would be brought to Eisleben, and, instead of adopting measures of his own, he despatched an officer for orders to Eisleben; the duke, however, did not pass through—the whole of this time was lost. All writers, besides, agree—and this is especially the opinion of the eye-witness—that no such command as that in Halle should have been given to Prince Eugène; because he had entirely failed in the performance of those duties which any general whatever in his situation would have performed. He should, as they say, have burnt down the bridge, and thus delayed the advance of the enemy, but not have risked an attack; he did, however, risk a battle, and was beaten. The consequence was, that above 4000 men, with 22 pieces of cannon, and all the stores which were collected together in Halle, like those in Erfurt, fell into the hands of the enemy.

* *Bericht eines Auzenzeugen.* Von Rühle von Lilienstein. Beiträgen, p. 270, and following.

From this moment, the confusion in those divisions of the army which had escaped the two main battles, and the anarchy among their leaders, became boundless; for Kalkreuth and Hohenlohe, Massenbach and Blücher, were mostly of totally different opinions as to what ought to be done. Blücher was undoubtedly as little acquainted with the systematic part of warlike operations as Hohenlohe, and perhaps less so; but for the direction of such things, he had, in Scharnhorst, a man upon whom he could much more confidently rely than Hohenlohe or Massenbach. The remnant of the corps under Duke Eugène, together with that under Von Natzmer, collected around Hohenlohe, at Magdeburg; but the governor of the fortress was an old man, without either head or heart, and useless, except for the mere purposes of a drill-sergeant. The aged Von Kleist refused to receive orders from Hohenlohe, and withheld from the Prussian army, suffering from every description of want, what he was afterwards, without attempting resistance, obliged to deliver up to the French.

Prince Hohenlohe, having formed a junction with Blücher and Kalkreuth (who was afterwards sent for by the king to join him in East Prussia, whither Rüchel had also made his way), at Nordhausen, sent direction from thence to Von Kleist, in accordance with the orders of the king, to take measures for providing for the troops, to prepare cantonments, to stop the passage of the bridge over the Elbe, and to cause the scattered and flying troops to be received and reduced to order. This, however, was not only wholly neglected, but the governor altogether refused to supply the prince's army with the necessary ammunition, provisions, and forage, from the stores of the fortress. The divisions under Lannes, Murat, Soult, and Bernadotte, were appointed to prevent the prince, with his army, from reaching the Oder; everything, therefore, depended on gaining a few days' march; but, nevertheless, he omitted so to do. He did not leave Magdeburg till the 21st of October, and, therefore, two days later than he should have set out. His line of march was to lie through Rathenow, Fehrbellin, Templin, and Prenzlau, to Stettin. On the march, Blücher and Winningen commanded the rear. The prince, however, soon found himself closely beset on two sides, pressed on all sides, and, at length, even separated from Blücher and Winningen. The last event took place when the prince, who, according to his list, thought he had only 10,000 men with him, had left Boizenburg, in order to march to Prenzlau. Blücher, indeed, followed him to Boizenburg; but when he reached this place, he found that the prince had, on the 28th of October, concluded that shameful capitulation, which Blücher only escaped by a desperate march. Blücher's march again brought some honour to Prussia, after a long run of disgrace, but at the same time it brought ruin upon the unfortunate town of Lübeck. The prince's march was, properly speaking, conducted by Massenbach, who was his oracle; but to him many faults

have been attributed. We ourselves offer no opinion on mere military questions, and shall therefore only lay before our readers some proofs of the disgraceful capitulation of Prenzlau. One error of Massenbach's is established—he believed that Lannes was also in the neighbourhood of Prenzlau, when he had only to do with Murat's division. Massenbach in his memoirs, and Rühle von Lilienstein in his report, represent the prince's situation in Prenzlau as desperate. They prove that his troops were destitute of provisions, ammunition, courage, and discipline; that Stettin could with difficulty have been reached in two days' march; and that many other circumstances rendered a longer resistance, if not impossible, at all events imprudent. To this it may be answered, that, as we are able to testify, every German then felt, and said openly, that Massenbach sinned against the German people by advising a capitulation; the prince proved himself an enemy to the national honour by consenting to it, till the last gun had been fired, and the last man been cut down; because this capitulation made us an object of contempt and ridicule to the French.

Massenbach was always a very frivolous, intriguing man. He had always been favourably disposed towards the French; he had detained news of a peace concluded with Lucchesini, of which we shall hereafter speak; and he was incomprehensibly deceived with respect to the situation of the place whither he was sent to the French, and most probably intentionally suffered the prince to be officially deceived.* The fact of the prince having declined the capitulation twice, was reason enough for refusing a third time; it was something unexampled to conclude, merely *verbally*, a capitulation whereby the whole remains of the Prussian army, except the troops under Blücher and Winningen, were surrendered to the enemy. It sounds singular, moreover, that all the officers, among whom, besides Hohenlohe, were General Tauenzien, the Prince of Mecklenberg, Schwerin, and Prince Augustus of Prussia, should be allowed to go whithersoever they pleased, whilst the poor soldiers were obliged to march as prisoners of war to France. As we cannot deny, that ALL

* In the *Geschichte des Kriegs*, pp. 97-98, we find the following: "Colonel von Massenbach returned to the prince under the altogether inconceivable illusion that he had been on the eastern shore of the Uckersee, had there spoken with Lannes, and seen a very considerable body of French cavalry. This being presumed to be so, he might properly allege, that they were already probably cut off from Locknitz, and at all events should be obliged to march the four miles (German) thither through a continual fight, in which, in consequence of the exhaustion of the troops, their whole reliance must be placed on the artillery. Immediately thereupon the commander of the artillery, unasked, and in the strictest form of the service, announced that most of the battalions were destitute of cartridges, and that there was not more than four or five charges for each gun (which was not true). In ordinary life, it would have been in a moment obvious to a less gifted man than the prince, that Herr von Massenbach could not have ridden six miles (German) in an hour and a half, and that the announcement of the commander of the artillery must have been false, because their supplies were completed in Magdeburg, and only a few shots had been fired since, at Boizenburg."

was soon lost on this side the Oder, it is scarcely worth the trouble of remarking, that the boasting French alleged the number of prisoners taken at Prenzlau to be 7,000 men greater than it really was.

What these 10,000 Prussians under Hohenlohe might have done for German and for Prussian honour, and how they might even have been able to have made their way to Stettin, is apparent from the fight made by a battalion of grenadiers under Prince Augustus, which consisted of only 240 men. Although the five squadrons of cavalry which ought to have covered this battalion from an onslaught of the cavalry had been separated from it, it nevertheless repulsed the attack seven times; and the last hundred men were only dispersed, when the intervention of a morass prevented them from forming a square. The enemy, who justly showed their contempt for Hohenlohe and his highborn officers, who had disgracefully capitulated and sacrificed their people, acknowledged the honourable struggle of the grenadiers, and would not suffer the remainder of these brave fellows to be cut down.

The haughty Prussian nobles, who boasted of Frederick and the seven years' war, rivalled Hohenlohe in their meanness; but Kleist, the aged governor of Magdeburg, outdid them all—and he, too, was a remnant of the seven years' war. Kleist, probably, even anticipated the French in his proposals; for the fact was known in Brunswick five days earlier than it was known in Magdeburg, to any except the governor and his confidants, that the fortress would capitulate. Ney himself, who had not half as many troops under his command as were in the city, and was not only destitute of materials for the siege of such a fortress, but could not even collect them within four weeks, was greatly surprised that resistance was not even attempted. The chief fortress of the whole kingdom of Prussia, with all its artillery and 23,000 men, was surrendered on the 20th of October to Ney. On the very same day a division of Prussian cavalry, 6000 strong, were taken prisoners without a blow in Pasewalk, by General Milhaud. The pitiful conduct of General Romberg, in Stettin, excited so much surprise in the mind of the Emperor of France, that he wrote to his brother-in-law, Murat, that it appeared to him, from what he daily heard of capitulations, there would no longer be any need for heavy artillery, since fortresses might now be conquered by hussars. Murat had sent forward General Lasalle, with the light cavalry, to Stettin; and Romberg surrendered the fortress on the first summons, although it was well provided, and had a garrison of 6000 men with 150 guns. As early as the 31st of October, General Bila further capitulated with 4000 heavy cavalry at Anklem; but Colonel von Ingersleben, in Küstrin, outdid even Kleist and Romberg in shamelessness and cowardice—which might appear almost impossible. Küstrin is situated in the midst of morasses, completely secure from any assault; at that time, its garrison amounted to 2700 men, with 90 pieces of artillery and considerable magazines, when Güdin appeared in the neighbourhood, at the end of October, with a single division of infantry. When the French

general summoned the commandant of the fortress, he had not even boats sufficient to convey his troops across the branch of the Oder, which separates the fortress from the left bank. Notwithstanding this, the noble commandant, who only thought of himself and his, surrendered the bulwark of the kingdom on the first summons, on the 1st of November. The French remark, with just contempt, that the commandant was obliged to send his own boats, in order to convey them across. Spandau had been already surrendered by Major von Beckendorf to Marshal Lannes, on the 14th of October, when Davoust entered Berlin, and Napoleon went for a few moments to Potsdam, in order to play one of his French comedies in Sans Souci, for the use of his bulletins and the newspaper writers of the day.

When one considers the series of meannesses, which contemptible men sought to excuse on political grounds, and by diplomatic talk, it will not be asked whether Blücher's march from Boizenburg to the Trave was wisely calculated or not; feelings of pity will be excited for Lubeck, which became a sacrifice; but all must, without hesitation, acknowledge that the honour of the nation and of the Prussian army was of more consequence than a town. The Spaniards, the Greeks, and the Circassians, have made greater sacrifices: where victory is impossible, single groups must steel the hearts of survivors, by their fall in hopeless combat. At this miserable time, Blücher was accused of having, out of enmity to Hohenlohe, forsaken him at Boizenburg, and of having recklessly exposed Lubeck to destruction: all that we could say in reference to such idle accusations, has been already said by a writer of Napoleon's school in the *Annuaire* for 1806;* and he himself has fully justified all that is there said against him in the letter, written by him, or caused to be written, to which we shall immediately refer. What the Frenchman says of the Hussars, does not affect Blücher in the least, for he had the assistance of Scharnhorst, who was renowned as a master in his department.

When Blücher withdrew from the command of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and escaped the fate which awaited him under his authority, he thought he might be able to save a part of his army for the King of Prussia, by endeavouring to reach the sea with 20,000 to 25,000 men, and taking refuge on shipboard; he calculated that, in any case, he should thus withdraw the French from the Oder. The Duke of Weimar, who, by the intercession of his wife, had obtained peace from Napoleon, had first led the corps which he commanded across the Elbe, given up the command, with the consent of the King of Prussia, to General Winningen, and then retired from the service; Blücher therefore aimed at forming a junction

* *Annuaire*: "Le vieux chef de troupes légères a montré, dans cette longue retraite, à quel point le courage, la constance et la fermeté de caractère peuvent suppléer aux talents . . . et l'on doit regretter qu'il ait un peu terni l'espée de gloire qu'il s'est acquise par la faute impardonnable qu'il commit de sacrifier inutilement la ville de Lubeck."

between Winningen's division and his own, and marching through Rostock to the sea; he was however overtaken by the French. We dwell at greater length than usual on this march of Blücher's, because, from the beginning, without laying claim to any military judgment, we have always been of his opinion, and still are, in opposition to most Germans of that time, who alleged, with Massenbach, that the injuries done to Lubeck were greater than the advantage of maintaining German honour and drawing off the French from the banks of the Oder to those of the Elbe.

The French got before Blücher at old Schwerin; the divisions under Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, pressed him on all sides. He appeared to be surrounded; conditions were offered to him several times, but he expressly rejected every proposal for capitulation, and might, on one day, have fallen upon Bernadotte had he not thought Soult and Murat nearer to him than they really were. On the next day, when he was desirous of making the attack, it was too late. Being hotly pursued, he strove to take up a position behind the Trave; and this it was which led him on the 5th of November to Lubeck. On the previous day, a body of Swedes, under General Mörner, flying before the French from Lauenburg, had blown up the gate, and hastened through the town in order to get on board their ships at Travemunde and Neustadt. On the next day (the 6th), the French stormed the castle-gate (Burgthor). The Duke of Brunswick-Oels, son of the old Duke of Brunswick, made a vain attempt to defend this gate, with three battalions, against a whole *corps d'armée* of the French, at least till Blücher and his Prussians had time to evacuate the town. Blücher's orders were not punctually followed; the gate was taken by storm, by the French, under Frère, Drouet, Leopold Berthier, and Pactod, who also attacked the Prussians within the town from another gate. The troops of Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, speedily filled the town, burst open the houses—and a dreadful scene of massacre continued for four hours. Blücher no sooner learnt that his orders had not been exactly obeyed, than he hastened back into the town, and a regular engagement was fought in the Königstrasse. The Prussian general soon found himself compelled to give way to superiority of numbers, and retreated by the bridge over the Trave into the territory of Eutin; the town was, however, swimming in blood, and the French, enraged at what appeared a useless resistance, slaughtered citizens and soldiers, men and women, and gave loose to all those enormities which are usually practised in cities taken by storm. Five thousand dead bodies were lying in the streets, and it is a scandalous falsehood, alleged by Mathieu Dumas, and other French writers, that the massacre and plunder were only perpetrated during the heat of the engagement, which lasted four hours, and that after the capitulation was signed, all these enormities immediately ceased. Villers, a Frenchman who then lived in Lubeck, has described the

cruelties perpetrated after the capitulation, and related in detail the cannibal misdeeds which were carried on for three days in cold blood.

Blücher, having made incredible exertions, and having no ground for hoping for a favourable reception on the Danish territory, capitulated in Ratkau, and was obliged to surrender himself, the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, 12 major-generals, and 518 officers, prisoners of war. The French, according to their invariable custom, allege the number of prisoners to have been as much more as it really was. They affirm that the prisoners consisted of 16,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry; whilst Blücher, in his report to the king, where he must have given the true number, stated, that he had only 9500 men with him in all.

With respect to Blücher's justification, it ought to be enough to say, that his undertaking was approved of by such a man as Scharnhorst, and that Massenbach was the man who attacked him in the *Lichtstrahlen*, at the time in which there was an outbreak of revilings against Prussia; Blücher himself, however, has given a victorious answer. He was no sooner released, than he demanded to be tried by a court-martial, in June, 1807, and was declared most honourably acquitted. He defended himself in such a manner against Massenbach's attack in the *Lichtstrahlen*, that every German heart must rejoice that, in that age of meanness and diplomatic selfishness, Germany had at least ONE such man among her generals.

"As to the blame," he observes, in his defence against Massenbach's attack, published in the *Lichtstrahlen*, on the 26th of January, 1808, "of not having spared my own native country, Mecklenburg, it appears as if the respected writer meant to compare me to the commandant of a fortress, who, out of mere goodness of heart, surrenders a fortress entrusted to him on his honour, duty, and conscience, merely in order that his own house and those of friends should not be injured by a cannonade. In my opinion, the first obligation which lies upon a man of honour, is the fulfilment of his duty. As to Lubeck, it was most painful to me to have been obliged to expose its excellent inhabitants to so great evils. Had, however, my orders been obeyed in Lubeck, and had these results followed, which might and ought to have been their consequences—had I even foreseen ten times greater misfortunes to the town, I would not have hesitated to take possession of it. **MY OBJECT IN OCCUPYING THE ENEMY UNTIL THE RUSSIAN ARMY ARRIVED, AND THEREBY SAVING PRUSSIA AND SILESIA, WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN IN A GREAT DEGREE ATTAINED.**"

The fifteen hundred Swedes under Count Mörner proved unable to leave the harbour of Travemunde, in consequence of contrary winds, and were also obliged, after a short resistance, to surrender, with the exception of 400, under Colonel Morian, who escaped. Bernadotte loaded the Swedes with all sorts of favours and attention, and formed a

close intimacy with Count Mörner, whose friendship, four years afterwards, contributed very much to his being chosen by the state crown-prince, and heir to the crown of Sweden.

All the other Russian generals emulated Hohenlohe, Kleist, and the commandants of Stettin and Kustrin. On the 12th of November, the Prussian division, under Generals Pellet and Usedom, surrendered; the generals and officers in Hameln and Nienburg exceeded even Ingersleben in cowardice and meanness. This General Savary rudely threw in their teeth, when they were obliged to sue for his aid, and that of his Frenchmen, against the anger and contempt of their own soldiers. Savary had before repulsed them with resentment, when, by the terms of the capitulation, they were eager to secure for themselves a pension from the future masters of the fortresses which they were about to betray. On the 19th of November, Hameln capitulated without making any defence, and 7000 men were made prisoners of war; Nienburg, with 4000, followed its example on the 25th. A Frenchman, who is less presumptuous than his other countrymen, has, in reference to this occasion, branded with an indelible stigma those high and mighty nobles, who, at the very moment when their intolerable knightly pride might have even for once been useful to their country, proved themselves equally regardless of honour in Hanover and Franconia. These haughty nobles were General von Schöler, commandant of Hameln; Herr von Strachwitz, of Nienburg; and Herr von Usedom, who surrendered Plessenburg without resistance.

Thus, in the course of six weeks, the whole of Germany, as far as the Oder, together with the fortresses, which ought to have stopped the French on their march to the Oder and Vistula, was wrested from the Prussians, and Napoleon proceeded to the division and distribution of the occupied country, even before it had been formally ceded to him. He constantly did this with great indifference, because he dealt with countries and people just as with purchased ground, which may be given to-day to one, and to-morrow to another—sometimes used as a garden, and sometimes as a field, and may be divided and portioned out according to the fancy of every individual. The fate of the Elector of Hesse, however, excited no man's pity. Immediately after the battle of Jena, Mortier was ordered to occupy Cassel, and to shut up the Hessian troops all around. The elector was not aware that documents could be laid before him containing damning proofs of his double dealing; he therefore went so far, that after having, on the 12th of October, written a letter from Louisenlund to Haugwitz, the contents of which were utterly irreconcilable with his neutrality, he met Mortier, on his arrival in Cassel, with an offer to form a union with the French, with all his forces, against their enemies.* If it were possible at all

* For some account of the elector's behaviour on this occasion, see the *Moniteur* for 1807, col. 1307—the thirteenth bulletin, and particularly the letter appended to it.

to approve of the insolent and contemptuous tone of the *parvenus* of the Napoleon school towards old families, and towards the degenerate princes, it would undoubtedly be excusable on this occasion. The elector and his son afterwards learnt in right time that they were to be seized, and escaped under favour of the darkness and a fog, reached the Danish territory, and at a later period sought an asylum in Bohemia. The tone of the 29th bulletin, in reference to these matters, was one hitherto unknown among civilised nations.*

The conqueror next issued an order for razing the fortifications of Marburg and Hanau, taking down the Hessian arms everywhere, emptying the magazines and arsenals, and conveying the stores which they contained to Mayence; and, finally, for disarming and disbanding the army. The unfortunate Duke of Brunswick, too, beloved as he was by his subjects, was not allowed to await his cure in his own palace, as he begged permission from the victor to do; but, in order to avoid becoming a prisoner, and being driven from place to place under suffering and pain, he was obliged to take refuge in Altona, and died in the village of Ottensen, near this town, early in November. The harsh answer which Napoleon gave to the duke's chamberlain is, moreover, no proof of resentment, but was merely intended to give a colouring to the robbery about to be committed on him, as the duke's territory was to make a part of the German kingdom, which Napoleon had destined for his brother Jerome. This was the only reason why the Emperor made an offence against the French nation out of the proclamation of 1792, inasmuch as he knew perfectly well what the state of the case really was.

The Emperor had given orders to his brother Louis to collect an army in Holland, and to invade North Germany. These orders were observed, and the king had taken possession of East Friesland, Jever, Oldenburg, the county of Mark, Munster, Paderborn, and Osnabruck. He pushed forward to Hesse-Cassel, in order to form a junction with Mortier, and march to Hanover. When, however, he arrived at Cassel, he was grievously offended by an order from his brother, forwarded by Berthier, on the 6th of November. By this order he was placed under the command of Mortier, and forbidden to interfere at all in the administration of the countries occupied by him; he was informed that he was not to be regarded as King of Holland in Germany, but only as a French general, and that the administration was to be left to the French governors and intendants. The king was deeply offended, and returned dissatisfied to Holland, whilst Savary obtained the command.

* As early as the twenty-seventh bulletin the extirpation of the dynasty of Hesse-Cassel was announced, in that insolent and pompous tone, which can only meet with the approval of such men as Thiers and his companions. In that of the 29th we read as follows:—"Il faut que cette guerre soit la dernière, et que ses auteurs soient si sévèrement punis, que quiconque voudra désormais prendre les armes contre le peuple Français sache bien, avant de s'engager dans une telle entreprise, quelles peuvent en être les conséquences."

In the mean time, Mortier had appointed a so-called executive committee, consisting of Hernn Patje, Meding, and Münchhausen, in Hanover, where he had conducted the administration three years before; on the 19th of November he caused Hamburg to be taken possession of, Bremen on the 20th, and Ritzebuttel and Cuxhaven on the 25th. Lubeck, also, was formally seized upon on the 28th, after having been exposed to burning, murder, plunder, and most exorbitant contributions, since the 6th. Fulda, although it was not Prussian, but Orange, Erfurt, Eichsfeld, Brunswick, Halberstadt, Hildesheim, Goslar, even Munster itself, Osnabruck, and Teklenberg, into which General Loison had marched, were taken possession of under a proclamation, that they would never be given back to their former rulers; the opposite course, however, was pursued in the case of Mecklenburg. When this duchy was taken possession of, on the 28th, it was expressly said, that the reinstatement of the duke would depend on the nature of the peace made with Russia.

Whilst the whole of Germany was thus conquered by his subordinate generals, the Emperor himself pursued his march without delay against Prussia Proper, where the Russians had appeared. Davoust, as we have remarked above, had immediately after the battle of Auerstadt marched to Berlin, and Napoleon himself went thither as soon as his troops had entered the city. We do not dwell on the contributions which were levied (at the very first 150 millions), nor on the flatteries and servility expended on the conqueror; we also pass over the manner in which a number of German officials, as administrative authorities, were placed under the direction of such a man as Clarke as a chief, or under the coarse and violent Daru, and employed as the instruments of systematic robbery and plunder, because these things were partly the rights of the conqueror, and partly arose from the manner in which the whole class of German officials had been trained; we do lament, however, that a truly great man, like Napoleon, condescended to act the part of a French comedian. As evidence of this, we reckon the pompous boasting of the bulletins, composed in the style of a sub-lieutenant, the scenes for effect which he designedly got up, the pityful things which he did in order to furnish materials and anecdotes for rhetoricians and sophists, and to exhibit the traits of a heroic novel to the French, who were more conversant with Plutarch than deeply read in true history. As evidence, we reckon all that which makes such agreeable reading in the widely circulated French books; and yet Johannes von Müller was so enchanted with a single conversation, that he caused it to be printed, and from being inspired with a *Teutomanée*, became most suddenly a Bonapartist, without ever suspecting that Napoleon knew what sort of a man the historian was, and had calculated every word for effect. How severely was Johannes von Müller afterwards obliged to pay in Cassel, for having, by his admiration of Napoleon, so recommended himself to Marat, as to have obtained through him the place of a secretary of

state in Westphalia!! Another comedy was the pardoning of Hatzfeld, especially when it is known who this Hatzfeld and his father-in-law, Von Schulenburg, were, and that three years afterwards Napoleon lent him his protection against his own king. In the list of these comedies we also place his declamation against the proclamation, drawn up by Von Lemoëlen and issued by the Duke of Brunswick in 1792, and still further, the ridiculous (though never executed) order to destroy the memorial of Frederick the Second's victory at Rosbach. The idea of robbing the gates of peaceful Berlin of their ornaments, and violating the resting-place of the greatest King of Prussia, was especially inglorious. We must not, however, omit to observe, that a well-informed French historian of our own times has expressed his disapprobation of this pompous folly, as strongly as we could do ourselves.* Frederick's remains, which Napoleon took away, would have been spared even by a heathen hero, through fear of the goddess, who soon enough overtook the Corsican who had violated the sanctity of the tomb. He who knows how to estimate true greatness when he sees it, cannot but feel deep pain that a man, who in other respects was above vulgarity and meanness, should, in order to please the French rabble and brutal soldiery, have condescended to use the tone of a rude sergeant, and to have uttered, through his bulletins and newspapers, the lowest and grossest abuse against the unfortunate but most amiable queen. However little we feel inclined to take the part of the high German nobility, whose custom it was in Hanover, Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Russia, to look down upon their fellow-citizens with ridiculous pride, and to consider themselves entitled to do as they pleased, we cannot but regard it as highly unworthy of the Emperor to have behaved so much in the style of a *sans-culottes*, at a public audience, to these old nobles, whose society at other times, on account of their courtly manners, he was only too willing to cultivate, when he abused them for their disinclination to him and their fidelity to their king, and threatened to reduce them to beggary. It was a matter of further surprise, that he required all Prussians, who received any public appointments, to do homage, a thing he had not done in Austria.

Küstrin and Stettin had shamefully fallen, and it might have been supposed that the resentment of the whole of Germany, which was loudly expressed on the occasion, would have made the commandant of Glogau afraid; but fear and shame had altogether disappeared.

* "Les droits de la victoire ne sauraient s'étendre jusqu'à la tombe. Les insignes dont l'Empereur fit présent à l'Hôtel des Invalides à Paris faisaient, pour ainsi dire, partie du domaine de la mort; ils appartenaient aux cendres du héros prussien. Il y aurait eu plus de véritable grandeur à n'y point toucher." With reference to the pardoning of Presica Hatzfeld, he observes: "L'adulation, qui altère tout ce qu'elle touche, a transformé en acte de haute clémence ce qui n'était qu'un simple mouvement d'équité." In reference to the violent expressions against the Duke of Brunswick, addressed to his chamberlain, who went to make a request on the part of the duke, he says: "Ces reproches n'étaient que trop fondés, mais addressés à un vieillard mourant, ils étaient bien durs."—Lefebvre, vol. ii., pp. 400-402.

Napoleon caused Glogau to be first attacked by his brother Jerome, and then by the troops of Wirtemberg. The fortress was well provided with everything, and could easily have been defended for some months, and yet the commandant of Glogau capitulated as early as the 6th of December. Colberg, Danzig, Graudenz, Breslau, Brieg, Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Glatz, alone held out a longer time. By the end of November, the meanness and cowardice of the commandants had nearly deprived the king of all his fortresses; and in the same way, the cowardly souls, to whom in his timidity he always trusted in preference, had nearly succeeded in faithlessly and foolishly separating him from the English and Russians, by a compact with the French, and delivering him with his hands bound into their power.

The recently published (1845) journal of the minister, Von Schladen, has furnished us with an excellent key to all that went on at that time at the Prussian court, and in the cabinet. Herr von Schladen was inseparable from the king from the 10th of October, daily wrote down what had occurred, and was employed in every matter. He gives us a true picture of Lucchesini, Lombard, Haugwitz, Zastrow, and their coadjutors, in their evil activity putting everything into confusion, regulating nothing, and continually surrounding the king on decisive days. At the very first, Haugwitz began by urging, through Schladen, the printing of the unfortunate war manifesto, as the matter of the highest importance; whilst in everything connected with military preparations, marching, and arrangement, the confusion was so great, that Schladen was unable to stir in any direction from Weimar. We learn how it was not only Lombard and Gentz who prepared this piece of patchwork, wherein Prussia accuses itself, and gives mortal offence to Napoleon, but how others were busy on the occasion, and how these very same people afterwards advised the king to express his sorrow to his enraged enemy. We see how Haugwitz afterwards hastened after the king from Magdeburg to Rathenau, and how, from thence, Lucchesini was sent to Napoleon to beg for a truce. The occasion and pretence for this ill-timed communication were drawn from Napoleon's letter, which Montesquieu should have delivered before the battle of Jena, but which only reached the king's hands on the field of battle. Napoleon, indeed, on the first moment, declined a truce; but he immediately afterwards gave full powers to his cool-headed Duroc to take advantage of the proposal, in order to allure the king, through Lucchesini, into a trap. Although every patriot, the moment the king was persuaded to empower the Italo-Prussian to sue for a truce, despaired of any possible result, and Von Schladen recorded his conviction to the same effect in his journal,* yet Lucchesini opened his negotiations on the 21st of October. Haugwitz had proceeded hastily to

* Prussen, — Ein Tagebuch, &c., p. 13:—“What result can any one expect from this step (the mission of Lucchesini), which may injure us, because it will remove every possible doubt from the mind of our inexorable enemy, as to our des-

establish government offices for himself in Küstrin, which, indeed, were of no duration, because the commandant soon proved himself worthy of his master. How deep had all the people sunk, who at that time filled the chief offices at the Prussian court!! Lombard would have been torn to pieces by the people, had he not been placed under the protection of a guard. Schulenburg, who was a minister of state and governor of Berlin, left everything there in difficulties, handed over the office entrusted to him to his worthy son-in-law, Prince Hatzfeld, and like all the rest to whom the preservation of order was specially committed, hastily departed with bag and baggage.*

When the negotiations were opened on the 21st of October, Napoleon was not fully aware of the whole extent of the miserable condition of all the Prussian affairs, and all the men in high offices; he had no idea that the commander of the corps pursued by his generals, and commandants of the fortresses, were emulating each other in their endeavours to render the king utterly defenceless; otherwise he would have undoubtedly imposed still harder conditions than he did. Duroc was instructed to require, and on the express condition of immediate acceptance or rejection by Lucchesini: I. That Prussia should cede all its possessions between the Elbe and the Weser; II. That she should bind herself to pay a contribution of one hundred millions; III. That she should henceforth refrain from interfering, under any pretence whatever, in German affairs, and unconditionally approve of all the changes which had already been, or might hereafter be made. These terms Lucchesini did not venture unconditionally to accept, and the events, so ruinous to Prussia, which followed close one upon another in the same week, influenced the mind of the Emperor so far as to make him recall what he had already promised. Lucchesini, with the Emperor's consent, returned to the king, in order to submit for his approval the proposals which they were desirous of considering open for acceptance as late as the 27th of October; the king, however, had already written an auto-graph letter to the Emperor on the 25th, which bears evidence of such a degree of despondency and hesitation, that it was impossible to avoid believing that he would have submitted to still harder conditions. This letter, which has been lately brought to light from the French archives of foreign affairs,† exhibits the king in a state

of all means for carrying on the war, and especially of our want of perseverance."

* Prussen, A.A.O.—“The crowning beauty of Schulenburg's conduct on this occasion is, that, in his precipitation, being filled only with the thought of serving the troops, he forgot to clear out the arsenal, which had remained complete in Berlin. What can be expected from such men in present circumstances?”

+ “Monsieur mon frère—Personne n'a déploré plus que moi les circonstances malheureuses, qui ont amené entre nous un état de guerre incompatible avec les intérêts de nos deux nations. Vous êtes trop juste, monsieur mon frère, pour m'accuser d'avoir inconsidérément cherché à rompre des liens que mes sentiments personnels pour vous me rendaient doublement chers! vous êtes trop grand pour que le résultat d'une seule journée puisse vous porter à m'apprécier moins. Mais

of most lamentable weakness, and proves that those who possessed his confidence had not the slightest idea of the dignity and bearing which a monarch ought to maintain, even in the most adverse circumstances. One of these men of the old school and of ancient lineage, General von Zastrow, who was altogether worthy of shining in the cabinet amongst the triumvirate of the times of Lichtenau, was chosen to be the bearer of the letter. He received full powers to join Lucchesini in signing the conditions laid before the king by the latter. The two Prussian plenipotentiaries met Duroc in Berlin, on the 27th of October; at the conference, Duroc made no essential changes in his proposals; they, by a note dated the 30th of October, declared that they were ready to accept the Emperor's conditions; to this note, however, they received no reply. Prussia appeared at this moment to have been thrown for aid on Russia alone, because negotiations had not been even opened with England, although hostilities between Prussia and England had ceased. Before the battle of Jena, the English ministry had sent Lord Morpeth to the King of Prussia, in his camp; he had, however, narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the French, and had set sail for England the same day (October 22) on which Duroc was negotiated with Lucchesini in Berlin.

No answer having been returned to his plenipotentiaries, the king wrote a second letter to the conqueror on the 7th of November, the contents of which we feel too deeply ashamed of the king to quote; we should be afraid of expressing ourselves too severely with regard to a prince, whom his admirer and biographer, Bishop Eylert, in his three volumes, has represented as a saint; and we shall therefore merely indicate to our readers, in a note, the place where it is to be found.* This letter, in which the monarch most unnecessarily throws himself at the feet of the conqueror, would be wholly incomprehensible, did we not learn, from Herr von Schladen's journal, something of the persons by whom the king, as he wandered about the country on this side the Vistula, was surrounded;† the manner in

puis je vous le dire, sire? je suis peiné d'être encore sans aucun avis de l'accueil fait aux ouvertures que j'ai autorisé mon ministre d'état, le Marquis de Luechesini, à vous faire, sire, pour rétablir la paix entre nous. Si j'en étais instruit, le renvoi des armées russes en serait la suite immédiate, et sorti d'une incertitude qui me pèse, je ne balancerais pas à donner à votre majesté cette preuve de mon empressement à remplir avec loyauté des engagements, qui seront, j'ose le croire, le commencement d'une nouvelle et inaltérable amitié entre nous." Von Schladen's remark in his journal, p. 18, corresponds admirably with this letter: "The treatment which Lombard has received is confirmed; as soon as the king was made acquainted with it, he sent orders to Stettin that the guards should be removed, and Lombard's security be henceforth placed on the personal responsibility of the whole magistracy of the place. At the same time, Lombard received a most flattering letter from the king."

* Lefebvre, "Hist. des Cabinets," etc., vol. ii., pp. 221-223.

† Preussen, p. 20. "Alas! I have had but too many opportunities of convincing myself, that all those who at this time (October 24) have any influence on the decisions of our lord the king, promised themselves very little as the result of longer resistance, and, that they, *without exception*, are disposed to submit even to the hardest conditions of France."

which Haugwitz and Kökeritz kept him in a state of siege, so that neither Von Stein, nor the noble and patriotic queen, was able to exercise any influence over his timid and irresolute mind; and how, at length, he associated such a spiritless man as Von Zastrow to the miserable Lucchesini, to beg for peace under any conditions.*

It was a piece of good fortune that on this, as on every former occasion, the idol of the French proposed terms of such a kind, that he could not have asked more had the king been his prisoner, and his army in possession of the whole country as far as the Niemen.

When one has seen and considered the king's letter, who Lucchesini and Zastrow were, and how little respect they inspired, the wonder will appear less that Talleyrand declared to them, in express terms, he would refrain from coming to any decision with respect to the fate of the king, till the latter had put himself wholly into his power. As to the conditions previously offered in his name by Duroc, and accepted by Lucchesini, he used precisely the same language as those men did, who, on the 10th of August, 1792, destroyed the first French constitution and the constitutional king, in the name of a cosmopolitic philanthropy, as he alleged, "*That there is a law, which must be dearer to those who govern others than any written law; this rule is the general good, and a regard for this good absolves him from his former word.*" Even such a shameless declaration as this proved insufficient to waken, in the minds of such diplomatists as Lucchesini and Zastrow, any idea that it was their duty to save, at least, the honour of their king, who was about to lose everything else. They remained; they requested to hear the conditions; whilst their coadjutor, Haugwitz, used every means in his power to prevent the king from going to the camp of the Russians, who were then in Prussia, advancing for his protection. As early as the 15th of November, Dombrowski had made an appeal to the Poles, in order to form an army amongst them against the Prussians; and the French had already appeared in Bromberg, while Haugwitz was still taking all possible trouble to induce the king to remove still further from the Russians, to Königsberg, instead of going to Osterode, where a part of their army lay. In reliance on their friend Haugwitz, who, not being able, as Von Schladen informs us, to restrain the king from going to Osterode, sent Kökeritz thither to him to frighten him, the two deputies accepted the conditions, on which, at length, a truce was conceded to them.

No time for reflection was granted to the king. Duroc was to travel to the royal camp with the treaty signed by Lucchesini and

* Preussen, p. 23. "General von Zastrow who has been associated with Lucchesini, left us at noon. May Heaven grant that my fears about this choice may not be fulfilled; for I regard him as one of the most dangerous partisans of the system of unconditional subjection, under the form of an alliance between Prussia and France, because he cherishes, or at least expresses the conviction, that every sacrifice to realise this alliance, would, in the end, be a gain to Prussia."

Zastrow, and immediately to return with the document ratified by the king. The conditions under which the truce was to be granted* were so much the harder, inasmuch as Talleyrand expressly declared that this truce was not concluded in order to prepare the way for a particular peace with Prussia, because the Emperor was not disposed to make peace with Prussia alone, but only with Russia, England, and Prussia together. The king's representatives had, however, signed the treaty, and, as Von Schladen informs us, Haugwitz advised the timorous and hesitating king to ratify the agreement, when Duroc came, although the first division of the Russian auxiliary force, under Benningsen, had at that time already appeared on the Vistula. Haugwitz and Kökeritz continued to keep the king away from all connexion with the Russians, so that even on the 21st of November, when Duroc arrived with the document signed by Napoleon, it was uncertain whether the king would ratify it or not; on the 22nd, however, when Duroc had an audience, he refused his signature, because, happily, other influences were for the moment stronger than the advice of Kökeritz, Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and Zastrow.† On this day, for the first time, the Prussian généraux and the king had a meeting with Benningsen. On this day it was intimated to the Russian minister, that all intercourse with the French was broken off, and that the king accepted of the magnanimous offer of the Emperor of Russia to hasten with the whole force of his empire to his aid. On the following morning the king went to Pultusk, to show himself to the Russian army.

From this time forward the war was changed from a war with Prussia to a war with the Russians. We should not be able to understand why the French Emperor did not give the Poles a more definite promise of the restoration of their kingdom, when he invited

* The conditions ran as follows: "The Prussian troops shall retire to East Prussia; the French take possession of the whole country as far as the Vistula, and the right bank of that river to the mouth of the Narew, as well as Hameln, Nienburg, Danzig, Thorn, Graudenz, Lanczic, and Colberg. In Silesia, Glogau and Breslau shall be given up to them, and the king is to confine himself to that part of the province which lies to the left of the Oder, and southward of a line running from Ohlau through Freiburg and Landshut to Liebau. The king is moreover to undertake the responsibility of removing the Russian troops out of his states; and in case of the renewal of hostilities, ten days' notice to be given on either side."

† The wonderful manner in which such persons can turn their cloaks according to the wind may be seen from the narrative of Lucchesini. After inexpressible turnings, historical developments, &c., he concludes part II., p. 183, with the following words:—"Persons may indeed be surprised that the royal commissioners accepted such conditions, and gave them validity by their signatures. No one, however, will believe that they regarded them as worthy of the royal ratification; but probably the hope of the speedy arrival of the Russians in Warsaw caused them to consider it very important to prevent for some days Napoleon's journey to Posen, when he was desirous of taking under his protection that district, already ripe for insurrection." This miserable creature, however, gives the true reason in these words:—"Perhaps—(no, surely)—fear, wakened by the reports announcing misfortunes, and the danger of the crown of Prussia, induced the plenipotentiaries, on their part, to present no obstacle to the restoration of the prince and the monarchy; for in cases of extremity it is a virtue to lay hold of any means of aid, *and to give other advice is rashness.*"

them to take up arms, through the instrumentality of Dombrowski, Zajontschek, and others, and caused them to form themselves into a division of the army, did we not know, from Sir Robert Adair's account, what was then taking place in Vienna, and could not be unknown to the French. As to Poland, Lucchesini states, that the nobility of the provinces united with the kingdom of Prussia under the name of South Prussia, with Warsaw as their capital, had, in the preceding year, sent deputies to the Poles in the French service, and offered to take up arms. The Poles afterwards continued the correspondence; but it suited the policy of France to advise them to remain quiet for the present. When the war had really begun, when the road from Warsaw to Berlin was open, and the fortresses on the Oder were taken, the French again renewed their intercourse with the malcontents. The South Prussians sent a new deputation to Berlin, and the French, disregarding all propriety or honour, mixed up the name of Kosciusko in the affair, without his permission. Napoleon was not ashamed to cause the ridiculously declamatory proclamation to the Poles, composed in the name of Kosciusko, and attested by his signature; to be published in all the public journals. The dread of the French and the cowardliness of all the governments were at that time so great, that not a single newspaper on the continent ventured to give publicity to Kosciusko's protest against this abuse of his name, and his declaration that he wished to have nothing whatever to do with the Polish insurrection. Dombrowski had been previously expressly recalled from Italy, and sent to Poland, because no one thought that he, as the former companion of Kosciusko, would misuse his friend's name; and yet it was he who issued this ridiculously stilted proclamation, and disgracefully alleged that Kosciusko would appear. This, indeed, did not take place; but the French were no sooner in Poland, than the nobles joined them in crowds, and formed companies from their peasants, which Dombrowski organised into regiments and battalions, and provided them with arms from the magazines and arsenals taken from the Prussians. Scattered bodies of Prussians were disarmed, and the strong towns of Kalisch, Sidarsch, Kampen, and Sidowa, were occupied by the insurgents. The answer, however, which Napoleon gave in Berlin to the Polish deputies was not very encouraging; and were not the silliness of the Poles proverbial, it would be inconceivable that, after all that had happened in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, they could have expected things from Bonaparte which had not been granted them by the kind disposition of the Emperor Alexander, or by the strong sense of justice of Frederick William the Third.

Davoust with his division entered Posen, as early as the 9th of November, the other divisions followed; and whilst Napoleon remained behind to regulate everything in Berlin, Murat was sent forward to the Vistula, to unite the four corps into an army, and to assume the command. It was during this sojourn that the Emperor issued the notorious Berlin decree against trade with England, which

furnished his marshals, officials, and ambassadors, with an occasion and pretence for incredible vexations, oppressions, and extortions, but which, when closely considered, was the cause of greater difficulties to him than to the English. By such a mode of action, he furnished the English with the long-desired opportunity of making themselves masters of the whole trade of the world, and of all colonies. These famous decrees declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and under the heaviest penalties forbade all commerce, or even correspondence, with England. Neither letters nor parcels, written or addressed in English, or even anything addressed to an Englishman, were to be received at the post-office. Every English subject, whoever he might be, who should be met with in any of the provinces occupied by the French, was to be treated as a prisoner of war. All the warehouses or goods belonging to English subjects, and especially all colonial produce, were to be confiscated wherever found, and trade with England to be punished as a political offence.

The measures against English trade completely demoralised Germany and Holland, especially when, two years afterwards, there was a regular search for English goods in all the large towns, and all that were found in the hands of the merchants or tradespeople were burned. Every one bribed the French, committed perjury, caused a few worthless things to be burned, and learned how to save goods of great value by the instrumentality of the refuse of the French nation, who were poured out like a plague over all these countries, and became enormously rich; whilst all honest traders were ruined. As it was found to be impossible to do without colonial produce, the consequence was an immense system of scandalous smuggling; and whole trains of waggons, laden with prohibited goods, were allowed to pass by the bribed French authorities. At length, from March, 1810, Napoleon himself granted licenses for trading with England to members of his own family, and others who enjoyed his favour; those persons enriched themselves by means of such licenses, just as men now-a-days get wealth by dealing in railroad shares. All who were ashamed of such knavery, were laughed at for their pains. We shall hereafter return to the subject of the licenses.

This imperial decree furnished the overbearing English with the wished-for pretence for dealing with the inhabitants of the continent of Europe as they were accustomed to do in the East Indies and in China. On the 7th of January, 1807, the English admiralty issued a declaration, by virtue of which all ships coming from any port occupied by the French were forbidden to enter an English harbour. Thus, a military despot and a nation of traders equally imposed their absolute will as right and law upon all the people of Europe. The English, however, at the least, had the satisfaction of knowing that the Parliament, that is, the will of the people, must in every case recognise the orders of the government, and confirm them as a matter of form. The French were obliged to sacrifice their properties and lives, without ever being consulted either as to the substance or form.

Napoleon issued his decree like an order of the day; the servile senate not only adopted it without resistance, but formally returned thanks for its issue. It must, indeed, be admitted that Napoleon's aim, which, to judge from what has been written by the French concerning him, was, and still is, the aim of the nation, could only be attained by his absolute dominion; the people, therefore, submitted to its fate, and no longer complained of not being consulted, even when the subject was conscription.

As early as 1806, the conscription for that year (An XIV.) had been decreed by the senate alone; but at that time, when passing over the deputies of the people, the excuse was employed, that the legislative bodies were not assembled, and that too much time would be lost by calling them together. When the conscription for 1807 was to be made, no idea was entertained of even consulting the legislative body. It was assembled on the 2nd of March, but its sittings were closed without a single word being said on the subject of the conscription. By a decree of the 4th December, 1806, the senate, without any consultation of the other body, decreed that 80,000 recruits of the year 1807, who, by law, could only have been called out in September of that year, should be immediately raised, in compliance with the Emperor's desire. The decree of the senate of September, 1805, was at the same time renewed—that all Frenchmen, with the exception of those filling official situations, should be enrolled in the national guard.

The national guard was now formed into a new regular army, divided into legions, battalions, and cohorts—first, indeed, confined to the defence of the country, but soon obliged to perform regular military service, and from the very first subjected to military discipline. No one, indeed, then thought of the possibility of the fall of the imperial dignity; otherwise, Napoleon's councillors, however eager they might have been to give a new organisation to all that was old, would have hesitated to organise a privileged militia out of the old nobility and the men of wealth, who had least of all reason to sacrifice themselves for Napoleon. In order to secure the co-operation of the old *noblesse d'Epée* in the military service of the Emperor, a privileged militia was instituted. First of all, two companies of volunteer heavy-armed cavalry were created; and this was attended with success. The young nobility eagerly entered the new military service, as the old had formerly crowded into the service of the court. They were anxious to share the glory and the advantages of Bonaparte's new-created nobility. At the head, therefore, of those two companies, we find two scions of the oldest families in France—the Vicomte de Laval and one of the Montmorencys, who became afterwards the main supports of the throne of the Bourbons, re-erected on the ruins of that of Napoleon. These were the men who led these two companies of nobles to Mayence. A German prince suffered himself to be made an instrument for forming a regiment out of the German prisoners taken by the

French from the Prussians, which was taken into the pay of Bonaparte. General Lagrange, who held the command in the Electorate of Hesse, formed a French army out of the Prussian soldiers which were at first dismissed and sent home, and who now, in their new service, were better treated, clothed, and paid, than they had formerly been by that of their own princes; the superior officers, moreover, obtained the same rank which they had formerly held in the Prussian army.

Before Napoleon left Berlin, on the 26th of November, in order to put himself at the head of the army sent to the Vistula, and to begin the struggle with the three Russian armies which had entered Poland one after another, he showed himself well disposed towards the Austrians, however little he trusted them. On the 10th of December, he issued orders to restore Braunau to the Austrians, gave up his claim to the county of Montefiascone, and recognised the channel of the river Isonzo as the boundary between the kingdom of Italy and the Austrian dominions. When the unity of will which pervaded the whole army of Napoleon, the energy of the measures which were adopted, and the punctuality of their execution, are compared with the confusion which Von Schladen daily describes as prevailing in the Prussian administration, with the disunion and strife among the Russian generals themselves, and with the Prussians, it is impossible not to acknowledge the practical superiority of Napoleon to all the other rulers, and to prefer his organisations of all kinds to the old.

At the end of November, the King of Prussia was, it is true, prevailed upon to withdraw himself from Haugwitz; this he did, however, most unwillingly, and could by no means determine to follow the advice of Herr von Stein, and to restore Hardenberg to the head of his foreign department. Half measures were, as usual, adopted, and the direction of foreign affairs was in the mean time to be entrusted to Beyme. Lucchesini and Zastrow again hovered about the king, like birds of ill omen, as soon as they returned from their mission, and the two Lombards gained the same influence as before. Under these circumstances, neither the English, from whom subsidies were sought, could trust the Prussians, nor were the Prussian commanders sure that all their plans would not be betrayed. The patriots, to whom particularly Von Stein, and his intimate friend, Von Schladen (author of "Preussen," &c.), belonged, succeeded, in the beginning of December, in having the cowardly or diplomatically-wise and cautious generals and commandants of fortresses brought to a strict trial, for having entered into diplomatic negotiations with, and capitulated to, the French, instead of resisting to the uttermost. The names of those who were found guilty, and the punishments inflicted on them, were published * in the Danzig newspapers, and very strict

* See the "Vertranten Briefen," I., pp. 325-327. The substance of the judgment, together with the names, will be found in "Preussen," &c., pp. 26, 27; "Bredow's Chronik," p. 520. The execution of the sentences was delayed till

orders were issued as to the manner in which soldiers and officers should comport themselves in future.

The Poles were in arms, the French had reached the neighbourhood of Warsaw as early as the 21st of December, and the King of Prussia was still irresolute. He was still surrounded by people, whose mediocrity did not alarm him, and whose servility led them to try to maintain all the old courtly forms. Rüchel had charge of the commissariat of the army, Zastrow was at the head of foreign affairs, Beyme and Kökeritz were restored to the council-board, and Von Stein removed. Fortunately, Scharnhorst was ransomed, and a new army was to be got on foot; Rüchel, however, conducted himself, at the training of the new troops in Königsberg, precisely after the fashion of the old service.* The 25,000 men of the king's army that now remained were, in the mean time, commanded with great skill by General Lestocq; but General Benningsen, who was in command of the first Russian army, from a spirit of obstinacy and contradiction, frustrated all the results of the well-calculated measures of the Prussian commander.† Benningsen had occupied Pultusk as early as the 11th of November, and advanced to Warsaw. Buxhövdén lay, with the second army, in the neighbourhood, and Kamenskoi, the commander-in-chief, was on the march with the third; but, notwithstanding, Benningsen suddenly withdrew from Warsaw. His retreat compelled Lestocq to remove from the Lower Vistula; and it was not till the French army had already taken advantage of Benningsen's mistake, that he and Buxhövdén attempted to repair the fault, and even then the discontented Russian generals did not resolve upon joint operations.

Benningsen was again in Pultusk; and Buxhövdén, with the troops under his command, at Ostrolenka, where Napoleon resolved to attack them with his whole force, and for that purpose to force his way across the Bug and Ukra, because the Russians lay beyond

1808. General Wartensleben was condemned to death, which was commuted to close confinement. Romberg, Lestocq, Von Beckendorf, Bouman, the engineer of Küstrin, and Major von Rauch, who had betrayed Frederick's sword, were imprisoned, and the aged Ingersleben was set free.

* An account of all the absurd plans adopted will be found in "Preussen," p. 85; the conclusion is as follows: "Yet what is still more incomprehensible is, that whilst infantry were sent hither and thither throughout the country, the regiment of horse-guards was brought to Königsberg, although every child knows that the proper place for cavalry to recruit is in the villages! I will not, however, continue these complaints respecting our blindness. If Providence does not take some means for the deliverance of Prussia, all is lost; for we are DESTITUTE OF ALL THOSE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL MEANS, WHICH ALONE, IN SUCH DECISIVE MOMENTS, DETERMINE THE FATE OF A KINGDOM."

† "Preussen," A.A.O. "A letter, written by Major von Knesebeck, from the Prussian head-quarters, on the 16th of December, gives us a very melancholy account of all that is passing there. Disunion and jealousy among the generals, insolence, disobedience, and a desire of plunder, among the soldiers, constitute the foundations of the aid which we are to expect. Instead of acting with vigour, they prefer delay, and waiting for reinforcements which never arrive. Fears begin to be entertained that hunger will compel our allies to evacuate the district; and if the arrival of Komenskoy, the commander-in-chief, does not very soon alter the state of things by a victory, the last province of Prussia is also gone."

these two rivers. In consequence of the deep roads and bad weather, the French lost a very great number of men in the three days, from the 22nd to the 25th of December; they, however, drove back the Russians, to whom Kamenskoi, the commander-in-chief, now eighty years of age, and weakened by a tedious march, had sent orders to retire to the Russian frontiers. This absurd command of an old man, soon after acknowledged as almost idiotic, could not have been obeyed, in consequence of the weather and the roads, except the Russians, on account of the incessant rain, had been willing to have left behind the whole of their baggage and artillery. Benningsen, therefore, resolved to await the attack of the French, on the 26th, at Pultusk. It is no part of our plan to describe battles; all, however, are agreed that the battle of Pultusk was fought with great obstinacy and loss of blood on both sides. The French spent the whole of a December night without covering; rain and snow fell incessantly; they waded up to the knees in marshes, spent twelve hours in making an advance of eight miles, and were obliged to pay dearly for their passage over the Narew. During the battle, Marshal Lannes and other generals were several times obliged to put themselves at the head of single regiments and battalions, and yet no decisive victory was gained. The French, indeed, boasted of the victory; because the Russians, after having maintained their ground on a part of the field, retreated the next day.

The victory at Pultusk, of which Benningsen boasted, and on account of which he was afterwards rewarded by his emperor, and appointed commander-in-chief, was very doubtful. It is, on the other hand, certain that Prince Gallizin completely defeated the French at Golymin, on the very same day on which they were to attack Buxhövden, at Ostrolenka. This victory, too, was the more glorious, inasmuch as the Russians were less numerous than their opponents. The French, however, had not been able to bring up their artillery; and the superiority of the Russians, in this particular, secured them the victory.* The weather and time of the year rendered active operations impossible for some weeks. Benningsen retired to Ostrolenka, and afterwards still farther; whilst the French, under Ney and Bernadotte, were scattered in the country on the farther side of the Vistula, in which Ney at length pushed forward as far as Heilsberg.

* The French, and their imitators among us, do not hesitate, indeed, to repeat the shameless rhodomontade, respecting the result of the battles of the 26th, of the 47th bulletin, which states, that the Russians on that occasion lost 80 pieces of artillery, all their *caissons*, 1200 baggage waggons, and 12,000 men in dead, wounded, and prisoners.

C.—HISTORY OF THE WAR TILL THE PEACE OF TILSIT.

In January, 1807, Benningsen and Napoleon came, almost simultaneously, upon the idea of changing the seat of war from the extreme east to the west. In the east, the struggle was afterwards carried on by two particular corps—a Russian one, under Essen, and a French one—first under Lannes, and then under Savary. This bloody struggle, however, had no influence on the issue of the war. Benningsen no sooner learned that Ney had scattered his troops widely over the country on the farther side of the Vistula, than he broke up his quarters, and resolved to attack him, before Bernadotte, who was near, could come to his relief; but he proved too late. Ney had already retreated when Benningsen arrived; whether, as the French allege, because Napoleon, who had seen the danger with which he was threatened, sent him orders to retreat, which arrived on the 20th of January, the very day on which he was to be attacked by the Russians, or whether General Markoff was at first too eager, and Benningsen afterwards too irresolute. Ney luckily marched from Heilsberg, nearer to the Vistula, and Benningsen followed him hesitatingly, so that Bernadotte proved able to keep him employed for some days till Bonaparte came up, who, on receiving news of Benningsen's march, had sent orders to all his corps to renew the campaign on the 27th. On this occasion, he had so adopted his measures, that before the Russians had any suspicion of an attack, the main army of the French would attack them on the left flank, whilst they were on their march. For this purpose, Bernadotte was to allure Benningsen quite to the Vistula; and then, as soon as Napoleon had outflanked the left of the Russians, again to advance.

Napoleon's army was on its march to cut off the Russians from Königsberg, and Bernadotte was to receive orders again to advance as far as Gilgenburg, when Berthier selected a young favourite as the bearer of this most important despatch. Through the inexperience of the officer, who failed to destroy the document at the right time, the despatch fell into the hands of the Russians. Thus warned, the Russians learned the impending danger, and when they found themselves pressed on all sides, allowed their stores and heavy baggage, at various places, to fall into the hands of the enemy, and thereby escaped being surrounded. After considerable sacrifices, they succeeded, on the 6th of February, in reaching the Prussian town of Eylau, which is only nine hours' distance from Königsberg. Soult attacked the rear, on the low hills behind the town, on the 7th, and drove them in; on the following day a general engagement took place. The glory of the victory is probably due to the Russians, as even Savary admits, who shared in the battle.* It is

* The Bonapartists (and Thibaudeau also), as usual, throw the blame upon Bernadotte. Benningsen, however, affirms what is said in the text. A still fuller account of the same affair will be found in the *Mémoires du Duc de Rovigo*, vol. iii., p. 50, &c. The duke (Savary) on that occasion commanded the fifth corps, because

not less certain, however, that the whole advantage accrued to the French, who, indeed, admit that the battle was one of the most dreadful recorded in history. The French accuse Bernadotte of having, by his delay, prevented the victory from being complete; whilst the Russians are just enough to admit that Lestocq, with his Prussians, saved their wing from utter defeat. On this occasion Napoleon did not, as usual, so much exaggerate the loss of the enemy, or ridiculously underrate his own; as it is established beyond doubt, that whole battalions and regiments—as, for example, that of Colonel Sémelé—were literally annihilated. Few prisoners were made, because the whole battle was fought with the bayonet.

The number of deaths on the day before, and on the day of the battle itself, was immense. Great numbers fell, not by the sword, but by cold, want, and excessive exertion. Augereau and Lannes were deeply offended, because the Emperor, who boasted of the victory, ascribed it exclusively to his brother-in-law, Murat.

The royal family of Prussia was placed in a very melancholy position by the issue of the battle, for they fell into the hands of the Russians, whose brutality and rudeness in a foreign country were more deeply offensive to the refined and noble minds of the king and queen, than even the conduct of the French, whom both abhorred. It appeared as if the Russians, after the battle, were no longer able to defend Königsberg; the king and the queen, therefore, were obliged, in the middle of winter, to flee to Memel, where they found themselves among Russians, of whom their own emperor alleged, that notwithstanding his despotic power, he was not able to restrain their barbarity, or to put a stop to their rapacity. Here, in the farthest corner of Prussia, they received news every month of the fall of one fortress after another, or of forced contributions levied from their people. In Silesia, where Vandamme, who was an able officer, but one of the rudest and lowest creatures of the reign of terror, pursued his unlicensed career, greater enormities were committed than anywhere else.

Glogau, which might have held out for months, was at first defended by Reinhard and Lindner, who held the command; but when the nobles (*i. e.*, the proprietors of the country) urgently requested the two generals not to ruin the first people in the country, by further resistance, they preferred yielding to the selfish entreaties of the noble proprietors, to performing their military duty as citizens, and capitulated early in the month of December. Breslau and Brieg made a longer resistance, and did not yield till after an honourable defence. The former surrendered to the enemy, by

Lannes was ill. Rüchel, in his well-known memoir, dated on the 28th of February, states that the French had 30,000 killed and 12,000 wounded. Napoleon gives the numbers 1900 killed and 5700 wounded. Rüchel adds: "The victory at Prussian Eylau was complete and decisive on the side of the Russians; and yet Benningsen did not pursue the enemy with the whole of his force, but, to the astonishment of the whole speculating world, again retreated."

capitulation, on the 5th, and the latter on the 17th of January, 1807. The defence of Colberg proved what zealous and patriotic citizens could do, even under the most unfavourable circumstances. This fortress was protected by its situation on the sea-coast, and its distance from any points of concentration. The little fortress of Kosel was also bravely and long defended. Colberg never capitulated. Kosel, by the terms of its capitulation, would have come into the power of the French in July, had not the peace of Tilsit, which was made in that month, put an end to the danger. Neisse was closely invested from March till June, and also bravely and gloriously defended. Glatz was first taken possession of by the enemy on the 20th of June.

Vandamme, whose miserable and vulgar soul neither knew pity nor compassion, but who was highly praised by all the soldiers, not only by the French, but also by General von Lossberg, extorted monthly contributions from Silesia to the amount of 6,000,000 of francs for his military chest, sent ammunition and clothing to Poland, and not only procured horses for the army, but, when Danzig was to be regularly besieged, sent thither the necessary heavy artillery. When Benningsen committed the error of returning from Warsaw, and thereby obliging Lestocq to withdraw from the Lower Vistula, Thorn was occupied, Graudenz, too, was blockaded; but the brave Courbière gave a proof to all the Prussian commandants, that it was possible to withstand a superior force. He was closely besieged, but he defended himself till the 30th of June, when news of peace at the last lucky moment put an end to the impending assault. Danzig was courageously defended by Count Kalkreuth, from the 8th of May, with an army of 15,000 Prussians and 3000 Russians, against 27,000 French; at length, however, the garrison became short of powder, and on the 8th the town capitulated, on the express condition that it should only be given up in case supplies did not arrive before the 26th. As this did not take place, the garrison marched out on that day, and the troops were obliged to promise not to serve against the French within a year.

The French army also retired after the battle of Eylau as well as the Russians. Benningsen marched towards Königsberg, and although Berthier, on the morning of the 7th, wrote to the Empress that they would be in Königsberg with their army on the following day, the French, nevertheless, drew off nearer to the Vistula. Nothing important was undertaken by either party for some months, but vigorous preparations were made for a new struggle; whilst new means were tried to prevent Prussia from taking any energetic measures—that is, from forming a close union with England and Russia. The king, as Von Schladen well describes,* hesitated be-

* Von Schladen, in his "Preussen," &c., p. 121, writes as follows: "To-day (15th of February), I have at length had an opportunity of speaking, on the present condition of affairs, with General von Zastrow, and on the determinations which it demands. I have freely spoken my own opinions, and taken pains to support them by principles and reasons; but, also, have only gained the conviction, that, under his

tween accepting the advice of Hardenberg and his friends, who urged him to adopt a decisive resolution, and that of Von Zastrow, who wished to continue diplomatic negotiations. The Russians were thoroughly dissatisfied with the English, and complained of being very badly supported by them; they suffered want of all kinds; they were worse treated in many places in Prussia than the French, and even borrowed 660,000 dollars in coin from the King of Prussia. The support which Prussia received from England might rather be called an alms than a subsidy. As we learn from Sir Robert Adair, the English at first gave 20,000 ducats for fitting out an army in Silesia, and afterwards 500,000 dollars more; but it never came to the conclusion of a regular treaty. The fault was partly owing to the delays which Von Zastrow promoted, and partly to the distrust of the Prussians, which the English still entertained. Lord Gower and Lord Hutchinson, it is true, came over, and in the articles of a secret agreement promised, in general terms, money, provisions, and arms. However, none of these articles* were embodied in the treaty of peace concluded on the 28th of January, 1807; and this treaty itself was never ratified. This is explained by the circumstance that the English well knew that Von Schrötter, Von Voss, and Von Zastrow, were still anxious for an unconditional submission to the will of Napoleon; and it was only when Hardenberg was called to office, and when Beyme agreed with him, that the English showed themselves ready to co-operate.†

On this occasion, Napoleon gave a new proof of his thorough knowledge of the miserable aims of the circle by which the King of Prussia was surrounded, and of how much further he himself saw, than the people who wished to advise him in the same way that Von Zastrow and his coadjutors did the King of Prussia. After the battle of Eylau, he withdrew nearer to the Vistula; and Thibaudeau informs us that his officers, particularly Berthier and Murat, earnestly begged him to retire altogether to the other side of the river. The loss in men during the few previous weeks had amounted to 30,000, and the tone and contents of the 58th bulletin had lowered the price of the stocks. The Emperor, however, judged rightly that this was not the time to retreat. He went to the castle of Finkenstein, and then wove all sorts of diplomatic negotiations; whilst he continued to besiege the Prussian fortresses, and reinforced his army, in order, by a new stroke, to cripple either both his weak antagonists, or, at least, one of them.

guidance, nothing is to be done for our affairs; because, though he is willing to do everything to induce us to form an alliance with France, he imagines it, on the other side, to be sufficient to speak out boldly against Russia and England, in order to awe those two powers," &c.

* Martens, "Supplément au Recueil des Principaux Traités," tome iv., p. 411.

† Preussen, p. 133. "Von Hardenberg has been summoned to give advice (17th of February); the necessary papers have been communicated to him, in order to enable him to form a judgment. This evening he has had a conference with Lord Hutchinson, the result of which is an assurance given by the English ambassadors

As early as the 29th of January, and therefore before the battle of Eylau, Talleyrand had written to Von Zastrow, and in rather an insolent tone proposed a separate peace and a close alliance with Napoleon; to this the king himself wrote an answer, on the 17th of February, declining the proposal. Napoleon then wrote an autograph letter from Finkenstein, which, indeed, Lefebvre did not succeed in finding in the archives of foreign affairs, but has given from the 8th vol. of Schöll's collection as undoubtedly authentic. This letter was written to Zastrow in a very friendly tone, and yet very cunningly drawn up so as to work upon the mind of the king, who felt a repugnance to any really vigorous measures. It was entrusted to General Bertrand. At first the Emperor speaks of a general peace, a congress, Austria, and so forth; but its sole aim is evidently a separate peace, in order to detach Prussia from Russia. This aim only failed of accomplishment, because, as Herr von Schladen informs us, Von Hardenberg and Rüchel had shortly before very freely given their opinions concerning Von Zastrow and his partisans in the presence of the king.* Zastrow and the ministers had just persuaded the king to send Herr von Kleist with a letter to Napoleon, wherein he entered upon the proposal (of the 29th of January) to conclude a particular peace; but, upon Hardenberg's advice, a messenger was sent after him with another letter, in which there was no mention whatever of a general peace. Although the letter brought by Bertrand did not express any desire for an exclusively separate peace, and although the king declined to negotiate for himself alone, notes continued to be exchanged from February till May. Napoleon, therefore, found it also advisable to satisfy Austria, by a declaration concerning Poland.

At this time the English ministry had not resolute men at its head; it therefore neglected the favourable moment, gave Prussia but very trifling support, and mortally offended the Emperor Alexander. Lord Howick not only refused subsidies, of which Russia stood greatly in need, but also declared, in a very discourteous manner, that England was not disposed to become guarantee for a Russian loan of 6,000,000*l.* sterling. That party of the English oligarchy, who, under the name of Whigs, use a certain liberalism as their ensign, and are therefore less consistent in their conduct, because they are obliged to conceal the principles of selfishness, to which they are equally attached with their opponents, under a false appearance, were, after Fox's death, under the leading of Lords Grenville and Howick; and they appeared at that time

that Great Britain **WILL DO ALL THAT WE WISH**, and that without delay. We must therefore be active to frustrate the plans of the peace-loving friends of the French, and for this purpose all honest patriots must unite."

* By comparing what Lucchesini says, in the *Historische Entwicklung der Ursachen und Verhinnungen des Rheinbundes*, part ii., p. 293, with Von Schladen's journal, it will be seen what sort of a historian the marquis is. The letter to the King of Prussia, delivered by Bertrand, may also be seen in the *Mémoires d'un homme d'état*, &c., vol. ix., pp. 332-334; and in Lefebvre, vol. iii., p. 65.

not indisposed towards a peace with France. Towards March, however, they lost their preponderating influence in the cabinet. When Pitt found it advisable, on account of circumstances, to withdraw from the government, he availed himself of the repugnance of the weak-minded king, George III., to grant new privileges to the Catholics, as a pretence; and thus the half-warlike ministry was dissolved, in order to give place to one of a very energetic character, when the king required a written assurance, that the question concerning the Catholic claims was not to be renewed. The mischief had, however, been done, and the Emperor Alexander offended; so that when the new ministry at length turned their attention to Prussia and Sweden, it was too late. We shall not enumerate the names of all the members of the new government, called to power in March, under the nominal headship of the Duke of Portland, and selected from the most decided political enemies of France, but merely refer to a few of the individuals who formed a part of the cabinet. Canning was appointed minister of foreign affairs—the man whom Pitt acknowledged as the only one who could replace himself, and who, as a young man, was taken into the cabinet solely on account of his abilities, and the vehemence of his enmity to the French. Lord Eldon, so renowned for his legal knowledge and his orthodoxy, and so notorious as a delayer of justice and as a scrupulous judge, who, by straining at gnats, and from a love of gain, so prolonged the causes before his court as to ruin widows and orphans, was created lord chancellor. Spencer Percival, whose character afterwards led to his assassination, was chancellor of the exchequer; Lord Mulgrave, to whose account much is laid, was first lord of the admiralty; and Robert Dundas (Lord Melville), president of the board of control. Melville, as well as Trotter, his coadjutor in fraud, was accused and tried before the House of Lords; but although the charges were virtually established, he was acquitted. This will excite no surprise in the minds of those who know the shameful transactions of the Duke of York which were brought to light, and that he, after having been in the first place obliged to resign his office, was afterwards not merely justified and praised, but restored to his former situation. Lord Hawkesbury was appointed home secretary; and, notwithstanding the badness of all the arrangements which had been made by Lord Castlereagh in connexion with the expedition to Walcheren and Spain, he continued secretary of war and the colonies till after the fall of Napoleon, and till he brought his life, during which he had fought a duel with Canning, to a close by self-destruction. The new ministry were obliged to call a new Parliament in April, and even then trusted as little in the proposals for peace as in the Prussian ministry, so long as it consisted of Von Voss, Beyme, Zastrow, and Schrötter, and Hardenberg was only applied to for occasional advice.

Austria continued to lie in wait, and by her jesuitical tricks ex-

posed herself to the contempt both of friends and enemies. On the one hand, she made the humblest declarations to the Emperor of the French, and suffered herself to be addressed in the coarsest language by Andreossy, who had been sent to Vienna; and on the other, was sometimes busied in preparations for war, and sometimes again anxious to become a mediator. Colonel Vincent was at Napoleon's head-quarters, and his business was to pay particular attention to the steps taken by the French in Poland, at the same time to offer the mediation of Austria, and to propose the holding of a congress in Memel. From what Sir Robert Adair, in a letter written on the 14th of March, says of the articles which Austria proposed as the basis of her mediation, it is obvious that the whole affair was a mere jesuitical feint on the part of the Austrian cabinet.*

During the time that the armies remained without undertaking anything decisive, and the diplomatists were busy, the Prussian cabinet found the administration of the army precisely in the same condition in which it was shortly before the battle of Jena. Herr von Schladen informs us, that the king's mind was so undecided, as to change not only from day to day, but from forenoon to afternoon, according as he listened to the views and advice of Voss, Zastrow, Schrötter, and their partisans, or to Hardenberg, Schladen, Rüchel, the queen, and other patriots. At length, when Beyme adopted the policy of Hardenberg, the patriotic party obtained the preponderance. The nature of the irresolution, and the greatness of the confusion which prevailed, may be gathered from the fact, that Beyme ventured to propose that Hardenberg should take away by force the official papers connected with the government from Von Zastrow.† That, indeed, Hardenberg did not do; he was therefore obliged to share his influence with Von Zastrow, till the Emperor of Russia freed the king from the presence and services of this evil genius. The Emperor of Russia met the King of Prussia on the 2nd of April, at Memel, and intimated to Herr von Zastrow that his presence was by no means acceptable to him. Zastrow, therefore, found it ad-

* See Sir Robert Adair's *Memoirs*, p. 175. I. The affairs of the Turks shall be regulated in accordance with former treaties entered into by the Porte with all the parties to the war; II. Poland to be left in the same condition as before the war; III. The affairs of Germany shall be made a subject of general negotiation and settlement, as Austria does not consider herself secure with only the agreement of the confederation of the Rhine, without other determinations and arrangements; IV. Italian affairs shall also be submitted to a new examination and to a reconstruction, as Austria feels that Italy in its present circumstances must continue to be the source of constant disputes; V. It is absolutely necessary to effect a general peace, and therefore to admit England as a party to the negotiations.

† *Preussen*, s. 149. "On the other hand, Beyme, as a member of the cabinet, expressed a wish that Hardenberg, as minister, might act with somewhat more vigour; and with this view, by the instrumentality of Messrs. Roux and Lecocq the younger, he proposed to Von Sladen, under seal of the strictest secrecy, to induce Hardenberg, if possible, 'TO MAKE HIMSELF MASTER OF THE CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS WITHOUT ANY DEFINITE COMMAND, AND AS IT WERE A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS RESTORATION TO OFFICE, AND TO CAUSE THE DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO BE BROUGHT TO HIM.' He alleges, from his knowledge of the king, that only such a resolution could lead to a favourable result."

visable, when the King of Prussia accompanied the emperor to Tilsit, and took Hardenberg with him, to remain behind, and to cause Hardenberg to be attended by councillors Lecocq and Laeroix. Hutchinson, the English ambassador, took advantage of this opportunity, expressly to declare that the English ministry could place no confidence in Prussia, as long as Von Zastrow and his colleagues maintained their influence. Herr von Schladen begged the English ambassador to say so to the king himself; and when he would not consent to this, he urged him to induce the Emperor of Russia to state it to the king, in his name. Von Schladen does not conceal the fact that he scarcely ventured to promise himself any decisive result from this step, because he did not know whether Kökeritz might not prove to have more power over the king than even the Emperor of Russia.*

Von Schladen's anticipations were quite correct; for whilst Hardenberg succeeded in bringing the king to enter anew into a closer alliance with Prussia, his opponents, who were caballing against him, worked upon the aged Kökeritz after their fashion, and induced him to support their plans. On this journey, Hardenberg succeeded in having a new treaty entered into at Bartenstein, between Russia and Prussia. The principle of this treaty was the same as that of the agreement made on the 12th of October, of the preceding year, at Grodno, by virtue of which the emperor bound himself to support the cause of the king with all his forces. In this treaty, it was not only promised, just as if they were before Paris, that Prussia should receive back all that had been lost, but it was formally determined what was to be done with the conquests wrested from France, and how even the left bank of the Rhine was to be partitioned among the allies. This partition of conquests not yet made is merely ridiculous; what, on the contrary, was important was, that Russia and Prussia not only reckoned confidently upon England and Sweden, but also upon Austria, and intimated that they would compel Denmark also to join the alliance. The part which Austria played on this occasion was very equivocal. This ought not to surprise any one, since already, under the Whigs, there had been some talk of a congress and of Austrian mediation, which no one could fully understand. On the 7th of May, Sir Robert Adair writes that Napoleon had accepted the mediation; and on the 8th, he at length received the news that Canning had become minister of foreign affairs; and the very first despatch from the new minister announced the prosecution of the war, and a firm alliance with Russia;† but, before Canning was able to give effect to his words, the battle of Friedland was

* *Preussen, &c.*, p. 166. Beyme and General von Kökeritz have remained here. General von Zastrow will probably now avail himself of the absence of the king, to gain some influence over the good-natured General von Kökeritz; and the latter will unconsciously, and certainly unintentionally, throw difficulties in the way of the success of the good cause and its representative, the minister Von Hardenberg.

† *Memoirs*, p. 200.

fought. It appears, from Napoleon's correspondence (vol. vii., 362-63), that, on the 17th, he gave a piece of paper to Talleyrand, on which the foundation of the negotiations of this chimerical congress were sketched; the principles are as chimerical as was the congress itself. He demands reciprocity—that is, that the English and Russians were to indemnify his allies, as he theirs; he knew right well, however, that the English neither could nor would agree to any such condition.

Long before the negotiations between Prussia and England, concerning a regular peace and formal subsidies, instead of the occasional sums hitherto granted, had been brought to a close, Hardenberg was installed in the office of minister of foreign affairs, and had associated with himself such men as Von Altenstein, Niebuhr, Von Schön, and Stegman; still, however, he entertained but little hope, especially since the English at first refused to grant more than 100,000*l.* as a subsidy to Prussia, and an equal amount to Russia. In the mean time, it proved a great gain to Prussia and its service, that Scharnhorst and Von Gneisenau began that career which afterwards turned out so salutary to the army, then newly to be raised and organised. It was also a lucky accident that Marshal Victor fell into the hands of a body of Prussian troops from Colberg, and was exchanged for Blücher. Blücher was then appointed to march from Pomerania against the French, as soon as Benningsen, with the main army, had made an attack in front upon the French, commanded by Bonaparte in person. The English had promised to reinforce the Swedish army in Pomerania with 30,000 men, and Prussia was also to send an army thither under Blücher. Five thousand Prussians really appeared; but the English delayed till it was too late, and were not in the wrong, because the King of Sweden, with whom it was impossible to do anything, wished to take the command.

About this time Benningsen was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian armies; but he is generally accused of incapacity, and fearful descriptions are given of the disorders, smuggling, and deception, which prevailed, and of the plunder and barbarity which they practised against unfortunate Prussia. We could not believe these accounts, did not all the works on Russia, which have recently appeared in England, France, and Germany, concur in proving that these evils are the result of the nature of the Russian government and its autocracy. The Emperor Alexander, as soon as he arrived at the army, did everything in his power to restore order; he was only able, however, to remedy single abuses; even Nicholas, who manifests a degree of severity, and carries out his autocratical principles to their consequences, from which Alexander shrank back, is notable to reach the source of the evil. Towards the end of May, Benningsen thought his troops already sufficiently reinforced to make an attack upon the French, and to drive them across the Vistula; whilst the combined army of English, Swedes, and Prussians, were to make an attack from Pomerania. The French army,

lying from Danzig to the Narew, was brought, before the beginning of June, when the campaign commenced, to 150,000 men, whose pay and sustenance were drawn from the requisitions and contributions imposed on Prussia. No attention being now paid to the legislative body in France, the servile senate, as early as April, 1807, passed a decree levying 80,000 conscripts, 60,000 of whom were to be immediately sent to the army; and the Poles, too, deceived by the hope of the restoration of their nationality, raised a body of between 25,000 and 30,000 men, among whom were whole regiments recruited by the Polish nobility, or formed exclusively of nobles who volunteered their service, although Napoleon limited all the expectations of the Poles to the country on this side of the Vistula.

As soon as Benningsen, in the beginning of June, made a serious movement in advance towards the Vistula, a series of murderous engagements commenced, similar to those which preceded the battle of Eylau; on the 9th, the main body of both armies came in sight of each other at Heilsberg; and on the 10th, the French made an attempt to drive the Russians from their position. The united corps of Soult and Lannes, supported by the cavalry under Murat, made repeated attempts to force the Russians to give way; they, however, kept their ground, and it was confidently expected that the attempts of the French, which had failed on the 10th, would be renewed on the 11th. The French give very good reasons why Napoleon had as little inclination to renew the contest as Benningsen. We shall quote the words of a writer of the Napoleon school, who, on this occasion, neither lies nor boasts: "On the 11th, the two armies were so near as to be within grape-shot range, and it appeared as if the struggle would again commence. That, however, neither of the commanders wished. Benningsen, weakened by a considerable loss of men, was afraid that his right wing might be cut off from Königsberg, and he therefore retired from his fortified position at Heilsberg on the morning of the 11th." (He also hoped, by this movement, to form an earlier junction with the division sent to Königsberg, under Labanoff, and anticipate the arrival of Napoleon's reserves.) "Napoleon had, however, no reason to risk the loss of so many men, by an attempt to storm the fortified position of the Russians; as he was sure, that as soon as he threatened Königsberg, the Russians would give up their trenches."

Benningsen afterwards heard, at Wehlau, that the French had separated into two divisions, and he resolved on the 13th, instead of continuing his route on the farther side of the Alle, to wheel about before Wehlau, and attack the French. By this step, as all writers admit, he gave himself into the hands of his great opponent, who never suffered a fault to be overlooked, inasmuch as he took up a position which must prove his destruction; because he had the Alle in his rear, and a marsh at one side, if he proved unable to keep the field. Napoleon took advantage of his opponent's mistake, as usual; and the orders which he issued before the battle prove, that on this

occasion he was sure of the victory. About five o'clock in the evening of the 14th of June, a battery of twenty guns gave the signal for the fight, the description of which we leave to others. The contest was bravely carried on on both sides, and both armies suffered great loss. Most writers, French and Prussian, allege that the blame of losing the battle rests upon Benningsen, who had already shown much ill-will, great neglect, and want of supervision for the maintenance of discipline and order in the army, and whom, on that account, the emperor had often been desirous of removing from his command. The French accounts exaggerate the number of the Russians who were led into the battle of Friedland, as well as the number of prisoners, to a most extraordinary extent;* certain it is, however, that 17,000 Russians were either killed or wounded.†

The result of the engagement was precisely according to the calculation which Napoleon had grounded on the character of the Emperor Alexander, and on the tone of mind of Constantine and the Russian nobles, which was well known to him. The same calculation, which at that time was so successful at Friedland, plunged him, however, into destruction, in 1812, at Borodino. After the battle of Friedland, there could be no longer any mention of the Prussians; and it was a piece of great good fortune, that such a gentle, noble, and generous prince as Alexander reigned in Russia, otherwise Prussia would have been wholly lost. Lestocq, with his Prussians, was obliged hastily to cross the Haaff to Memel; and their magazines, considerable stores of powder and ammunition, together with 100,000 muskets, which the English had sent by sea to Königsberg, fell, with the town, into the hands of the French. Benningsen was not very closely pursued on the other side of the Alle; he passed the Niemen on the 19th, and burnt down the bridge behind him; immediately afterwards, Bonaparte arrived in Tilsit. Of all the Prussian fortresses, Colberg alone might have been able to maintain itself for some weeks, and Graudenz was saved merely by the peace. The treaty with England, which the Prussian minister signed in London on the 17th of June, and by which 1,000,000£ sterling was promised in subsidies, came too late.

The best information concerning the feelings of the Emperor Alexander, already referred to, and those of the Russians in his suite, is to be derived from Von Schladen, who was thoroughly well informed concerning all that was going on in the interior of the

* The statements made in the note to the "Geschichte des Kriegs von Preussen und Russland gegen Frankreich in den Jahren 1806 und 1807" (Belin, 1835), p. 249, appears the most probable: "At the recommencement of hostilities, the Russian army amounted to 75,000 fighting men, from which, if we deduct 10,000 previously lost, as well as the corps of Kamenskoi, only about 55,000 could have been brought into the field at Friedland."

† The French and the bulletins add to the (17,000) amount of killed and wounded, according to their custom, "AND AS MANY TAKEN PRISONERS," when, in fact, no prisoners were taken, as was natural, from the nature and locality of the battle.

cabinet.* Schladen informs us that all those who were about the King of Prussia had so completely lost courage, that Von Hardenberg, Von Stein, Schladen himself, and many others who recommended perseverance, found none upon whom they could reckon. With respect to the Russians, he informs us that there was a party who assumed a threatening aspect—that the army was dissatisfied with the war—that the Grand-Duke Constantine behaved often very rudely towards the Prussians, and allowed himself to be used as an instrument for working on the fears of his brother, Alexander. As early as the 7th of June, the emperor manifested a disposition, altogether contrary to the agreements and partition-projects of the convention of Bartenstein. He was dissatisfied with England, and perceived that the Austrians had no other object than to fish in troubled water; and he was, therefore, desirous, as much as possible, to withdraw from the whole affair. He proposed a truce for himself, with a clause, that the Prussians also should obtain a cessation of hostilities; but the Russians and Prussians were to negotiate each for themselves, respecting the conditions.

The proposal for a truce was made by Bagration, who commanded the Russian advanced troops on one bank of the Niemen, to Murat, who was commander-in-chief of the French on the other, and was contained in a letter from Benningsen, of the date of the 18th. As Napoleon entertained the proposal, Labanof presented himself at the head-quarters of the French, as early as the 19th; Berthier and Labanof very soon came to an understanding concerning the conditions; Russia agreed, that during the continuance of the truce, the French should retain possession of the whole of Poland, except the circle of Bialystock. The agreement was signed on the 21st, and a four weeks' notice of the renewal of hostilities was reserved. The negotiation with Prussia was more difficult. Von Schladen tells us, that Hardenberg, himself, and their friends, were no sooner aware that the weak and aged Count Kalkreuth, who sympathised with Prince Henry in his preference of the French to the Germans, was appointed to conduct the negotiations, than they felt convinced they would be miserably managed on the side of Prussia.† According to the agreement entered into with Kalkreuth, on the

* *Preussen*, p. 277. Herr von Schladen, under date of the 7th of June, observes: "People here (Tilsit) remark a surprising alteration in the opinions of the Russian authorities, and of all those who have any influence with the emperor; and it is obvious that they wish for a peace. It is a question whether his imperial majesty possesses strength of mind enough to stand upright alone, in the midst of such a circle as that by which he is surrounded. The emperor has assured the minister, Von Hardenberg, that he will go for a time to Wilna, to hasten the arrival of Russian reinforcements and provisions, but will soon be here again, and that no one shall induce him to depart from the path which he has proposed to himself."

† *Preussen*, p. 240. "To-day (the 22nd), about 11 o'clock, Major von Schöler came to head-quarters. He is to be sent to the Emperor Napoleon, to announce the arrival of General von Kalkreuth, to conduct the negotiations. **THUS, THEN, THIS CHOICE IS MADE, AND OUR DEAREST INTERESTS ARE COMMITTED TO AN OLD FRIVOLOUS TALKER, ALTOGETHER DESTITUTE OF VIGOUR OR ABILITY.**"

25th, the French remained in possession of the whole of Prussia; and the few fortresses which were not yet reduced, were not to be allowed to be supplied either with new works, ammunition, or provisions. Blücher, who commanded the Prussian auxiliary forces in Pomerania, was to leave the King of Sweden to his fate. The peace was to be negotiated at Tilsit, and for that purpose one half of the town was to be declared neutral.

D.—THE PEACE OF TILSIT.

Napoleon had a much easier game to play with the Emperor Alexander than with the good Emperor Francis of Austria. The former was a visionary and mystic, who idealised, idolised, and, after his visionary fashion, reverenced men and women, and afterwards let them fall in the mud in order to follow the same course towards others, whom in their turn he neglected as quickly as their predecessors. The Emperor Francis, as is well known, was a plain matter-of-fact man, and had neither an idea nor a fancy; he was therefore not to be taken on that side. Alexander had previously held the King of Prussia in a sort of enthusiastic admiration as a pious and honourable man; he now exhibited a degree of veneration, bordering on idolatry, for Napoleon, as a hero and ruler. The first meeting, therefore, of the two emperors, on the raft which had been constructed for the occasion by General Lariboissière, was altogether prepared to produce a great effect upon the romantic disposition of the mystical emperor; we, however, leave to the French the rhetorical and dramatic of the first greeting, and make no pretension to rival them in depicting such scenes. The King of Prussia was not present at the first meeting, on the 25th, which lasted some hours; he was, however, at the second, which took place on the next day. We are surprised, moreover, at the great importance laid by the French, who detail every word spoken (and also not spoken) by the Emperor Alexander, and on his observations; as he much more frequently in his life said things which he did not think, than really spoke his thoughts; and as the French themselves have repeated, endlessly, that their Napoleon alleged Alexander was as false as a Byzantine Greek. The negotiations respecting the peace commenced as early as the 28th, and the King of Prussia, during their course, played merely a subordinate character. If we believe the French, their idolised Emperor made him feel his position in a very pitiful manner, by observing a totally different ceremonial in his case from that which he adopted on receiving the Emperor Alexander, and designedly prevented the fact, that he returned the king's visit, from being published in the journals, though he undoubtedly did. Whether the blame rests with the Emperor, or the writer, we know not; but it is clear that the French, notwithstanding the revolution, are still the same people who formerly made the greatest possible noise respecting the conditions of a visit of ceremony, and regarded it

as a question of importance to determine whether the visitor was entitled to the honour of an arm-chair, an ottoman, or a chair. If the Emperor really interfered in such a petty affair as the return of a visit of ceremony, he obviously forgot not only his origin, but also the true foundation of his greatness, and behaved in a most undignified manner. The Emperor of Russia, with all his religious sentimentality, was as great a stranger to the true principles of morality as his opponent; he suffered himself to be won, by having his attention directed to Turkish, and especially to Swedish provinces, almost indispensable to the safety of his capital, and consented to be enriched, even at the expense of his friend, the King of Prussia. He appeared at the same time as a friend of the Prussian royal family, and as a worshipper of Napoleon, who had treated them with the greatest cruelty.*

We can readily believe, as the French allege, that Alexander, on his first meeting with Napoleon, expressed his disinclination for England; but even although that may not hold good of Alexander which is told of Augustus, that on his death-bed he exclaimed, "*The piece is finished, now applaud,*" the words of Lord Howick, who had retired from the government in March, do hold good. He it was who had delayed the sending of the troops to Pomerania, refused the subsidies, and given a negative answer to the application to guarantee the loan for Russia.†

The peace of Tilsit‡ was, properly speaking, made up at the especial meetings between Alexander and Napoleon, after the King of Prussia had retired. The actual treaty of peace was afterwards agreed upon by Talleyrand, with Princes Labanof and Kurakin. Talleyrand, on the other hand, dictated, word for word, the peace for Prussia, to Counts Kalkreuth and Golz, who had full powers to conclude it. There were two treaties, a public treaty of alliance, and

* *Preussen*, p. 253. Von Schladen observes: "The powerful Autocrat of Russia here plays a character, in reference to Napoleon, which is very little in accordance with his dignity: his mind appears to be entirely occupied with one thought, that of winning him by flattery. He accepts all his invitations to banquets, without making a return in kind; and captivated by the cunning deceptions of this extraordinary man, he is become a mere dumb tool in his gigantic plans, and the King of Prussia a sacrifice to this state of things, and to his own fidelity."

† We shall quote the words used by Lord Howick, and to which we have before alluded: "Il y a trop de danger à garantir un emprunt, parceque si les gouvernements venaient à se brouiller, il serait à craindre que le désir de faire du mal à l'ennemi ne l'emportât sur la loyauté des engagements pris."

‡ The treaty is given in Martens, vol. iv., pp. 436, and on; but essential portions are wanting. Bignon also denies the existence of these essential points. The author of the article "Alexandre," in the *Biographie Universelle*, vol. lvi. (supplement), alleges that he has given them for the first time; but they are not even there in a full, authentic form. Schnitzler, in the notes to his "Histoire intime de la Russie," No. x., vol. i., p. 445, has reprinted the article from the *Biographie Lefebvre*, in vol. iii. of his "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," quotes everything which was agreed on either positively or eventually—even what affected Sicily, the partition of the Turkish Empire, and the combined expedition of the Russians and French against the English East Indies, but says nothing of the quarter whence he derived his information, or how much of it was really written down.

an agreement, by which the parties agreed, eventually, to divide the possessions of other powers not engaged in the war: these were concluded between France and Russia, and signed on the 7th of July. The third, between France and Prussia, was first concluded on the 9th. When the secret articles, partly verbally agreed upon and partly written, are compared, no one can be surprised that the agreements, partly not written, and partly written, have been steadfastly denied, and were never published. The most of them, such as the joint expedition to India, and the partition of the territories of powers not engaged in the war, are so extravagant, that we cannot help doubting that such things were even seriously meant; still, much was done, and that was bad enough.

If we might draw a line of distinction more minutely, in a case in which the originals of the treaties are not before us, we might say that there were, properly speaking, one public, and three secret treaties concluded with Russia, which were, at later periods, partly acknowledged and partly denied. We shall proceed to give all that is known of these secret agreements, or is given by the director in the department of foreign affairs, who has written the history of the cabinets of Europe, as the summary of the results of the verbal consultations of the two emperors. In reference to this public treaty, a compliment is paid the Emperor of Russia; Napoleon, for his sake, agreeing to restore to the King of Prussia those possessions which are afterwards mentioned specifically in the treaty of peace.

In the fourth article of the treaty with Russia, namely, it is settled that Prussia, out of regard to the Emperor of Russia, was to lose only some four millions and a half of subjects, and one-half its income. In the fifth article, the city of Danzig, occupied by the French with a small army, and ruled by a French governor, is declared to be a free republic, and a territory assigned it of some six or eight miles in circumference. In the two following articles, it is determined that the King of Prussia shall allow a military road from Saxony to Warsaw, and that neither Prussia nor Saxony shall impose or collect any tolls on the Vistula. The new republic of Danzig is to be placed under the protection of the King of Saxony, for whom Warsaw is to be erected into a duchy, and under the protection of the Emperor of the French, who, under the title of protector, properly speaking, remains master of the town, and furnishes an army, whose commander-in-chief is to have unlimited rule over everything. In the ninth article, it is first of all determined that that portion of Poland which on the last partition had fallen to Prussia, should form the Duchy of Warsaw, which France was to cede to the King of Saxony. From the part of Poland thus wrested again from Prussia, the district, however, between the Bug, the Lassassna, and the Bobra, as well as the districts of Bialystock, Bielsk, and Debrizyn, are to be given over to Russia, which is thus to share in the spoil of her ally. In the twelfth article, it is settled that Oldenburg, Coburg, and Mecklenburg, are to be restored to their princes, with this reserve alone,

that the harbours in Oldenburg and Mecklenburg are to remain in the hands of the French till the establishment of a general peace. In the fourteenth and fifteenth articles, the Emperor Alexander acknowledges Louis Bonaparte as King of Holland, and Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, the confederation of the Rhine, and the titles and possessions of the individual princes who compose it; and thus, consequently, quietly relinquishes Orange, Fulda, Piedmont, and Naples, and all the demands which Russia had made on behalf of these princes since 1803. In the eighteenth article, Alexander also recognises Napoleon's brother, Jerome, as King of Westphalia—as rightful possessor of the kingdom hastily formed out of the patrimonial states of German princes. In the sixteenth article, Alexander cedes to Holland the lordship of Jever, which his grandmother, Catherine, as a Princess of Zerbst, had inherited from her brother; and Holland also receives East Friesland from Prussia. In order to deceive Austria, all sorts of settlements were afterwards made in reference to the peace with the Turks, as well as to Moldavia and Wallachia; all which were abolished, and declared null, by a secret treaty agreed to at the same moment.

The first of the secret treaties changed the simple treaty of peace into an alliance, offensive and defensive, according to the conditions of which, Napoleon gave up the Turkish Empire, with the exception of Constantinople and its neighbourhood, to the Russians; while they, on their part, unconditionally acknowledged whatever Bonaparte might choose further to undertake on the continent. In another article, Alexander promised his assistance against England, and his accession to the continental system. He consented, not only to close all his ports against the English, and to forbid all trade, but also that Sweden (whose destruction was verbally agreed on, because it was intended to divide it between Russia and Denmark) was to be forced to co-operate, and close all the ports of the Baltic, or be reduced by war.

The second secret treaty—the existence of which Bignon boldly denies, although Savary appeals to it in reference to Spain and Portugal, and although the English, in the manifesto which they issued immediately after their predatory incursion against Denmark, also appealed to it—gave up Portugal and Spain, Malta, and the north coast of Africa, to Napoleon's arbitrary disposal. The Russians might, indeed, have very well subscribed all this, even if they had been enemies of Napoleon, because these colossal plans were prodigiously wild, and must have necessarily ended in the same manner as the winter campaign against Moscow. The English knew, besides, that Talleyrand was always in need of money; they therefore applied a very considerable sum, as they had done once before, to purchase a transcript of this secret treaty from the French department of foreign affairs. Talleyrand himself closed his eyes against such vile transactions, but his confidential *employés*, whom he always so

selected with very pliable consciences, were obliged to deal for him. On this occasion the notorious Count d'Antraignes was very active. He at first wrote in favour of the revolution, then against it; sold himself first to the English, and then, on the annihilation of Venice, to Bonaparte; and, after all, prepared against Napoleon the fragments from Polybius. Both Talleyrand and Fouché were altogether safe from any prosecution on the part of the Emperor; for both of them were acquainted with things known to none besides; and Talleyrand, in addition, had half besought, and half insolently extorted, the place of a grand-elector. He was, besides, indispensable; though, afterwards, he was obliged to give up the ministry of foreign affairs to Champagny. The English have never published the text of the purchased article; they allege, however, that by virtue of an article in the second treaty, Denmark was to be compelled to give up her fleet to France, and was to receive compensation for the loss by the possession of the Hanse Towns.

In the third secret treaty, the evacuation of Cattaro, and the cession of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, was promised to France; and in another article, a new signification was given to the acknowledgment of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples. He was acknowledged as King of Naples and Sicily; and Ferdinand IV. was to be compensated for the loss of Sicily, by the island of Candia, the north coast of Africa, and the Balearic isles; that is, by possessions in the moon. In other secret articles, Napoleon is said so have agreed, even as his friends admit, that although the article of the secret treaty, in reference to the partition of Turkey, was not to be fixed, on account of Austria, the Emperor of the French was not to insist upon the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, as settled in the public treaty, and not even to throw obstructions in the way of any further conquests made from the Turks. In the celebrated conversation which Napoleon had in Bayonne with Canon Escoiquiz, the notoriously knavish Mentor of Ferdinand VII. of Spain, he also alleged that the Emperor of Russia, at Tilsit, had approved of the expulsion of the House of Bourbon from Spain, and the house of Braganza from Portugal.* As to Prussia, the main points of the peace to be concluded with the king were already contained in the treaty with Russia, and only a few remaining points, which we shall presently mention, were to be added; which, as Napoleon says, was conceded to Prussia merely out of friendship to Russia. Concerning the honour, or rather regard to common morality and the outward appearance of right (for only the weak pay any attention to right itself), of which the two emperors gave a conspicuous example to the whole world, on this occasion, a distinguished French diplo-

* “L'Empereur Alexandre, à qui j'ai fait part à Tilsit de mes projets sur l'Espagne, qui remontent à cette époque, les approuva; j'ai reçu sa parole d'honneur qu'il ne s'y opposera pas.” See appendix to De Pradt's Mémoires, “Sur la Révolution de l'Espagne.”

matist pronounces his opinion in terms even as strong as we ourselves would be disposed to use, judging, as we do, from the point of view of our plebeian morality.*

The King of Prussia was, indeed, a thoroughly estimable man, but wholly incapable of any great thought; the aged Kökeritz was not fit to inspire him with one, and yet he was the man whose advice was asked. An old loquacious man, like Kökeritz, was to conduct the most difficult negotiation! It is, therefore, no wonder that the king was not only robbed, but also most unnecessarily offended in the person of his wife. The noble queen should have been restrained from mixing herself in the affair, and from seeking to obtain from Napoleon's grace what was not to be had from his sense of justice; but, instead of this, she was advised to humiliate herself. She went to Tilsit, sought what she ought not to have sought—to touch the feelings of the conqueror, who, under the mask of French gallantry, gave mortal offence to the noble queen; she ought to have kept herself apart from politics. All the French journals and annalists represent the queen as performing a part in a melodrama; and even Thibaudeau is not ashamed to triumph and to scoff at misfortune! The Prussian minister of foreign affairs, Count von Budberg, did all in his power to prevent the queen's journey to Tilsit, where anything like feeling in the negotiations was least of all in place; and when, nevertheless, she came, he gave open expression to his censures on the conduct of the miserable courtiers who had recommended the measure. Budberg unwillingly said beforehand, that this journey would not only not be attended with the slightest result, but would bring a humiliation upon the well-meaning but ill-advised queen. He said, that hitherto the king's honour had not been properly maintained, and that it was shameful to wish to sacrifice the queen's. Budberg was at that time highly dissatisfied with the king, because he suffered himself to quail before Napoleon, and neglected Hardenberg's counsel for that of people whose only fears were about their estates and their rank; in this respect only, Budberg called Hardenberg a noble man, who was not afraid of the French.†

* Lefebvre, "Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe," vol. iii., p. 114. "Jamais il ne fut donné aux hommes d'assister à un tel spectacle; mais toute cette grandeur ne nous éblouit point. Jamais les combinaisons de la force matérielle ne prévalurent avec plus d'audace sur les principes du droit et de l'équité; jamais on ne vit des pouvoirs humains disposer avec une autorité plus arbitraire des destinées des peuples, violer avec un plus effroyable cynisme cette morale vulgaire qui défend de sacrifier l'ami qui s'est dévoué à vous et qui a reçu vos serments. Toute notre âme se révolte à la vue de ces deux souverains, les plus puissants de ce monde, hier ennemis acharnés, alliés aujourd'hui, donnent pour ciment à leur union l'ingratitude et la déloyauté, se livrent mutuellement, à l'exemple des triumvirs de Rome, les dépouilles de leurs propres alliés que naguères ils avaient arrachés à leur repos et trainés violemment à leur suite dans l'arène des combats—nouvelle et terrible leçon, qui apprend aux peuples à quel prix s'achètent les conquêtes et la grandeur."

† Preussen, p. 256. Budberg, the Prussian minister, is said to have given it as his opinion, under the seal of the most profound secrecy, THAT WITH A MONARCH SUCH AS OURS, NO ONE COULD SAVE THE STATE; FOR, ALTHOUGH HE HAD ONE OF

Napoleon knew Hardenberg, and formed a perfectly correct judgment of the king; he therefore had recourse to an instance of unexampled audacity, as early as the 4th of July, in order to frighten the king from following Hardenberg's advice, and to induce him to give himself up to Kalkreuth and his partisans, and to submit blindly to his orders. On the 4th, Napoleon observed Count Danhof in his ante-chambers, sent for him, and commanded him to tell the king, that he would not conclude the peace till Hardenberg was dismissed from office. He made it an express condition, that Hardenberg should leave the capital, and not come nearer to it than one hundred miles. This Danhof was to convey to his sovereign, and to inform him at the same time that he (Napoleon) would not consider himself bound to the promises which he had made to the Emperor Alexander. By the peace which was signed on the 9th of July, the king indeed received, first of all, a kingdom, reduced by the half, and even the future possession of this was in no way secured. Prussia was deprived of all her possessions between the Elbe and the Rhine, and, on the east of the Elbe, South Prussia, New East Prussia, New West Prussia, and the circle of Cottbus, in Lusatia. From this territory, taken away from Prussia, there was erected the Duchy of Warsaw for the Elector of Saxony, elevated to the rank of king; and, notwithstanding the much-lauded constitution granted to the duchy, it merely continued an advanced post against Russia and Austria, and was completely exhausted by dotations and the reservation of domains for French soldiers, courtiers, and diplomats.

For form's sake, Prussia was also obliged to acknowledge the new Bonaparte kings, Louis of Holland, Joseph of Naples, and Jerome of Westphalia, as well as the King of Saxony, and beforehand to give its approval of all the measures and institutions which Napoleon might subsequently adopt in Germany and Poland. The arrangements already made were: I. That Prussia should retain East Prussia, West Prussia, the New-Mark, the Kur-Mark, Pomerania, and as much of the Duchy of Magdeburg as lay upon the right bank of the Elbe, together with Silesia—in all, therefore, 2618 square miles (German) of territory, fourteen millions of dollars revenue, and 5,200,000 inhabitants. II. Holland should receive from Prussia East Friesland, and from the Emperor of Russia the lordship of Jever; but must, on the other hand, cede to France a part of Zealand, with the town of Middleburg, the harbour and fortress of Flushing, the district lying between the Meuse and the Belgian departments, including the fortresses of Bergen-op-zoom, Breda, Bois-le-duc, and Gertruidenberg. III. The kingdom of Westphalia, for Jerome, was to be formed out of the Old Mark, Magdeburg, Halle, the county of Mansfeld, Hildesheim, Halberstadt, Paderborn, Muhlhausen, Nordhausen, Eichsfeld, Minden and Ravensberg, Stolberg,

THE NOBLEST MEN AT HIS SIDE, HE STILL LISTENED TO AND FOLLOWED THE ADVICE OF FOOLS AND KNAVES; and that through himself, therefore, PRUSSIA WOULD BE RUINED.

Wernigerode, Göttingen, Grubenhagen, Hohenstein, Elbegerode, Osnabrück, with which the whole of Electoral Hesse, Brunswick, Wolfenbuttle, and the territory of Corvey, with the possessions of the Prince von Kaunitz-Rittberg, were to be incorporated. A number of places and districts, to which the remainder of Hanover, with 700,000 inhabitants, Erfurt, Bayreuth, and Fulda, belonged, were, at a later period, after having been exhausted, and their best properties reserved for the French, shared amongst those who proved themselves most servile; on which account, the prince-primate and Bavaria received the greatest portion. Münster, Tecklenburg, and Lingen, the counties of Mark, Essen, Elten, and Verden, which were also reserved, were handed over by Napoleon as early as May, 1808, to his brother-in-law, Murat. The new kingdom of Westphalia, before Hanover was united to it, had nearly 2,000,000 of inhabitants, but at first neither treasury nor soldiers.

In addition to the loss of territory, other very hard conditions were imposed, especially ingratitude towards England. Russia and France had entered into a regular alliance against England, and resolved to shut all their ports against her ships, and to forbid and prevent trade of all kinds with her: Prussia was compelled to do the same. They did not, however, stop even here. Conditions were to be proposed, which they knew England would not accept; and it was agreed, that if these conditions were not accepted by the end of November, war was to be declared. The King of Sweden, too, was to fall a sacrifice to this alliance. His kingdom was to be divided between Denmark and Russia, provided he did not join the alliance; and this, it was well known beforehand, he would refuse to do. In all this the King of Prussia was compelled to concur, and to promise that he, too, would declare war, in December, against England. This last point was determined by a separate and secret treaty, signed on the 9th: two articles of the treaty, not previously settled with Russia, annihilated, even meditately, the very shadow of independent existence, which appeared to have been left to Prussia. In the sixteenth article of the treaty, it was agreed that Prussia was to allow a military road, between Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw, to cross the Prussian territory; and in connexion with this, definite stations, and places for stores of provisions, were to be conceded. This article was afterwards enlarged, and, by new additions, explained and applied precisely as it suited or pleased the French. By an apparently supplementary article it was so arranged, that French officers were to continue masters of the country till 1809, and the blood-sucking *employés* of the harsh Daru were to administer the revenue. The king was obliged to suffer French garrisons to remain in the fortresses of Stettin, Küstrin, and Glogau; to furnish them with provisions and other necessaries; and to leave the administration of the revenue in the hands of the intendant Daru, till all the requisitions and contributions were paid. That this could not possibly be done under two years, will be readily seen from Daru's

own account, especially as in all cases in which gold is to be weighed, the iron sword is thrown into the scale. Daru states that he had to obtain 513,744,400 francs, of which 474,352,650 had been paid at the end of 1808. This sum, even when the ninety millions are added which he particularly mentions,* is very far indeed from including all that was extorted in general; whilst every individual sought to carry away something for himself. Who, then, can be surprised that Napoleon was idolised in France; that Soult was the prop of his Emperor; and that Thiers is the historian of his greatness?

Even after the conclusion of the peace, the further cession of New Silesia, and of the circle of Michelau, was wrested from Prussia; and it was not sufficient to concede a military road through Silesia; three high-roads for trade were also required, to connect Saxony with Warsaw. Because, moreover, the three fortresses remained occupied, and because a French army was in Danzig, Prussia was further obliged to consent to seven military roads to these fortresses, and between Warsaw, Danzig, and Magdeburg.

* Mathieu Dumas, in the 19th part of the "Précis des Événements Militaires," p. 463, gives Daru's report as follows:—

Subsistances	55,333,926
Hôpitaux	18,177,957
Habillement	7,626,926
Chevaux	6,840,920
Artillerie, 3000 pieds d'arbre et 812,706 francs, du dépôt des mires	1,067,705
Bois de Chauffage à Berlin	1,373,935
Porcelaine	65,860
Métaux trouvés à la Monnaie	16,256
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	90,503,485

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TILL THE PEACE OF SCHÖNBRUNN.

§ I.

FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TILL THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA
IN 1809.

A.—SWEDEN, DENMARK, TURKEY.

1.—SWEDEN TILL THE DEPOSITION OF GUSTAVUS IV.

ALTHOUGH a partition was suspended over Sweden at the meeting of the two autocrats at Tilsit, and the Emperor Alexander himself, as a husband, paid very little attention to his wife (till the *last* year of his reign)—so that we cannot suppose he would have spared the King of Sweden from any regard to relationship,—yet neither Alexander nor Napoleon would have treated Sweden in a hostile manner, had not the king exhibited a degree of obstinacy bordering on madness. During the war, Napoleon had overlooked everything which the unfortunate king in his rage had done with respect to him and the French; he had given strict orders to all his generals to spare the Swedes, and, whenever possible, to enter into friendly relations with them. When Bernadotte, therefore, in the pursuit of Blücher, overtook Count Mörner, and the 1500 Swedes whom he had brought from Lauenburg to Travemunde, he treated the general and his soldiers so kindly as to gain the favour of the nation: the king, however, was inaccessible to all advice.

Bonaparte being obliged to proceed from Berlin to Poland, it could form no part of his plan to attack Stralsund; but Marshal Mortier was to continue the siege of Colberg alone; he therefore received orders to propose to the King of Sweden the neutrality of his part of Pomerania. The king declined every proposition—made warlike preparations in Sweden and Pomerania, without any object—sent fresh troops to Stralsund—and threatened, at the beginning of the year, to put himself at the head of a Swedish army reinforced by English and Prussians. Mortier, who had commenced the siege of Colberg, thus found himself threatened in the rear, when the Swedes began to extend their positions towards the Peene, and first of all gave up the idea of a regular siege of Colberg. He marched against the Swedes, and in January, 1807, his troops crossed the Peene on the ice. The Swedes were forced to retire; Mortier took possession of Greifswalde, and appeared as if he intended to besiege Stralsund.

A regular siege was not, however, commenced, but a series of engagements and skirmishes were carried on incessantly in the neighbourhood of Stralsund, during the months of February and March. In these collisions, the Swedes exhibited great courage and skill, but were sacrificed without, properly speaking, any object or use; till, at the close of March, the defence of the fortress of Colberg, and the bold sallies of the volunteers whom Schill had there collected around him, excited so much attention, and so animated the courage of the Prussians, that Mortier found it advisable to withdraw from Swedish into Prussian Pomerania.

Loucadou, the commandant of Colberg, belonged to the same class of officers of the old army as all the other commanders of the Prussian fortresses in 1806—men who, out of mere prudence and diplomatic foresight, forgot bravery. He would, probably, have proved no better than the rest, had not the citizens of Colberg, and a lieutenant who had escaped from the battle of Jena, observed and controlled him. Lieutenant Schill, who had been wounded at Jena, reached Colberg before the French had penetrated so far. He collected a body of volunteers from the Prussians, who had escaped from prison, or fled from the enemy on the way, and made some very successful sallies and incursions upon the French. Many of the citizens of Colberg, among whom the name of the brave Nettelbeck deserves to be specially recorded, were prepared to make every sacrifice, and encouraged the garrison and the commandant to hold out, and not to spare them; but unlike the Silesian nobles, who besought the commandant not to bring them into danger by the defence of the fortresses entrusted to them, Schill and his companions made sallies to seek for booty and information, and brought provisions into the garrison, because the commandant did not venture to send out any of his troops. In this way, Schill gained great honour and reputation, by matters of small importance in themselves, at a time when nothing was heard of except flight and cowardice. First, because the French were too careless in their escorts, he carried off stores and money for the troops; and secondly, gained an advantage near Gilzow, on the 8th of December, at the head of twenty men, which excited great attention. He scattered a hostile band of fifty cavalry, and as many infantry, and took a part of them prisoners. In the middle of January, 1807, he got permission to raise a particular corps; and General Teulie, who, with some thousands of men, was ordered to carry on the siege of Colberg, soon found so many difficulties, that Mortier was obliged to return with the larger body of the French which were before Stralsund, at the very time when the Swedish garrison of that fortress was considerably reinforced. True, he left General Grandjean before Stralsund; but he was no longer able to cope with Generals Armfelt and Essen, and was obliged to withdraw. On their retreat, the French lost many men, who were taken prisoners by the Swedes; and between the 1st and 5th of April, found themselves compelled to evacuate Swedish Pomerania, and to retire

behind the Peene; but no sooner did the Swedes separate, Essen establishing his head-quarters at Demmin and Armfelt at Anclam, than Mortier resolved to attack them singly. He united other troops with a portion of the besieging corps before Colberg, and as early as the 15th of April he had got together a body of 13,000 men, with whom he drove back the Swedes, across the Peene. About the same time, the incapable Loucadou was recalled from Colberg, and Colonel von Gneisenau appointed in his stead. The latter, who was one of the few Prussian officers that gained any renown in this war, undertook the command, on the 29th. In the mean time, Mortier tried, first of all, to settle the affair with the Swedes, in order to be able again to direct his force against Colberg. Essen had requested a suspension of arms, which was concluded for the whole of Swedish Pomerania on the 18th of April, in Schlattkow. By this agreement, it was settled that either party should give ten days' notice previous to resuming hostilities; this was, however, afterwards altered into four weeks. The conditions were, that the Swedes were to remain altogether undisturbed behind the Peene and Trebel; whilst, on their part, they agreed to evacuate the islands of Usedom and Wollin—promised not to undertake anything for the relief of the Prussians besieged in Colberg and Danzig, and not to suffer any foreign troops in any part of Pomerania.

The King of Sweden, however, even before he came to Stralsund on the 12th of May, had expressed his dissatisfaction with the truce, as he always entertained the idea of shining at the head of an allied army. It had, in fact, been agreed to give him the command of an army of Swedes, Prussians, and English, which from Pomerania was to threaten the rear of the French in Prussia. For this purpose, an army of from 25,000 to 30,000 English were to be landed in Pomerania, with whom 12,000 Prussians, under Blücher, were to be united. The Emperor of the French, however, even before the arrival of the King of Sweden, had formed a very different plan with reference to the war in Pomerania. He had ordered a body of Spanish troops to the Elbe, assembled a new army on the banks of this river, and placed another marshal at its head. Mortier was to command an army between the Oder and the Vistula, to prosecute the siege of Colberg, and extend his operations as far as Danzig; Marshal Brune was appointed commander of an army of observation between the Ems and the Oder, and general governor of the Hanse Towns. The left wing of this army of observation was to be composed of Dutch and the above-mentioned Spanish troops, and to occupy the coasts westward from the Elbe; the right wing consisted of troops who came from Italy, and a division of Mortier's corps stationed at Demmin.

As soon as Brune arrived at the army, which was to begin the siege of Stralsund anew, he acted on the Emperor's desire to spare the Swedes, and offered again to King Gustavus IV. the truce concluded with Mortier, with the reserve of a longer notice in case of

the resumption of hostilities; but the king insisted on its limitation to ten days. There was at this time with Gustavus IV., who himself entertained the most extravagant notions of hereditary privileges and the divine right of kings, an *émigré*, Mons. de Pienne, who strengthened him in his fanaticism in favour of Louis XVIII. Pienne induced him to issue an absolutely mad proclamation, addressed to the French, in which he urged and invited them to leave the victorious standard of Napoleon, in order to throw themselves into the arms of an exiled Bourbon, who was as well skilled in the mysteries of cookery and court ceremonies as Napoleon was in ruling and leading an army. When we have seen what the conduct of the king was, no one can be surprised that the English were very unwilling to entrust their army to his discretion, and delayed its departure under all kinds of pretences. The suspension of hostilities nevertheless continued for some time, because the king was in daily expectation of the arrival of the 30,000 English.

Just at this time took place the glorious defence of Colberg against a besieging army of 18,000 men, who had already got possession of the outworks. The glory of this defence against a great and superior hostile force was shared by Colonel von Gneisenau with Captain Schill and the brave Nettelbeck. General Teulié, who commanded the siege, was severely wounded at the storming of the Wolfsberg, on the 29th of May; a Swedish frigate, notwithstanding all the protests of the French, lent her aid to the garrison; and an English ship brought forty pieces of cannon with three hundred charges for each, and 10,000 muskets with three millions of cartridges: all this contributed very much to save the small fortress from the enemy. It appears to us as if Mortier was vexed at the prospect of failing at the very moment in which his guns had opened a way for him into the town, and that although he was most probably aware of the conclusion of the treaty of Tilsit on the first of July, he gave orders for storming the fortress on the second. Columns were advancing on all sides to the storm, but the enemy met with an unexpected resistance, and the tremendous fire of the besieged prevented them from reaching the works. The fight, however, continued till about three o'clock in the afternoon, when a Prussian officer arrived from head-quarters with the news of the conditions of a suspension of hostilities.

The burden of the war now fell upon the Swedes alone. The English did not arrive, and Blücher, whose army had grown to 10,000 men, was obliged to retire to Prussian Pomerania. The King of Prussia wrote two affecting letters to King Gustavus, in which he lamented that the Emperor of Russia had left him to his fate, so that he was compelled to withdraw his support from the Swedes. He at the same time conjured the King of Sweden in like manner to yield to the circumstances in which he was placed. This Gustavus would not do, for he never had been capable of following any reasonable advice; although he at that time saw, that the

English never had been serious in their professions of sending him an auxiliary army. Under pretence of helping the king, they had, indeed, equipped and sent off an army; but their object was merely to conceal their murderous and predatory descent upon Denmark, and their attack upon Copenhagen, in the midst of peace. As soon as everything was ready, they re-embarked the 8000 men previously landed on the island of Rügen, and left the king to his fate. The king knew that Napoleon was no particular favourite with Brune, and, therefore, immediately on the arrival of the latter at Stralsund, he availed himself of the negotiations concerning the term of notice for the resumption of hostilities after the truce, in order to make a very strange proposal to Brune. There was a dispute whether the term of notice should be twenty or thirty days before the recommencement of war; and the marshal, too, made complaints respecting the assistance which the Swedish ship had lent to the Prussians before Colberg. The correspondence on these disputed points gave occasion to the king to invite the marshal to a personal meeting in Schlattkow. The marshal presented himself on the 4th of June; but soon learned that the king had invited him for a very different reason than to negotiate about these disputed points.

The history of this meeting in Schlattkow clearly shows that King Gustavus IV. was wholly incapable of any rational deliberation, and that he constantly made himself ridiculous and contemptible. The marshal was a son of the revolution; and yet the king did not hesitate to propose to him, openly and without circumlocution, to break the oath which he had taken to the Emperor—who also owed his greatness to the revolution—and to adopt the cause of a pretender, who was an enemy of the revolution. The latter had just then been sent away from Russia, and remained a short time in Sweden, where he was received by the king with ridiculous ostentation. This new piece of madness on the part of the king was related in all the French newspapers with cynical scorn; and Marshal Brune refers to it with a contemptuous allusion in the proclamation concerning the time of notice for the cessation of the truce. The king's own report of the interview, however, tells far more strongly against himself than all the scorn and contempt of the French. This report he caused to be printed both in German and Swedish.*

Immediately afterwards, the king proved, in another way, that he was inaccessible to every advice, and incapable of pursuing any sound policy. He absolutely refused to prolong the suspension beyond the day fixed, the 13th of July, in spite of the earnest entreaty of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, and in spite of the long forbearance which Napoleon showed towards his follies;

* We must be very brief, both here and subsequently, on Swedish history, and only remark here, in passing, on what is said in the text, that the king's account, and also that of Marshal Brune, which are very different, are both to be found in a Swedish work in justification of the deposition of King Gustavus IV.

and yet, scarcely were hostilities begun, when he was driven to Stralsund.

When confined to Stralsund, the king then sued for a suspension of arms; but the marshal gave him, as a well-deserved answer—THE FIRST CONDITION OF A SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES MUST BE, THAT HE SHALL BE ALLOWED TO OCCUPY STRALSUND WITH HIS TROOPS. The king, whose self-will was altogether like that of Charles XII., took good care, however, like the latter, not to expose himself night and day to every description of trouble and danger, or in any possible way to take part in the struggle. The council and citizens of Stralsund entreated him, as early as the 28th of July, to prevent the useless destruction of the town; but he refused steadfastly to leave it, although no help was to be looked for from any quarter, and his presence brought him no honour, because he neither exhibited knowledge nor bravery. A negotiation was at that time wholly impossible, because Napoleon was weak enough to make reprisals, on account of the conversation Gustavus had held with Marshal Brune in Schlattkow, and to order that the King of Sweden was not to be acknowledged as king till he had restored the Swedish constitution. On the 15th of August all the arrangements for the bombardment were ready—and the council and citizens once more entreated the king not to give them up to destruction, before he resolved to leave the city. At length, the king, with the greater part of the troops, went to Rügen, whilst Colonel Peyron remained with a small portion behind. The colonel was unable to make any terms of capitulation; still the French, as they entered on the 20th, spared the town, which was afterwards, without any object, cannonaded by its own king. A cannonade upon the town was kept up from the small island of Dänholm, from Werdern, and from his ships, till at last the French took possession of Dänholm on the 25th.

When Dänholm was taken from him, the king at length caused all the troops to be conveyed to Rügen. The French immediately made preparations for a landing on that island, the king took ill, the suspension asked for on the 26th was rejected, and the king continued his refusal to depart.* He appeared as if he intended to expose the island of Rügen to the attack of the French, the Swedes, and his faithful Pomeranians, of whose fidelity Arndt, in his book respecting this king, has given a most remarkable example; at length, however, they began to complain, and he found it advisable to get

* The good, patriotic, and monarchical Arndt has done everything which could be done, to represent extravagant and crazy conduct as rational. It is, however, quite incomprehensible to us, how any man can take the view of this history which is presented in Arndt's Swedish history, under Gustavus IV., pp. 248-276. We are rather astonished at the patience of the Swedes, who suffered themselves so long to be the sacrifice of a madman. This is also made evident by a French work, edited by Venturini—*Skandinavien und Carl XIV.* Johann Braunschweig, 1821. Baron von Végesack, as an eye-witness, has also given an account of the Pomeranian affairs in the beginning of his *Mémoires*. Leipzig, 1834.

out of the difficulty. Baron von Toll, who, up to this time, as well as Von Armfelt and Von Essen, had strengthened the king in his foolish obstinacy, remained behind, in order to negotiate with Brune respecting the embarkation of the Swedes.

Both commanders were in great difficulty as to the mode in which they should express themselves respecting their governments, in whose names they were desirous of concluding an agreement; for King Gustavus had never recognised Napoleon as a ruler, to say nothing of an Emperor; whilst Napoleon, since the meeting in Schlattkow, had declared that he would no longer recognise the king as such, but publicly called him a fool.* The commanders got out of the difficulty in a somewhat singular manner. On the 9th of September they concluded the agreement, by virtue of which the Swedes were to be allowed to embark without hindrance, in order to evacuate the German soil; and in the terms of the agreement, the one was called *Commander of the Swedish Troops*, and the other, *General of the Army of the Emperor of the French*.

The Emperor was the more deeply offended at this conduct on the part of the marshal, as the latter was known to be a republican, and, according to the report published by the Swedes of the conversation at Schlattkow, was said to have spoken in the warmest and strongest terms of the Emperor's person, but very doubtfully concerning the condition and duration of his empire. The Emperor was, moreover, very much dissatisfied with the marshal on another ground. As Governor-general of the Hanse Towns, he had neglected to enforce a strict observance of Napoleon's Berlin decrees on the subject of trade, but, like Bourrienne, who was minister in Hamburg, and some others of Napoleon's first officials, entered into private speculations with merchants; as, too, at a later period, was done by the Emperor himself, who, by virtue of the licenses which he sold or made presents of, availed himself of the profits of the forbidden trade in English goods, to fill his own private coffers, or the pockets of those whom he wished to enrich. Prosecutions were instituted against some of those who had joined Brune in those speculations, or they were squeezed like sponges by the Emperor; Brune was deprived of his command and his governorship. Berthier, who informed him of his removal, assigns the reason of it to have been, the unexampled omission of the name of the prince upon whose commission the treaty was concluded, for the first time since the origin of monarchy in France.†

When the English afterwards made the predatory invasion of

* On the 3rd and 4th of June, Berthier, by Napoleon's command, was obliged to write to Brune as follows:—He was to say, “Dans ses propos, et non pas par écrit, que la France ne reconnaissait plus le Roi de Suède, qu'elle ne le reconnoîtrait que lorsqu'il aurait aboli la constitution qui ôtait à la nation suédoise ses priviléges; de parler de lui comme d'un fou, plutôt digne de regner sur les petites maisons que sur sa brave nation; de n'avoir des communications qu'avec le Général Essen, ou quelque Suédois raisonnable.”

† “Que depuis Pharamond cela ne s'était jamais vu.”

Denmark, the history of which will be given in the next division, the King of Sweden played a very equivocal character; and the crown prince-regent took it much amiss, that when the English sailed off with the plunder of the Danes, in October, the king gave a festive entertainment in Helsingborg, on the 21st and 22nd of October, to the leaders of the expedition. Denmark was therefore prepared, at the same time with Russia, to declare war against Sweden, unless it yielded to the demands of the Emperor of Russia. Were we unacquainted with the characters of the persons by whom the King of Sweden was surrounded, we should find ourselves unable to explain his quietness at the very close of the year 1807, when Russia and Denmark threatened war; but from what Arndt tells us of the attendants and councillors of the king, everything is clear, and it is easily understood why everything remained as quiet in Sweden, in 1807, as if it was in the midst of peace, and there were no fears of a war. The King of Sweden, for several years previous to these events, had a series of disputes with his brother-in-law, the Emperor of Russia; the latter, from a feeling of compassion, had always shown himself friendly, till Napoleon, at Tilsit, opened up to him the prospect of being able, at the same time, to wrest Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey, and Finland from Sweden; and even then he delayed, and hesitated still. He did not really seriously enter into Napoleon's projects, till King Gustavus compelled him. As early as November, 1802, Gustavus had given evidence of his ridiculous whims towards Russia, by directions to send the Russian minister, Panin, then travelling in Sweden on family affairs, out of the kingdom. In 1805, he was desirous, for a length of time, of preventing the Russians, who were returning from Hanover, and marching to Stettin, from passing through his territory; and insulted the Duke of Mecklenburg, because the command of the corps under Count Tolstoy was withdrawn from him (the king). He took an entirely unexampled course, by laying an embargo, in March, 1807, on the sum of 375,000 rix-dollars of English subsidies, lodged in Göttenburg to Russian account, because he had still some old claim upon Russia.* The emperor remained silent, because he knew the pecuniary difficulties in which the king then was, as he had shortly before sold to him a quantity of muskets and cannon, of which he had afterwards the greatest need in Sweden, when he called a multitude of peasants into the field. As long as Budberg continued minister of foreign affairs, he, like the King of Prussia, urged King Gustavus not wilfully to fall out with Russia—but he put his confidence in an indication of the Revelation of St. John. He was afraid of sinning against God, and for that reason had before refused to follow the advice of the Governor-general of Pomerania; he had also written to the Duke of Brunswick, who had made an application to Napoleon on account

* Two very remarkable letters, written by Gustavus on the affair, may be seen in the appendix to the "Historisches Gemälde." U. S. W. No. 31 und No. 32.

of his country, that the Scripture forbade him to do any such thing.*

It appeared, from the manner in which King Gustavus replied to the proposals made to him in consequence of the treaty of Tilsit, as if he were desirous of bringing about the outbreak of hostilities with Russia; and the war, in fact, would have been commenced in October, had not Count Stedingk, a Pomeranian nobleman, then Swedish ambassador in Petersburg, contrived to soften, by his language and manner, the very singular proposals which he was commissioned to make. The emperor hesitated long about proceeding to extremities against Sweden, and it almost appears, that if the king had followed the advice of his cabinet, he might have prevented the good-natured Alexander from suffering himself to be made a tool of Bonaparte. As early as the 7th of September Russia had declared against England, on account of her attack upon Denmark, and it was not till the 6th of October that a formal demand was made upon Sweden, to close the ports of the Baltic against her ships and trade. The king persevered in his alliance with England; and finally, because the Emperor of Russia had conferred upon Napoleon the order of St. Andrew, he sent back his insignia; whereupon Alexander not only returned his Swedish order, but quietly adopted measures to take possession of Finland, whilst the Danes concerted measures, in common with the French, to invade the western provinces of Sweden. Although the king, in the months of November and December, repeatedly declined the proposals of the Russians for a union against England, everything went on in Sweden as in times of the most profound peace; and even when the Russian forces were collected on the very frontiers of Finland, the unfortunate king adopted no measures of defence whatever.

Notwithstanding the tone adopted by the king, the negotiations continued throughout the whole winter; and on this occasion the king was altogether in the right, because his subjects could not exist without England, and had nothing to hope for from Russia, Denmark, and France; but right must always be silent when force makes the demand; every one therefore blamed the king for afford-

* The words of the letter, as recorded (No. 58 der Beilagen des Historischa Gemäldes), are as follows: "I SHOULD THEN SIGN MY PRESENT AND ETERNAL MISERY." In the Swedish *official* accounts this is explained in the following manner: "To his own misfortune, and that of his country, he became acquainted with the explanation of the Book of Revelation, published by the German visionary, Jung, and with which the Swedish public were enlightened by a translation. Gustavus Adolphus, who, in other respects, was not even a friend of reading, now found his greatest pleasure in reading the Revelation of St. John, together with the commentary just mentioned; and it is quite credible, that mysteries, which always produce a very strong effect on weak minds, may have, on this point, quite turned his head. Besides, some careful calculator had discovered a scale, according to which the letters in the name of the Emperor of the French were to make out the number 666, which the Evangelist regards as the number of the beast. He afterwards gave orders for 888 oaks to be felled in the royal park; and when people wondered at the peculiarity of the number, it was found that Jung Stilling, in the first part of his explanation, calls this the sacred number."

ing the Russians the pretence for making war, which they earnestly desired to commence. On the 21st of January the king was, for the last time, called upon to declare against England; he, however, not only haughtily refused, but on the 8th of February even concluded a new alliance with her. By the terms of this treaty, the English, it is true, promised 100,000*l.* monthly as subsidy; on the other hand, Buxhövdén issued a hostile proclamation against him on account of this treaty. On the 21st of February the Russians invaded Finland, without any specific declaration of war, and on the 14th of March, 1808, Denmark declared war against Sweden.*

The whole of Finland as far as Vasa, the island of Aland, and even the islands of Gothland, Abo, Sweaburg, and all the fortresses, were taken possession of by the Russians even before the Swedish army and fleet were prepared. It was not till the end of April and beginning of May that a Swedish army under Klingspor and Adlercreuz, supported by a Swedish fleet, appeared in the field, and fought with various success. The history of the military operations, which cost a great loss in men, I leave to military writers. It was easy to anticipate that the superior force of the Russians must in the end prevail; although the Russian garrison in Gothland, and that in the island of Aland, were at first taken prisoners, the island occupied, and the Russians beaten by land at Vasa on the 26th of July, and by sea at Roggerwick on the 26th of August. The Swedes lost all the advantages they had thus gained by the bloody battle fought at Ormais on the 14th of September, and by the defeat at Lokalar, on the 18th. The Russian generals, probably in order to give courage to the malcontents, who were very numerous in Sweden, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce which were sent in the king's name, and carried on negotiations with the Swedish generals alone, for a suspension of arms, which was concluded for an indefinite time. By consulting the king's letters, given in the official report of the Swedish regency concerning the last years of the king, and printed in the appendices thereto, it will be obvious, that it was impossible to come to any conclusion as long as such a king was concerned.† The truce concluded on the 20th of

* This declaration may be seen in No. 7 of the appendices to the second part of the *Historisches Gemälde*.

† The unfortunate king wished to do everything, to regulate everything, and to write everything himself; but all that he did or wrote bears manifest signs of mental alienation. It would only be tiresome to the reader to go into details; and we shall confine ourselves to one or two passages concerning the war in Finland, selected from Arndt, who protects and defends the king in every way possible. In p. 396 he observes, that the regular army and the militia amounted to a force of 104,000 men; but that it was dreadful to see how matters were carried on. "Many official persons carried on a trade in young men capable of bearing arms. Many of the rich young people who were able to pay, but ought to have been kept in the army, because better fitted for military service, purchased an exemption; all the very poorest alone remained, and many of them were merely of the stature and strength of boys from twelve to fourteen years old." Such was the course followed with the militia. And in p. 398 he further observes: "Matters were not managed much better with the other troops; for trickery, covetousness, and ignorance, rivalled each

September only continued till the 27th of October, when the Russians resumed hostilities, and the Swedes were driven to the north, across the Kemistrom; on the 20th of November a new truce was agreed upon between the Swedish general Adlercreuz and the Russian general Kamenskoi, with the reserve of fourteen days' notice, before renewal of operations. By virtue of the conditions of this agreement, the Swedes were to evacuate the whole of Uleaborg, and to retire completely behind the Kemistrom, with all their artillery, arms, and stores.*

There was less to be feared from the Danes, for they had very dangerous friends in the French and Spaniards, whom Napoleon had sent to them as auxiliaries. In the mean time, the attack made by the Swedes on Norway altogether failed, and 12,000 English, who had been sent to Göttenburg under General Moore, were speedily recalled, because the king's conduct was intolerable to his own allies, and the English ministry were able to make better use of the troops elsewhere. The king had first of all insisted upon the recal of Thornton, the English ambassador, and then drawn the sword against his successor. The nobility, who had caused his father to be put to death, had no doubt in their favour the excuse, that at the end of the year 1808 a conspiracy against the king was necessary, in order to save the nation. This conspiracy of the officers against the king led, therefore, to no bloody scenes; and Gustavus IV. was declared incapable of reigning, without being lamented by any one—not even by his mother.

As early as December, a number of officers and other nobles had formed a union to dethrone the king; a part of them had also communicated their views to the English, and intimated the probability of offering the crown to the Duke of Gloucester; another party sought aid from Napoleon. The English ministry regarded the whole affair as too problematical, whilst Napoleon had entered into arrangements with Denmark, and promised Finland to Russia; the Swedes, therefore, were obliged to help themselves. At the commencement of the year 1809 the officers of the three Swedish armies in the field came to an understanding, to force the king to abdicate if he did not consent voluntarily; and at the end of January

other in their endeavours to ruin everything: disease soon followed want, carelessness, and neglect; this obstructed all the operations of the army; and pusillanimity, lamentation, and discontent, spread over the whole country. *Everybody railed against the king*, and many also accused the council of war, whose members were guilty of the grossest corruption and dishonesty."

* When the Russians took possession of Finland, the king gave them a pretence for incorporating it with their empire, which, however, they would no doubt have done without. He caused Alopaeus, the Russian ambassador, to be arrested. This took place on the 3rd of March, and on the 25th a declaration was published on the part of Russia to the following effect: "L'Empereur informe maintenant toutes les puissances que de ce moment il regarde la partie de la Finland jusqu'à ce jour réputée suédoise, et que ses troupes n'ont pu occuper, qu'à la suite de divers combats, comme une province conquise par ses armes, et qu'il la réunit pour toujours à son empire."

the whole plan was ripe for execution. The army of the west, which was in the field against the Danes, was under the command of Cederström, in whom the conspirators had no confidence, and therefore did not inform him of their project; but Lieutenant-Colonel Adlersparre and other heads of the conspirators obtained a promise from the Danes not to take advantage of the withdrawal of the army to make an attack. Having thus made sure of the Danes, Adlersparre made Baron Cederström a prisoner, and at the head of 3000 men marched against Stockholm. The northern army, which was stationed at Torneå to guard against the advance of the Russians, was, by the agreement of the conspirators, to remain in its position; the guards who were in the islands of Aland were to come over, in order to aid the army of the west in effecting the king's deposition.

Adlersparre issued a proclamation, in which he described the condition of the state, and announced that he had the assurance of the Norwegian troops not to undertake anything against the Swedes during his march to Stockholm. The small army of the malcontents grew considerably on the march, and the king, who was at the castle of Haga, never heard a word of the movement for four days. On the 12th of March he learned, for the first time, that Adlersparre was in possession of Orebro, and that the conspirators, therefore, were at no great distance from Stockholm. He now hastened to the capital, and appeared resolved to try the fortune of arms against the advancing troops; but at the same time adopted as absurd and perplexing measures against his personal enemies, as he had formerly done against the enemies of his kingdom. The officers of the guards and some of the generals in Stockholm shared the views of the members of the nobility, who aimed at the deposition of the king; and in the night between the 12th and 13th of March they made themselves masters of his person. General Adlercreuz, Field-Marshal Klingspor, and Colonel Silbersparre arrested the king in his chamber; whilst the Duke of Sudermania, the king's uncle, who had already played a very equivocal part at the murder of Gustavus III., appeared in the midst of the alarm without making any attempt in favour of his nephew; perhaps because he was convinced that the king was incapable of giving heed to any sensible advice.

The queen and her children had remained behind in Haga; the king himself was conveyed from Stockholm to Drottingholm. Duke Charles assumed the regency as early as the 14th of March, and on the 29th the king signed the documents whereby he renounced the crown. Not a man in Stockholm or the whole of Sweden took the king's part; and still more, the states of the kingdom assembled on the 1st of May, returned thanks to the duke for having undertaken the regency, as well as to Count Klingspor, Baron Adlercreuz, and Baron Adlersparre, together with the troops under their command, for that bold undertaking, whereby their native land had been saved from ruin. His private property was preserved to the king and his family, and the states appropriated,

besides, especial grants for their use. He himself declined everything, and advisedly continued to live afterwards meanly in exile. At first, Visingsoe, an agreeable and fertile island in Lake Wettern, was assigned him as an abode, but he was afterwards allowed to leave the country. The Diet nominated a committee to propose the necessary changes in the constitution, before Duke Charles should be acknowledged as king. The chief alteration was, that whilst the king was to continue to hold the executive power, the affairs of importance were to be decided by a council of state, consisting of nine members, and that this council of state was to be answerable to the nation. On the 5th of June, 1809, the regent was proclaimed king, and on the 29th crowned as Charles XIII.

2.—DENMARK; ENGLISH PREDATORY ATTACK UPON COPENHAGEN.

Denmark was under the wise administration of the crown-prince, who governed in the name of his unfortunate father, and of Von Bernstorff, who alone, of all the European ministers of his time, understood how to combine high feelings of honour and a love of true freedom with political and diplomatic skill. From the beginning of the revolution till 1806, it had remained at the same time at peace with France and England; but when Russia, in 1807, adopted the French system, the English ministry began to entertain fears, which were not groundless, that Denmark would be obliged to allow its fleet and sailors to be used against Sweden. The English alleged, that it had been settled at Tilsit that the French should lay claim to the Danish fleet; and in order to prevent this, they assembled an army, and made very great naval preparations. It was pretended that these armaments were set on foot (in 1807) with a view to render aid to the King of Sweden in Pomerania. We have already stated that the Hanoverian legion, and many other troops, were collected, professedly, with a view of being landed on the coast of Holland or Belgium, or in Pomerania; and, in fact, Lord Cathcart, the commander-in-chief, with a portion of these troops, had been landed in Rügen, and there remained till the fleet and the remainder of the army had arrived before Copenhagen.

In the manifesto issued by the English, they sought to justify the unexampled step of invading a friendly power in the midst of peace, by a reference to the secret articles of the peace of Tilsit, purchased by them from the French department of foreign affairs. The reasons were too weak; partly because both the French and the Russians have always denied the article respecting the alleged exchange of the Danish fleet for the Hanse Towns; partly because the English, in their manifesto, did not publish a literal copy of the article; and partly because the thing itself was so extravagant, that the English could have nothing whatever to fear. But Percival and Castlereagh gave abundant proofs, during the whole course of their administration,

that they never shrank from any line of policy which might be serviceable to their nation. Canning was selected by Pitt, therefore capable of any course of political violence; and he found in Jackson a diplomatist fitted for the duty he was required to discharge. Jackson was to insult the Danes, and had previously shown himself quite fit for such a mission in Berlin. The French had constantly warned the Danish government that the English armaments were designed against Denmark. Lord Carlisle, the honourable English ambassador, who was not himself acquainted with the views of his government, had constantly assured them that there was no idea of violating the neutrality of Denmark; but no sooner was everything ready, than Lord Carlisle was recalled, and Jackson was commissioned to issue the insulting declaration which was to be made against the Danes. The armament prepared by the English was immense, and the fleet, which sailed under Admirals Gambier and Keats, was perhaps greater than any expedition which ever took its departure from England.*

Lord Castlereagh was quite right in saying, as he did, openly in Parliament, on the 31st of July, that those against whom the expedition was intended, would first become aware of its object when they felt their death-blow; although, if such a great man can be ashamed, he ought to have been ashamed to say this of his allies, on whom, in the midst of peace, he fell like a thief in the night. The army of the Danes was very much scattered; a great part of it was collected in Holstein, no preparations were made in Copenhagen, and there were no guns mounted on the batteries, when the English fleet appeared, in two divisions, in the Sound, on the 27th of July and the 2nd of August. On the arrival of the expedition in the Sound, Jackson hastened with his message to the crown-prince, then in the camp at Kiel. This message consisted of a demand on the Danish government either to enter into an alliance with England, or to give the whole fleet into the hands of the English, in order to be kept for safety in their ports. At the same time, the English ambassador threatened, that if these conditions were not accepted, the capital would be forthwith bombarded; because it was well known that Denmark would be compelled by Russia and France to take part in the alliance against England. As the crown-prince was alone in Kiel, the king and ministry having remained behind in Copenhagen, he gained a brief respite, by referring Jackson to the government.

In order to go to Copenhagen, the English minister was obliged to take a route by land, and he was detained at every station on the road; the prince, therefore, made the passage more quickly by water, but not without danger. He reached the capital on the 11th, and

* The fleet consisted of the admiral's ship of 98 guns; 17 ships of the line of 74 guns; 6 ships of the line of 64 guns; 9 frigates, from 32 to 38 guns; and 32 smaller vessels of war. The transports consisted of 300 ships, freighted with troops, provisions, and munitions of war; and when the 8000 from Rügen joined, the whole amounted to 33,000 men.

caused every possible means to be adopted to oppose the English incendiaries. The noble and resolute crown-prince sent for Major-General Peymann, in whose firmness he placed greater confidence than was afterwards justified, Major-General Bielfield, and Steen Bille, the commandant, and gave the strictest commands to defend the capital to the uttermost, and on no conditions whatever to deliver up the fleet to the English. Before he left the capital again, and, accompanied by the king and ministers, returned to Kiel, he issued an affecting and earnest appeal to the inhabitants of the capital, and to the whole nation, to make a vigorous resistance.* He reached Kiel as early as nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th. In the mean time, the English fleet had passed peaceably through the Sound, saluted the castle of Cronenburg, and the crews bought what they needed on shore; the object of the expedition, however, was still a riddle, till the first division of the fleet was through the Sound, and the second was lying in the Great Belt. Jackson arrived at Copenhagen on the 12th, and received from Bernstorff the same answer to his unexampled demand which the crown-prince had previously given; still the minister, who was well known as an honourable man, assured him that neither France nor Russia had, up to that time, sent any threatening declarations to Denmark.

In the attack upon Copenhagen, the crown-prince, the nobility, and the common people, showed themselves equally worthy of admiration; whilst, on the other hand, the bankers, merchants, and a great number of the middle classes, afterwards gave Peymann no rest, till, contrary to the will of the crown-prince, he consented to give up to the English the whole of the fleet, which, in compliance with the crown-prince's orders, was to have been burnt, as at a later period the Russians burnt Moscow. It is surprising that Arndt, who often shows himself so enthusiastic for King Gustavus of Sweden, has not done greater justice to the Danes, and commended the English for an expedition which, however cunningly it was devised and boldly executed, was severely blamed by every honest Englishman.

The Danes were unable to resist the superior force, but they determined rather to perish gloriously than to make a shameful capitulation; and in an incredibly short time they put Copenhagen in a state of defence.† Of the army, there were only 5000 troops in

* The appeal runs as follows:—"Fellow-countrymen! having done everything in my power which the circumstances demand, I hasten to the army, in order, as quickly as possible, to employ our troops for the well-being of my beloved people, should not circumstances soon occur which may lead to an honourable termination of the present state of affairs."

† The fortifications of the city were mounted with 356 heavy guns and 85 mortars. The ships employed in the defence consisted of 1 ship of the line, 29 floating batteries and gun-boats, which carried in all 193 guns and a suitable number of mortars. They were manned by 3000 men, and so stationed as to form an immense line of defence between the land and sea batteries. In addition to this, the entrance into the harbour was barred by a large ship, sunk, during the darkness of the night, in the midst of the channel.

the city, but these were reinforced by the militia-armed citizens and students. Many volunteers offered their services; the 4000 men belonging to the fire-brigade were dispersed all over the city to extinguish the flames, and before the English landed at Webek, on the 16th of August, a considerable number of guns had been mounted. As soon as the English had effected their landing, a proclamation, signed by Admiral Gambier, as commander of the fleet, and by Lord Cathcart, as commander-in-chief of the army, was issued and circulated. Cathcart had brought with him to Zealand, from the island of Rügen, the Hanoverian legion, together with other English troops, professedly intended to protect Pomerania. The present Duke of Wellington—then Sir Arthur Wellesley—served on this occasion under Lord Cathcart. Peymann was well known and highly esteemed as a skilful officer, but he was, nevertheless, generally blamed on this occasion for not having done all, and dared all, to prevent the landing of the English; this was the more important, as the invaders did not think it advisable to make an attack from the side next the sea.

The English were no sooner on shore than, on the 17th, they took the large cannon foundry and powder manufactory of Freidrickswert, and erected batteries round the city. Sir Arthur Wellesley very easily frustrated the attempt of the hastily-armed and ill-disciplined country people to attack the besiegers in the rear. Kastenschild and Oxholm had formed a corps from the militia of Zealand, Moen, Falster, and Laland, amounting to 7000 men, but which were easily beaten by the German legion, and totally dispersed. The crown-prince refused to listen to any proposals on the part of the English, the commandant of Copenhagen declined to listen to any summons of surrender, and a murderous fire was therefore opened on the unfortunate capital on the 1st of September. This cannonade was carried on from fifty 24-pounders and sixty mortars of from 70 to 150 pounds, placed in position from about 1200 to 1500 yards from the city. A tremendous fire for three successive days and nights was poured upon the town—its churches, palaces, and houses destroyed, twenty-eight streets laid in ashes, and 2000 persons killed. The crown-prince continued unshaken; but in consequence of the city being so closely beset, it was impossible to consult him. Peymann, who had been left as commander-in-chief in the capital, suffered himself to be influenced by the entreaties of the rich, as many of the Prussian commandants, in 1806, had suffered themselves to yield to the wishes of the noble proprietors. On the 6th of September he made application for a suspension of arms, and on the succeeding day concluded a capitulation, which was afterwards strongly disapproved of by the regent; but when his displeasure was known, it was already carried into effect.

The capitulation was agreed to by Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Home Popham, and Sir George Murray, who conducted the siege; and confirmed by Admiral Gambier and Lord Cathcart. The second,

third, and fourth articles contain the conditions to be referred to below; and the promise attached to the fulfilment of these conditions proves that the English themselves regarded this expedition which they had undertaken, not as a regular attack upon Denmark, with which they were at peace, but as a predatory invasion. They promised, if the conditions were fulfilled, that they would take their departure within the course of six weeks. The main conditions were, that the whole of the naval docks or Holm was to be evacuated to the English; the ships and transports, or other vessels of war, of whatever description, together with all stores and materials, were to be given up; and the English transports and store-ships to be allowed to come into the harbour, to take on board the troops and munitions of war, which they had previously put on shore. Steen Bille alone had fully seized the meaning and spirit of the crown-prince, and had given it as his advice rather to burn the fleet than surrender it to the enemy; in this he was outvoted. Eighteen ships of the line, fifteen frigates, six brigs, and a great number of gun-boats, many of which, as the English pretended, could have been of no use to the French, were carried off and conveyed to England. The destruction of everything which could not be carried off was afterwards systematically executed, under the orders of Sir Home Popham and James Mackenzie. Two ships of the line, then on the stocks, were cut in pieces, and a third, just ready for sea, was destroyed, because the time allowed for carrying off the booty could not be prolonged. Everything which in the most remote degree belonged to the navy—all the implements on the wharves, and costly machinery, were either rendered useless or taken away. Even the metal cross of a tower, iron stoves, stove doors, and torn-off locks, were not beneath the notice of the plunderers, boasting of their wealth.

The whole of Europe shuddered at this enormity, perpetrated by the astounding aristocrats and plutocrats, whose cruelties, practised in Ireland, India, and China, and even against the poor in their own country, are known to, and properly judged of, by only a few, whilst their ostentatious benevolence and magnanimity are praised by themselves, and by innumerable writers deceived by them. We must, however, add, to the honour of the English nation, that on this occasion there was no rejoicing, when the ministry, in October, caused their booty to be brought to Portsmouth. The feeling of all those Englishmen who looked upon their government, which was destitute of all morality and shame, as a necessary evil—to be endured, but not commended—may be best learned from the words of an English historian, whom we have quoted in a note.* Not only

* See Belsheon's "Memoirs of the Reign of George III.," vol. i., p. 261. "But this extraordinary spectacle was not hailed by any shouts of gratulation. This was a victory which caused no exulting emotions. The long glories of Britain disdained an association with such an exploit, and the question was pointedly asked—'WHAT WORDS WOULD HAVE BEEN STRONG ENOUGH TO EXPRESS THE NATIONAL ABHORRENCE, HAD THIS BEEN THE ACT OF THE BLOOD-STAINED TYRANT OF FRANCE?'"

the Danish government, but the whole people and every individual, were in the highest degree indignant at this faithless attack. The crown-prince not only disapproved of the capitulation, but on his return to Copenhagen, in October 6th, caused all those who had signed the capitulation to be arrested, and brought to a court-martial.

From this moment Denmark was inseparably bound to France, and gave full effect to the hostile decrees issued by Napoleon against English trade, English ships, English property, and even English persons. The English pushed their insults to the very uttermost; they continued still to act as if they were at peace with the Danes; and the declaration of war, at length issued on the 4th of November, was the result of the noble answer returned by the crown-prince to their threats and demands for a close alliance. He declared *that he felt himself as full of indignation at the demands as at the threats of the English; and that, considering what had taken place, no idea of an especial union between England and Denmark could be for a moment entertained.*

3.—HISTORY OF TURKEY.

Turkey, properly speaking, was much earlier threatened with partition than Poland; it was, however, more important to the English to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire than that of the republic of Poland, and it was, besides, easier to assist the Turks than the Poles. Joseph II. and Catharine II. had agreed, at Cherson, on the fall of the Turkish Empire; the Russians had penetrated deep into Bulgaria; and the Austrians, under Leopold II., had at length reduced the fortresses on the Save and the Drave, when Prussia, roused by England and supported by money, began to make warlike preparations on the frontiers of Silesia. The convention of Reichenbach was concluded as early as August, 1791, and in consequence, Austria, by the peace of Sistowa, was obliged to renounce all its conquests. Russia persevered in carrying on the war; for as early as autumn, 1790, Potemkin had taken Ismail on the Danube; in May, Repnin, without the aid of Potemkin, had completely beaten the Turks at Babada, and in July their numerous imperial army was so completely dispersed, that the terms of peace might be dictated to them. From a regard to the then condition of affairs in Poland, and to the representations of those powers which Russia was anxious to instigate to a war with France, Catharine II. contented herself with opening an easy way for herself to Moldavia and Wallachia, by means of the peace concluded at Jassy in January, 1792. Russia did not require any cession of the provinces on the Danube; but, by the peace of Jassy, the sultan was obliged to cede all the country between the Dneister and the Bug, together with the fortress of Otschakof. From that period the Russians were very much occupied by Polish affairs, and under Paul I. there was even an alliance

concluded between Russia and the Porte against the French, who at that time were in occupation of Egypt. When the English joined this alliance, they caused an article to be inserted in the treaty that the territory of the Turks was in no respect to be diminished.

The same guarantee for the integrity of the Turkish Empire is also contained in an article of the preliminary peace concluded between the Turks and the French. The empire of the former appeared at this time threatened on all sides, because it was disturbed by a variety of internal commotions, and was not equal to resist the power of the Russians. The Russians had long enjoyed the protectorate of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, but they now sought to carry it out in such a manner as necessarily to lead to continual strife. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople used the protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia so as when occasion required to make the most violent demands on the sultan. Within the empire itself, Djezzar Pasha had long completely torn Syria from the central power; Egypt had first been long in the power of the French, and it afterwards appeared as if the English, who had wrested it from the hands of the French, were not disposed to evacuate it again. In Europe, Paswan Oglu was assuming a threatening attitude. This Pasha of Widdin had made himself independent from 1797; he treated with contempt the imperial army, which had taken the field against him, under the command of the Capudan Pasha Hussein, and in the beginning of the nineteenth century was still continuing to extend his rule. In the year 1800 he vanquished the Pasha of Roumelia, reduced the city of Ternowa in Bulgaria, and in 1801, when the Hospodar of Wallachia and the Pasha of Belgrade had united their armies against him, and even besieged him in Widdin, he dispersed and annihilated both their forces. The sultan was at that time almost wholly without an army, for the troops, which were organised and disciplined in the European fashion (Nizami Gedid), were not yet properly trained, nor were they very numerous; and the old imperial militia (the Janissaries) was not only universally dissatisfied with the introduction of the new discipline, but had renounced the service, or had proceeded even to open rebellion.

The English and Russian ambassadors ruled at that time either alternately or together in Constantinople. On the 25th of July, 1802, the old friendship between France and the Porte would most likely have been restored, had not the two ambassadors interfered to prevent the French from gaining their former influence. This was the more easily effected, because Bonaparte had, in the earlier part of his career, entrusted his embassies to most courts to his generals. These men brought the rude and insolent tone of the revolution into diplomacy, and employed it in the composition of notes and memorials.

When, therefore, he had assumed the imperial title, he selected Marshal Brune as his ambassador, to prevail upon the sultan to ac-

knowledge him as Padisha of the French, which the Russian and English ambassadors succeeded in preventing. Brune appeared in Constantinople with Oriental splendour, but was wholly unacquainted with the usages of the court. He was attended by a numerous and splendid suite, and brought everything with him calculated to carry out the sultan's favourite idea—the organisation of an army well disciplined and armed after the European fashion. He nevertheless failed in attaining his object, because he did not understand how to manage the Turks; and Napoleon was not acknowledged by the sultan as emperor till a year after Brune's departure. In the mean time, however, the Turkish Empire was sinking deeper and deeper, and in 1805 appeared threatened with dissolution.

From Damascus, Djezzar Pasha reigned with absolute dominion over the two Syrias, although he apparently acknowledged the supremacy of the sultan. After the departure of the English from Egypt, first the beys, and afterwards Mehemet Ali, reigned over that country, and only paid their yearly tribute to the sultan when they pleased. Ali Pasha, in Albania or Jannina, was as independent as Paswan Oglu in Widdin. In Servia, Czerni George soon became independent prince of the Sclavonians of the Danube. Ypsilanti and Morusi, both Greeks, by the permission, or more properly by the command, of Russia, were appointed H ospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, for seven years at least, and were, therefore, rather subjects of the Russians than of the Turks.

At the time of the foundation of the Empire in France, the sultan hesitated long whether he would lean upon the English and Russian, or upon the French influence, for he felt a great want of confidence in Napoleon, since he had been informed by the English of the language which fell from the Emperor in conversation with Lord Whitworth. He was reported to have taken the partition of Turkey for granted—as a thing unavoidable; and that on such partition the province of Egypt ought necessarily to fall to the share of France. This conversation was printed, in 1803, among the documents connected with the renewal of the war between England and France, and was communicated to the sultan. The French, indeed, in their official journals, contradicted the allegation; but whoever put any faith in their official journals? On this ground, we must explain the fact that the Turks favoured the Russians in the war which they were carrying on with the Persians; suffered them to sail up the Phasis, and even to build a fort at its mouth. They were even desirous of renewing the friendly alliance formed with Russia in 1798, which renewal, indeed, the Emperor of Russia was afterwards unwilling to confirm, because the English had taken care to have the inviolability of the Turkish Empire incorporated in the treaty of 1798. Had, therefore, the Emperor of Russia ratified the alliance, he would have guaranteed to the Turks the present condition of their empire in Europe, which he did not wish to do. This excited the suspicion of the Turks, who inclined more and more

towards the French, and did not suffer themselves to be frightened by the threats of the English and Russians. Immediately after the peace of Presburg, the Turks, who had previously acknowledged Napoleon's Empire, sent a new ambassador to Paris. This close alliance between the Turks and the French became at length so suspicious to the English and Russians, that the latter assembled a body of troops on the Bug. Whilst the Russians and the rebels were thus threatening the Turkish state, a hereditary chief of the Bedouins arose in Arabia in opposition to the orthodoxy of the sultan, and consequently to his authority in spiritual things.

Abdul Wahab or Abd el Ouahab collected together a hoard of predatory Bedouins, and by stimulating their fanaticism, formed them into a sect. With these followers he plundered the holy cities, and threatened all the places bordering on Arabia with heresy and pillage; at the same time that Sultan Selim III. deeply offended all the Turks of the old school, by the introduction of reformatory measures which appeared necessary to secure his throne.

Sultan Selim knew that the theological lawyers—the ulemas—by the influence which they exercised as the legal advisers of the council of the state, the Divan, were opposed to every improvement which he wished to introduce. He therefore tried to weaken this influence; and these orthodox jurists, on the other hand, quietly conspired against him, and were ready to break out into rebellion on the first opportunity. Russia favoured those conspiracies, and kept up an understanding with the conspirators and malcontents, in order to prevent the power of the Turkish Empire from being again restored by means of French assistance. In order to enable the sultan to improve his army, artillery, and the bulwarks of his empire, Napoleon sent engineers, officers, artillerymen, workmen, and materials; whilst, on the other hand, the Russian ambassador, Italinski, and the English ambassador, Arbuthnot, threatened war if the alliance with the French was not relinquished; and Italinski's threats fell with a double weight, because a corps of Russians were ready for action on the Bug.

About the time at which Napoleon adopted the resolution of attacking Prussia also, and therefore foresaw a war with Russia, a Turkish army was assembled to take the field against the Russians on the Turkish frontiers, and Napoleon clearly saw how advantageous to him a war between the Russians and the Turks would be. He therefore sent General Sebastiani as ambassador extraordinary to Constantinople.

General Sebastiani arrived at Constantinople in August, 1806, as the chief of a very splendid embassy, attached to which there was a whole army of mostly German, Polish, and Italian engineers, artillerymen, and officers, who were to organise and lead the Turkish army. Sebastiani soon gained considerable influence, and as early as the middle of September succeeded in prevailing upon the sultan to dismiss Ypsilanti and Morusi, as creatures of Russia, from their

offices, and to appoint in their stead Suzzo and Callimaki, as Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. This appeared as if it would necessarily lead to a breach, especially as at that very time the reasons became known for which the Emperor of Russia had refused to ratify the treaty of alliance with the Turks; the English ambassador, however, first obtained the peace. Arbuthnot threatened that he would employ the English fleet against the capital, if the demands of the Russians, in reference to Moldavia and Wallachia, were not satisfied. The hospodars were restored to their offices; but when this took place, hostilities had been already begun.

On the arrival of the news of the dismissal of the hospodars, Michelson advanced to the Danube with an army, which has been exaggerated to 80,000 men, besieged Choczyn and Bender, and pushed forward into Moldavia. Jassy was taken possession of on the 29th of November, 1806, and as a Russian patent was given to Czerni George, who had set up as Prince of Servia, the views of the Russians could not be misunderstood; Sultan Selim, therefore, sought council and assistance from Sebastiani.

As soon as Napoleon arrived in Belin, after the battle of Jena, he sent for Argyropulos, who was there as a deputy from Turkey, and commissioned him to inform the sultan that he would take care to prevent the Russians from maintaining their advantages on the Danube. The Turks, in fact, at that time needed encouragement, for in the very same month in which Napoleon marched against the Russians to the Vistula, their army suffered considerable loss on the Danube. The Turks, under Kusanzy Ali, had defended Belgrade with incredible obstinacy against the Servians; on the 13th of December, however, the fortress was reduced, and on the 23rd Michelson defeated the Turks who opposed him in the field. All this took place without any declaration of war; and it was not till Michelson had entered Bucharest on the 27th of December, that the Turks summoned up resolution enough formally to declare war. At the very time in which the Turks declared war, Michelson received orders to send to the Bug the third division of the army, employed against the Turks, because its services were needed in Poland. When this army, under General von Essen, reached the Upper Vistula, the English, by an attack on Constantinople, tried to compel the Turks to make peace.

The Turks, before they were threatened by the English fleet under Admiral Duckworth, had made immense preparations for war in the Danube. Sultan Selim had sent for the Pasha of Caramania, who had organised an army after the European fashion, to come to Europe. His troops were to be joined by another force, trained also on the new system introduced by Sultan Selim, under the command of Bairactar Pasha of Rutshuk, and as this was regarded as a sacred war, Paswan Oglu consented to unite with the sultan's army of the faith. Paswan Oglu died so suddenly, that, as usual in such cases, his death was attributed to violence. The Turkish army, however, was very numerous, and Marmont sent a number of skilful

French staff-officers to Bairactar's army. Marmont was at that time the general in command in Dalmatia, and resided in Ragusa. He had to contend by land with the Russians, who, on the retirement of the Austrians, had made themselves masters of all the strong places, and was at the same time constantly harassed at sea, by the fleet of Admiral Siniavin, which was then in the Adriatic. Napoleon talked much of sending 25,000 French as auxiliaries to the Turks in Bulgaria; this army, however, would soon have proved more ruinous to the Turks than to the Russians; on the other hand, Sebastiani saved Constantinople from a conflagration by the English, such as that which they twice kindled at that time in Copenhagen, and in our days at Acre and in China.

Arbuthnot had long professedly played the part of a friendly mediator; but no sooner did Admiral Duckworth appear with the English fleet in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and Siniavin also had received orders to sail thither, than he assumed the same insulting tone which Jackson afterwards adopted in Kiel towards the Crown-Prince of Denmark. On the 25th of January, 1807, he sent a note to the Turkish minister, in which he declared, that unless the sultan adopted a number of conditions therein contained, he would cause the capital to be bombarded. The most prominent of these conditions were, that the French ambassador should be immediately sent out of the city, and that the sultan should conclude a firm alliance with Russia and England. Arbuthnot did not wait for the answer in the city, but on shipboard; and when his conditions were refused, sailed to join the fleet of Admiral Duckworth, then cruising off Tenedos.

The question now raised was, whether the English ships could pass the Straits of the Dardanelles without danger. The French engineers and artillery-officers alleged, that the straits between Sestos and Abydos could be effectively defended by the batteries on both banks, provided these batteries were properly repaired and armed, and ships were at the same time stationed after a manner prescribed, in order to support the fire of the batteries; the Turks, however, delayed. Duckworth kept watching for a favourable opportunity, and appeared to hesitate; but on February 19th sailed safely through, because the Turks in the batteries, confounded and terrified by the tremendous fire of a whole fleet, did not manage their guns well. The English, it is true, lost a few people, but none of their ships; nor was one of them even seriously damaged. The English admiral afterwards burned all the Turkish ships which were in the channel, or in the Sea of Marmora, and then appeared in a threatening position before Constantinople. Sultan Selim was frightened by the threat of laying the capital in ashes, and was about to yield; he even begged Sebastiani, for peace sake, to take his departure voluntarily from the city; instead of that, however, the French ambassador again inspired Selim with courage, and undertook the direction of the measures for the defence of the city.

The first object was to gain time by negotiations, till the officers and gunners sent by Marmont should arrive. The inhabitants of the city were hastening forward to act as volunteers, and, by their aid, 500 guns had already been mounted in favourable positions; and fire-ships were also prepared. Whilst Sebastiani thus directed the operations for the defence of Constantinople, Generals Haxo and Foix were busy in repairing and restoring the batteries at the Dardanelles, which had been erected by Baron Tott in 1770. The object was to cut off the English from returning the same way. Even the huge guns which had stood as a useless show for a couple of centuries, were so mounted as to be rendered fit for service. In the mean time, Duckworth had learned, to his surprise, that Constantinople could not be safely attacked from the sea; and when he heard of the activity of the Turks in the Dardanelles, he began to be afraid of being shut in, and sailed back without delay. The passage through the straits appeared to be dangerous; but, nevertheless, having found a favourable wind on the 2nd of March, he passed through, but not without as much apprehension and danger as must have deterred him from a repetition of the attempt.*

Shortly afterwards Admiral Siniavin appeared in the Ægean Sea, and incited the Greeks of the islands to throw off the Turkish dominion; whilst Duckworth sailed to Egypt, there to support the cause of the beys, or chiefs of the Mamelukes, against Pasha Mehemet Ali, who, as representative of the sultan, defended his sovereignty. Mehemet Ali always played a considerable character, and founded a kingdom for his son, Ibrahim, in Egypt and Nubia. Originally, he had come to Egypt as the leader of a body of Arnauts; and at the head of these and other Turkish troops gave proofs of those great military talents to which he was indebted for a kingdom. Egypt appeared as if it must necessarily become the prey of the English; but the Pasha founded the Turkish dominion anew. On the 15th of March, General Mackenzie, with an English army brought from Sicily, had been disembarked at Aboukir, and taken Alexandria by capitulation, when Duckworth with his fleet appeared and landed still more troops. The chief command of the whole army was given to General Fraser, who attempted to take possession of the whole line of coast, and therefore made two expeditions, with some thousands of men, against Rosetta. He was twice repulsed, and lost 1500 men killed, and many prisoners. Immediately afterwards Mehemet Ali appeared before Alexandria, and blockaded the English so closely, that they were obliged to come to terms, by virtue of which the city was evacuated, but the prisoners were returned to the English.

In the mean time Siniavin maintained his superiority in the Ægean Sea. He defeated the Turkish fleet on the 4th of April,

* Among others, two ships of the line were seriously injured by the huge stone balls, of from 600 to 700 pounds weight, thrown from their immense cannon. One of them struck the mainmast, and took off sixty men.

captured several ships, and took possession of some islands. The bad condition of his ships compelled him, however, to give up the blockade of the Dardanelles, and to retire, in order to refit, after having another time defeated the Turkish fleet.

The Russians and English, enraged at the continued favour shown to Sebastiani, at length took means by their partisans to stir up the fanatical opponents of Sultan Selim and his new troops to rebellion.

In order to make a rebellion among the Janissaries, two reports were put into circulation in Constantinople; one, that the sultan wished to force the Janissaries to adopt the new uniform; and the other, that he thought of depriving them of the privilege of defending the Dardanelles, which they had much neglected. The outbreak of the conspiracy against the sultan and his innovations took place when Sebastiani was absent for a short time to inspect the keys of the Dardanelles. Four of the chiefs of the Janissaries first took possession of a castle on the Asiatic side of the straits; an attempt was next made to kill the minister of foreign affairs—the Reis Effendi; and finally the whole of the Janissaries were summoned to meet on the European side, at the celebrated village of Buyukdere. The penalty of death was threatened to be inflicted on all those who failed to appear, and the aga, or chief of the Janissaries, appeared there to conduct the whole affair.

The result of this general assembly of malcontents was, that, on the 28th of May, 15,000 rebels took possession of the suburb of Pera, made themselves masters of the artillery, and demanded the abolition of all the military innovations. They paid no attention to anything which the grand sultan either did or promised, in his anxiety, in order to gain back their favour; they declared, however, that they would injure no one, except those who might have taken share in the new institutions for the army, and in the administration of the finances. Selim had, at first, attempted to reconcile the soldiers by liberal distributions of money; but Bastandshi Pasha, who ought to have disbursed it, kept it to himself; and the measures to which Selim finally had recourse against his own innovations, made him an object of complete contempt. The ulemas and the mufti first of all pronounced a solemn condemnation on the new plans, and especially on the innovations in the army, by means of a *fetwa*, and denounced the sultan as a dangerous heretic; then they proceeded to the palace, and murdered the whole of the twelve ministers. This took place without the palace; whilst, in the interior, they spared Selim's life, it is true, but deposed him, and caused him to be conveyed to that part of the harem where all the princes of the imperial house, who might be in any way dangerous to the reigning sultan, are usually kept in a state of durance. Among the princes, entitled by descent to the throne, and then in confinement, were Mustapha and Mahmud, two sons of Abdel Hamet, Selim's predecessor; Selim had been preferred to them in 1789, because, at that time, they were both children. Mustapha, the

elder of these princes, was now brought forth from captivity, on the 29th of May proclaimed emperor, and being, according to ancient usage, girded with the sword of Mahomet, was conducted to the Mosque of Job on the 13th of June, and there greeted as Mustapha IV. The new sultan immediately declared that he would continue to prosecute the war with England and Russia; his fleet, however, suffered very considerable injury before Siniavin withdrew from the station, in order to refit his ships. The Russian and Turkish fleets met off Lemnos on the 1st of July; the Turks were beaten, lost several ships, and a great many men. In Asia, the Wahabites maintained possession of the holy cities, and Mehemet Ali firmly established his power in Egypt. In Europe, the Russians took the usurper of Servia into their alliance; but did not evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, as had been settled by the public articles of the peace of Tilsit, and as, in fact, they had promised in the articles of an agreement for a suspension of arms.

Even before the peace of Tilsit, and the truce agreed upon in Slobosia, it had become evident to the Turks that the Russians were not only aiming at the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, but that they regarded all the Sclavonians of the Danube as allies or subjects of the czar. When the Turks, on the 14th of July, concluded a treaty with Czerni George, whereby Servia became in some measure independent—and Czerni George afterwards called himself Prince of Servia—a Russian general was present at the ratification, and guaranteed the treaty by adding his signature as one of the parties to the agreement. In the following year, a Russian councillor of state made his appearance to establish the new principality. Radofinikin, who came to Belgrade for that purpose in 1808, at that time called an assembly of the nobles, drew up a sketch of a constitution for Servia, and tried also to organise the administration. As to Napoleon, his chief adviser, Talleyrand, had done everything in his power, before the peace of Tilsit, to lure the Turks into a trap which was laid for them; in such arts, however, they, like all Asiatics, were much deeper than the French, and, therefore, escaped the snare. Those who know what things Talleyrand had tried in Warsaw—and Napoleon himself, afterwards, in Finkenstein—will not be surprised that the Turks became still more suspicious after the peace of Tilsit, and believed in the truth of the secret articles which Lord Paget and Baron von Stürmer had communicated to them.

When Napoleon took the field against the Emperor of Russia he made the most splendid promises. He expressed his desire to secure the restoration of the Crimea and Bessarabia to the sultan; but stipulated, that the Turkish ambassador, Seid Mahomed Wahab Effendi, who was sent after him to Poland to conclude an alliance, should allow him to negotiate with the Russians on behalf of the sultan. The Turk was, however, by no means willing to confide the fate of the sultan and his empire, so unconditionally, to the man who was engaged in uprooting all the old monarchies, however cun-

ningly and adroitly Talleyrand tried to persuade him so to do. Napoleon, therefore, sent for him to the castle of Finkenstein, because he wished to persuade him to conclude a treaty of alliance with himself, even without conceding what the Turkish ambassador demanded—" THAT NO PEACE SHOULD BE CONCLUDED WITH RUSSIA, WITHOUT MAKING THE TURKS PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT." But Napoleon himself, who, in the 77th bulletin, gives his own version of his conversation in Finkenstein, on the 18th of May, with the Turk, could not persuade him to acquiesce in conditions such as those which the princes of the confederation of the Rhine had been obliged to accept.*

It immediately afterwards became obvious, even before the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit was known to the Turks, how well the ambassador had done, not to commit the destinies of his master and his empire into the hands of Napoleon. General Guilleminot, who, according to the public articles of the treaty of Tilsit, was professedly sent as plenipotentiary to the Russian and Turkish armies on the Danube, to effect a suspension of hostilities, and the removal of both armies from Moldavia and Wallachia, was at the same time entrusted with a very singular message to Constantinople.

As regards Guilleminot's instructions, of which we allege that they contained a *direct* command to use the whole weight of the French influence *in favour* of the Russians and *against* the Turks, even one of Napoleon's greatest admirers, although possessing occasional republican scruples, admits that their tone was very equivocal.† It became, in fact, very soon obvious, that the whole mission of the general, and the negotiations which he had to conduct, was a mere piece of diplomatic imposture, calculated for deception and treachery. As he had promised, on his short visit to the armies on the Danube, before his journey to Constantinople, he returned, indeed, from thence to the camp, in order to be present at the negotiations for a truce, although he well knew beforehand, that the Emperor of Russia would not ratify the conditions which he proposed. There was no doubt a congress holden at Slobosia, in the neighbourhood of Jiurdjewo, and on the 24th of August, 1807, an agreement signed by Guilleminot, by Privy-councillor Laskaroff, appointed plenipotentiary in the room of General Michelson, just then dead, and by Ghalib Effendi; no idea, however, was entertained of keeping it. The truce, it was said, was to continue till the 30th of April, 1808.

* " La Turquie," says the bulletin, " devait se reposer sur la France du soin de ses intérêts."

† The reader may consult Bignon's diplomatic mystifications in his work. In the text we follow Thibaudeau. See " Hist. de France," &c., vol. vii., ch. lxxiii., pp. 359, &c., where the writer speaks of Michelson, then no longer alive. In vol. iii., p. 220, the author observes that Guilleminot had gone to Constantinople: " De là il retournerait au quartier général russe, pour présider à la conclusion de l'armistice et à tous les arrangements provisoires entre la Porte et la Russie. IL NE PERDRAIT PAS DE VUE QUE L'EMPEREUR VOULAIT EXTREMEMENT MÉNAGER LA RUSSIE TANT DANS LES CHOSES QUE DANS LES FORMES." The copy of the truce is to be found in Martens, and also in the *Politisches Journal, von 1807*, s. 1021-1026.

The Russians were to withdraw; the fortresses of Ismail, Brailow, and Jiurdjewo to be given up to the Turks, whose troops, however, were to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia in thirty-five days. Everything, however, which afterwards took place in consultation between the French and Russians, in reference to Turkey, bore upon a scheme of partition.

The Russians, at length, on the 7th of August, had left Cattaro and the other strong places in Dalmatia to the French; their emperor, on the 9th, had ceded all his rights as protector of the republic of the seven united islands to Napoleon, and the latter was busy making preparations to be able from thence to extend his operations and dominion farther to the east. Marmont, who administered the province of Dalmatia, was obliged to fortify Ragusa more strongly; and received orders to make a report on the best plan to be adopted, in case it should be desirable to send an army quickly and safely from Corfu, through Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. The Russians continued to be quiet observers of all this, because it was too far-sighted, and in the mean time made firm their footing in the provinces on the Danube. The Russians made a pretence of the conduct of the Turks on the occupation of Galatz, and the ill-treatment practised by them on the inhabitants of Moldavia, for not fulfilling the agreement entered into at Slobosia. The Russian troops, who, according to the terms of the treaty, were already retiring, received contrary orders; and the Turks, driven again out of the two provinces, occupied Galatz anew.

The conduct of the negotiation respecting the division of the Turkish booty, was committed to the chief of Napoleon's *sbirri*, who was at the same time head of his secret police, and as such had been actively engaged in the murder of the Duc d'Enghien. He now held a princely rank as Duke of Rovigo, and was on this account sent to Petersburg with this and similar commissions. In the Russian capital the Emperor Alexander and the duke acted as rivals in the art of dissimulation; the emperor loaded him with civilities of all kinds, as some compensation for the coolness and contempt with which he was at first treated, to a surprising extent, by the empress-mother and the Russian nobility. He was, indeed, soon consoled, as the slaves of the czar were as zealous in showing respect in the presence of their master, as they were gross in their insolence when not under his observation. The accounts which Savary gives us of the political principles of the pious emperor and his chancellor, and their complete agreement with Napoleon's morality and his own, would be quite incredible to us, did he not literally quote their words. Savary's secret report to the Emperor Napoleon, partly written in the form of dialogue, is to be found among the fragments of Napoleon's unprinted correspondence. A contempt for public agreements, and the plunder of Sweden, even before the declaration of war, astonish us less than Romanzow's audacious contempt of the opinion of all Europe. Romanzow alleges, that such

men as they were far above the opinion of all Europe,* which is quite in accordance with what the Emperor Alexander says of the Turks.† Thibaudeau has given so correct an opinion of both the emperors—of the nature of their consultations—of Savary and Romanzow, that we could not possibly better express our own views of the principles of all autocratic and aristocratic diplomatists, by whatever names they may be called, than in the words of that writer.‡

Turkey would at that time undoubtedly have been partitioned, had Austria been willing to follow the numerous gentle hints to join the alliance of the emperors, who imagined themselves able to make their will the right and law of all nations; or if Napoleon had not found it inconsistent with his plans to bring on at an unfavourable moment a new war with Austria, which he clearly foresaw in 1808. The Russians, in the mean time, remained, throughout the whole of the year 1808, in quiet possession of the provinces which had been previously evacuated by them, and ruled, not only in them, but extended their dominion as far as Belgrade, because the new Prince of Servia was likewise under Russian protection. The army under the command of the grand vizier, which lay at Adrianople during the winter of 1807-1808, diminished during the continuance of the truce of Slobosia to a few thousand men, because, according to ancient custom, the Janissaries returned to their homes in winter; it again increased, however, in the beginning of summer. Bairactar's army, which was organised on the new European principle, was computed at from twenty to thirty thousand men; it remained on the Danube, till its leader, at length, resolved to put an end to the anarchy prevailing in Constantinople.

* "L'Europe ne dira rien. Qu'est l'Europe? Qu'est elle, si ce n'est entre vous et nous?"

† For Savary's report to the Emperor, see "Correspondence inédite de Napoléon Bonaparte," &c., vol. vii., pp. 364-384. In p. 375, it proceeds as follows: "A la lecture de cette dernière réponse de ma part, l'Empereur Alexandre se prit à rire et me dit: Ma foi, tout ce que l'Empereur voudra. Je compte uniquement sur lui. Je vous dirai même, que, dans nos conversations de Tilsit, il m'a souvent dit, qu'il ne tenait pas à l'évacuation de la Moldavie et de la Wallachie, qu'on la trainerait en longueur pour se dispenser, et qu'il n'était pas possible de souffrir plus longtemps les Turcs en Europe, il me laissait même entrevoir le projet de les jeter en Asie; ce n'est qu'ensuite qu'il est revenu à leur laisser Constantinople et quelques provinces environnantes."

‡ Thibaudeau, "Empire," vol. iii., p. 222. "Cette affaire fut traitée verbalement dans des entretiens de Savary avec Alexandre, et ensuite avec le ministre Romanzow. Mettant de côté toute finesse diplomatique on s'explique franchement comme deux chefs de bande sur un partage de butin. Alexandre disait qu'à Tilsit Napoléon lui ayant promis les principautés, il reclamait l'effet de cette promesse, parcequ'il valait mieux les garder pendant qu'on y était, que de les évacuer pour y revenir. Il s'était déjà assez dépopularisé aux yeux de sa nation en déclarant la guerre à l'Angleterre et à la Suède, il failait du moins qu'il pût lui présenter les principautés comme compensation. Il s'agissait, non de chicaner, mais de s'obliger à l'envie l'un l'autre. On pouvait aider beaucoup Napoléon, on le voulait, il serait content, toujours content. S'inquiéterait-on de l'Europe? Elle ne dirait rien. Qu'était l'Europe? Où était allé? si ce n'était entre la Russie et la France? La logique de Savary était faible contre ses arguments; il ne dit ni oui ni non. Toute l'année se passa à disputer sur le lien, où se tiendraient les négociations; la Russie les voulait en Moldavie, Napoléon à Paris." Compare with this Bignon's miserable trash in vol. vii., ch. 74, of his work.

Mustapha Bairactar had at an earlier period served with great renown under Tarsanik Oglu; he distinguished himself particularly in the war against Paswan Oglu, and on the death of the latter was appointed Pasha of Rustschuk. Of all the Turkish generals he was the one who had most zealously co-operated with Selim in his improvements, and, therefore, was least of all satisfied with Mustapha's elevation and the reigning anarchy. After Selim's deposition, he remained for some time perfectly quiet; but the misconduct of the Janissaries under the restored chiefs, whom Selim had removed, no sooner became very gross than he set out with his army to Constantinople, and invited the grand vizier to join him, in order to put an end to the mischief in the capital. When he arrived at Adrianople, he found that the army of the grand vizier had again considerably increased, by the gradual return of the soldiers from their homes; but neither the vizier nor his army was favourable to the innovations. When, therefore, Bairactar invited the grand vizier to march with him, he did not inform him of his design to reinstate Selim on his throne. Twenty days elapsed before the grand vizier resolved to unite his army with that of Bairactar, and to march to Constantinople. On the arrival of the two generals with their armies in the capital, in July, 1808, they were very honourably received by Sultan Mustapha, and to him the grand vizier remained faithful. He allied himself closely to the party of the ulemas and the aga of the Janissaries; whilst Bairactar, on the contrary, reinforced his troops by the addition of some thousands of sailors.

Bairactar no sooner felt himself strong enough than he began to prosecute the design for which, properly speaking, he had come to Constantinople. He first of all removed some of the highest officers of state from their positions, and then compelled the sultan to appoint him generalissimo. At last he summoned the chief of the Janissaries, the mufti, and the ulemas, to the palace of the grand vizier, whom he dismissed from his office and deprived of the insignia of his dignity. All this took place without the Seraglio, the doors of which were closed. On the 28th of July, Bairactar, at the head of his followers, first presented himself before the Seraglio, and sent in the mufti and the aga of the Janissaries to inform the sultan of his wishes.

He caused the sultan to be informed, that he did not acknowledge his right to the throne, and that he would continue to remain at the head of his troops, before the gates of the Seraglio, till the deposed Selim was restored. The soldiers, and their leader, waited long in vain; at length, when they broke open the gates, Mustapha caused the head of Selim, who had been cruelly murdered at his command, to be thrown over the wall. This murder was followed by a bloody revenge, when Bairactar and his followers forced their way into the palace. Mustapha IV. was thrown into prison, his brother Mahomed proclaimed emperor, and the grand vizier and the mufti drowned in the Bosphorus. All those who, under Mustapha, had taken any

share in the government, were beheaded, and their heads, according to custom, stuck up over the gates of the Seraglio.

Sultan Mahomed was the mere creature of Bairactar, who collected an army, without saying for what purpose it was designed, and at the same time restored all Selim's military regulations.

The Nizami Gedid, whom Bairactar favoured, were the detestation of the Janissaries, and of the whole orthodox and conservative population of the capital; the consequence was a general insurrection on the 14th of November. In spite of a vigorous defence, Bairactar was overpowered by numbers, and the strong building into which he had fled for safety was stormed by the enraged fanatics. The building contained a powder-magazine—and Bairactar no sooner saw his cause lost, and the house filled with people, than he blew up himself and his followers. The capital now became a prey to the rude soldiers; nothing but murder and robbery prevailed for some days, and whole rows of houses were reduced to ashes. Sultan Mahomed, too, would have been murdered, had he not accidentally been the only male scion of the imperial family; he was, however, obliged completely to change his ministry, and resign the government into the hands of those who enjoyed the favour of the ulemas and the Janissaries. He thenceforward left to them all the business of the state, and occupied himself with the factions and the pleasures of the harem alone.

As our object here, and subsequently, is only to touch upon Turkish affairs, in as far as they are connected with those of England, Russia, and France, during the time of Napoleon's Empire, we shall not enter at all into any consideration of the internal state of the empire, but merely observe that it very nearly resembled that of the middle ages, which has been the theme of praise of the imaginative, of jurists, and knights. The nature of this condition may be most truly conceived, by quoting, as we shall do in a note, the hattischerif, or proclamation in favour of the Janissaries and the conservative Jesuits of Islam, addressed to the murdering and plundering Janissaries in Constantinople.*

During the disturbances in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, the foreign relations continued the same as they were in the year 1807, immediately after the truce of Slobosia. When Napoleon's plan of removing the negotiations respecting a peace between the

* "Be it known to all men," so it runs, "that I have made peace with my old troops, the Janissaries, and hereby declare all those to be enemies of myself and my empire, who shall attempt to introduce into the discipline of my army the system adopted among the unbelievers; know, also, that the two pashas, who were favourites of this detestable practice, have been banished from the country, and given up to the vengeance of all good Musselmen, who may put them to death if they attempt to return to the territories of Osman. Take notice, particularly, that I prize most highly our old troops, for the brave men of whom they consist have obtained the greatest renown by the most splendid victories. We declare that they alone are still able to prove themselves the stay of the empire. It is also hereby made known that the present firman has been written by us in order to give you a public testimony of our gratitude."

Russians and the Turks to Paris failed of success, he found it advisable, in consequence of an impending war with Austria, to give the Turks into the hands of the Russians. One of the chief causes of the war between France and Austria in 1809 was the close union between Austria and England in reference to Turkish affairs, which appeared in the co-operation of Lord Paget and Baron von Stürmer, the English and Austrian ambassadors in Constantinople. It was the Austrians who mediated the peace between England and the Turks, which was concluded on the 5th of January, 1809; and after the conclusion of which the Turks refused to cede Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russians, at the congress of Jassy, as they had formerly done at Bucharest. This led to a new war, to which we must afterwards refer.

B.—FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY.

1.—ALEXANDER AND NAPOLEON — THE LATEST CAROLINGIAN IDEAS AND AUTOCRACY—GERMANY AND ITALY TREATED AS FRENCH PROVINCES.

We have already pointed out the manner in which Savary, in his report to Napoleon, proceeds upon the principle, that the two emperors should constantly aim at the extinction of the independence of the nations of the continent, and of all individual freedom either by the Russian or the French autocracy, and the substitution of military power for the rights and privileges of the people. Both emperors were convinced that their will was the best, and that they had much more correct ideas of the objects of all political constitutions than the whole of the defenders of popular rights. We feel justified in coming to this conclusion with respect to Napoleon, from all that his relations, friends, and servants, say of his kindly disposition, when neither politics nor ambition was in question. We have shown, and will further show, that he selected bad means for accomplishing good objects; and the blame in most cases belonged to those servile creatures who suffered themselves to be employed for any and every purpose.

As Napoleon, however good and great his views were, almost always exposed them to suspicion by the instruments he used, so Alexander's actions very often presented a complete contradiction to his intentions and words. Napoleon was a creature of the revolution, and filled with its ideas; Alexander was a pupil of Laharpe, the republican, and the actions of both, therefore, formed but too often a contrast with their language and principles. Alexander was mild and gentle; but he was attended during his whole life by his father's coarse and rude servant, General Arackdhejef, whose name was a terror to every one, who watched over and suppressed every breath of freedom, and yet still remained the confidential friend of the visionary emperor till his very death. Alexander was

rational and tolerant, the noble Alexander Turgenieff conducted the ministry of public worship, and yet the emperor affected a slavish reverence for the ignorant monks and extravagant fanatics of the Greek church.

As to Napoleon, whose power and glory reached its highest point by the peace of Tilsit, he was at this time exalted as an idol, before whom princes, nobles, clergy, and people, always ready to reverence mere outward greatness and outward effect, bowed down in adoration, and to whom they willingly offered in sacrifice the highest blessings of mankind. It is some consolation to the Germans, that, just at this time of idolatry, there arose a great number of noble-minded men, bound together throughout the whole of Germany, in the cause of freedom and right, of virtue and German nationality; because they would not, like the French, suffer themselves to be induced, by the bombast of the bulletins, to take apparent greatness for real—the outward show for the inward reality. The French altogether forgot freedom, because the dictatorship of their Emperor flattered their national vanity; because their ruler, who overthrew kings, elevated Frenchmen of the humblest class to the rank of princes—everywhere placed Frenchmen in the administration of the governments of other countries, and enriched them with the spoils of all nations. Immediately after the peace of Tilsit, it became continually more obvious, that the great man who, since his adoption of the imperial title, had been led astray by a false conception of Charlemagne, would, in future, be hurried on from one step to another, till he overthrew himself. It was clear that one war would lead to another; and that he could not remain quiet, till he had either brought everything into subjection, or till he himself was plunged into the pit which he had digged. Men, such as Von Stein, Von Schladen, Canning, many of the Austrian ministers, and Gentz, long suspected that he was on the way to ruin himself; he ought to have taken council from his enemies. He, however, took no warning—he surrounded himself with Frenchmen, who were like-minded, and accomplices with those who undermined the ground beneath his feet; he, therefore, listened to the advice of Talleyrand and of his own family, who confounded splendour with greatness. As there are numerous works which have given a minute and full account of all Napoleon's merits—and Thiers has recently exhausted all that can be said in praise of Napoleon's institutions—we shall not refer to his laws and administrative regulations, but confine ourselves to that alone which refers to the liberation of Europe. With this view, we must first show how the giddiness of greatness seized him; how he changed the institutions and measures adopted by himself, and calculated for the well-being of the people and not for autocracy, from free to autocratic objects, and in such a manner, that every trace of freedom must necessarily disappear.

No doubt can be entertained that Bonaparte's dominion was salutary to those countries whose institutions he altered from the very

foundations; for, by the introduction of a selection of the wisest deductions of the most experienced and ablest men, who had been active in the revolution, he rooted out all traces of the feudalism, castes, and hierarchy, of the middle ages, which were wholly inconsistent with the condition of men in modern times. Unhappily, from 1804, he added new evils to the old, which he scarcely, in any case, completely removed. In the later period of his sway, this was almost universally the case. When he introduced anything new, after 1806, it was almost always merely a mutilation of something old under a new name. We, therefore, willingly concur in the commendations which the French are never weary in bestowing, on his patience, perseverance, and his skill in hitting the right point, which he showed in the consultations, concerning laws of all kinds, as may be seen from the minutes of the discussion on the new system of laws. It clearly appears, from these minutes, and from the notes written down by the elder Pelet, in the sittings of the council of state, and published by his son, with what instinctive penetration he immediately perceived, in the case of every law—nay, in the special applications of every clause—not only what at this moment would obstruct his own objects as a ruler, but also what might be hurtful to them in future. We regard it, therefore, as most suitable to our purely historical and general object, to show by some striking examples how he, by degrees, altered all the laws and ordinances, borrowed from the archives of the republic, and drawn up by the ablest politicians of the republic, whom he converted into imperial councillors, which made his reign salutary; and how, by very small changes, he everywhere rooted out every trace of freedom and self-government on the part of the people. True it is, there was still preserved the name of a representation of the people: the inviolable freedom of the person, equality before the law, the right to speak and write freely, to be answerable for conduct to the law and a jury, and not to the police and *gendarmes*, but the things themselves were gone. There was still the form of freedom, but none of the substance.

The senate and the council of state, who were mere labourers in Napoleon's vineyard, gave the appearance of legality to the Emperor's most arbitrary decisions; and the miserable senators, instead of making representations, congratulated the people on the introduction of those Russian forms. In this way the Emperor, without ever consulting the legislature, in the course of only four months after the conscription of 1807, by a mere decree of the senate, called into active service 80,000 men of the conscription of 1808; and added even to this, five legions of reserves. We are ashamed to record the flatteries which such men as Cambacérès, Regnault, and Lacepède, at that time, clothed in splendid, but empty phraseology, or the meanness which the whole servile senate exhibited on this occasion.

At the time at when Napoleon returned from Tilsit, Fontanes, a creature of his sister, a rhetorician and phrase-maker of the old régime,

was president of the legislative body, at length called together in August. The first thing that took place was a change of the civil code introduced in the time of the consulate, adapted completely to the spirit of the old absolute monarchies. It was now denominated the *Code Napoléon*, and in the text of the laws, the word subjects was substituted for that of citizens—state for nation—empire for republic. Substitution, which had been previously forbidden, was now granted to those who held imperial fiefs, and the article relating to primogeniture was so drawn up as to prepare the way for founding a class of new hereditary nobility. The legal interpretation of the law, in cases in which the Court of Cassation entertained any doubt as to its meaning, was not to be referred to the legislature whence it emanated, but altogether, according to ancient custom, to the imperial council of state.* Did we suffer ourselves to enter into legal minutiae, it would be easy for us to prove, that in this revision of the laws, framed in the time of the republic, the same course was pursued to please Napoleon, which was followed by Trebonian in the case of the ancient Roman pandects to satisfy Justinian. Without going further into the question of imperial legislation, we shall only refer, by way of example, to some of the changes of the institutions of the consulate, which were made altogether in the spirit of, and with a view to, an absolute monarchy.

Among the changes made in this absolute direction, we must mention, first of all, that of the manner of appointing the judges. In future, all judges were to be nominated immediately by the Emperor; whereas previously he had only the privilege of selecting from a list of names submitted to him. A remarkable instance of the want of openness, honesty, and truth, in everything proceeding from the cabinet, may be seen in the underhand manner in which these new arrangements were effected, and the sophistical manner in which they were defended. The independence of the judges from the government was in appearance maintained, but in fact so diminished, that means enough were given to the government to procure judges suited to their purposes. It was determined that every judge should be liable to removal at pleasure till he was of five years' standing in his office; and with respect to those who had been longer in office than five years, so many corporal and other disqualifications were assigned as causes of removal, that it would have been difficult to find a man who might not be brought under some of the categories of disqualification. Things were still worse with the case of the legislature. The members of the tribunate were deprived of all public respect and influence by the reduction of their number to fifty, and by being rendered only capable of being consulted in sections or committees; and yet the tribunate appeared as a college or body independent of the Emperor, wholly inconsistent with the new system, however submissive the poor fifty, since the reduction of their

* In former times the phrase was, "Le roi en son conseil;" in Napoleon's, "L'Empereur en son conseil."

number, had proved themselves. On the 19th of August, 1807, the tribunate therefore was altogether abolished; and yet Boulay, one of the fluent sophists of the revolution, pronounced upon it a splendid funeral oration. The rump of the assemblies of the states, sovereign since 1789 (the so-called legislative bodies), was also completely changed. No one was now any longer to be admitted as a member of the legislature who was under forty years of age. The particular sections, to whose department any proposed law was to be submitted, were further required in every case to come to a complete agreement with the three members of the council of state, by whom the bill was laid before them, before it could be brought to a discussion in a full meeting of the body. Notwithstanding this, Fontanes was bold enough to allege that the legislative bodies, by the abolition of the tribunate, had recovered all the distinction and privileges of the legislative assemblies of the time from 1789 till 1800. This allegation rouses the indignation even of a member of Napoleon's council of state.*

At the same moment in which those institutions, which the new state of things had found necessary, in order to replace the decayed or destroyed establishments of the middle ages—that is, all those which, since 1789, had secured to the nation a share in the legislative power—were abolished or mutilated, Napoleon meditated the foundation of a new order of knights and nobles, combined with a revival of the ancient orders rooted out by the revolution. The first step towards the renewal of the abolished privileges of noble and other proprietors in France, was the permission granted to the generals, diplomatists, or other favourites, to whom he had presented domains, estates, and lordships, in conquered countries as fiefs, to sell them, and to replace them by the purchase of similar estates in France. When the next great step towards the restoration of the old *régime*, to which we shall now advert, was taken, there was a general rejoicing in all countries amongst those who, because they were destitute either of virtues or merits of any kind, had as yet had nothing to console them for the loss of those privileges which came

* We here give the words in which Thibaudeau concludes the 34th chapter of his book: “Doté des dépouilles du tribunat le corps législatif en réalité ne gagnait rien. Son président, Fontanes, le savait bien, et MENTAIT À SA CONSCIENCE ET À LA FRANCE LORSQU'IL ANNONÇAIT QUE LA MAJESTÉ DES ASSEMBLÉES NATIONALES ALLAIT RENAITRE. En vain on donnait aux membres des commissions la faculté d'exposer devant le corps législatif leur opinion contraire aux projets de loi, jamais ils n'en feront usage; ils s'accorderont toujours avec les conseiller d'état.” In order to show the manner in which the sophists of the revolution ruined the great man by scandalous flattery, we will just add to this obvious falsehood of the president of the legislative bodies the shamelessly exaggerated language in which Lacepède, the president of the senate, greeted Napoleon on July 29th, 1807, on his return to Paris. He says, first: “On ne peut plus louer dignement V. M.; votre gloire est trop haute, il faudrait être placé à la distance de la postérité pour découvrir son immense élévation.” He next alleges, what was also ridiculously alleged by others, although Lacepède and his colleagues *did not certainly believe it*, nor could believe it: “Eloigné de quatre cents lieues de sa capitale, Napoléon a seul gouverné son vaste empire, seul imprimé le mouvement à tous les ressorts de l'administration la plus étendue,” &c., &c.

merely by inheritance, and were to be obtained and enjoyed without any deserts whatever. Napoleon himself did not indeed win their favour, because they readily perceived that these new institutions were not precisely the same as they had enjoyed before; but with sure tact they anticipated the appearance of historical jurists, as soon as the military empire was destroyed, who would take care, as is done in our own days, that the reign of parchment and the great seal should revive.

After 1806, new grand feudatories, feudal titles, and arms of dukes, princes, counts, and barons, sprang up, with all the official privileges belonging to them. Two former sergeants, one of whom was married to a washerwoman, and the other to a woman who died in an hospital (Lefebvre and Junot), were created dukes; Clarke was made Count of Hüneburg, and received estates in Halberstadt and Hanover. Nothing was now wanting but a new edict for the institution of a class of nobility. The old viscounts and marquises, whose name was legion, immediately reappeared when Napoleon formed a new order of nobles from the sons of the revolution. He had not, indeed, created either viscounts or marquises, especially because a certain degree of ridicule attached to the last title, but he formally recognised the titles of those who had borne them before 1789. The vain Cambacérès, the greatest historical jurist of the Reign of Terror and the Empire, took the leading part in settling the resolution of the senate of the 11th of May, 1808, by virtue of which the hereditary nobility, with all its feudal distinctions, was restored. The various gradations of this distinctive order, so completely in contradiction to all the demands of the age, and even to prevailing usages, consisted of princes, dukes, counts, barons. Those only who enjoyed the privileges of nobility were allowed to form *majorats*, or to create a hereditary property for the maintenance of the dignity of the chief of the family. The great dignitaries of the Empire were to be princes, with the title of *serene highness*; their sons to be dukes, as soon as the father was able to found a *majorat* of 200,000 francs yearly income. All ministers of state, senators, members of the council of state, presidents of the legislative body, and archbishops, were by virtue of their office to enjoy the title and rank of counts, to which we merely incidentally advert, as we have no idea of enumerating the names of all those offices and conditions which entitled their occupants to the title and privileges of barons. As all these titles were made hereditary, the continent, in which the old nobility were still very numerous, was soon inundated with a legion of newly-made counts, barons, and knights, who, in order to be able to live suitably to their rank, as it was called, sucked the blood of the people like vampires. The paltry German princes, particularly the King of Wirtemburg, made no delay in imitating the example of the great man whose servants they were. They did not, like Napoleon, see in these titles rewards for service, but merely a new piece of tinsel, as an ornament to the creatures who figured

in their ante-rooms and at their courts. Men whose lives would not have borne investigation, were no sooner decked out with titles, than history and the freedom of the press were also necessarily mystified and restricted. For this purpose, too, a great man suffered himself to be made an instrument, who, with all his deficiencies and faults, had no need to fear true history, till he became small in great things, because he wished to be great in small things. The idea of sharing the despotic rule and the bloody police over the miserable and cowardly governments of the continent, with the Czar of Russia, was matured in Tilsit, where Sweden and the Turkish Empire were sacrificed to the alliance by the one autocrat, and Spain and Portugal by the other. As soon as Napoleon became desirous of being great, after the fashion of Russia and Austria, he was necessarily obliged to suppress all intellectual movement and activity in his states, as they had done in theirs.

The steps taken to make even the literature imperial, rapidly followed one another as early as 1807. On the 27th of November a decree was issued, which at once reduced the press to the condition in which it was before the revolution. A commission for licensing publications was appointed; and booksellers were strictly prohibited from selling any book whatever which had not been previously submitted for revision, that is, which had not obtained imperial approbation. The limitation of the freedom of the press became doubly injurious, because Napoleon suffered himself to be led astray by an idea, which has led astray many of the princes of our days, and especially the government of Austria—that great political advantage would accrue from a great prominence being given to that religion of usages and ceremonies to which his mother, wife, sisters, step-daughters, and Cardinal Fesch, were attached. In the case, therefore, of worship, he fell into a similar contradiction to himself, as he did with respect to the value of orders and nobility. He was led to entertain the idea that a hierarchy and superstitions constitute the support of every absolute government; the same opinion seems to be adopted by Louis Philippe, because he thinks and says, that France is not to be governed except by the aid of Jesuits—only they must be rendered incapable of mischief. The ladies were deluded by Chateaubriand and the men of the romantic school, who, at the same time, mystified Germans also. Napoleon was therefore induced to protect and encourage the Trappists, and to commit the primary instruction to monks of the pious schools; to consent that a pope's brief should be published, granting indulgences to those who visited the calvaries; and, finally, he favoured even the religious exercises of the Jesuits in honour of the heart of Jesus and the system of missions; or, in other words, the zeal of a set of very ignorant priests against every description of rational religious worship and belief. He did not suffer himself to be warned by particular occurrences, which resulted from this course, that he was alienating from himself the friends of the revolution without

gaining the good-will of their opponents; although he never hesitated to deal after a military fashion, even with the priests, when they stood in the way of his ambition. A single example will serve to show the manner in which he dealt with religious affairs as soon as his personal objects were at stake.

Napoleon most foolishly attached great importance to everything which was an object of respect or interest to the *élite* of the old régime; the Abbé Frassinous, who at a later period played a part at the court of Louis XVIII., as half Jesuit and half man of the world, excited his resentment by a species of opposition theology which he propounded in the church of St. Sulpice. His meetings, which were very numerously attended by all the friends of the old régime, and all the members of the old nobility, and especially the ladies, were called "LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION;" and the Emperor soon became so angry at the numerous attendance on these legitimist lectures that he caused, not the ecclesiastical authorities, but the police to interfere. The prefect of police summoned the abbé to his presence; the latter appealed to the minister of ecclesiastical affairs, who sided with him; when, however, the affair was brought before the Emperor, he sustained the prefect of police, and the abbé was compelled to cease his lectures.

The states recently organised by Napoleon were indeed dreadfully oppressed by him, and by the French in general; but through him they obtained a share in the immense advantages of the revolution, which they never would have attained, had not the Emperor, without entering into long consultations with the Germans who were parties concerned, like a military dictator, levelled the ground for the erection of a completely new edifice. We admit, therefore, that Germany was vastly indebted to him; but that can just as little induce us to idolise him as to be grateful to the English for incidentally civilising whole regions and countries by tyrannising over the natives, and exhausting the wealth of uncivilised countries, or to the Jesuits for converting China and Japan to Christianity. The advantages gained by Napoleon's dictatorship in Germany may be seen from considering the state of Saxony, which till this day continues always behindhand in a political point of view, because there Napoleon never swept away the old institutions; or from the condition to which Mecklenburg, Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, and other countries, were brought, when everything old was again introduced, and everything new, which was not to the advantage of the government and to the injury of the governed, abolished. The advantages of the expulsion of the old governments must not, however, be exaggerated; the other side of the question must also be taken into account. Prussia, too, is indebted for the best part of its present institutions to the French, because they compelled the king, who clung to everything that was old, and the people who were his greatest favourites, to assent to a complete change in all their institutions. In order to gain the good-will of the people, it became as

necessary to create a new Prussia as it was for Napoleon to found a new France.

In all the new kingdoms which Napoleon founded, we always find the apparently small circumstances the most injurious—things which the masses, intent only on merely material advantages, scarcely ever remarked, but which were all calculated so as, firstly, to serve the Emperor and his absolute dominion; secondly, to benefit the French in general; and, last of all, for the good of the small or the great state which was reconstructed or founded. This is particularly true of Poland, to which a new and apparently excellent constitution was given, although every one perceived that the new duchy of Warsaw never could, nor was ever intended, to become a kingdom of Poland; but that a much-favoured Prussian province was merely converted into a French advanced post against Russia. The very concession of a district of Poland, wrested from Prussia, and lying very convenient to Russia, to the latter, was in itself a proof that no such idea as the restoration of Poland was ever thought of. And, moreover, however much Napoleon appeared desirous of conciliating the Russians, it is obvious, by his whole course of action, that he had no confidence in the endurance of Alexander's enthusiasm in his favour. He therefore turned the whole duchy of Warsaw into a fortified camp against Russia, and left a large French army in Danzig under Rapp; whilst the Emperor Alexander, if we can in anything place the least confidence in the novel-writer Scott and his Tories, secretly continued the friendly relations with the English, which he publicly renounced.* We shall not, however, enter into more minute examination either of the constitution of the duchy of Warsaw, or that of the kingdom of Westphalia, drawn after the same model, because their existence was merely ephemeral, and can have no interest, except for theorists.

The most productive estates and domains in the new duchy of Warsaw were reserved for the disposal of the Emperor of the French, who distributed them as gifts to a number of his adherents; and this led to an increased taxation on all other estates, because those granted as fiefs by the Emperor were declared free from all contributions to the taxes and expenditure of the state. The tenth article of the constitution imposed an entirely fresh burden upon the newly-created

* Walter Scott, the organ of the English Tories, and the idol of romantic knights, to whom in general we attach no credit, deserves belief in this point, which he would not have stated had he had any contradiction to fear from his friends, the aristocrats, or from the Emperor Alexander. In the contemptible book which he has entitled a "LIFE OF NAPOLEON," he states, that although the Emperor Alexander published a declaration against England in 1807, in which all previous treaties and alliances were renounced, yet a Russian officer was sent to London, who gave the English government to understand that he quite approved of the undertaking against Denmark. This officer, commissioned by the emperor in person, is said to have called upon the English ministry to deal quite frankly with the emperor, for that he was, indeed, compelled to yield to circumstances, but was not on that account less inclined to counteract in every way the extension of French dominion.

state. By this article it was determined, that together with the national guards, now instituted, an additional army of 30,000 men was to be organised. And even this was not enough; there still remained in the country a large part of the French, Polish and Saxon troops employed in the war, and these were to be provided with all necessary stores.

As the duchy of Warsaw and its constitutions were a mere delusion, in order to furnish a cloak for French dominion, so was also the republic of Danzig and its new constitution, which only existed upon paper, in pompous newspaper articles, speeches and proclamations. In spite of the constitution, Rapp was sole king and lord in Danzig, which was treated as a conquered city, and released from none of the still remaining demands. Not only were all the requisitions and contributions most harshly exacted by Rapp, but because the treasury was empty, he extorted a forced loan of 2,500,000 francs.

The kingdom of Westphalia, directly governed by Napoleon's brother Jerome, but indirectly by himself, contained two millions of inhabitants before Hanover was united to it in 1810, and comprehended within its bounds the most considerable cities and towns in central Germany.* Those who are at all acquainted with the manner in which Hanover and Hesse had been previously governed (in Brunswick and the former Prussian parts of the new kingdom things were better) will be disposed to think that almost any change must have been desirable to the inhabitants, but this was not the case. There was at that time abundant evidence of what has again manifested itself in our own times, that the idea was as natural to many German races, as it is to the Sclavonian races, that a divine right to rule belongs to certain families as a hereditary privilege; and that in many parts of Germany the mere material interest of the moment was of more importance than any prospect of higher advantages in the future. The people, too, were therefore disinclined to the indisputable advantages of the new institutions. The northern Germans were accustomed to *bureaucracy* and their traditional usages; they felt the convenience of being governed, and willingly bent humbly before their superiors, as those below them did to them; all this was called paternal and patriarchal government. There was now not only an end to all this, but incredible evils were at first connected with the abolition of all the old usages and institutions. Very few ever thought of the prospect which was opened up, of a better future, and most were anxious for a return to the past. The newly-organised districts, it is true, were at length delivered from the evils of feudalism, hierarchy, and bureaucracy; but if we only consider for a moment, what they had to endure, not only during the continuance

* The author's remarks here, and subsequently, on the kingdom of Westphalia, chiefly rest upon a most interesting essay communicated to him by the late Count Malchus, with a view to the correction and completion of the French work entitled "Le Royaume de Westphalie, Jerome Bonaparte, sa Cour, ses Favoris et ses Ministres, par un Témoin oculaire." Paris, 1820.

of the war, but long afterwards, we shall easily understand, that the prospect of future advantages brought them as little alleviation of their present evils as the hopes of a better world usually bring to the sufferings of the poor and miserable.

For the consolation of all those minds to which the word constitution possessed a charm, even though its privileges were merely empty words, Napoleon announced, on the 16th of August, 1807, when he founded the new kingdom of Westphalia, that it was to be blessed with a constitution similar to that granted to the new duchy of Warsaw. This might, indeed, have been a consolation to countries such as Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and certain parts of Hanover, in which, previously, the nobility alone prospered and ruled. Napoleon's brother, Jerome, was appointed king. His youthful habits, like the mode of his separation from his first wife, were but very little encouraging. The grand-daughter of the plundered Duke of Brunswick—the Princess Catherine of Wirtemberg—was betrothed to the new king. Jerome's first object was pleasure, and the means of procuring money for his gratification. Even this would have been durable, because he was milder and more humane than the princess to whose provinces he succeeded, had not Napoleon at his accession plainly declared, that the subjects of the King of Westphalia must always bear in mind that, in future, Jerome would always regard their well-being as secondary and subordinate to the especial objects of his brother the Emperor, and his care of France. He stated to the new king, namely, that his first duties would be towards him—the Emperor, his second towards the French, and that his German subjects and their well-being must always be considered as subordinate to both.*

In the note we subjoin a passage from the French work to which we have already referred, the correction of whose generally false and exaggerated statements we owe to Count Malchus. We quote this, because, if the description given of the very elements of this new kingdom, utterly destroyed by the war, had been incorrect, Count Malchus would have undoubtedly observed upon it.† As to the constitution, and the duty of the king towards France, everything was immediately conducted after the French fashion, even before the new king had arrived, or the constitution itself had been put out of hand by the constitution manufacturers in Paris. All this was done without any regard whatever to the usages and customs of the country, according to the theory of a few conceited French-

* In Bonaparte's address on the 16th of August, the following language is employed in reference to the new German kingdom:—"Un prince français régnera sur l'Elbe, il saura concilier les intérêts de ses nouveaux sujets AVEC SES PREMIERS ET SES PLUS SACRES DEVOIRS."

† "Le Royaume de Westphalie," &c., p. 16. "En attendant les frais de table des gouverneurs et des intendants français, n'en allaient pas moins leur train; ces malheureux provinces étaient devenues PASCHALICS impériaux; des routes militaires traversaient le pays en tout sens, et les sacrifices toujours croissants augmentaient incessamment la masse des dettes."

men, who, in their opinion, were engaged in introducing civilisation into a barbarous country. For this purpose Jollivet, Beugnot, and Siméon, members of the French council of state, were selected. They formed a regency, whose opinions of German life were all formed after French prejudices. General Lagrange, who had continued to exercise the office of governor-general till their arrival, still remained in office along with them, and conducted the business of the police and administration. Lagrange was to form an army, and to take care to provide for the numerous Frenchmen, who were scattered about in all parts of the kingdom; he, therefore, laid claim to the ordinary and extraordinary revenues of the state for the supply of the military chest. The business of introducing the French institutions was, properly speaking, done by Massdorf of Mayence, a member of the council of prefecture, who was a creature of Jollivet's, and acted as chief-secretary to the regency. There was no idea whatever of following any ordinary course of proceeding. General Lagrange was a scandalous plundering bully, only to be compared with Soult; the other three rulers were Frenchmen, of the times of the empire and its prejudices. Jollivet's contemptible mind led him to seek to enrich himself at the expense of the country; he and his colleagues, however, met with but little obedience from the intendants, who had been everywhere appointed by the Emperor, before the proclamation of the king. The French writer is of opinion, that the intendants were unwilling to pay any respect to the orders of the regency. Count Malchus alleges that they wished to be regarded as middlemen—between the regency and the local authorities of the country; however this may be, the whole was a most extraordinary proceeding. The Emperor took to himself the whole of the revenues till December, whilst the intendants, regency, and governors, lived at the expense of the country; and, in the mean time, Jerome raised a loan of 2,000,000 of francs in Paris, on the security of his future income.

The regency was properly speaking appointed merely to introduce the new constitution, which was ready on the 15th of November, and proclaimed on the 7th of December. This was necessarily a very difficult affair, because the people of the country for whom the constitution was destined were only incidentally consulted. In order to present the appearance at least of consulting Germans, also, concerning this paper constitution, manufactured by the French, orders were issued to have a deputation sent from Cassel to Paris; and afterwards the falsehood, which no one dared to contradict, was caused to be circulated by the newspapers, that a voluntary deputation had been sent to the Emperor and to the new king. For form's sake, the document itself was laid before the persons who had been sent to Paris as members of this deputation; this however was mere appearance, for no attention whatever was paid to their opinions.*

* Count Malchus in his MSS. observes, "The constitution was drawn up by Cambacérès, Regnault, and some other councillors of state, and laid before the

The Germans were then indeed delivered from the power of their haughty nobility, their egotistical and fiscally monarchical princes, their *bureaucracy*, and an administration of law, founded on the principle of Justinian, and carried on solely by written and documentary evidence; but they never could rejoice in their new freedom, because all its advantages merely fell to the share of the Emperor of the French and his creatures. Napoleon retained for himself the one-half of the domains belonging to the banished princes, whose united territories formed the new kingdom. His object was to enrich his new grandes, his generals and officials, with grants out of the mass of these estates, as had been done in the duchy of Warsaw and in Italy. In addition to the withdrawal of a great amount of wealth in this way from the Germans of the kingdom, they were also compelled to support a great number of Frenchmen. The maintenance of an army of 25,000 men was imposed upon them as a duty, with the condition that one-half of this number was to consist of Frenchmen. This army was to form the garrison of Magdeburg, to be placed under the command of a French general, and to be provisioned, clothed, and paid, out of the revenues of the kingdom of Westphalia.

In compliance with Napoleon's commands, the imperial interim government was to cease as early as the 1st of December, and a kingly one to succeed; all however that immediately preceded the arrival of the king, furnished anything but a favourable anticipation as to the choice of the persons likely to be selected by him, and to whom he was about to entrust the management of affairs. Colonel Zurwester, who was placed at the head of the royal household, ordered the whole of the furniture, without exception, to be brought from Paris; and the weak and cowardly General Reubel, a son of the former director of the French republic, was to be at the head of the military department; but he performed the duties of his office very badly. Johannes von Müller, the Thucydides of the Swiss aristocrats, was so urgently recommended to the Emperor by Maret (the Duke of Bassano) that he was sent to Cassel as secretary of state.* The Emperor immediately perceived his inca-

deputies from Cassel-Westphalia before its signature and publication. These deputies, who were sent for to Paris, were professedly treated as if they had been sent by their constituents to do homage to the Emperor and the king; and no attention was paid to their remarks. This constitution (according to Napoleon's frequent assertion) was to serve as a model for that of the States of the Confederation of the Rhine, which however was only the case in the first sketch of a constitution for the kingdom of Bavaria (of the 1st of May, 1808), in that of the Grand-Duchy of Frankfurt (of the 16th of August, 1810), in which there was an express reference to the constitution of Westphalia, and in the petty imitation of the duchy of Köther (in its constitution of the 28th December, 1810, and the new organisation and administration of 1811)."

* "Johannes von Müller," says Count Malchus, "was proposed as secretary of state by March, and so warmly recommended, that he was sent for to Paris. Müller had neither capacity nor taste for the practical business of life. He had scarcely arrived in Cassel, when he earnestly begged to be relieved from the office conferred upon him," &c., &c.

pacity, but appointed him, by way of providing for him, minister of public instruction, for which he was equally unfit.

The Frenchmen who had hitherto governed the country in the name of the Emperor, under the title of a regency, formed the new ministry after the arrival of the king, at the end of December, 1807. Lagrange, minister of war, was soon, however, found guilty of gross extortion and of intercepting what he had extorted, and obliged quickly to take his departure to Paris; Morin, another Frenchman, was appointed in his stead. He was the king's favourite adjutant and confidant; and as Jerome had not the slightest idea of business, everything was left to the discretion of this wholly inexperienced adjutant. A dissolute Parisian lawyer, who did not understand a single word of German, was appointed director of police; and, on Müller's resignation, a Frenchman was made secretary of state. All the higher offices were filled by Frenchmen; all the gamblers and cheats of Paris came to Cassel to make their fortunes. In Cassel, formerly, the old, gloomy, and strict elector put down everything which did not originate with himself, and would not suffer any kind of festivity or pleasure. Under the new order of things, pleasure became the fashion; although all the money which reached the public treasury was claimed for the benefit of France. The means for the uninterrupted pleasures and festivities of the king and his court were furnished by Jacobson, the banker, under very burdensome conditions.

The king was young and dissolute, like his frivolous companions, and, when he could be so without observation, boyish in his conversation and amusements; notwithstanding all this, however, his personal character and habits were a hundred times better than those of the old Landgraves, or than those of the sons of George III., or the son and grandson of the Duke of Brunswick, who were driven from their country. In public, Jerome conducted himself with propriety, was magnanimous and mild, took a great deal of pains to learn how to govern, and did not suffer any of the numerous women of rank, who, following the example of their predecessors for centuries, in Cassel, thought it an honour to be a mistress of the reigning sovereign, or of others whom he kept in his pay, to exercise any influence whatever in public affairs: this appeared to the people of Cassel an instance of virtue of the very highest order. We subjoin in the note the notices given us by Count Malchus, because they appear worthy of confidence; and, especially, because the author of the French work already referred to, who blames everything else, is still just towards the king's person and character.*

* Count Malchus observes: "The opinions expressed by the writer respecting the king's character are generally correct, but not complete. He devoted himself, especially till the time of the campaign in Russia, with great industry to business; never neglected to attend a meeting of the council of state, where he paid strict attention to the discussions, even in cases where the matter required several sittings to decide, and at the conclusion presented a summary of the argument with such clearness and precision, as left no doubt either of his ability or attention. With great kindness, which in many cases degenerated into weakness, he united a

We learn from the passage just quoted, that the writer of the book referred to, whose statements are rectified by Malchus, has made the state of the Westphalian finances worse than it really was ; and yet Malchus shows, that Napoleon's dealings with his brother's subjects were not a whit better than the course he pursued in Prussia. This is obvious from the fact, that Daru, the relentless oppressor of the Prussians, was sent to Cassel. He there gave directions for the systematic plunder of the country, with all the severity which he had exercised in Berlin ; he insisted upon the payment to the last farthing of all the contributions which had been laid for the expenses of the war, and concluded the negotiations respecting the domains in such a manner, by an agreement concluded in Berlin, on the 22nd of April, 1808, that all claims remaining unsatisfied were to be completely liquidated, and thenceforward seven millions annually to be paid to France, as a compensation for the reserved domains. The whole sum paid into the imperial treasury, on account of these arrears, exceeded the annual revenue of the new kingdom. It amounted to 25,794,381 francs, and so minute in his calculation was Daru, that he carried eighty-three centimes into the account. In consequence of all this, the cost of the administration of the new kingdom was very great. Jollivet having taken his departure, Beugnot soon followed, and of the Paris ministry, Siméon alone remained ; the department of finance was assigned to Von Bülow. A French secretary was appointed instead of Johannes von Müller. The whole new government, and new court, became a subject of the greatest vexation to the founder of the kingdom. The course of life followed in Cassel was thoroughly dissolute. There was a universal want of money, and a confused mixture of former *émigrés*, French fortune-hunters, and German nobility, who could not dispense with a court, Jews, and adventurers, as Count Malchus admits, sought to make their fortunes at court.

The total want of economy in Cassel, and the continual difficulties about money, at length became so annoying to the Emperor, that he began to use the kingdom of Westphalia precisely as the English for many years used Botany Bay. All the able men, whom he had sent thither, were recalled ; and he made provision there for those who were wholly unfit for use elsewhere. He treated the king, his brother, like a school-boy ; but as there was no immediate interest at stake, he suffered things to take their usual course. Whenever he had any object to serve, he assumed the tone of command. When means were to be adopted for training the artillery corps, he sent General Allix ; and when King Jerome wished to commit the war de-

strong sense of justice, and neither did any injustice, nor, knowingly, allowed any to be done. One of his weaknesses was to ape his brother, the Emperor ; and another, the belief that a prince was bound by his situation to assume a great degree of external splendour ; this he afterwards overcame. He was addicted to pleasure more than was consistent with the maintenance of his dignity, or the credit of his finances. He, however, in this, avoided everything which was publicly offensive —even in his intrigues, with respect to which it must not be forgotten, that he never suffered any of his favourites to exercise the smallest influence in public affairs."

partment to Von Bülow, the minister of finance, he compelled him to appoint General Eblé minister of war. Moreover, the prefects, sub-prefects, judges, and chief officers of taxes, were for the most part Germans; and as Jollivet and Beugnot themselves admitted, Von Bülow and Malchus (at that time a councillor of state) had the largest share in the internal organisation. When Beugnot took his departure, he therefore recommended the king to transfer his duties also to one of these two.

The greatest difficulty arose from the payment of the French debt, regulated in April, which was exacted with the greatest severity, harshness, and threats. The matter became at length so urgent, that in order to meet the payment due on the 19th of October, 1808, the king was compelled to raise a forced loan—which, for form's sake, was *afterwards* sanctioned by the states. The German language was not altogether banished, as the French writer, in his satire on the kingdom of Westphalia, alleges; but Count Malchus rectifies his views in such a way, that we perceive, from his language, that it was merely endured along with the French.*

Returning then to Napoleon's dominion, and considering the kingdom of Westphalia in reference to the empire, it appears that the internal disturbances in this kingdom, to which we shall subsequently refer, as they are connected with the history of the war, were merely symptoms of a general reaction against Napoleon's inconsistencies. He provoked all the states and individuals whom he drew within his circle, by acting sometimes in a liberal and sometimes in a despotic manner, never treating them as citizens or provinces united to a kingdom, but always in a French and revolutionary sense. This drove the German people into the hands of the reactionary party, which became the national one by Napoleon's endeavours to extirpate every vestige of nationality. In consequence, an alliance was formed in Germany of all those whose interests were threatened; and the feudal aristocracy, the most considerable proprietors of the soil, the richest merchants, the men of the romantic school, at that time very numerous, and the learned men of the old institutions, had all an interest in saving their palladium. This was the origin of the Tugenbund (league of virtue) whose real object was concealed under the attractive names of patriotism, and zeal for the restoration of the virtuous usages of past times. The young, the peasants, and the citizens, yielded themselves up to the inspiration of these feelings, deceived by the advantages procured for them by the nobler part of the aristocratic unknown and secret heads of the alliance in Prussia, and at a later

* "There was not," says Malchus, "any proscription of the German language. The reports and other documents to be laid before the king, and the communications from one minister to another, were drawn up in French; and the discussions in the council of state were carried on in the same language. Communications and business with the states, and correspondence with the subordinate authorities, were all in German; and a GERMAN TRANSLATION WAS APPENDED TO DECREES PUBLISHED IN THE GAZETTE."

period promised to them, by Gentz and Frederick Schlegel (what patriots!), in Bavaria and the Tyrol. The mere talk about freedom and country was for awhile endured, but the English Tories, Pozzo di Borgo, and the whole united body of nobles and diplomatists, awaited their time for throwing off the mask and turning the good nature and simplicity of the Germans into ridicule. Had Napoleon not been ruined by good-fortune and flatterers, he must have seen that he was more and more withdrawing from his natural allies, in order to surround himself with his enemies. He continued anxiously to seek for connexions with the old royal and princely families, and to become associated with them; he promoted the marriages of the rich heiresses of ancient families with his new democratic princes, counts, and barons. He founded principalities, and married the daughters of his *parvenu* nobles to men of ancient lineage and name, and thus himself gave a new importance to those forgotten names. The people, therefore, resumed their old usages; and all whom he drew around him, no longer belonged to him, but to the old system; and as early as 1809, his power and dominion were maintained by external force alone.

Under the circumstances in which Napoleon came to the throne of a newly-erected feudal monarchy, and surrounded as he was by a new and old nobility, the important improvements which he introduced and prescribed to the vassal-princes of his new kingdom, were political faults; and his benefits conferred on the people gained him no favour; he was obeyed only as long as he could compel obedience.

The benefit of deliverance from the legal forms and parchment usurpation of the middle ages, was in other respects incalculable. When Murat was created King of Naples, by Napoleon, and the grand duchy of Berg again fell in as a fief to the empire, vassalage and everything connected with it was abolished, sometimes with, and sometimes without, compensation. The peasants of Westphalia, however, thought as Möser, in his history of Osnaburg, makes them think; and the owners of feudal states, such as Von Stein, Count Münster, and others, made loud complaints of the violation of historical and hereditary rights, and met with sympathy and credit from their order, and from the men of learning. The Emperor had at first retained Erfurt, Hanau, Fulda, and Bayreuth, for himself; but, by a decree of the 12th of December, the same privileges were conferred upon them which had been conceded to the grand duchy of Berg. Among the constitutions granted according to the promise of the Emperor, by his vassal-princes, with the exception of the detestable King of Wirtemberg, who never did anything good of his own accord, that of Bavaria was one of the most beneficial. By this constitution, all the barriers were removed which had hitherto separated from one another the inhabitants of one and the same country. The states, calculated for the old condition of the kingdom, which was altogether different, were replaced by general

representatives of the whole country. The privileges of the nobility disappeared ; they were compelled to contribute to the burdens of the state, deprived of the right to certain offices of honour and emolument, and placed on the same footing as other citizens ; civil and religious liberty was promised, but alas ! in no way guaranteed. These essential rights all depended on the personal character of the rulers ; and therefore, like the assurance of freedom of the press, and of the promised responsibility of ministers, were rather splendid promises than real benefits.

Under the reign of Maximilian, when there was no lack of free speech and liberal theories, things went on in Munich no great deal better than in Cassel ; and the king was as grossly plundered by the Bavarian and Palatinate nobles, whom he placed in offices of trust, as King Jerome was by the French. The account given by Ritter von Lang, who had, indeed, a very sharp tongue, in his " Memoirs" (vol. ii., p. 81), of the things of which he was an eye-witness, is undoubtedly true. He observes, that " all order in the management of public money had, at that time, completely ceased ;" and he proceeds to give an admirable description of the manner in which Count Mongelas, the great-great-grandchild of a president of a French parliament, who, like Talleyrand and Coburg, had studied under Koch in Strasburg, and afterwards shared the poverty and debts of Maximilian, played Richelieu in Bavaria, in which he carried on, with equal frivolity, the departments of home and foreign affairs, as well as that of finance ; and, yet, brought some rays of beneficent light into a country full of Cimmerian darkness. Jesuits, and even Jesuitism, faith in processions, singers, holy coats and nails, fell into discredit through such a man as Sailer ; and the whole class of men, who were favoured under Carl Theodore, no longer enjoyed any distinction ; new methods of instruction were not only introduced in Würzberg, Bamberg, and Landshut, but a glimmering of light dawned in the Tyrol, in which full day has not even yet shone. In Baden, matters did not go so far as in Bavaria ; no constitution was promised, but the newly-acquired sovereignty was not abused, because the ruler of the country was just the very opposite of his neighbour, the King of Wirtemberg. The newly-organised university of Heidelberg, which ceased to be an alms-house for Catholic monks and Protestant bunglers, owed its new reputation in Germany, at first, to mysticism and jurisprudence. The way was prepared for the introduction of the *Code Napoléon*, with a few alterations, into Baden ; the government was conducted in a manner suited to the demands of the age, and the eligibility to public offices, which the nobility enjoyed, wholly abolished. The prince-primate, having suffered himself to be used as a tool for promoting the confederation of the Rhine, in order to please his relations, Prince von der Leyen, and Herr von Dalberg, continued to sink deeper.

The main proofs of this severe sentence will be exhibited in the history of the subsequent years ; but as early as 1809 he acted in a

manner wholly derogatory to his dignity, when, on the call of the Emperor, he went to Paris, to solemnise the marriage of King Jerome with a princess of Wirtemberg. The prince-primate and the Grand-Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt did not, moreover, immediately introduce the Code Napoléon into their states, although in Hesse the difference between the civil law then in use and the traditional judicial processes was greater than in any other German state. Both these rulers, however, found it advisable to prove to their powerful feudal superior that they were ready to obey his commands to his vassals in reference to unity of legislation. They gave directions to have lectures delivered on the Code Napoléon in their schools of law, as a preparation for its introduction into general use.

We shall hereafter be in a condition to speak of the union of Hanover with the kingdom of Westphalia; in this place we shall merely observe, that, up to the year 1810, its very sap was sucked out by France, and also that when it was incorporated with Westphalia, the union was rather injurious than advantageous to the finances of that kingdom. When one reflects on the immense sums which Napoleon drew from the private properties of the expelled princes, from the poverty of the peasants and townspeople of those countries occupied by the French, and from the petty contributions which the privileged estates paid towards the outlay of the state, it becomes obvious where the proper evil of the old German empire lay. The princes and nobles paid little; the townspeople and peasants bore the whole of the burden. Hence, also, it is obvious that the townspeople and peasants lost little by the oppression of Napoleon, for all that afterwards went to France would only have enriched the princes, and increased the real property of those princes and their nobility; whilst now, on the other hand, many of these properties were broken up and sold, new proprietors created, and the others ceased to be exempt from duties and taxes. As to the Hanoverian domains, Napoleon, as early as 1807, made presents of offices and particular estates to seventy-three Frenchmen, whom he wished either to reward or merely to favour. The incomes from these large and small estates amounted to no less a sum than 2,500,000 francs.* We shall see, that subsequently, even when the whole country was united to Westphalia, all the war taxes were continued for three months in favour of France, and an especial imperial director of domains was appointed, who always got the right side in cases of dispute respecting doubtful ownerships.

The greatest evil which beset those millions of men, whom Napoleon regarded merely as pieces of the chess-game of war, which he played with such masterly skill, and especially for the poor Germans, was the continual changes which took place, the enlargement or diminution of the various territories, and the alteration in their re-

* For a list of the names of the offices, estates, and persons, as well as the amount of income, see Bredow's (Venturini's) "Chronicle des 19 Jahrhunderts," vol. v., pp. 370-374, and vol. vi., p. 518.

lations to others, which were scarcely ever of a year's continuance; and, consequently, those very things which the French so highly commend. Immediately after the peace of Tilsit, the Emperor proved to his slaves, the members of the confederation of the Rhine, how little confidence can be placed in the promises of the strong when made to the weak, and how little security there was for retaining possession of the scraps of booty which he had thrown to them. He had caused them to be repeatedly assured, in the strongest manner, that he would not seize a single foot of land on the right bank of the Rhine; and yet only a few months elapsed before Wesel, Kehl, and Cassel, near Mayence, were incorporated with France, and made bulwarks of his dominion over the Rhine. The fortifications of Hameln were razed, and a very considerable body of French troops were stationed in Magdeburg and in the Prussian fortresses, all which were to be paid and supplied at the expense of the Germans. Even in 1810, when the whole of Hanover was united to Westphalia, Napoleon reserved Lauenburg for himself, and caused it to be administered by his own agents, precisely like a private estate. The fate of the Hanse Towns, occupied by the French, and thoroughly exhausted by his generals, remained still undecided, as well as that of Swedish Pomerania, because the King of Holland had declined the proposal of exchanging Dutch Brabant and Zeeland for the Hanse Towns, although he was afterwards obliged to cede both without receiving anything in return.

The same changes of plans and institutions, the same alterations in the extent of territories and smaller divisions, which reduced the Germans to despair, although many of them may have been improvements, caused the greatest confusion in Italy, and awakened in many minds gloomy anticipations of the future. The Italians, however, had much more reason than the Germans to be satisfied with Napoleon's rule. This became obvious at a later period, when they fell under the dominion of the Germans, which the whole country is now labouring to shake off. Everything that had taken place in 1805 was altered, and Melzi, who had shown himself so subservient, was, as well as other creatures, pushed into the background; for this treatment, the title of Duke of Lodi could be no compensation to a man who had already so many Italian, Austrian, and Spanish titles, under the old *régime*. Occasion was taken, from the wishes of the Italians themselves, to effect those changes which the Emperor wished to bring about. A pretended voluntary deputation, therefore, appeared at St. Cloud, to congratulate the Emperor on his return from the army. This deputation was treated and used precisely as had been done with that from Westphalia. Among the members of this complimentary body was Gamboni, Patriarch of Venice, who, in his address, far outdid all the French flatterers—which appears almost impossible—and urgently entreated the Emperor to honour and bless Italy with a visit.

The first result of the Emperor's journey to Italy was an increased

severity in the unexampled and, as the result proved, wholly impracticable measures adopted against English commerce, or, more properly speaking, against trade by sea in general. The decree of Milan* increased the limitations already contained in that of Berlin, and still harder conditions were added to those published on the 17th of December, by an edict issued from Paris on the 11th of January, 1808. On the occasion of this journey, Parma was at length completely united with France. This was no doubt beneficial to the Parmans, because they then obtained the full rights of French citizens, after having been for years governed by Frenchmen and after the French fashion, without the enjoyment of any of those rights. Dutillot, a Frenchman, governed the country even under the reign of the old avaricious duke, and his administration was generally commended. He was succeeded in this office by Moreau de St. Méry, who even then carried on the government more for the benefit of Napoleon than of the duke; but still he did not oppress the little country. Oppression first began when Napoleon sent some of his more personal favourites thither as governors-general. Junot, at his command, practised such extortions, that the people of Parma had in reality the best reason to be thankful, when their country was incorporated with France under the name of the department of Tarn.

The annihilation of the newly-erected kingdom of Etruria was still more unexpected than that of the independence of Parma, which had been in preparation for eight years; and yet it is most probable that the event had been previously made known to Charles IV., the miserable King of Spain, to whose grandson the new kingdom had been given as a compensation for Parma, and to his favourite, Godoy, as is proved by the plan for the partition of Portugal. By this scheme it was agreed that the Queen of Etruria, who acted as guardian for her son, still a minor, was to be compensated for the loss of Etruria by receiving a third part of Portugal. The Spanish princess, Maria Louisa, who reigned in the name of her son, then only eight years of age, had, since her removal to Etruria, given abundant proofs that she was as utterly incapable, both from disposition and knowledge, as her husband had been, and as bigoted, ignorant, and disinclined to all sorts of progress, as her brothers and uncle. These, however, were not the real grounds of her deposition. She was fanatical, surrounded herself with Jesuits, and delighted to have every thing carried on after the old fashion, instead of entering into the views of the Emperor. Napoleon was already at that time (1808) desirous of wholly putting an end to the temporal power of the pope, and the queen could not, therefore, be endured, if for nothing else than her excessive and superstitious veneration for the pope and his

* Art. 1. "Tout bâtiment de quelque nation qu'il soit, qui aura souffert la visite d'un vaisseau Anglais, ou se sera soumis à un voyage en Angleterre, ou aura payé une imposition au gouvernement Anglais, est par cela seul déclaré DENATIONALISE, a perdu la garantie de son pavillon et est devenu propriété Anglaise. Art. 2. Les dits bâtiments sont déclarés de bonne et valable prise. Les îles Britanniques sont déclarés en état de blocus sur mer comme sur terre."

clergy; neither was this, however, the real reason of her removal. Napoleon longed for and aimed at sole dominion; and for this reason the expulsion of the reigning house in Spain, to which Maria Louisa belonged, and of that of the house of Braganza, had been a matter of speculation and of consideration as early as the conferences of Tilsit.

The conversation, too, which Napoleon had with his brother Joseph in Venice, long before he caused the announcement of her destiny to be made to the Queen of Etruria, bore upon this idea of extirpating all the old reigning houses and the foundation of new ones. The historians of Napoleon dwell at great length on the circumstances connected with this meeting of the two brothers, on account of the immense expenditure made by the Italians and French on this occasion, and the colossal festivities and ceremonies, with the details of which the journals of the day were filled; we refer to it merely on account of the ordinances which were issued on the occasion. These ordinances may have been admirable, but we see in them nothing but manifestations of that description of policy, rife in our own times, which conceals a real retrogradation in relation to mental possessions, under an apparent progress in material prosperity. These ordinances, which we cannot here specifically recapitulate, may have been very well meant, and very well calculated also for certain objects; but they had the same relation to civil freedom as the well-sounding Russian ukases, Prussian cabinet orders, and Austrian notes. A single example of the changes then published, will best serve to show how completely and arbitrarily, according to circumstances, or the conceits or humour of the moment, the fate of whole provinces was decided, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, according to the wishes of the idolised hero of the French. On the 10th of March, 1805, Napoleon had solemnly promised that, in all future time, the crown of Italy should continue wholly separate from that of France; as early as November, 1807, he decreed exactly the reverse. He adopted Eugène Beauharnois as a son, but declared, at the same time, that the adoption was only to be valid in case he had not himself a son and heir. On this, too, depended, therefore, his adherence to the promise of the future separation of the crown of Italy from that of France.

His brothers, whom he elevated to the dignity of kings, were also obliged to be as submissive to his will as foreign princes; and yet it was from them especially he met with the most vehement resistance. Lucien disagreed with him on account of his wife, whose early life was not indeed very reputable, although the pope took no offence at it, and whose subsequent conduct was much more becoming than that of Elisa, who was called the Italian Semiramis, or even than that of the beautiful Pauline. On the occasion of the journey to Venice Joseph tried to reconcile the brothers, and Lucien came to Mantua, where he had a meeting with Napoleon; when the latter insisted that the former should sacrifice his domestic happiness to his brother's greatness: they parted at enmity. This enmity afterwards

became complete, when Napoleon first adopted measures indicating his purpose of giving one of Lucien's daughters in marriage to the Prince of the Asturias, the heir to the crown of Spain; then adopted a totally different course of action towards Spain, and brought thither his brother Joseph, to whom he had communicated his views in Venice. Lucien afterwards loudly expressed his disapprobation of his brother's conduct towards the pope, and went into exile.

The Queen of Etruria, during the very short time in which she reigned as guardian of her son Charles Louis, had exhibited such a degree of gloomy bigotry, and such incapacity of forming any opinion as to the real wants of the times, that no one felt any sympathy with her, much less lamented her removal; and yet it was something monstrous for the miserable Charles IV., her own father, to take part in the plundering and expulsion of his grandson, not in order to procure a better government for the inhabitants of Tuscany, but a court, luxuries, and a princely splendour for one of the Emperor's sisters. On the 22nd of November, 1807, the French and Spanish ambassadors most unexpectedly appeared in the presence of the queen, and declared to her that her father had ceded the country to France, and that her son was to be compensated for the loss in Portugal. Immediately afterwards General Reille took possession of the kingdom in the name of Napoleon, and the deposed queen first travelled to Napoleon in Milan, then to Paris, and subsequently to her parents in Spain, whose expulsion was already decided on, and with them went into exile.

The object of cutting off the dry and poisoned branch of the degenerate and withered house of the Spanish Bourbons was not, as it has been represented to us in the romantic writings of the French historians, the restoration of the moral power of the Italians and of the independence of national government, but the obtrusion of two of the female members of the Bonaparte family into the list of princes, and the enrichment of a throng of idlers whom they favoured and provided for. Up to this time Abdallah Menou had been governor-general in Turin; but now Camillo Borghese, Napoleon's brother-in-law, was appointed governor-general of the French possessions on the farther side of the Alps, and established a splendid court in Turin. Her small principality also became too small for the Semiramis of Lucca; and she never rested till she, not her husband, Baciocchi, was elevated to royal splendour. This, however, did not take place till March, 1809, till Abdallah Menou was transferred from Turin to Florence, as governor-general of Tuscany; and a commission, consisting of four members of the council of state and a secretary-general, had made three French departments of the kingdom. The person most active in this organisation was Dege-rando, who had been long in Italy, and has written a full history of Italian literature. In March, 1809, Elisa took up her residence in Florence as Grand-Duchess of Tuscany. The servile senate in

Paris was first informed, on the 14th of May, 1808, of the union of Tuscany, Parma, and Piacenza with France.

We have already referred to the dispute between Napoleon and the pope, which concluded with the taking possession of the states of the church and a fruitless council. We must, however, here, and once again, subsequently return to the subject. On even the slightest examination of this question, it will be obvious to all, except that class of Frenchmen who believe in Bonaparte's infallibility, how very greatly he fell at every moment into contradiction with himself. Without any attention whatever to the principles of the Gallican church, and merely to get rid of certain bishops of the time of the Bourbons, and to have others consecrated in their stead through the instrumentality of the pope, he had formally given his sanction to the papal in opposition to the episcopal system, and restored to the pope his temporal dominion. Now, however, he wished to prescribe to the pope his mode of action in spiritual things, and in temporal affairs to treat him as his vassal. He played the part of Charlemagne, and assumed the exercise of the same privileges which he claimed, but he treated with contempt the doctrines of popery, which his great prototype honoured and cherished; and, by appealing to the example of Charles the Great, made himself ridiculous, because times and circumstances were altogether changed. As no concessions are ever made in Rome, or when they are made, only in such a manner as that the thing conceded may be immediately resumed, the dispute with the pope continued throughout the whole of the year 1808, without leading to any conclusion. Pius VII. neither made any concession respecting the concordat with Bavaria and Wirtemburg, nor respecting his approval and sanction in spiritual things, which the Emperor demanded of him. He would not, for a moment, listen to the cession of the legations of Fermo, Urbino, Ancona, and Macerata. In this, also, therefore, the Emperor was obliged to have recourse to force. As Napoleon himself had previously ceded everything that was now brought forward against him, the right—such as it would be decided in court—was indisputably against him; and the other right—according to which, the good of the greatest number is the highest law—he himself would by no means acknowledge. The Emperor's appearance in Italy, and the declaration, that what Charles the Great had presented he might take away, were simultaneous with the advance of his troops into the states of the church. As early as the 1st of November, 1807, Lemanois, who had held the command of the troops in the Roman territory since the commencement of the dispute, took possession of Civita Vecchia on the one hand, and the four legations on the other. At the end of January, 1808, when his army was reinforced by new troops from Tuscany, he himself went to Rome, and caused his army to encamp on the plain of Beccano, in the neighbourhood of the city; the further proceedings were taken on the command of General Miollis. In

spite of the pope's protest, issued on the 1st of February, 1808, General Miollis ordered from 7000 to 8000 Frenchmen to march into the city on the 2nd.

The French marched straight from the Porta del Popolo to the castle of St. Angelo, took possession of this citadel, and kept the pope a prisoner in the Lateran; at first, however, leaving him his Swiss guards as sentinels about his palace. The rest of the papal troops were compelled to enter into the French service; the pope, however, as Bonaparte must have foreseen, could not be induced to enter into any kind of agreement; an attempt was therefore made to remove from him the college of cardinals, which consisted partly of foreigners. On the 16th of March, 1808, fourteen cardinals were carried away from Rome, and immediately afterwards the four legations, violently seized upon in the midst of peace, were united to the kingdom of Italy. Then, for the first time, Champagny, at that time minister for foreign affairs, drew up a manifesto, which sounded somewhat like a declaration of war. The pope, on his side, published a brief on the 27th of April, in which he announced to the Emperor that he would make use of the power which God had conferred upon him. This does not appear to us so absurd as it is represented to be by French writers, as reference is not made to the ban or civil excommunication of the middle ages, but to measures purely ecclesiastical. Napoleon had acknowledged in the concordat the church which recognises the pope as its only head. He had conferred upon it temporal privileges and estates. He still professed to belong to its communion, suffered himself to be eulogised in the pompous sermons and pastoral letters of its bishops, and, like the Czar of Russia, caused himself to be recommended to the honour and reverence of the people in its catechisms along with the pope. It is not, therefore, easy to see, why he, who cherished him in the bosom of the church as long as he was a pious child, should not have been able to exclude him from that bosom when he became ungodly.* Recourse was not had at first to the formal proclamations of the darkly-threatened excommunication, although General Miollis, as early as May, had broken off the negotiations, and adopted still harsher measures against the pope and the cardinals. One after another of the latter were seized upon and sent away from Rome under military escort. The pope, at first, only showed his resentment against the Emperor, by bringing the good Catholics in

* The pope wrote to the Emperor as follows: "Depuis longtemps le domaine du Saint Siège a dû supporter la charge énorme de vos troupes, en sorte que depuis 1807 jusqu'à présent elles ont consommé à peu près cinq millions d'écus romains. Vous avez Nous nous forcerez ainsi que nous fassions, dans l'humilité de notre cœur, usage de ce pouvoir que le Tout-Puissant a mis dans notre main de faire connaître au monde la justice de sa cause." The whole of the documents are to be found in the "Correspondence Authentique avec la cour de France le premier jour d'Août, fête de Saint Pierre dans les liens, 1809," and in the "Pièces officielles touchant l'invasion de MDCCCVIII. pour servir de suite à la correspondance. Rome, October, 1809." The Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca contain the hints respecting the sympathy which the pope experienced from foreign powers.

France into some difficulties. He allowed some of the French sees, like many of the German ones, to continue vacant, and refused the apostolic investiture to the Bishops of Liege, Acqui, St. Flour, and Poictiers. As he never mentioned the Emperor's name on the occasion of the erection of a bishopric at Montauban, and the consecration of Napoleon's flatterer, talker, and boaster, De Pradt, as Archbishop of Malines, the Emperor protested in his council of state against the conduct of the pope, and caused this protest to be made public through the press. The time for this dispute with the pope was very badly chosen, for Napoleon roused against himself the fanaticism of the monks and Jesuits of Italy and of all the countries of Europe, precisely at the very moment in which he had to struggle with open insurrection in Spain, and with secret associations in Germany.

We have already observed, that Bernadotte, the brother-in-law of his brother Joseph, was always an object of suspicion to the Emperor, because he gave no proofs of that kind of idolatrous veneration which was shown by the other generals; we believe, however, that the chief ground of his disinclination to Bernadotte arose from his never having completely broken off his connexion with some of the most considerable men of the republican times. This was particularly apparent on the occasion of the English expedition to Walcheren, to which we shall hereafter refer. Bernadotte became so much an object of fear, on account of his partisans in Antwerp, as well as afterwards in Paris, that the Emperor showed symptoms of great anxiety. There were also secret combinations in the army against the continually-increasing harshness of his despotism; and Napoleon was obliged several times in Spain to remove generals from their command, who, relying confidently upon their allies in the army, had entered into negotiations with the enemy. In Italy, also, secret societies were formed against French dominion, to which Napoleon, by his conduct towards the pope and the Italian states in the years 1808 and 1809, gave a much greater extension and importance than they would otherwise have had.

These secret associations were formed in Calabria and Apulia, and the members of them were called Carbonari (coal-men), because in these provinces the lowest and rudest of the populace were secretly instigated to fanaticism in favour of priestcraft and absolutism. In the very commencement, however, these associations received a mixture of republicanism, and afterwards went into its very extreme.

At the time when the French were in possession of Lower Italy, and the English maintained an army in Sicily, under the pretence of protecting the contemptible King Ferdinand, and his energetic wife and ruler, Caroline, the ships of the latter lingered upon the coasts of the island, and frequently made descents upon the coast of Calabria to disturb the French, secret associations were formed among the exiled remains of the former republicans, among bandits, fanatical

partisans of the old government, and finally among the charcoal-burners of the mountains and their gorges. The refugees who joined these associations gave them the forms and nature of freemasonry; Queen Caroline and the English supported them, and they were at first exclusively directed against the French, in order to raise an army in the country in favour of the oppressed church, the pope, and Queen Caroline, in which the numbers of the Carbonari quickly increased to an incredible extent. Both the Calabrias have been, from olden times, dens of robbers, who were, at this time, greatly increased by the royalists, professedly struggling in favour of King Ferdinand, and pursued by King Joseph; these parties, for two years, turned Calabria into a scene of murder and pillage. The character of these societies, however, underwent an essential change in the years 1808-1809, when persons of all ranks joined their association, assembled at stated times in lodges like freemasons, and, like them, also, adopted certain signs, by which they might be able to recognise each other.

Colletta, in the eighth book of his History of Naples, and Botta, in the twenty-third book of his History of Italy since 1789, have both treated the subject of these societies at great length. The former considers the origin of the republican Carbonari to have first taken place in the year 1811, when French and German freemasons obtained permission from King Joachim Murat to extend the Carbonari branch of freemasons in the kingdom of Naples. We prefer following the authority of Botta, who is of opinion, that the principles of the Carbonari of 1799 underwent a change as early as 1808, and that it then spread with incredible rapidity over Naples and the states of the church.* On this ground, even Napoleon supported himself in his justification of the violent measures adopted against the pope and the states of the church. He alleged that he must necessarily dissolve the Roman state, because Rome and the Romagna had, up till that time, afforded protection and a place of refuge to robbers and conspirators. These reasons of justification, at that time loudly proclaimed in manifestoes, newspapers, and addresses, and briefly set forth by Thibaudeau,† might have raised

* Botta, lib. xxiii., p. 24: “Sentivano i primi carbonari già molto fortemente de’ repubblica, niun altro reggimento volevano che il repubblicano ed in repubblica già si erano ordinati apertamente nelle parti di Catanzaro sotto la condotta di quel Capobianco, che abbiamo sopra nominato. Odievano acerbamente i Francesi, acerbissimamente Murat, per essere Francescere, ma non per quanto erano amici di Ferdinando, perchè piuttosto non volevano re. Nati primi nell’ Abruzzo e nelle Calabria si erano propagati nelle altre parti del regno e perfino nelle Romagna avevano introdotta le pratiche loro e creato consettarii. In Napoli stessa pullulavano; non pochi fra i lazaroni della secreta lèga erano consapevoli et partecipi.”

+ Thibaudeau, vol. iv., ch. lxii., p. 494, writes as follows: “D’après les rapports que l’Empereur, pendant la campagne d’Autriche, avait reçus d’Italie, les états Romains étaient un foyer de troubles, dont les ramifications s’entendaient au loin; les prêtres excitaient les mécontents. Ils formaient une sorte de maçonnerie orthodoxe, dont le pape était le chef; ils avaient leur mot d’ordre et de ralliement; l’Italie serait dans l’agitation tant que le pape réunirait sur sa tête l’autorité spirituelle et le pouvoir temporel. Un mouvement était prêt à éclater dans les états

doubts, at least, in the mind of a German who was acquainted with what had recently occurred in Belgium, Lucerne, Freiburg, on the Rhine, in Westphalia, Posen, and Bavaria; but all that is brought forward by Las Casas and the other memoir-manufacturers in St. Helena, is calculated to make an impression on Bonapartists only. We can readily believe that Napoleon said what they have communicated; but those of us who have drawn knowledge from our own experience, know that Napoleon never persecuted priests or the priesthood except when they happened to struggle in favour of liberty, but cherished them as despots have always been accustomed to do, as the supports of his throne. The Emperor also availed himself of accidental circumstances to carry out his romantic notion that he was really a new Charles the Great.

Napoleon, too, embraced what was indeed a clever but by no means happy thought, which he conceived he ought to profit by, in order to maintain the rights of Charlemagne, who was in very different circumstances from himself, against the claims of the pope. This thought occurred to him in 1809, at the very moment in which he had for the second time conquered the capital of the emperor, from whose head he had snatched the crown of Charles the Great. Among the reasons on which he founded the decree of the 17th of May, 1809, he appealed expressly to the fact, that he had resolved upon the incorporation of Rome and the Roman territory with France, with the same right, and on the same grounds, on which Charlemagne had formerly conferred lands and people upon the popes. This is, perhaps, on the whole, true, but it was in absolute contradiction to what he had a few years before done, and agreed to. The first decree issued at that time contains six articles, which we shall subjoin;* and on the very same day a second was issued, by virtue of which a commission (*consulta*) was nominated, first of all to take possession of the states of the church, to introduce the French laws, administration, and government; and secondly, to divide these states into two departments. The commission, of which General Miollis was president, consisted of Dégérando, Janet, and Dalpozze, *maîtres des requêtes*, and Balbi (the son of a count of the same name at Turin), as auditor. They were to take their measures in such a manner as that the states of the church and the city of Rome should be completely incorporated in the French Empire, in January, 1810.

romains. Qui pouvait douter que la cour de Rome fut liée secrètement avec les ennemis de la France, leur prêtât la main et leur tendit les bras?"

* Article 1: "Les états du pape sont réunis à l'Empire Français. Article 2: La ville de Rome, premier siège du Christianisme (what a scandalous falsehood!) et si célèbre par les souvenirs qu'elle rappelle, et les monuments qu'elle conserve, est déclarée ville impériale et libre, son gouvernement et son administration seront réglés par un décret impérial. Article 3: Les monuments de la grandeur romaine seront conservés, maintenus aux dépens de notre trésor. Article 4: La dette publique est déclarée dette de l'empire. Article 5: Les revenus annuels du pape seront portés jusqu'à deux millions de francs, libres de toute charge et redevance. Article 6: Les propriétés du Saint Père ne seront soumises à aucune imposition, juridiction, visite, et jouiront en outre d'immunité speciale."

As soon as the papal government was dissolved, the Emperor's decrees were carried into execution. The pope, however, or rather Cardinal Pacca, who remained with him till the 6th of July, issued a manifesto, or, to use the technical language of the court of Rome, an allocution, which was posted up and circulated in all directions, but torn down and suppressed by the French in every possible manner. In this official declaration, the Romans and the whole of Christendom were appealed to in the strongest terms to be witnesses of the violence and wickedness perpetrated on the church; the very commencement of the allocution, which we give below, resembles the celebrated introduction of Cicero's oration against Cataline.* The decrees of the 17th of May did not indeed arrive in Rome till the 10th of June, but Cardinal Pacca had long foreseen what followed, and had, therefore, long before prepared allocutions and excommunications. The pope, however, was unwilling at first to proceed the length of excommunication, and yet he suffered himself to be persuaded to do so on the following day. It is indisputable that the pope, according to the existing rights and privileges of his office, was entitled to exclude from the communion of the faithful a ruler who had recently acknowledged him as the head of the hierarchy and of the whole body of the faithful, and of whose services he wished to avail himself for his own purposes, in depositing some of the bishops of the Gallican church; the effect, however, was very uncertain. The number of unbelievers was undoubtedly greater than that of the believers; all, however, were dissatisfied, and even Maury and De Pradt were unable to justify the Emperor's measures. When the pope was thus maltreated, even those who despised his office and authority pitied the poor old man. The papal excommunication did not fall upon the Emperor alone, but on all those who had been active or instrumental in seizing upon the states of the church, and especially the city of Rome. All those bishops and prelates who neglected to act in a manner consistent with their vows of obedience, and to observe the ceremonies of the church as the pope had ordered they should do, were also excommunicated.

From this moment the pope kept himself closely shut up in the Quirinal, and caused all the approaches except one to be built up, in order to prevent all access, except by force. The cunning manufacturers of the St. Helena memoirs here intimate, and even the most unscrupulous of the Emperor's eulogists admit, that the severe measures, which could not have been adopted without the Emperor's consent, were a great mistake, because Pius VII. and Cardinal Pacca thereby became martyrs, and the whole Christian world, not merely Jesuitical papists, declared their sympathies to be with the spoiled, and against the spoiler. The manufacturers of St. Helena remove the blame completely from the Emperor, by throwing it upon King

* “Adunque sono adempite le tenebrose trame dei nemici della sede apostolica?”


Joachim; Thibaudeau lays the reproach upon General Miollis; both of them overlooking the fact, that the pope was much worse treated afterwards even at Savona than he had been treated in Rome. We cannot venture, therefore, to ascribe to General Miollis acts of violence which he could only have perpetrated on express command. He had *orders to use every means* to constrain the pope to recall the excommunication, and to accept of the Emperor's offer to relinquish his temporal sovereignty for a yearly income of four millions. In case of the pope's refusal, he was commissioned to arrest him, and cause him to be conveyed to France. This could only be done by force, and he used no more than was absolutely necessary; and when all his attempts at persuasion proved useless, he was compelled to leave the execution of the arrest and conveyance to General Radet, the inspector of *gendarmerie*, who then, indeed, took measures similar to those which would have been adopted for carrying off robbers or murderers.


During the days from the 3rd to the 5th inclusive, he got together a great mob, of which there is more than enough in Italy, and a number of bailiffs, of whom there is no want. These, in compliance with the usages of their calling, were to break like robbers into the papal palace, in order afterwards to open the doors to Radet and his *gendarmes*. On the night between the 5th and 6th the mob scaled the walls of the Quirinal, violently broke into the interior, pushed forward to the only external door which was capable of being opened, and let in Radet and his followers. In the interior of the palace every place, too, was firmly barred; all the doors, therefore, were broken, every one who opposed knocked down, and the mob commenced a regular scene of plunder and pillage, till the general finally reached the pope through the broken doors. It is singular enough, that Diana the Roman, the intimate friend of Ceracchi the democrat, who had been executed for a design on Bonaparte's life in the time of the consulate, accompanied General Radet like a robber into the pope's chamber, where they found him dressed in full pontificals. The general once again submitted Napoleon's offer, but as it was known that this would be rejected, his carriage stood ready at the gate. The pope was then separated from Cardinal Pacca, driven to the outside of the Porta del Popolo, and transferred to another carriage with post-horses, which was ready to receive him. Radet mounted the box, and, as early as the 8th of July, the pope reached the Carthusian convent in Florence. Elisa Baciocchi was at that time reigning in Florence as grand-duchess, and gratifying the importunity of her desires. Even there the aged and weakly pope was not allowed to repose, although Elisa, who belonged to the same school of piety as her favourites, Fontanes and Chateaubriand, sent to compliment him. He was speedily transferred to another carriage, and handed over from one brigade of *gendarmerie* to another. They did not even venture to convey

him by the nearest way to Genoa, through Lucca and Massa, but placed him on board a Tuscan vessel, and thus landed him in Genoa.

From Genoa his escort proceeded with him immediately to Mount Cenis; but here the aged pope became so completely exhausted by the fatigue of a rapid journey, prosecuted day and night without intermission, and during which even the postillions were threatened with being shot if they did not keep their horses at full speed, that he declared at Suza, that if they wished to take him alive over Mount Cenis, he must be allowed a night's rest. This was granted; but he was afterwards hurried on with the same haste to Grenoble, where he arrived on the 21st of July. At a later period, and on Napoleon's express command, he was further conveyed to Savona. As he remained at Savona, under the surveillance of Chabrol the prefect, being treated as a prisoner, and continually importuned, it appears to us superfluous to inquire how much or how little share Napoleon really had in the measures adopted by Radet.

END OF VOL. VII.





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